L, G v Minister for Families and Communities

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

L, G & ANOR v THE MINISTER FOR FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES & ORS

[2012] SASCFC 72

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Vanstone, The Honourable Justice Peek and The Honourable Justice Stanley)

15 June 2012

FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE - CHILD WELFARE UNDER STATE LEGISLATION - CHILDREN IN NEED OF PROTECTION - GUARDIANSHIP OF CHILDREN

FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE - CHILD WELFARE UNDER STATE LEGISLATION - CHILDREN IN NEED OF PROTECTION - PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO CARE AND PROTECTION - EVIDENCE AND PROOF

The parents of children appealed against orders of a Youth Court Judge placing the children under the guardianship of the Minister pursuant to s 38(1)(d) Children’s Protection Act 1993, the Judge having found that the children were “at risk” pursuant to s 6(2) of the Act.

The appellants asserted that the orders should be set aside because procedural fairness had not been afforded to them, s 45 of the Act had been misapplied with evidence being improperly received, the commission of a number of errors of law, a failure to consider alternatives to the making of the order under s 38(1)(d) of the Act and apparent bias by the Judge.

Held: Appeal dismissed.

(Vanstone, Peek and Stanley JJ): The appellants were given a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present their case and there was no procedural unfairness. The direct and circumstantial evidence in support of the Judges findings and orders was very strong. Section 45 of the Act had not been misapplied and evidence had not been improperly received. There was no appearance of bias by the Youth Court Judge. His Honour correctly found that the children were “at risk” under the Act and the making of the order pursuant to s 38(1)(d) was entirely justified in the circumstances.

Children's Protection Act 1993 (SA) ss 3, 4, 6(2), 37, 38, 45, referred to.
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, applied.
R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228; Minister for Immigration v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; Qantas Airways Ltd v Gubbins (1992) 28 NSWLR 26; Griggs v Noris Group of Companies (2006) 94 SASR 126; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273; McGee v Gilchrist-Humphrey (2005) 92 SASR 100; TA Miller Ltd v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1968] 1 WLR 992; Re Pochi v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 26 ALR 247, discussed.
Brandi v Mingot (1976) 12 ALR 551; Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; Theophillus v Police (2011) 110 SASR 420, considered.

L, G & ANOR v THE MINISTER FOR FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES & ORS
[2012] SASCFC 72

Full Court:  Vanstone, Peek and Stanley JJ

  1. VANSTONE J.     I would dismiss the appeal.  I agree with the reasons of Peek J and with the additional reasons written by Stanley J.

  2. PEEK J.   Appeal against orders…

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Details
Case
[2012] SASCFC 72
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned orders made by the Youth Court of South Australia, pursuant to section 38 of the *Children’s Protection Act 1993* (SA), placing children under the guardianship of the Minister for Families and Communities until they attained the age of 18. The appellants, the parents of the children, sought to set aside these orders. The appeal was heard by Vanstone, Peek, and Stanley JJ of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia.

The primary legal issues before the Full Court included whether the Youth Court had erred in admitting certain evidence, and whether the proceedings had been conducted with procedural fairness. Specifically, the appellants argued that the initial application provided inadequate notice of the case against them, that particulars were provided too close to the trial date, and that they lacked sufficient time to prepare their case and obtain expert evidence to rebut the Minister's material. They also contended that there was a statutory tension between the provisions of section 45(1)(a) and (b) of the Act, which govern the admissibility of evidence and the court's approach to proceedings.

The Full Court reasoned that proceedings under the *Children’s Protection Act* are not criminal prosecutions and are not bound by strict rules of evidence. Section 45 of the Act permits the Court to inform itself as it thinks fit, to act according to equity and good conscience, and to disregard technicalities, provided that facts are proved on the balance of probabilities. The Court found that some of the grounds of appeal and arguments presented by the appellants postulated a standard of proof more akin to criminal trials, which was inappropriate for these proceedings. The Court also noted that phrases such as "unfairly prejudicial" are primarily relevant to criminal trials and have little application in this context. The Court ultimately rejected all grounds of appeal.

Having rejected all grounds of appeal, the Full Court dismissed the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Some preliminary comments may be made which apply to a number of the grounds of appeal in common. The first comment is that these proceedings are not a criminal prosecution; while there were a large number of factual matters sought to be established in support of the application, it was not necessary that they be established strictly according to the rules of evidence or that they be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Section 45 of the Act provides:45—Evidence etc (1) In any proceedings under this Act— (a) the Court is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself as it thinks fit; and (b) the Court must act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities and legal forms. (2)A fact to be proved in proceedings under this Act is sufficiently proved if proved on the balance of probabilities. Of course, such provisions have been the subject of discussion in a number of authorities, and it may be accepted that the process by which Courts correctly apply such provisions takes into account considerations such as relevance, reasonableness and reliability. I have regard to those authorities but I consider that some of the present grounds of appeal, and some of the arguments put in support of them, tended to postulate a required mode and standard of proof which was more consonant with a criminal trial than with the present proceedings. In the same vein, I note that in a number of the grounds of appeal it is asserted, usually in the alternative to a different complaint, that the adducing of evidence was “unfairly prejudicial” or “insufficiently material to the enquiry to justify its introduction” or “more prejudicial than probative of the Minister’s case”. It should be obvious that these phrases are evocative of matters primarily relevant to criminal trials but have no real application to the present proceedings. The affidavit of Mr Haebich At the commencement of the hearing of the appeal, Mr Heywood-Smith QC, Senior Counsel for the appellants, sought to tender an affidavit of Mr Haebich, the appellants’ solicitor, affirmed on 1 May 2012. Mr Evans QC, Senior Counsel for the Minister, and Mr Holland, counsel for the children, both opposed the tender. The Court permitted Mr Heywood-Smith to refer to the affidavit but reserved its decision as to whether the affidavit would be received on the appeal. Having now heard all submissions of counsel and considered all other material before the Court I am of the view that the affidavit should not be received on the appeal.Procedural fairness: grounds (1), (2) and (13) of appeal Grounds 1, 2 and 13 are relied upon cumulatively to establish procedural unfairness. I will consider grounds 1 and 2 together and then ground 13.Grounds (1) and (2) of appeal The essential complaints made under grounds (1) and (2) were that the initial application dated 5 July 2010 gave inadequate notice of the case against the parents; that particulars contained in a letter from the Crown Solicitor dated 31 August 2010 were provided only six days before the trial; that the application was supported by voluminous and technical material such that the appellants generally did not have sufficient time to prepare their case and respond to that of the Minister; and that the trial commenced before the appellants were able to obtain expert evidence to rebut the expert material relied upon by the Minister.

Decision

Reasons for decision

VANSTONE J (dissent) PEEK J (dissent) STANLEY J (dissent)
I reject ground 18 of appeal.Conclusion and disposition of the appeal Having rejected all grounds of appeal, I would dismiss the appeal I have had the advantage of reading the reasons of Peek J in this matter. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by his Honour. I merely add the following, having regard to the importance of some of the issues raised by the appeal. The appellants seek to have set aside orders made by a judge of the Youth Court pursuant to s 38 of the Children’s Protection Act 1993 (SA) (“the Act”) placing children under the guardianship of the Minister until each of them attains 18 years of age. Section 38 confers broad powers on the Court to make orders for the care and protection of children. The powers conferred include power to grant custody of a child to persons other than the child’s parents, power to place the child under the guardianship of the Minister or such other person or persons as the Court thinks appropriate in the circumstances, and power to direct a person to cease or refrain from having contact with a child or from residing in the same premises as a child or coming within a specified distance of a child’s residence. In deciding whether grounds have been made out that warrant the exercise of such powers, namely, whether a child is at risk, the Court is governed in its proceedings by the terms of s 45. Section 45 provides:45—Evidence etc(1) In any proceedings under this Act—(a)the Court is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself as it thinks fit; and(b)the Court must act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities and legal forms.(2) A fact to be proved in proceedings under this Act is sufficiently proved if proved on the balance of probabilities. The appellants contend that the Court erred in admitting certain evidence notwithstanding the provisions of s 45. The appellants submitted that there is a statutory tension between subparagraphs (a) and (b) of s 45(1). They submitted that in order to act according to equity and good conscience in some matters, the Court is compelled to observe the rules of evidence. They called in aid the dictum of Evatt J in R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; ex parte Bott:[18]Some stress has been laid by the present respondents upon the provision that the Tribunal is not, in the hearing of appeals, “bound by any rules of evidence”. Neither it is. But this does not mean that all rules of evidence may be ignored as of no account. After all, they represent the attempt made, through many generations, to evolve a method of inquiry best calculated to prevent error and elicit truth. No tribunal can, without grave danger of injustice, set them on one side and resort to methods of inquiry which necessarily advantage one party and necessarily disadvantage the opposing party. In other words, although rules of evidence, as such, do not bind, every attempt must be made to administer “substantial justice”.[18] (1933) 50 CLR 228 at 256.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: