HFM045 v The Republic of Nauru

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BELL, KEANE AND NETTLE JJ

HFM045  APPELLANT

AND

THE REPUBLIC OF NAURU  RESPONDENT

HFM045 v The Republic of Nauru

[2017] HCA 50

15 November 2017

M27/2017

ORDER

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside the order of the Supreme Court of Nauru made on 22 February 2017, and in its place order that:

(i)the appeal be allowed;

(ii)the decision of the Refugee Status Review Tribunal made on 16 January 2015 be set aside;

(iii)the matter be remitted to the Refugee Status Review Tribunal for determination according to law; and

(iv)the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the proceedings before the Supreme Court of Nauru and of the proceedings to date before the Refugee Status Review Tribunal.

3.The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Nauru

Representation

P J Hanks QC with R Chaile for the appellant (instructed by Holding Redlich)

G R Kennett SC with R C Knowles for the respondent (instructed by Republic of Nauru)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

Migration – Refugees – Appeal from Supreme Court of Nauru – Procedural fairness – Where Refugee Status Review Tribunal must act according to principles of natural justice – Where Refugee Status Review Tribunal did not provide appellant with notice of adverse country information relevant to Tribunal's determination on which it ultimately relied – Whether failure by Tribunal to put substance of information to appellant constituted breach of requirements of procedural fairness.

Words and phrases – "complementary protection", "natural justice", "procedural fairness".

Appeals Act 1972 (Nr), s 44.
Nauru (High Court Appeals) Act 1976 (Cth), s 5, Schedule, Art 1.
Refugees Convention Act 2012 (Nr), ss 37, 40(1).
Refugees Convention (Derivative Status & Other Measures) (Amendment) Act 2016 (Nr), s 24.
Refugees Convention (Amendment) Act 2017 (Nr), s 4.
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1967).

  1. BELL, KEANE AND NETTLE JJ.   The appellant is a Nepalese citizen.  He has spent most of his life in the Jhapa district of Nepal.  He is a member of the Chhetri caste.  In May 2013, the appellant left Nepal and arranged through a people smuggler to travel to Australia.  He arrived at Christmas Island in September 2013.  In early November 2013, he was transferred from Christmas Island to Nauru under the regional processing arrangement between Australia and Nauru. 

  2. On 29 January 2014, the appellant applied for a refugee status determination.  He claimed to fear persecution in Nepal from Maoists on account of his political opinion.  He also claimed to fear persecution from Mongols (members of the Limbu tribe in particular) in his home district of Jhapa on account of his membership of the Chhetri caste.  

  3. The Secretary of the Department of Justice and Border Control ("the Secretary") determined that the appellant is not a refugee,…

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Details
Case
[2017] HCA 50
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a refugee status determination made by the Refugee Status Review Tribunal of Nauru. The appellant, HFM045, sought to challenge the Tribunal's decision, which had affirmed a prior determination that he was not owed refugee status or complementary protection. The matter came before the High Court of Australia on appeal from the Supreme Court of Nauru.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Refugee Status Review Tribunal had breached its obligation to afford procedural fairness to the appellant. Specifically, the court had to determine if the Tribunal's failure to provide the appellant with notice of adverse country information, upon which it ultimately relied in its decision, constituted a breach of the principles of natural justice.

The High Court reasoned that the Tribunal was bound by the common law to provide procedural fairness, which included affording the appellant the opportunity to ascertain the relevant issues and comment on any adverse information that was credible, relevant, and significant. The court found that the Tribunal had failed to discharge this obligation by not putting the substance of the adverse country information to the appellant. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the order of the Supreme Court of Nauru was set aside, and the decision of the Refugee Status Review Tribunal was quashed. The matter was remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law, and the respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside the order of the Supreme Court of Nauru made on 22 February 2017, and in its place order that:

(i) the appeal be allowed;

(ii) the decision of the Refugee Status Review Tribunal made on 16 January 2015 be set aside;

(iii) the matter be remitted to the Refugee Status Review Tribunal for determination according to law; and

(iv) the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the proceedings before the Supreme Court of Nauru and of the proceedings to date before the Refugee Status Review Tribunal.

3. The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

BELL, KEANE AND NETTLE JJ
In his statement the appellant said that he had fled from Nepal because he feared that "I will be captured and killed by the Maoist rebels and the Maoist ruling party". He stated his opposition to the communist ideals of the Maoist party and referred to his political profile as the President of the local committee of the Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal ("the RPP(N)") from 2008 to May 2013. He said the Maoist party was violently opposed to the activities of the RPP(N) because of the latter's "pro-royalist views and objective to return Nepal to a Hindu State". He described Mongols as having attempted to eliminate the Chhetris in his home district of Jhapa. He claimed to have been physically assaulted in 2012 by Mongols and to have had the source of his subsistence (his cattle, buffalo and goats) stolen by them. He said that he had been unable to seek the assistance of the police because of his membership of the RPP(N) and because the police "are controlled by the Maoist Party". The appellant clarified in the course of a later interview that he had been President of the local committee of the RPP(N) for about 10 or 11 months in 2008. Thereafter he was no longer an officeholder but he continued to be a RPP(N) supporter. The Secretary's decision The Secretary found that there are two distinct racial groups in Nepal: Mongols, who make up 80 per cent of the population, and members of Hindu castes, including Chhetris, who make up the remaining 20 per cent. The Secretary noted country information that in November 2006 a comprehensive peace agreement was signed between the Nepalese Government and the Maoists, formally ending a 10 year Maoist insurgency. The Secretary was satisfied that following the agreement the Maoists had joined the political mainstream in Nepal. The Secretary noted country information that "after decades of turmoil 'Nepal remained completely free of insurgency-related violence through 2013'". The Secretary accepted that the appellant is a member of the Chhetri caste and a supporter of the RPP(N). The Secretary was dubious of the appellant's claim to have a political profile of a kind that had caused him to be harassed by Maoists to the extent that he claimed. He considered that country information did not support the appellant's claim to have suffered harm on account of being a Chhetri. The Secretary was not satisfied that the appellant would be singled out for extortion by Maoists on his return to Nepal and, in the event he was subject to extortion demands, he considered there was no reason to find that the appellant would be denied State protection. The Secretary concluded that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution, nor was there a reasonable possibility that the appellant would face harm in Nepal such as to put Nauru in breach of its international obligations were he to be returned to that country. The Tribunal's determination Under s 31(1) of the Refugees Act a person has a right to apply to the Tribunal for the merits review of a determination that the person is not recognised as a refugee or that the person is not owed complementary protection. The Tribunal may affirm or vary the determination, remit the matter to the Secretary for reconsideration or set the determination aside and substitute a new determination[4]. [4]Refugees Act, s 34(2).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BELL, KEANE AND NETTLE JJ

Two further provisions of the 2017 Act should be noted: "5 Declaration of rights, liabilities, obligations and status(1)For the avoidance of doubt, the rights, liabilities, obligations and status of all persons are, by force of this Act, declared to be the same as if section 37 of the principal [A]ct had not been enacted. (2)For the avoidance of doubt, the rights, liabilities, obligations and status of all persons are, by force of this Act, declared always to have been the same as if section 37 of the principal Act had not been enacted. 6Force and effect of proceedings, matters, decrees and acts(1)For the avoidance of doubt, all proceedings, matters, decrees, acts and things taken, made or done, or purporting to have been taken, made or done, under the principal [A]ct in relation to an application to the Tribunal under section 31 of the principal Act for merits review of a decision or determination of the Secretary are, by force of this Act, declared to have the same force and effect after the commencement of this Act, as they would have if section 37 of the principal [A]ct had not been enacted. (2)For the avoidance of doubt, all proceedings, matters, decrees, acts and things taken, made or done, or purporting to have been taken, made or done, under the principal Act in relation to an application to the Tribunal under section 31 of the principal Act for merits review of a decision or determination by the Secretary are, by force of this Act, declared to have had the same force and effect before the commencement of this Act, as they would have had if section 37 of the principal Act had not been enacted." The appellant relies on the absence of reference to the exercise of judicial power by the Supreme Court. He argues that while the 2017 Act may have immunised the Tribunal's review of the appellant's claim if the Supreme Court were considering that review after its enactment, it cannot have this effect when the 2017 Act had not been enacted at the time the Supreme Court gave judgment. The combined effect of the 2016 Act and the 2017 Act is that the Tribunal cannot be held to have breached the obligation in s 37 of the Refugees Act because s 37 must be taken to have been repealed before the Tribunal conducted the review. Nauru submits, correctly, that the circumstance that ss 5 and 6 do not address the exercise of judicial power by the Supreme Court is not to the point: s 37 formed no part of the obligations of the Tribunal and the Supreme Court's conclusion that the Tribunal did not err in law cannot be successfully challenged on the ground that it failed to consider s 37. It smacks of the absurd to contemplate allowing the appeal on the ground of the Supreme Court's failure to address s 37 in circumstances in which, on remitter, the Supreme Court would not be required to consider the provision. The focus on s 37 in the appellant's written submissions is a distraction. It is not in issue that the Tribunal was required to act according to the principles of natural justice[13]. Section 6 of the 2016 Act and s 7 of the 2017 Act each affirm the Tribunal's obligation under the common law to afford procedural fairness to an applicant for review. Nauru did not contest that procedural fairness in the circumstances required that the appellant be given the opportunity of ascertaining the relevant issues and commenting on any adverse information that is credible, relevant and significant[14]. As earlier explained, the appellant particularises three respects in which the Tribunal failed to discharge this obligation. [13]Refugees Act, s 22(b). [14]Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 628; [1985] HCA 81; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 at 69 [30]-[32]; [2001] HCA 22; SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at 160-161 [26]; [2006] HCA 63; Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252 at 256 [2], 261 [19]; [2010] HCA 23.Changed circumstances in Nepal