SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court)
GRIGGS v NORIS GROUP OF COMPANIES (INCLUDING SA HELICOPTERS PTY LTD ACN 069 223 463 & CAPTURED PTY LTD ACN 008 134 772)
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Justice Perry, The Honourable Justice White and The Honourable Justice Layton)
3 February 2006
EMPLOYMENT LAW - THE CONTRACT OF SERVICE AND RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES AS BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE - THE CONTRACT OF SERVICE GENERALLY - FORMATION AND CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRIAL LAW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY MATTERS RELATING TO COURT AND COMMISSION - PRINCIPLES AFFECTING EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION - REGARD TO EQUITY, GOOD CONSCIENCE AND SUBSTANTIAL MERITS
CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS - IMPLIED TERMS
Appeal against a decision of the Full Bench of the Industrial Relations Court that neither the terms of the employment contract nor s 154 of the Fair Work Act 1994 entitled the appellant to payment in respect of an accrued entitlement to time off in lieu of payment for overtime ("TOIL") as at the date of termination of employment - where there was no express term for such a payment - whether a term for payment of accrued TOIL could be inferred in the contract - whether a term could be implied in the contract as both reasonable and necessary - whether s 154 of the Fair Work Act permitted an order for payment in respect of accrued TOIL.
Held: the parties had not directed their minds to the issue of payment in respect of untaken TOIL and that such a term could not be inferred - term could not be implied as it was not necessary for the effective operation of the contract - further, implying such a term would contradict an express term of contract that there was to be no entitlement to additional payment for overtime - where contract is partly written and partly oral, not necessary to satisfy the five conditions identified in BP Refinery v Shire of Hastings before a term can be implied - in any event, an implied term would not satisfy the test in BP Refinery - consideration of s 154 of the Fair Work Act - s 154 does not confer additional jurisdiction but requires the Court to act in accordance with equity and good conscience when applying the statutory and common law principles relevant to claims within its jurisdiction - s 154 did not authorise an order in respect of a claimed entitlement which was independent of the claim in contract - appeal dismissed.
Cross-appeal by respondent against decision that appellant was entitled to be paid the value of an accrued entitlement to annual leave as at the date of termination of employment - whether an employee, who by virtue of terms incorporated into a contract of employment by the Fair Work Act, has accrued an entitlement to annual leave, is entitled to be paid the monetary equivalent of that entitlement on termination of employment - where no…
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- Case
- [2006] SASC 23
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the parties had not specifically addressed the issue of payment for untaken TOIL, and thus, such a term could not be inferred. The court further held that implying a term for payment of accrued TOIL was not necessary for the effective operation of the contract and would contradict an express term that there was no entitlement to additional payment for overtime. The court noted that even if the contract was partly written and partly oral, it was not necessary to satisfy the conditions identified in BP Refinery v Shire of Hastings for a term to be implied. Moreover, the court held that section 154 of the Fair Work Act did not grant additional jurisdiction but required the Court to act in accordance with equity and good conscience when applying statutory and common law principles. Consequently, the court concluded that section 154 did not authorize an order for a claimed entitlement independent of the contractual claim. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
In the cross-appeal, the court considered whether an employee who has accrued an entitlement to annual leave under the Fair Work Act is entitled to be paid the monetary equivalent of that entitlement upon termination of employment. The court found that the Fair Work Act provides for the method of calculation of accrual of annual leave when employment ends, implying that an employee is entitled to payment for accrued but untaken leave upon termination. The court held that a valid notice of termination brings a contract of employment to an end at the expiry of the notice period, not at the time when notice is given. Therefore, the cross-appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was entitled to be paid the value of his accrued annual leave.
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: PERRY J