In the Matter of Torrens Constructions Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

IN THE MATTER OF TORRENS CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD

[2024] SASC 136

Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice Kimber  

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - SECURITY FOR COSTS - PROCEDURE

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - SECURITY FOR COSTS - FACTORS RELEVANT TO EXERCISE OF DISCRETION

The applicant brings a claim in various statutory and common law causes of action against the respondents following the breakdown of a business relationship between the respective directors of the applicant and fourth respondent.  

There are two applications by the first to third respondents; first, an application for security for costs from and including the second day of trial (FDN 113); and second, an application for costs with respect to an interlocutory application by the applicant which was withdrawn (FDN 116).

With respect to the application for security for costs, the respondents submit that, on the basis of a 15-day trial, the appropriate amount of any security is the sum of $118,700.00.  The applicant did not dispute that an order for security should be made, but submits that it should be an amount that it has offered namely $70,00.00.  The applicant disputes the respondents’ estimated length of the trial.  Further, the applicant submits that the approach of the respondents to the proceedings should result in a lesser sum than would otherwise be ordered. 

As to the costs of the withdrawn application, the respondents seek an order for costs on an indemnity basis.  The respondents submit, inter alia, that the application had no chance of success and was filed at a late stage in the proceedings.  

Held, with respect to the application for security for costs:

1.A trial length of 12 days should be used for the application of the respondents, which includes the first day of the trial. In the circumstances, the conduct of respondents during the proceedings relied upon by the applicants is not such to warrant sanction. Security for costs is granted from the second day of trial in the amount of $85,580.00 in favour of the respondents.

with respect to the application for costs following the withdrawal of FDN 116:

2.The respondents are entitled to their costs with respect to FDN 116 on a party-to‑party basis, to be agreed or taxed.

Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) S 115.1; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) SS 181(1), 181(2), 223; Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) S 20, referred to.

Reschke v Trevor Reschke Nominees Pty Ltd; Reshcke v Australian Executor Trustees [2020] SASC 60, applied.

Re Torrens Constructions Pty Ltd [2023] SASC 25; In the Matter of Torrens Constructions Pty Ltd (No 2) (Supreme Court of South Australia, Bochner J, 6 March 2023), considered.

IN THE MATTER OF TORRENS CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD

[2024] SASC 136

Civil: Application

KIMBER J:

  1. These are applications by the first, second and third respondents (the respondents) for security for costs from and including the second day of the trial in this…

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Details
Case
[2024] SASC 136
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Torrens Constructions Pty Ltd involves the applicant, who commenced an action against several respondents, alleging oppressive conduct and other breaches. The matter has progressed through various stages, including an application for security for costs and an application for further and better discovery. The court, in the application before it, considered the submissions of the parties regarding the appropriate amount of security for costs and the duration of the trial.

The primary legal issue was the amount of security for costs that the applicant should be required to pay and the duration of the trial. The court examined the submissions of both parties and considered the nature of the claims and the complexity of the issues involved. The court also took into account the findings from previous judgments and the conduct of the parties during the litigation process.

In its reasoning, the court rejected the submissions of the respondents that certain past conduct should influence the current order for security for costs. The court found that the past conduct, while relevant to the overall litigation process, did not warrant a different outcome in this particular application. The court also considered the applicant's submissions regarding the duration of the trial and the number of trial days, taking into account the complexity of the claims and the amount of evidence expected. After careful consideration, the court determined that the appropriate amount of security for costs should be $85,580.00, payable from the second day of the trial, and that the trial would likely take approximately 10 days.

The final orders of the court included the requirement for the applicant to pay security for costs in the specified amount and the rejection of the respondents' costs of the application. The court's decision reflects a balanced approach, taking into account the submissions of both parties and the nature of the claims and evidence involved.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

With respect to FDN 113, I order that the applicant pay security for costs from the second day of the trial and in the amount of $85,580.00. With respect to FDN 116, I order that the applicant pay the respondents’ costs of that application on a party-to-party basis, to be agreed or taxed. My reasons follow. Background Given that the applicant accepts that some costs order should be made in relation to the trial, and as the applicant did not submit that the summary of the proceedings set out in Re Torrens Constructions Pty Ltd [2023] SASC 25 (the first judgment), was inaccurate in any relevant way, I respectfully, and gratefully, adopt that summary. The applicant commenced this action in March 2022, alleging that the affairs of the fourth respondent, Torrens Constructions Pty Ltd (Torrens Constructions), had been conducted in a manner contrary to the interests of the members as a whole, or otherwise oppressive, or unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly discriminatory against the applicant. The applicant further alleges that the respondents have committed the tort of conspiracy, and that Torrens Constructions has breached its contract with it. The applicant seeks declarations, damages and an order that the respondents purchase its shares in Torrens Constructions. The applicant pleads, in its revised statement of claim, that the applicant was registered by its sole director, Mr Peter Toubia, in May 2012, to carry on the business of a construction company. It engaged principally in the renovation, repair, and maintenance of commercial and residential properties. It appears, however, that the applicant is, in fact, the trustee of the INYHWHI Trust, which carries on the business of a construction company. Between about February and June 2019, the applicant was in a contractual relationship with Torrens Constructions, to carry out renovations, maintenance and repair of commercial and residential properties. From 1 July 2019, the applicant operated as consultant to Torrens Constructions. The first respondent, Mr Chao Dong, was a director of Torrens Constructions from 29 January 2019 to 20 April 2021. The second respondent, Ms Yue Hong Zhao, is the sole director of the third respondent (the Dong Family Company Pty Ltd), and since 20 April 2021, she has been the sole director of Torrens Constructions. She is married to Mr Dong. Torrens Constructions was registered on 29 January 2019. Its registration came about because of an agreement reached between Mr Toubia and Mr Dong in late 2018 to go into business together to carry out renovations, maintenance and repairs to, and construction of, commercial and residential properties. They agreed that a new company (Torrens Constructions) would be formed, and Mr Toubia would bring in the existing clients and business of the applicant, while Mr Dong would refer new work to the company, including the introduction of significant projects. At registration, Torrens Constructions had two directors, Mr Dong and Mr Toubia. The applicant held 49 per cent of the fully paid-up shares of Torrens Construction and Mr Dong and Ms Zhao jointly held the remaining 51 per cent. At this time, the paid-up capital of Torrens Constructions was $2,000.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In the application before me, the respondents advanced submissions which reflected a lack of acceptance of the correctness of the above findings of the Judge. Putting that aside, the respondents do not accept that the order I am asked to make should consider any of the conduct, the subject of discussion in the first judgment. Contrary to the position of the applicant, the respondents submit the relevant conduct is ‘spent’ and not relevant to the current application. The second judgment The second judgment relates to an application for further and better discovery from the respondents. There were 18 categories of documents, but nine of those were not pursued, and one was limited in its scope. With respect to the majority of the balance, orders were made contrary to the submissions of the respondents. In the application before me, the applicant directs attention to criticisms within the second judgment of the approach of counsel for the respondents to the application for further and better discovery. That is, an aspect of the approach of the respondents was held to be ‘most unhelpful’ and contrary to the objects of, and certain obligations, within the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) (‘the Rules’). It was held that time which could have been saved had not been and that the ‘conduct of the respondents in [the application do not] accord with the standards of modern litigation’.[2] [2] In the Matter of Torrens Constructions Pty Ltd (No 2) (Supreme Court of South Australia, Bochner J, 6 March 2023) [39]. Other aspects of the approach of the respondents The applicant also directed my attention to matters not the subject of any finding in either the first or second judgment. Specifically, the offer of security for costs in the amount of $70,700 having been made, what the applicant submits has been a failure by the respondents to negotiate with respect to that offer; the approach taken to a request for certain documents pursuant to s 198F(2) of the Corporations Act; and the approach of the respondents when challenged by the applicant as to whether a conflict arose that might have prohibited the solicitor for the respondents acting in these proceedings. Consideration In so far as it was submitted by the respondents that I should doubt any finding in the first judgment, that submission must be rejected. It is not open to me to question the approach in the first judgment. In any event, I am not satisfied that the relevant findings should be taken into account by me. The conduct found to be unreasonable and premature occurred some time ago and are related to pre‑trial steps and mediation. As for the second judgment, that is also conduct that occurred some time ago and I am also not satisfied it should impact the order I am asked to make. As to those other aspects of the approach of the respondent, even assuming, without deciding, that the failure to negotiate differently with respect to costs and the approach taken to documents sought pursuant to the Corporations Act should be regarded as reflecting an approach that might be contrary to the overarching obligations within UCR 3.1(f), I would not regard those matters as sufficient to warrant any sanction being reflected in the outcome of this application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As set out above, the applicant does not oppose the making of an order for security for costs from the second day of the trial. The applicant submits that the order should not exceed that which has been offered, namely $70,700.00. The applicant also does not relevantly dispute what is set out in the report of Mr Ericson, nor does it dispute that an appropriate order should take into account the attendance of Mr Morris at trial. The disputes relate to two matters. First, the number of trial days. The applicant submits that the trial will take no more than 10 days, likely less. Second, in exercising my discretion, the applicant submits that regard should be had to what it submits are relevant aspects of the approach of the respondents to the litigation. The duration of the trial It is anticipated that there may be five witnesses at trial. There may be three lay witnesses; Mr Toubia, Mr Dong, and Ms Zhao. That said, the respondents submit that the involvement of Ms Zhao may be limited. There will be two experts, Mr McFarlane and Mr Morris. Nevertheless, the respondents submit that a trial estimate of 15 days is appropriate given what it says are complex issues of fact and law. The respondents submit that the applicant has brought claims which include: a claim for an order under s 233 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (for convenience, the ‘oppression claim’); breaches of s 181(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); breaches of s 182(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); breaches of s 20 of the Australian Consumer Law; breach of contract; and in the tort of conspiracy. The respondents submit that the applicant’s opening may take a day; that together the evidence of the three lay witnesses may take about six–eight days; that together the experts may take about two days; and that closing addresses may take more than two days. The applicant submits that the trial will not take longer than 10 days. The applicant does not dispute the respondents’ summary of the nature of the claims advanced. Nevertheless, the applicant submits that its opening will take less than a day (perhaps half or two‑thirds of a day); submits that the evidence‑in‑chief of Mr Toubia and its expert should not take more than a day in total; and submits that the balance of the evidence should not take nearly as long as estimated by the respondent. In some respects, it is difficult to estimate the length of the trial with any great confidence given the different positions of the parties. A starting point is that both parties should be expected to be faithful to the obligations in UCR 3.1, including to cooperate with the other parties; to use reasonable endeavours to ensure that the time incurred is proportionate to the importance and value of the subject matter of the proceeding; and to use reasonable endeavours to minimise delay. Certainly, many issues are raised and there appear to be substantial matters which are in dispute, particularly with respect to the evidence of the lay witnesses. There are multiple causes of action alleged against multiple respondents. The claims against each respondent differ and somewhat different defences will be mounted by each. It appears that the matter has been hard fought to date. There is no criticism in my observation that the applicant is pursuing his claims with some vigour. That may be expected to continue at trial and may be reflected in the way the trial is conducted by the applicant. There is also no criticism in my observation that the conduct of the proceedings to date has left me with the clear impression that the respondents are also defending the matter with some vigour and that few, if any, concessions have been made. There are differences in the opinions of the experts, but there appear to be matters not in dispute. The experienced counsel involved should be expected to deal with examination‑in‑chief and cross‑examination of the experts in a way which is efficient and does not unnecessarily traverse matters not in dispute. I have raised with the parties the appropriateness of the preparation of a joint report. While no order has yet been made, neither party submitted a joint report would not be appropriate. While difficult to be precise, it seems unlikely that each expert would need to give evidence for any more than one day given the issues that may be in dispute.