Griggs v Noris Group of Companies

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

GRIGGS v NORIS GROUP OF COMPANIES (INCLUDING SA HELICOPTERS PTY LTD ACN 069 223 463 & CAPTURED PTY LTD ACN 008 134 772)

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Perry, The Honourable Justice White and The Honourable Justice Layton)

3 February 2006

EMPLOYMENT LAW - THE CONTRACT OF SERVICE AND RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES AS BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE - THE CONTRACT OF SERVICE GENERALLY - FORMATION AND CONSTRUCTION

INDUSTRIAL LAW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY MATTERS RELATING TO COURT AND COMMISSION - PRINCIPLES AFFECTING EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION - REGARD TO EQUITY, GOOD CONSCIENCE AND SUBSTANTIAL MERITS

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS - IMPLIED TERMS

Appeal against a decision of the Full Bench of the Industrial Relations Court that neither the terms of the employment contract nor s 154 of the Fair Work Act 1994 entitled the appellant to payment in respect of an accrued entitlement to time off in lieu of payment for overtime ("TOIL") as at the date of termination of employment - where there was no express term for such a payment - whether a term for payment of accrued TOIL could be inferred in the contract - whether a term could be implied in the contract as both reasonable and necessary - whether s 154 of the Fair Work Act permitted an order for payment in respect of accrued TOIL.

Held: the parties had not directed their minds to the issue of payment in respect of untaken TOIL and that such a term could not be inferred - term could not be implied as it was not necessary for the effective operation of the contract - further, implying such a term would contradict an express term of contract that there was to be no entitlement to additional payment for overtime - where contract is partly written and partly oral, not necessary to satisfy the five conditions identified in BP Refinery v Shire of Hastings before a term can be implied - in any event, an implied term would not satisfy the test in BP Refinery - consideration of s 154 of the Fair Work Act - s 154 does not confer additional jurisdiction but requires the Court to act in accordance with equity and good conscience when applying the statutory and common law principles relevant to claims within its jurisdiction - s 154 did not authorise an order in respect of a claimed entitlement which was independent of the claim in contract - appeal dismissed.

Cross-appeal by respondent against decision that appellant was entitled to be paid the value of an accrued entitlement to annual leave as at the date of termination of employment - whether an employee, who by virtue of terms incorporated into a contract of employment by the Fair Work Act, has accrued an entitlement to annual leave, is entitled to be paid the monetary equivalent of that entitlement on termination of employment - where no…

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Details
Case
[2006] SASC 23
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Griggs v Noris Group of Companies involves an appeal against a decision by the Full Bench of the Industrial Relations Court, where the appellant, Mr. Griggs, sought payment for accrued time off in lieu of overtime (TOIL) and annual leave upon termination of his employment. The court was required to determine whether certain terms could be implied into the employment contract and whether the statutory provision under the Fair Work Act permitted such a payment. The appellant argued that despite the absence of express terms for payment of accrued TOIL and annual leave, these terms could be inferred or implied into the contract.

The court found that the parties had not specifically addressed the issue of payment for untaken TOIL, and thus, such a term could not be inferred. The court further held that implying a term for payment of accrued TOIL was not necessary for the effective operation of the contract and would contradict an express term that there was no entitlement to additional payment for overtime. The court noted that even if the contract was partly written and partly oral, it was not necessary to satisfy the conditions identified in BP Refinery v Shire of Hastings for a term to be implied. Moreover, the court held that section 154 of the Fair Work Act did not grant additional jurisdiction but required the Court to act in accordance with equity and good conscience when applying statutory and common law principles. Consequently, the court concluded that section 154 did not authorize an order for a claimed entitlement independent of the contractual claim. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

In the cross-appeal, the court considered whether an employee who has accrued an entitlement to annual leave under the Fair Work Act is entitled to be paid the monetary equivalent of that entitlement upon termination of employment. The court found that the Fair Work Act provides for the method of calculation of accrual of annual leave when employment ends, implying that an employee is entitled to payment for accrued but untaken leave upon termination. The court held that a valid notice of termination brings a contract of employment to an end at the expiry of the notice period, not at the time when notice is given. Therefore, the cross-appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was entitled to be paid the value of his accrued annual leave.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The cross-appeal raises another important issue: is an employee who has, by virtue of the terms incorporated into the contract of employment by s 71 and Schedule 4 of the Industrial and Employees Relations Act 1994 (“IERA”),[5] accrued an entitlement to annual leave at the time of termination entitled to be paid the monetary equivalent of that entitlement on the termination of the employment? The Magistrate held that the appellant was entitled to be paid the value of his accrued entitlement to annual leave as at the date of termination. That finding was upheld on appeal to the single judge and on further appeal to the Full Bench of the IR Court.[5] By the Industrial Law Reform (Fair Work) Act 2005 the IERA was renamed the Fair Work Act 1994. As most of the events relevant to this appeal occurred whilst the Act was known by its former name, it will be referred to in these reasons by the acronym “IERA”.Background Circumstances The appellant commenced full time employment with the respondent group of companies[6] on or about 5 January 1998 as a maintenance repairer, trainee licensed aircraft maintenance engineer and maintenance controller. A written contract of employment was entered into between the parties. Clauses 5-10 inclusive of that contract provided as follows:[6] No point was taken at any stage in the proceedings in the Industrial Relations Court or in this Court about the way in which the respondent has been named.5. Hours of WorkDue to the nature of work to be carried out, no set hours can be given. It is envisaged however that a minimum of 40 hours a week will be fulfilled. Days off and holidays will be by negotiation and acceptable to both parties. Communications must be maintained at all times in case of urgent calls. Should this not be possible you are to advise management at the earliest convenient moment or prior to if possible.6.Wages/Salary PackageA salary of $50,000 per annum will be paid. Company vehicle in the form of one tonne utility or similar will be supplied inclusive of all operating costs and fuel. Salary adjustments are by mutual negotiation and not prior to 12 months service.7.Overtime/ShiftworkAs required without penalty.8.Annual LeaveAnnual leave will be allowed and subject to negotiation. It must be realised that annual leave may not be available at all times due to the nature of employment, however best endeavours will be made to fulfil any request. No penalty will be paid on annual leave neither will it be accumulative.9.Sick LeaveSick leave will be paid up to 10 days a year accompanied by a Doctor’s Certificate. The Noris Group will pay WorkCover. 10.Special LeaveLeave required in special circumstances will be available by mutual negotiation. The Magistrate rejected a submission of the appellant that his employment was governed by either the Aircraft Engineering (Aviation) General Industry Award (an award of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission) or by the Metal Industries (South Australia) Award (an award made by the South Australian Industrial Relations Commission). Those findings were not challenged by the appellant at either level in the appellate hierarchy in the IR Court.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

PERRY J
Following the cessation of his employment, the appellant submitted a claim to the respondent for payment of the monetary equivalent of the TOIL accrued but not taken as at 5 May 2002. This Court was informed that the appellant asserted an entitlement to payment of approximately $115,000.[8][8] It does not seem that the quantum of the appellant’s claim has been fixed by the IR Court. Nor have any final orders been made by the Magistrate. No point has been taken at any stage in the appellate hierarchy about the competence of the appeals in those circumstances.The Decisions in the IR Court The Magistrate did not rest his finding in favour of the appellant on any contractual entitlement. Instead, the Magistrate invoked s 154 of the IERA which provides:(1) In exercising its jurisdiction, the Court or the Commission- (a) is governed in matters of procedure and substance by equity, good conscience, and the substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities, legal forms or the practice of courts; and (b) is not bound by evidentiary rules and practices but may, subject to subsection (2), inform itself as it thinks appropriate. (2) The Court and the Commission must observe the rules of natural justice. The Magistrate regarded s 154 as vesting a discretion in the IR Court. Invoking that discretion, the Magistrate held that the appellant should be paid the monetary equivalent of the accrued TOIL as at the date of termination of his employment. His reasoning appears in the following paragraphs:When applying s 154 what is involved is the application of a discretionary power. As s 154 indicates the discretion to be exercised must be done so in accordance with principles of equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case.Hours had accrued which were by agreement to be taken as TOIL. The applicant only took 16 days of TOIL during the entire period of employment. The respondent never policed the taking of TOIL, instead it left it up to the applicant to make his own arrangements. I accept that the applicant was unable to take TOIL other than the 16 days because of his workload.In my view in applying the discretionary power contained in s 154 equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case must result in the applicant being entitled to be paid the monetary equivalent of the accrued TOIL hours, that is hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.[9][9] [2004] SAIRC 47 at [84]-[86]. On appeal to a single judge, that decision was upheld by the Senior Judge in the IR Court who held:The fact remains however, that the employer had the benefit of the worker’s labour and in the absence of his ability to exercise his rights pursuant to the TOIL arrangement, it seems to me, that the worker should be properly compensated for his labour. I therefore reach the conclusion that the proper application of s 154 of the Act compels a conclusion that the worker’s undischarged entitlements pursuant to the TOIL agreement, as at the end of the contract of employment, should be payable as wages.[10][10] [2004] SAIRC 83 at [44].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PERRY J