Heiner v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Heiner v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 212

File number: VID 376 of 2020
Judgment of: ANASTASSIOU J
Date of judgment: 16 March 2021
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for judicial review of a decision of the Australian Human Rights Commission to cease inquiring into the Applicant’s complaint – whether Applicant’s complaint was properly closed having regard to s 20(2) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) – no error in Commission’s decision to cease inquiring into the Applicant’s complaint – Applicant attempting to re-litigate issues that had been raised unsuccessfully on earlier occasions – application dismissed
Legislation:

Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth), s 17

Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth), ss 16(2), 21(6), 29

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), ss 11(f), 20(2)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 14(2), 25(1)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Australian Education Union v Department of Education and Children’s Services [2012] HCA 3; 248 CLR 1

Heiner and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] AATA 236

Heiner v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 617

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28; 240 FCR 158

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 1; 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; 241 CLR 594

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; 243 CLR 164

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21; 197 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; 205 CLR 507

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; 206 CLR 323

Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Gugerli [1992] FCA 316; 36 FCR 68

Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 45; 147 CLR 589

Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission (No 2) [2018] FCA 473

R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd [1953] HCA 22; 88 CLR 100

SBBA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 90

Sun v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1977] FCA 1488; 81 FCR 71

United Firefighters’ Union of Australia v Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission [2017] VSC 773

VFAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872; 131 FCR 102

Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 242; 146 FCR 10

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 52
Date of last submission: 5 November 2020 (Applicant, by email)
Date of hearing: 4 November 2020
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr R. Minson
Solicitor for…
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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 212
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Heiner v Minister for Home Affairs, the Applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Australian Human Rights Commission (Commission) to cease investigating his complaint. The Applicant alleged that the Commission's decision was erroneous and that his human rights were violated by being prevented from travelling to Australia. The Applicant's complaint was investigated by the Commission as a potential breach of Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which provides for freedom of movement. The Commission ultimately decided to cease investigating the complaint, finding it to be lacking in substance and considering other available actions, remedies, and prospects of a practical outcome.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Commission's decision to cease investigating the Applicant's complaint was erroneous. The court considered the Applicant's eight grounds for the application, including allegations of arbitrary alienation from Australia, actual and apprehended bias on the part of the Commission, and racial discrimination by operation of the Australian Citizenship Instructions. The Minister for Home Affairs argued that the Applicant was attempting to re-litigate issues that had been unsuccessfully raised before and that the Commission's decision was not erroneous.

The court found that the Commission's decision to cease investigating the Applicant's complaint was not erroneous. The court agreed with the Minister's submissions that the Applicant was attempting to re-litigate issues that had been previously considered and that the Commission was entitled to draw on the factual and legal conclusions in prior decisions. The court found that the Applicant failed to provide any cogent evidence of actual bias and that there was no basis for inferring apprehended bias on the part of the Commission. The court also found that the Applicant's complaint was lacking in substance and that the Commission's decision to cease investigating the complaint was justified.

The application for judicial review was dismissed, and the Applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the Minister for Home Affairs. The court found that the Commission's decision to cease investigating the Applicant's complaint was not erroneous and that the Applicant was attempting to re-litigate issues that had been previously considered. The court found no merit in the Applicant's grounds for the application and dismissed the application in its entirety.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The Applicant pay the First Respondents’ costs of and incidental to the application.

3. The costs of the Second Respondent are reserved.

4. The Second Respondent file and serve any written submissions concerning any claim for costs in connection with the application, limited to two pages, by 22 March 2021.

5. The Applicant file and serve any written submission in relation to any claim for costs by the Second Respondent, limited to two pages, by 29 March 2021.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 6 November 2019, the Applicant lodged a complaint with the Commission, claiming that the Department violated his human rights by preventing him from travelling to Australia, or otherwise denying his re-entry to Australia. The Applicant claimed the cessation of his Australian citizenship was based on a law which was invalid. He also claimed that the earlier decisions of the Tribunal and this Court concerning his 2011 Application were “corrupt”. The Applicant relied upon the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 (Cth), the “rule of law”, and international treaties including the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), in support of his complaint to the Commission. The Commission inquired into the complaint as it was obliged to do by s 11(1)(f) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRCA). That sub-section requires the Commission to: “inquire into any act or practice that may be inconsistent with or contrary to any human right”. In its Reasons for Decision, the Commission explained that it does not have jurisdiction to investigate alleged breaches of the Constitution or rule of law, and that the ICERD is not one of the international human rights instruments scheduled to, or declared under, the AHRCA for the purposes of the Commission’s human rights complaint handling jurisdiction. Based on the information provided by the Applicant, the Commission investigated the complaint as a potential breach of art 12 of the ICCPR, which provides for freedom of movement. That article provides:1.Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.2.Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.3.The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.4.No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. On 6 May 2020, a delegate of the President of the Commission decided pursuant to s 20(2)(ba) of the AHRCA to cease inquiring into the Applicant’s complaint on the basis that it was not satisfied that continuation of the inquiry was warranted. In making that decision, the Commission said that it considered: the apparent merit of the claim; other actions that have been taken and other remedies that are available in relation to the subject matter of the complaint; and the prospects of a practical outcome or remedy being achieved through the Commission’s complaint and conciliation process.Merit of the Applicant’s complaint to the Commission On the question of merit, the Commission concluded that the claim of breach of art 12 of the ICCPR was “lacking in substance”. The Commission gave two reasons for this conclusion.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

During oral submissions, counsel for the Minister addressed each of the eight grounds in the Applicant’s Originating Application, having regard as well to the Applicant’s Contentions of Fact and Law. The Minister’s submissions are set out below.Ground 1: alleged arbitrary alienation from Australia by operation of s 17 of the 1948 Citizenship Act With respect to the Applicant’s first ground – that the Department arbitrarily alienated the Applicant by its decision to refuse the visa – the Minister submitted that this amounted to an abuse of process, being an impermissible collateral attack on prior administrative decisions that have previously been considered by judicial review. The Minister relied on Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission (No 2) [2018] FCA 473 at [40], where Perry J noted that the proceeding, being judicial review of a decision by the Commission to close a complaint, was an abuse of process because the applicant in that case was merely seeking to relitigate substantive matters which he had unsuccessfully litigated before the Federal Circuit Court.Ground 2: alleged actual and apprehended bias on the part of the Commission The Minister submitted that the Applicant’s second ground, relating to an allegation of bias on the part of the Commission, fails at its premise. The Minister submitted that nowhere in its Reasons did the Commission accept as ‘valid’ “all four decisions made to cease [the Applicant’s] Australian citizenship”. The Minister submitted that the Commission was entitled to draw on the factual and legal conclusions in those decisions, in particular the decision of Marshall J in Heiner v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 617. Insofar as the Applicant is to be taken to assert actual bias on the part of the Commission, the Minister submitted that it is well-established that such a claim requires “cogent evidence” (Sun v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1977] FCA 1488; 81 FCR 71 at 123) that the decision-maker was in fact biased, and must be “clearly proved” (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng[2001] HCA 17; 205 CLR 507 at [69] (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J), [127] (Kirby J)). See also R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd [1953] HCA 22; 88 CLR 100 at 116 (Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ); SBBA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 90 at [15] (Weinberg, Stone and Jacobson JJ). The Minister submitted that the Applicant failed to provide any such evidence and there is nothing in the materials before the Court to suggest that the Commission was actuated by actual bias. Insofar as the Applicant alleges apprehended bias on the basis of pre-judgment, the Minister submitted that the Applicant must show that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably have apprehended that the Commission was “so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or argument may [have been] presented”: Jia Legeng at [72] (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J, with whom Hayne J agreed) (emphasis added). The Minister submitted that no inference of bias can be drawn from the mere fact that the decision was adverse to the Applicant (VFAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872; 131 FCR 102 at [21] (Kenny J)). Further, the materials before the Court demonstrated that the Commission received and took into account information from the Applicant and the Department in an entirely appropriate and orthodox fashion.Ground 3: alleged racial discrimination by operation of the Australian Citizenship Instructions