In the Matter Of Torrens Constructions Pty Ltd

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Supreme Court of South Australia

(Civil)

IN THE MATTER OF TORRENS CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD

[2023] SASC 25

Decision of Judge Bochner a Master of the Supreme Court  

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - SECURITY FOR COSTS - FACTORS RELEVANT TO EXERCISE OF DISCRETION - STIFLING OF LITIGATION

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - SECURITY FOR COSTS - FACTORS RELEVANT TO EXERCISE OF DISCRETION - JUSTICE OF CASE

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - SECURITY FOR COSTS - FACTORS RELEVANT TO EXERCISE OF DISCRETION - DELAY

Application for security for costs - pre-action steps not complied with.

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA), referred to.
Reschke v Trevor Reschke Nominees Pty Ltd; Reschke v Australian Executor Trustees Ltd [2020] SASC 60; Mathew (SA) Nominees Pty Ltd v Belconnen Automotive Pty Ltd [2019] SASC 39; ACN 006 577 162 Pty Ltd (formerly Harrop Engineering Australia Pty Ltd) as trustee for the Harrop Family Trust v Beauville Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 298; Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson [1992] FCA 110; Basetec Services Pty Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 991; Adelaide (SA Pools & Spa) Manufacturing and Installations Pty Ltd & Ors v Westcourt General Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 60; Southbank Liquor Stores Vic Pty Ltd v Ardila [2021] VSC 404; Letore Pty Ltd v Associated International Finance Pty Ltd Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, McDonald J, 28 May 1993, BC9303883; Denward Lane Pre-cast Panels Pty Ltd v Cornerstone Constructions Australia Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 144; Industrial Conveying (Aust) Pty Ltd v SKM Recycling Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 588; Coca-Cola Amatil (Victoria) Ltd v PAA Enterprises Pty Ltd [2003] VSCA 135, considered.

IN THE MATTER OF TORRENS CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD
[2023] SASC 25

CIVIL

  1. The applicant commenced this action in March 2022, alleging that the affairs of the fourth respondent, Torrens Constructions Pty Ltd (“Torrens Constructions”) had been conducted in a manner contrary to the interests of the members as a whole, or otherwise oppressive, or unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly discriminatory against the applicant. It further alleges that the first to third respondents have committed the tort of conspiracy and that Torrens Constructions has breached its contract with it. It seeks declarations, damages and an order that the first and third respondents purchase its shares in Torrens Constructions.

    Background

  2. The applicant pleads, in its revised statement of claim, that the applicant was registered by its sole director, Peter Toubia, in May 2012, to carry on the business of a construction company. It engaged principally in the renovation, repair, and maintenance of commercial and residential properties.

  3. It appears, however, that the applicant is, in fact, the trustee of the INYHWHI Trust, which carries on the business of a construction company.

  4. Between about February and June 2019, the applicant was in a contractual relationship with Torrens Constructions, to carry out renovations, maintenance and repair of…

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Details
Case
[2023] SASC 25
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court involved an application by the respondents for an order that the applicant provide security for costs. The applicant, who is a trustee company, had commenced an action against the respondents alleging breaches of contract, tortious liability, and oppressive conduct under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The legal issues before the court were whether the applicant, as a trustee company, should be ordered to provide security for costs and if so, what amount should be ordered. The respondents argued that the applicant should be ordered to provide security for costs as it was necessary in the interests of justice. The applicant contended that an order for security would stultify the action. The court considered various factors, including the applicant's status as a trustee company, the conspicuous silence of any person standing behind the applicant, and the lack of evidence of the applicant's ability to enforce its right of indemnity. The court also considered the respondents' delay in bringing the application, their disregard for the pre-action steps required by the Rules, and their refusal to engage in mediation without incurring significant costs.

The court found that the applicant's status as a trustee company, the lack of evidence of the applicant's ability to enforce its right of indemnity, and the conspicuous silence of any person standing behind the applicant supported the conclusion that an order for security should be made. On the other hand, the respondents' delay in bringing the application, their flagrant disregard for the pre-actions steps required by the Rules, and their refusal to engage in mediation without incurring significant costs led to the conclusion that an order for security should not be made. The court considered that the interests of justice demanded that an order for security should be made, albeit one that took into consideration the conduct of the respondents. The court accepted the assessment of legal costs provided by a highly respected and experienced costs specialist, who estimated that the costs incurred to the date of his report were $35,000 and the total costs likely to be incurred to the first day of trial was $112,000. The court considered that an appropriate amount for security was half of the amount estimated by the costs specialist as the costs of the matter to the first day of trial, the amount of $56,000. The court also considered that such amount should not be payable until 14 days after the mediation listed for 10 March 2023 had concluded, either by way of a settlement being reached or by way of termination by the mediator.

The court's decision was based on Rule 115.1 of the Rules, which provides that the Court may order that an applicant in an action provide security for costs if the order is necessary in the interests of justice. The court considered all relevant circumstances, including the applicant's status as a trustee company, the lack of evidence of the applicant's ability to enforce its right of indemnity, and the conspicuous silence of any person standing behind the applicant. The court also considered the respondents' delay in bringing the application, their flagrant disregard for the pre-actions steps required by the Rules, and their refusal to engage in mediation without incurring significant costs. The court concluded that an order for security was necessary in the interests of justice, albeit one that took into consideration the conduct of the respondents. The court's decision was also influenced by the well-established principle that security for costs ought not ordinarily be ordered against a natural plaintiff if that would stultify the action. In this case, the court found that an order for security would not stultify the action.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant commenced this action in March 2022, alleging that the affairs of the fourth respondent, Torrens Constructions Pty Ltd (“Torrens Constructions”) had been conducted in a manner contrary to the interests of the members as a whole, or otherwise oppressive, or unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly discriminatory against the applicant. It further alleges that the first to third respondents have committed the tort of conspiracy and that Torrens Constructions has breached its contract with it. It seeks declarations, damages and an order that the first and third respondents purchase its shares in Torrens Constructions.Background The applicant pleads, in its revised statement of claim, that the applicant was registered by its sole director, Peter Toubia, in May 2012, to carry on the business of a construction company. It engaged principally in the renovation, repair, and maintenance of commercial and residential properties. It appears, however, that the applicant is, in fact, the trustee of the INYHWHI Trust, which carries on the business of a construction company. Between about February and June 2019, the applicant was in a contractual relationship with Torrens Constructions, to carry out renovations, maintenance and repair of commercial and residential properties. From 1 July 2019, the applicant operated as consultant to Torrens Constructions. The first respondent, Chao Dong, was a director of Torrens Constructions from 29 January 2019 to 20 April 2021. The second respondent, Yue Hong Zhao, is the sole director of the third respondent, and since 20 April 2021, she has been the sole director of Torrens Constructions. She is married to Mr Dong. Torrens Constructions was registered on 29 January 2019. Its registration came about as a result of an agreement reached between Mr Toubia and Mr Dong in late 2018 to go into business together to carry out renovations, maintenance and repairs to and construction of commercial and residential properties. They agreed that a new company (Torrens Constructions) would be formed and Mr Toubia would bring in the existing clients and business of the applicant, while Mr Dong would refer new work to the company, including the introduction of significant projects. At registration, Torrens Constructions had two directors, Mr Dong and Mr Toubia. The applicant held 49% of the fully paid up shares of Torrens Construction and Mr Dong and Ms Zhao jointly held the remaining 51%. At this time, the paid up capital of Torrens Constructions was $2000. Torrens Constructions commenced business in January 2019. The applicant says that it was agreed that the applicant would work as a contractor to Torrens Constructions and would invoice Torrens Constructions for the work that it carried out. The applicant and Mr Dong would share the profits of the company in accordance with their respective shareholdings. The business of Torrens Constructions carried on in accordance with this initial arrangement until 30 June 2019. Effective 1 July 2019, it was agreed that the applicant would become a consultant to Torrens Constructions, and in return for providing consulting services, it would receive a fee of $150,000 per year as well as reimbursement of expenses.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Since this question was raised by the applicant, further affidavit material has been filed by Mr Dong, in which he deposes that the first to third respondents are personally meeting their legal costs. I have no basis for doubting the veracity of this deposition.Conclusion The respondents’ delay in bringing this application until after significant costs have been incurred by both parties, and their flagrant disregard for the pre‑actions steps required by the Rules lead to the conclusion that an order for security for costs should not be made. On the other hand, the applicant’s status as a trustee company, the conspicuous silence of any person standing behind the applicant coming forward to provide an undertaking to meet an adverse costs order and no evidence of the applicant’s ability to enforce its right of indemnity support the conclusion that an order for security should be made. I consider that the interests of justice demand that an order for security should be made, albeit one which takes into consideration the conduct of the respondents. I note that, other than in respect of a number of discrete issues, the applicant does not take issue with the assessment of legal costs provided by Mr Ericson. I accept that Mr Ericson is a highly respected and experienced costs specialist. Mr Ericson has estimated that the costs incurred to the date of his report, 13 September 2022, on a party/party basis are $35,000. He has estimated that the total costs likely to be incurred to the first day of trial is $112,000. This is the amount sought by the respondents. I note that at the time that Mr Ericson was instructed to prepare his report, the parties had not yet made discovery. This has now occurred. The respondents’ refusal to take part in a pre-action meeting before the applicant complied with their onerous demands, and their subsequent refusal to engage in mediation without incurring very significant costs are matters that deserve sanction. These actions are contrary, not only to the objects of the pre‑action steps, but to the object of the Rules set out in r 1.5 and to the overarching obligations of parties and lawyers, set out in r 3.1. These are matters that I am entitled to take into consideration pursuant to r 61.16. In doing so, I have reached the conclusion that, while the respondents are entitled to an order for security, they are not entitled to an order that would provide security for costs incurred prematurely or unreasonably and as a result of their breaches of Rule 3.1 and the rules relating to pre-action steps, and their disregard for the provisions of r 1.5 and r 61.1. I consider that an appropriate amount for security is half of the amount estimated by Mr Ericson as the costs of the matter to the first day of trial, the amount of $56,000. As the respondents declined to take part in a pre-action meeting without imposing unreasonable demands on the applicant, I also consider that such amount should not be payable until 14 days after the mediation listed for 10 March 2023 has concluded, either by way of a settlement being reached or by way of termination by the mediator.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to the applicant’s divesting itself of its only asset, Mr Toubia’s family home, it provided a letter from its accountant, Mr Romeo of Ashmans Accounting, wherein Mr Romeo said that it had been his “long-standing recommendation” that the property should be removed from the trust.[6][6] FDN 50, PT-75.Consideration Rule 115.1(1) of the Rules provides:115.1—Security for costs(1) The Court may order that an applicant in an action provide security for costs if—(a) the applicant is bringing the claim or application for someone else’s benefit;(b) the applicant is ordinarily resident outside Australia;(c) there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the action has been brought for an ulterior purpose; (d) the order is authorised by statute; or(e) the order is necessary in the interests of justice.Note—Section 1335 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), section 19 of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) and section 15 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act2010 (Cth) empower the Court to order security for costs in defined circumstances. The respondents rely on r 115.1(a), (d) and (e). The statute relied on pursuant to (d) is the Act. In Reschke, Blue J summarised the principles to be applied in application for security under the Rules in the following way:Paragraph (e) of subrule 194(1) is expressed in different terms to the specific paragraphs (a) to (d). Paragraphs (a) to (d) clearly import a two-stage test: first, has the defendant established the prerequisite contained in the relevant paragraph (for example that the plaintiff is ordinarily resident outside Australia in the case of paragraph (a)); secondly, should the Court exercise a discretion to make a security order in all of the relevant circumstances. By contrast, paragraph (e) only applies when the Court is satisfied that a security order is necessary in the interests of justice. Before the Court can so conclude, it must take into account all relevant circumstances. If the Court concludes that a security order is necessary in the interests of justice, there is no room for the exercise of a residual discretion. Accordingly, in the case of paragraph (e), the test involves only a single stage. In this respect, I agree with the following observations by Hinton J in Strazdins v ANZ Banking Group Ltd: If the Court arrives at the conclusion that an order is necessary in the interests of justice, what discretion is there then to be exercised? All factors relevant to the question of the order being necessary in the interests of justice will have been considered. If the order is necessary, it is necessary. I cannot think of a circumstance where a court, having arrived at a conclusion that an order for security for costs is necessary in the interests of justice, would then decline to make the order. What additional factor not considered as part of determining whether the jurisdictional fact is established would subsequently be considered and, potentially, justify a conclusion that no order be made? Absent any additional factor, the answer arrived at in determining whether the jurisdictional fact was satisfied must be decisive of the exercise of the discretion.It is well-established that security for costs ought not ordinarily be ordered against a natural plaintiff if that would stultify the action. Thus, in Pearson v Naydler Megarry V-C said:The basic rule that a natural person who sues will not be ordered to give security for costs however poor he is, is ancient and well-established. As Bowen LJ said in Cowell v Taylor, both at law and in equity ‘the general rule is that poverty is no bar to a litigant’. The power to require security for costs ought not to be used so as to bar even the poorest man from the courts.In this respect, the position is different as between a natural person and a corporation. In the case of a corporation, stultification of the action if security is ordered is an important factor against ordering security but it is not decisive. In the case of a natural person (absent special circumstances such as the person being resident out of Australia), stultification of the action will preclude an order for security.It is well-established that the onus of proving that a security order will stultify an action lies on the plaintiff. On the other hand, the onus of establishing the pre-requisite under paragraphs (a), (b), (c) or (d) of subrule 194(1) lies on the defendant.In conclusion, if the plaintiff, on being unsuccessful in the action, will not have sufficient resources to meet an order for costs and an order for security will not stultify the action, it may be (depending on all of the relevant circumstances) that it will be necessary in the interests of justice to order that the plaintiff provide security for costs.[7](citations omitted)[7] Supra, [43]-[47].