Grant v Commissioner of Patents

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120

PATENTS – patentable subject matter – business system or method – legal discoveries – manner of manufacture – claim for a method for structuring a financial transaction designed to protect an individual’s assets – new use of known products with known properties for which their known properties make them suitable – no physical effect or physical phenomenon – mere intellectual information – claimed subject matter not a proper subject of letters patent

Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 18(1A)
Statute of Monopolies 1623 (Imp)
Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth)

Arrow Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Merck & Co Inc (2004) 213 ALR 182 cited
AT&T Corp v Excel Communications, Inc 172 F 3d 1352; 50 USPQ 2d 1447 (Fed Cir 1999) considered
Burroughs Corp (Perkins’) Application [1974] RPC 147 considered
CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1994) 51 FCR 260 followed
Commissioner of Patents v Lee (1913) 16 CLR 138 cited
Commissioner of Patents v Microcell Ltd (1959) 102 CLR 232 cited
Diamond v Diehr 450 US 175; 67 L Ed 2d 155 (1981) cited
Grant v Commissioner of Patents (2006) 67 IPR 1 affirmed on different grounds
In re Alappat 33 F 3d 1526; 31 USPQ 2d 1545 (Fed Cir 1994) cited
International Business Machines Corporation’s Application [1980] FSR 564 considered
International Business Machines Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1991) 33 FCR 218 considered
Merck & Co Inc v Arrow Pharmaceuticals Ltd [2006] FCAFC 91 cited
National Research DevelopmentCorporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252 applied
Neilson v Minister of Public Works (NSW) (1914) 18 CLR 423 cited
N V Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken v Mirabella International Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 655 cited
Re Brown (1899) 5 ALR 81 cited
Re Cooper’s Application for a Patent (1901) 19 RPC 53 cited
Re ESP’s Application (1944) 62 RPC 87 cited
Re Fishburn’s Application (1938) 57 RPC 245 cited
Re GEC’s Application (1942) 60 RPC 1 cited
Re Johnson’s Application for a Patent (1901) 19 RPC 56 cited
Re Lenard’s Application (1954) 71 RPC 190 cited
Re Peter Szabo and Associates Pty Ltd (2006) 66 IPR 370 considered
Re W’s Application (1914) 31 RPC 141 cited
Rogers v Commissioner of Patents (1910) 10 CLR 701 cited
Rolls Royce Ltd’s Application [1963] RPC 251 cited
State Street Bank & Trust Co v Signature Financial Group Inc 149 F 3d 1368; 47 USPQ 2d 1596 (Fed Cir 1998) considered
Trustees of the Property of Cummins (a bankrupt) v Cummins (2006) 224 ALR 280 cited
Welcome Real-Time SA v Catuity Inc (2001) 113 FCR 110 followed

Advisory Council on Intellectual Property, Report on a Review of the Patenting of Business Systems, September 2003
J Lahore, “Computers and the Law: The Protection of Intellectual Property” (1978) 9 Federal Law Review 15

STEVEN JOHN GRANT v THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS

NSD 1573 OF 2005

HEEREY, KIEFEL AND BENNETT JJ
18 JULY 2006
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES

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Details
Case
[2006] FCAFC 120
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, the case of Grant v Commissioner of Patents involved a dispute over the patentability of a business method proposed by Mr Grant. Mr Grant argued that his method, which involved a trust, a gift, a loan, and a mortgage, was a business system and therefore patentable. The Commissioner of Patents, however, contested that the proposed method did not constitute a patentable invention under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) because it lacked a tangible physical outcome. The central issue before the court was whether Mr Grant's business method could be considered a manner of manufacture, which is a requirement for patentability.

The court's reasoning focused on the principles established in previous cases, particularly NRDC v Commissioner of Patents, which outlined the criteria for determining whether an invention is a manner of manufacture. The court held that for an invention to be patentable, it must result in a useful, concrete, and tangible result, rather than merely being an abstract idea or a method of calculation. In this case, the court found that Mr Grant's method was essentially "intellectual information" and a scheme without a physical product or phenomenon, and thus it did not meet the requirement for patentability. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and Mr Grant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

HEEREY, KIEFEL AND BENNETT JJ
Mr Grant submits that, in the event that the appeal is dismissed, he should be entitled to the costs of the hearing before the primary judge. There is no basis upon which the Commissioner should pay the costs of the hearing before her Honour. Mr Grant did refer in general terms to the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth), but this legislation does not apply because the appeal has not succeeded: see ss 6 and 7.CONCLUSION Mr Grant’s asset protection scheme is not unpatentable because it is a “business method”. Whether the method is properly the subject of letters patent is assessed by applying the principles that have been developed for determining whether a method is a manner of manufacture, irrespective of the area of activity in which the method is to be applied. It has long been accepted that “intellectual information”, a mathematical algorithm, mere working directions and a scheme without effect are not patentable. This claim is “intellectual information”, mere working directions and a scheme. It is necessary that there be some “useful product”, some physical phenomenon or effect resulting from the working of a method for it to be properly the subject of letters patent. That is missing in this case. The appeal is dismissed. The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HEEREY, KIEFEL AND BENNETT JJ

In Catuity, Heerey J distinguished between an abstract idea, a method of calculation or a business method (in the sense of a particular method or scheme for carrying on business) which his Honour described as non-patentable and a claim to a method and device for use in business, that is a practical operation of an abstract idea. His Honour drew a distinction between a technological innovation which is patentable and a business innovation which is not. His Honour did not accept that a physically observable effect was necessarily required, although he held such an effect was present in Catuity. While the development of US patent law is derived from the Constitution of the United States rather than the Statute of Monopolies, as Heerey J observed at [129], the policy behind the two provisions is the same. In both jurisdictions, the courts have confirmed that a broad approach to subject matter should be taken in order to adapt to new technologies and inventions but that does not mean that there are no restrictions on what is properly patentable.CONSIDERATIONPatentability of business systems Mr Grant, who appears in person, contends that the invention is a business system, as discussed in the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property, Report on a Review of the Patenting of Business Systems, September 2003 (‘the ACIP Report’) at 6. The Government response to the ACIP Report was in favour of the patentability of business systems. We do not consider that the question here is whether a business system, in the sense of a system for use in a business, is or is not patentable. Patent protection is afforded to an invention that complies with the requirements of the Act, including manner of manufacture. The fact that a method may be called a business method does not prevent it being properly the subject of letters patent; see Catuity at [125]–[126].Manner of manufacture Mr Grant’s contentions on manner of manufacture, based on NRDC, can be summarised as follows:· The claimed invention has economic utility.· The state of affairs created by the trust, the gift, the loan and the mortgage is an artificial state of affairs within the meaning of that expression in NRDC.· The invention is the method by which an artificially created state of affairs is itself created.· The artificial state of affairs is that financial rights and obligations have changed.· If the result of the scheme is an artificial state of affairs with economic utility, the principles enunciated in NRDC and as developed for the application of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies apply and the claimed invention is a proper subject of letters patent.· The documents that create the scheme are not part of the claimed invention.· It is conceded that there is no physical object or physical phenomenon as part of the invention but none is required.· It is not suggested that there was a new combination or new working of the integers of the claim being the different arrangements that make up the scheme.· The “useful, concrete and tangible result” of the invention is an alternative to accepted asset protection methods that enable people to trade.· The invention is a new use of a known substance in which the substance comprises a trust, a gift to the trust and a loan of money secured by a mortgage in a new use or purpose.· The Deputy Commissioner wrongly applied NRDC in a rigid and formulaic, rather than a flexible, manner.