HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BELL, KEANE AND NETTLE JJ
HFM045 APPELLANT
AND
THE REPUBLIC OF NAURU RESPONDENT
HFM045 v The Republic of Nauru
[2017] HCA 50
15 November 2017
M27/2017
ORDER
1.Appeal allowed.
2.Set aside the order of the Supreme Court of Nauru made on 22 February 2017, and in its place order that:
(i)the appeal be allowed;
(ii)the decision of the Refugee Status Review Tribunal made on 16 January 2015 be set aside;
(iii)the matter be remitted to the Refugee Status Review Tribunal for determination according to law; and
(iv)the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the proceedings before the Supreme Court of Nauru and of the proceedings to date before the Refugee Status Review Tribunal.
3.The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of Nauru
Representation
P J Hanks QC with R Chaile for the appellant (instructed by Holding Redlich)
G R Kennett SC with R C Knowles for the respondent (instructed by Republic of Nauru)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
Migration – Refugees – Appeal from Supreme Court of Nauru – Procedural fairness – Where Refugee Status Review Tribunal must act according to principles of natural justice – Where Refugee Status Review Tribunal did not provide appellant with notice of adverse country information relevant to Tribunal's determination on which it ultimately relied – Whether failure by Tribunal to put substance of information to appellant constituted breach of requirements of procedural fairness.
Words and phrases – "complementary protection", "natural justice", "procedural fairness".
Appeals Act 1972 (Nr), s 44.
Nauru (High Court Appeals) Act 1976 (Cth), s 5, Schedule, Art 1.
Refugees Convention Act 2012 (Nr), ss 37, 40(1).
Refugees Convention (Derivative Status & Other Measures) (Amendment) Act 2016 (Nr), s 24.
Refugees Convention (Amendment) Act 2017 (Nr), s 4.
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1967).
BELL, KEANE AND NETTLE JJ. The appellant is a Nepalese citizen. He has spent most of his life in the Jhapa district of Nepal. He is a member of the Chhetri caste. In May 2013, the appellant left Nepal and arranged through a people smuggler to travel to Australia. He arrived at Christmas Island in September 2013. In early November 2013, he was transferred from Christmas Island to Nauru under the regional processing arrangement between Australia and Nauru.
On 29 January 2014, the appellant applied for a refugee status determination. He claimed to fear persecution in Nepal from Maoists on account of his political opinion. He also claimed to fear persecution from Mongols (members of the Limbu tribe in particular) in his home district of Jhapa on account of his membership of the Chhetri caste.
The Secretary of the Department of Justice and Border Control ("the Secretary") determined that the appellant is not a refugee,…
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- Case
- [2017] HCA 50
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Refugee Status Review Tribunal had breached its obligation to afford procedural fairness to the appellant. Specifically, the court had to determine if the Tribunal's failure to provide the appellant with notice of adverse country information, upon which it ultimately relied in its decision, constituted a breach of the principles of natural justice.
The High Court reasoned that the Tribunal was bound by the common law to provide procedural fairness, which included affording the appellant the opportunity to ascertain the relevant issues and comment on any adverse information that was credible, relevant, and significant. The court found that the Tribunal had failed to discharge this obligation by not putting the substance of the adverse country information to the appellant. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the order of the Supreme Court of Nauru was set aside, and the decision of the Refugee Status Review Tribunal was quashed. The matter was remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law, and the respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the order of the Supreme Court of Nauru made on 22 February 2017, and in its place order that:
(i) the appeal be allowed;
(ii) the decision of the Refugee Status Review Tribunal made on 16 January 2015 be set aside;
(iii) the matter be remitted to the Refugee Status Review Tribunal for determination according to law; and
(iv) the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the proceedings before the Supreme Court of Nauru and of the proceedings to date before the Refugee Status Review Tribunal.
3. The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BELL, KEANE AND NETTLE JJ
Two further provisions of the 2017 Act should be noted: "5 Declaration of rights, liabilities, obligations and status(1)For the avoidance of doubt, the rights, liabilities, obligations and status of all persons are, by force of this Act, declared to be the same as if section 37 of the principal [A]ct had not been enacted. (2)For the avoidance of doubt, the rights, liabilities, obligations and status of all persons are, by force of this Act, declared always to have been the same as if section 37 of the principal Act had not been enacted. 6Force and effect of proceedings, matters, decrees and acts(1)For the avoidance of doubt, all proceedings, matters, decrees, acts and things taken, made or done, or purporting to have been taken, made or done, under the principal [A]ct in relation to an application to the Tribunal under section 31 of the principal Act for merits review of a decision or determination of the Secretary are, by force of this Act, declared to have the same force and effect after the commencement of this Act, as they would have if section 37 of the principal [A]ct had not been enacted. (2)For the avoidance of doubt, all proceedings, matters, decrees, acts and things taken, made or done, or purporting to have been taken, made or done, under the principal Act in relation to an application to the Tribunal under section 31 of the principal Act for merits review of a decision or determination by the Secretary are, by force of this Act, declared to have had the same force and effect before the commencement of this Act, as they would have had if section 37 of the principal Act had not been enacted." The appellant relies on the absence of reference to the exercise of judicial power by the Supreme Court. He argues that while the 2017 Act may have immunised the Tribunal's review of the appellant's claim if the Supreme Court were considering that review after its enactment, it cannot have this effect when the 2017 Act had not been enacted at the time the Supreme Court gave judgment. The combined effect of the 2016 Act and the 2017 Act is that the Tribunal cannot be held to have breached the obligation in s 37 of the Refugees Act because s 37 must be taken to have been repealed before the Tribunal conducted the review. Nauru submits, correctly, that the circumstance that ss 5 and 6 do not address the exercise of judicial power by the Supreme Court is not to the point: s 37 formed no part of the obligations of the Tribunal and the Supreme Court's conclusion that the Tribunal did not err in law cannot be successfully challenged on the ground that it failed to consider s 37. It smacks of the absurd to contemplate allowing the appeal on the ground of the Supreme Court's failure to address s 37 in circumstances in which, on remitter, the Supreme Court would not be required to consider the provision. The focus on s 37 in the appellant's written submissions is a distraction. It is not in issue that the Tribunal was required to act according to the principles of natural justice[13]. Section 6 of the 2016 Act and s 7 of the 2017 Act each affirm the Tribunal's obligation under the common law to afford procedural fairness to an applicant for review. Nauru did not contest that procedural fairness in the circumstances required that the appellant be given the opportunity of ascertaining the relevant issues and commenting on any adverse information that is credible, relevant and significant[14]. As earlier explained, the appellant particularises three respects in which the Tribunal failed to discharge this obligation. [13]Refugees Act, s 22(b). [14]Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 628; [1985] HCA 81; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 at 69 [30]-[32]; [2001] HCA 22; SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at 160-161 [26]; [2006] HCA 63; Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252 at 256 [2], 261 [19]; [2010] HCA 23.Changed circumstances in Nepal