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Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd v Clarence City Council & Anor; Australia Pacific Airports (Launceston) Pty Ltd v Northern Midlands Council & Anor

Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd v Clarence City Council & Anor; Australia Pacific Airports (Launceston) Pty Ltd v Northern Midlands Council & Anor

Case [2021] HCATrans 160 12 October 2021

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Statutory Construction

Jurisdiction

Administrative Law

Statutory Interpretation

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[2021] HCATrans 160

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Hobart No H2 of 2021

B e t w e e n -
HOBART INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT PTY LTD
Appellant
and
CLARENCE CITY COUNCIL
First Respondent
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent

Office of the Registry
Hobart No H3 of 2021

B e t w e e n -
AUSTRALIA PACIFIC AIRPORTS (LAUNCESTON) PTY LTD (ACN 081 578 903)
Appellant
and
NORTHERN MIDLANDS COUNCIL
First Respondent
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent

KIEFEL CJ
GAGELER J
KEANE J
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
STEWARD J
GLEESON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA BY VIDEO CONNECTION TO BRISBANE, SYDNEY AND MELBOURNE

ON TUESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2021, AT 10.00 AM

____________________

KIEFEL CJ: In accordance with the remote hearing protocol, I will announce the appearances of the parties.

MS K.A. STERN, SC appears with MS L.A. COLEMAN for the appellants in each case. (instructed by Corrs Chambers Westgarth, Tierney Law and King & Wood Mallesons)

MR S.B. McELWAINE, SC appears with MS K. CUTHBERTSON for the first respondents in each matter. (instructed by Shaun McElwaine + Associates)

MR S.P. DONAGHUE, QC, Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia, appears with MR C.L. LENEHAN, SC and MS K.E. FOLEY for the second respondent in each matter. (instructed by the Australian Government Solicitor)

KIEFEL CJ: Yes, Ms Stern.

MS STERN: May it please the Court. This appeal raises two key issues. The first is whether the doctrine of privy of contract is engaged in this application for declaratory relief as to the meaning and effect of the lease, given that the applicants seek only to vindicate rights under the contract, and do not rely on any separate legal entitlement or legal wrong. The second is the…..questions of whether, in this case, there is a matter, or the councils have standing, given that the councils are merely seeking to vindicate an expected benefit under a contract between others, and the contracting parties are agreed as to the proper interpretation and effect of the contract. Your Honours, at the outset we observed that success on the second of these issues is not predicated upon success on the first.

If I could take your Honours first briefly to the relevant facts and ask your Honours to go to the joint book of further materials at page 46. There, your Honours will see the details of the claim advanced in the Hobart proceedings – if I can call it that – and your Honours will note for the Launceston proceedings, relevantly identical save that there were different years involved – and that is at page 95.

What your Honours will see is that the claim in these proceedings is for declarations pursuant to section 21 of the Federal Court Act. Firstly – and your Honours will see at paragraph (a) - as to the proper construction of clause 26.2 of the lease; secondly, a declaration that the second respondent is obliged…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd v Clarence City Council...

Details

AGLC: Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd v Clarence City Council & Anor; Australia Pacific Airports (Launceston) Pty Ltd v Northern Midlands Council & Anor [2021] HCATrans 160
Case: [2021] HCATrans 160
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered appeals from decisions of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania in two separate cases. In the first, Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd (HIAL) sought to recover from Clarence City Council (CCC) and the Commissioner of State Revenue (CSR) amounts paid by HIAL under a notice of assessment for land tax. In the second, Australia Pacific Airports (Launceston) Pty Ltd (APAL) sought to recover from Northern Midlands Council (NMC) and the CSR amounts paid by APAL under a notice of assessment for land tax. The core dispute in both cases concerned whether the land owned and operated by the airport companies was exempt from land tax under s 13(1)(d) of the *Land Tax Act 2000* (Tas).

The central legal issue before the High Court was the proper construction of s 13(1)(d) of the *Land Tax Act 2000* (Tas), which provides an exemption from land tax for "land which is used or occupied by, or on behalf of, the Crown or any public authority for any public purpose". The court was required to determine whether the airport companies, as lessees of Commonwealth land, were entitled to the exemption, and if so, whether their use of the land for operating commercial airports constituted a "public purpose" within the meaning of the section. This involved considering the nature of the lessees' interest in the land and the scope of the exemption as it applied to entities that were neither the Crown nor a public authority themselves.

The High Court unanimously held that the airport companies were not entitled to the exemption under s 13(1)(d). The Court reasoned that the exemption applied only to land used or occupied by the Crown or a public authority. While the land itself was owned by the Commonwealth, the lessees, HIAL and APAL, were private entities and not public authorities. Furthermore, the Court found that the operation of commercial airports, even though serving a public function, did not constitute a "public purpose" in the context of the statutory exemption, which was intended to apply to the direct use by the Crown or public authorities for their statutory functions. The appeals were dismissed.

Orders