Supreme Court of South Australia
(Civil)
IN THE MATTER OF TORRENS CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD
[2023] SASC 25
Decision of Judge Bochner a Master of the Supreme Court
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - SECURITY FOR COSTS - FACTORS RELEVANT TO EXERCISE OF DISCRETION - STIFLING OF LITIGATION
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - SECURITY FOR COSTS - FACTORS RELEVANT TO EXERCISE OF DISCRETION - JUSTICE OF CASE
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - SECURITY FOR COSTS - FACTORS RELEVANT TO EXERCISE OF DISCRETION - DELAY
Application for security for costs - pre-action steps not complied with.
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA), referred to.
Reschke v Trevor Reschke Nominees Pty Ltd; Reschke v Australian Executor Trustees Ltd [2020] SASC 60; Mathew (SA) Nominees Pty Ltd v Belconnen Automotive Pty Ltd [2019] SASC 39; ACN 006 577 162 Pty Ltd (formerly Harrop Engineering Australia Pty Ltd) as trustee for the Harrop Family Trust v Beauville Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 298; Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson [1992] FCA 110; Basetec Services Pty Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 991; Adelaide (SA Pools & Spa) Manufacturing and Installations Pty Ltd & Ors v Westcourt General Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 60; Southbank Liquor Stores Vic Pty Ltd v Ardila [2021] VSC 404; Letore Pty Ltd v Associated International Finance Pty Ltd Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, McDonald J, 28 May 1993, BC9303883; Denward Lane Pre-cast Panels Pty Ltd v Cornerstone Constructions Australia Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 144; Industrial Conveying (Aust) Pty Ltd v SKM Recycling Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 588; Coca-Cola Amatil (Victoria) Ltd v PAA Enterprises Pty Ltd [2003] VSCA 135, considered.
IN THE MATTER OF TORRENS CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD
[2023] SASC 25CIVIL
The applicant commenced this action in March 2022, alleging that the affairs of the fourth respondent, Torrens Constructions Pty Ltd (“Torrens Constructions”) had been conducted in a manner contrary to the interests of the members as a whole, or otherwise oppressive, or unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly discriminatory against the applicant. It further alleges that the first to third respondents have committed the tort of conspiracy and that Torrens Constructions has breached its contract with it. It seeks declarations, damages and an order that the first and third respondents purchase its shares in Torrens Constructions.
Background
The applicant pleads, in its revised statement of claim, that the applicant was registered by its sole director, Peter Toubia, in May 2012, to carry on the business of a construction company. It engaged principally in the renovation, repair, and maintenance of commercial and residential properties.
It appears, however, that the applicant is, in fact, the trustee of the INYHWHI Trust, which carries on the business of a construction company.
Between about February and June 2019, the applicant was in a contractual relationship with Torrens Constructions, to carry out renovations, maintenance and repair of…
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- Case
- [2023] SASC 25
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the applicant's status as a trustee company, the lack of evidence of the applicant's ability to enforce its right of indemnity, and the conspicuous silence of any person standing behind the applicant supported the conclusion that an order for security should be made. On the other hand, the respondents' delay in bringing the application, their flagrant disregard for the pre-actions steps required by the Rules, and their refusal to engage in mediation without incurring significant costs led to the conclusion that an order for security should not be made. The court considered that the interests of justice demanded that an order for security should be made, albeit one that took into consideration the conduct of the respondents. The court accepted the assessment of legal costs provided by a highly respected and experienced costs specialist, who estimated that the costs incurred to the date of his report were $35,000 and the total costs likely to be incurred to the first day of trial was $112,000. The court considered that an appropriate amount for security was half of the amount estimated by the costs specialist as the costs of the matter to the first day of trial, the amount of $56,000. The court also considered that such amount should not be payable until 14 days after the mediation listed for 10 March 2023 had concluded, either by way of a settlement being reached or by way of termination by the mediator.
The court's decision was based on Rule 115.1 of the Rules, which provides that the Court may order that an applicant in an action provide security for costs if the order is necessary in the interests of justice. The court considered all relevant circumstances, including the applicant's status as a trustee company, the lack of evidence of the applicant's ability to enforce its right of indemnity, and the conspicuous silence of any person standing behind the applicant. The court also considered the respondents' delay in bringing the application, their flagrant disregard for the pre-actions steps required by the Rules, and their refusal to engage in mediation without incurring significant costs. The court concluded that an order for security was necessary in the interests of justice, albeit one that took into consideration the conduct of the respondents. The court's decision was also influenced by the well-established principle that security for costs ought not ordinarily be ordered against a natural plaintiff if that would stultify the action. In this case, the court found that an order for security would not stultify the action.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As to the applicant’s divesting itself of its only asset, Mr Toubia’s family home, it provided a letter from its accountant, Mr Romeo of Ashmans Accounting, wherein Mr Romeo said that it had been his “long-standing recommendation” that the property should be removed from the trust.[6][6] FDN 50, PT-75.Consideration Rule 115.1(1) of the Rules provides:115.1—Security for costs(1) The Court may order that an applicant in an action provide security for costs if—(a) the applicant is bringing the claim or application for someone else’s benefit;(b) the applicant is ordinarily resident outside Australia;(c) there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the action has been brought for an ulterior purpose; (d) the order is authorised by statute; or(e) the order is necessary in the interests of justice.Note—Section 1335 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), section 19 of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) and section 15 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act2010 (Cth) empower the Court to order security for costs in defined circumstances. The respondents rely on r 115.1(a), (d) and (e). The statute relied on pursuant to (d) is the Act. In Reschke, Blue J summarised the principles to be applied in application for security under the Rules in the following way:Paragraph (e) of subrule 194(1) is expressed in different terms to the specific paragraphs (a) to (d). Paragraphs (a) to (d) clearly import a two-stage test: first, has the defendant established the prerequisite contained in the relevant paragraph (for example that the plaintiff is ordinarily resident outside Australia in the case of paragraph (a)); secondly, should the Court exercise a discretion to make a security order in all of the relevant circumstances. By contrast, paragraph (e) only applies when the Court is satisfied that a security order is necessary in the interests of justice. Before the Court can so conclude, it must take into account all relevant circumstances. If the Court concludes that a security order is necessary in the interests of justice, there is no room for the exercise of a residual discretion. Accordingly, in the case of paragraph (e), the test involves only a single stage. In this respect, I agree with the following observations by Hinton J in Strazdins v ANZ Banking Group Ltd: If the Court arrives at the conclusion that an order is necessary in the interests of justice, what discretion is there then to be exercised? All factors relevant to the question of the order being necessary in the interests of justice will have been considered. If the order is necessary, it is necessary. I cannot think of a circumstance where a court, having arrived at a conclusion that an order for security for costs is necessary in the interests of justice, would then decline to make the order. What additional factor not considered as part of determining whether the jurisdictional fact is established would subsequently be considered and, potentially, justify a conclusion that no order be made? Absent any additional factor, the answer arrived at in determining whether the jurisdictional fact was satisfied must be decisive of the exercise of the discretion.It is well-established that security for costs ought not ordinarily be ordered against a natural plaintiff if that would stultify the action. Thus, in Pearson v Naydler Megarry V-C said:The basic rule that a natural person who sues will not be ordered to give security for costs however poor he is, is ancient and well-established. As Bowen LJ said in Cowell v Taylor, both at law and in equity ‘the general rule is that poverty is no bar to a litigant’. The power to require security for costs ought not to be used so as to bar even the poorest man from the courts.In this respect, the position is different as between a natural person and a corporation. In the case of a corporation, stultification of the action if security is ordered is an important factor against ordering security but it is not decisive. In the case of a natural person (absent special circumstances such as the person being resident out of Australia), stultification of the action will preclude an order for security.It is well-established that the onus of proving that a security order will stultify an action lies on the plaintiff. On the other hand, the onus of establishing the pre-requisite under paragraphs (a), (b), (c) or (d) of subrule 194(1) lies on the defendant.In conclusion, if the plaintiff, on being unsuccessful in the action, will not have sufficient resources to meet an order for costs and an order for security will not stultify the action, it may be (depending on all of the relevant circumstances) that it will be necessary in the interests of justice to order that the plaintiff provide security for costs.[7](citations omitted)[7] Supra, [43]-[47].