SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application)
IN THE MATTER OF TORRENS CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD
[2024] SASC 136
Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice Kimber
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - SECURITY FOR COSTS - PROCEDURE
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - SECURITY FOR COSTS - FACTORS RELEVANT TO EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
The applicant brings a claim in various statutory and common law causes of action against the respondents following the breakdown of a business relationship between the respective directors of the applicant and fourth respondent.
There are two applications by the first to third respondents; first, an application for security for costs from and including the second day of trial (FDN 113); and second, an application for costs with respect to an interlocutory application by the applicant which was withdrawn (FDN 116).
With respect to the application for security for costs, the respondents submit that, on the basis of a 15-day trial, the appropriate amount of any security is the sum of $118,700.00. The applicant did not dispute that an order for security should be made, but submits that it should be an amount that it has offered namely $70,00.00. The applicant disputes the respondents’ estimated length of the trial. Further, the applicant submits that the approach of the respondents to the proceedings should result in a lesser sum than would otherwise be ordered.
As to the costs of the withdrawn application, the respondents seek an order for costs on an indemnity basis. The respondents submit, inter alia, that the application had no chance of success and was filed at a late stage in the proceedings.
Held, with respect to the application for security for costs:
1.A trial length of 12 days should be used for the application of the respondents, which includes the first day of the trial. In the circumstances, the conduct of respondents during the proceedings relied upon by the applicants is not such to warrant sanction. Security for costs is granted from the second day of trial in the amount of $85,580.00 in favour of the respondents.
with respect to the application for costs following the withdrawal of FDN 116:
2.The respondents are entitled to their costs with respect to FDN 116 on a party-to‑party basis, to be agreed or taxed.
Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) S 115.1; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) SS 181(1), 181(2), 223; Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) S 20, referred to.
Reschke v Trevor Reschke Nominees Pty Ltd; Reshcke v Australian Executor Trustees [2020] SASC 60, applied.
Re Torrens Constructions Pty Ltd [2023] SASC 25; In the Matter of Torrens Constructions Pty Ltd (No 2) (Supreme Court of South Australia, Bochner J, 6 March 2023), considered.
IN THE MATTER OF TORRENS CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD
[2024] SASC 136
Civil: Application
KIMBER J:
These are applications by the first, second and third respondents (the respondents) for security for costs from and including the second day of the trial in this…
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- Case
- [2024] SASC 136
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was the amount of security for costs that the applicant should be required to pay and the duration of the trial. The court examined the submissions of both parties and considered the nature of the claims and the complexity of the issues involved. The court also took into account the findings from previous judgments and the conduct of the parties during the litigation process.
In its reasoning, the court rejected the submissions of the respondents that certain past conduct should influence the current order for security for costs. The court found that the past conduct, while relevant to the overall litigation process, did not warrant a different outcome in this particular application. The court also considered the applicant's submissions regarding the duration of the trial and the number of trial days, taking into account the complexity of the claims and the amount of evidence expected. After careful consideration, the court determined that the appropriate amount of security for costs should be $85,580.00, payable from the second day of the trial, and that the trial would likely take approximately 10 days.
The final orders of the court included the requirement for the applicant to pay security for costs in the specified amount and the rejection of the respondents' costs of the application. The court's decision reflects a balanced approach, taking into account the submissions of both parties and the nature of the claims and evidence involved.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As set out above, the applicant does not oppose the making of an order for security for costs from the second day of the trial. The applicant submits that the order should not exceed that which has been offered, namely $70,700.00. The applicant also does not relevantly dispute what is set out in the report of Mr Ericson, nor does it dispute that an appropriate order should take into account the attendance of Mr Morris at trial. The disputes relate to two matters. First, the number of trial days. The applicant submits that the trial will take no more than 10 days, likely less. Second, in exercising my discretion, the applicant submits that regard should be had to what it submits are relevant aspects of the approach of the respondents to the litigation. The duration of the trial It is anticipated that there may be five witnesses at trial. There may be three lay witnesses; Mr Toubia, Mr Dong, and Ms Zhao. That said, the respondents submit that the involvement of Ms Zhao may be limited. There will be two experts, Mr McFarlane and Mr Morris. Nevertheless, the respondents submit that a trial estimate of 15 days is appropriate given what it says are complex issues of fact and law. The respondents submit that the applicant has brought claims which include: a claim for an order under s 233 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (for convenience, the ‘oppression claim’); breaches of s 181(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); breaches of s 182(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); breaches of s 20 of the Australian Consumer Law; breach of contract; and in the tort of conspiracy. The respondents submit that the applicant’s opening may take a day; that together the evidence of the three lay witnesses may take about six–eight days; that together the experts may take about two days; and that closing addresses may take more than two days. The applicant submits that the trial will not take longer than 10 days. The applicant does not dispute the respondents’ summary of the nature of the claims advanced. Nevertheless, the applicant submits that its opening will take less than a day (perhaps half or two‑thirds of a day); submits that the evidence‑in‑chief of Mr Toubia and its expert should not take more than a day in total; and submits that the balance of the evidence should not take nearly as long as estimated by the respondent. In some respects, it is difficult to estimate the length of the trial with any great confidence given the different positions of the parties. A starting point is that both parties should be expected to be faithful to the obligations in UCR 3.1, including to cooperate with the other parties; to use reasonable endeavours to ensure that the time incurred is proportionate to the importance and value of the subject matter of the proceeding; and to use reasonable endeavours to minimise delay. Certainly, many issues are raised and there appear to be substantial matters which are in dispute, particularly with respect to the evidence of the lay witnesses. There are multiple causes of action alleged against multiple respondents. The claims against each respondent differ and somewhat different defences will be mounted by each. It appears that the matter has been hard fought to date. There is no criticism in my observation that the applicant is pursuing his claims with some vigour. That may be expected to continue at trial and may be reflected in the way the trial is conducted by the applicant. There is also no criticism in my observation that the conduct of the proceedings to date has left me with the clear impression that the respondents are also defending the matter with some vigour and that few, if any, concessions have been made. There are differences in the opinions of the experts, but there appear to be matters not in dispute. The experienced counsel involved should be expected to deal with examination‑in‑chief and cross‑examination of the experts in a way which is efficient and does not unnecessarily traverse matters not in dispute. I have raised with the parties the appropriateness of the preparation of a joint report. While no order has yet been made, neither party submitted a joint report would not be appropriate. While difficult to be precise, it seems unlikely that each expert would need to give evidence for any more than one day given the issues that may be in dispute.