Grant-Taylor v Babcock & Brown Ltd (in liq)

Link copied
Case Copied 79 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Grant-Taylor v Babcock & Brown Limited (In Liquidation) [2015] FCA 149

Citation: Grant-Taylor v Babcock & Brown Limited (In Liquidation) [2015] FCA 149
Parties: ANDREW GRANT-TAYLOR, CRAIGELLACHIE PTY LTD ACN 065 937 966, NIELMA GRANT-TAYLOR, ANDREW CASEY THAM, BRUNO NERI, CHARMAINE MARY NERI, CAROLYN JOY KELMAR, CHARLES JAMES LEOTTA, DANIEL FRANJIC, DANIEL RAMLU, SAROJINI RAMLU, ENORE QUERIN, MARIA QUERIN, ERIC YACOEL, JOANNE YACOEL, ERNEST MICHAEL REAVELL, EWEN MCPHERSON, GERRY PETER O’HEHIR, GRAEME CUCEUL, JOHN CHRISTOPHER PARISOTTO, JUDITH MAE NGUYEN, KEVIN EDWARD CROSLAND, LYNDSEY JOAN CROSLAND, LAGBAIL PTY LTD ACN 010 395 632, LESLIE GEORGE MILLER, MARIA GIULIA FATIGUSO, NANCY LAMBROPOULOS, PAUL ROBERT HACK, RONALD MCDERMOTT, STEPHEN DEW, RIKA DEW, STEVE CONTOGIANNIS, TERENCE MCDONALD, FLEUR FANSELOW, TERRY JOHN BORLAND, WAYNE JAMES FOOTE, PAULINE FOOTE, G HARVEY NOMINEES PTY LTD ACN 001 021 236, GRAEME LESLIE LAIDLER, JUNE ISOBEL LAIDLER, GRAHAM KENNETH GIRDLER, ROBYN ANN GIRDLER, LAURENT LUCIEN BORDES, CECILE MADELEINE BORDES, MUSTAFA FIKRET, GUNSEL FIKRET, NEVILLE ALLAN LAKE, JANET MARY LAKE, NEWK’S INVESTMENTS PTY LIMITED ACN 001 426 348, PETER ROBERT MACMORRAN, IRENE VALENTINE MACMORRAN, S HARVEY NOMINEES PTY LIMITED ACN 123 497 334, YOOGALU PTY LTD ACN 002 269 132, BRENDAN CHRISTOPHER TAYLOR, MARIANA TAYLOR, RICHARD TERANCE GOLDBURG, CHRISTINE ROSE SHEARING, WILLIAM MATTHEW DUNSTAN, ROSEMARY JANE DUNSTAN, BENJAMIN KARL RUDZYN, CHRISTOPHER JOHN GARVAN, JAMES BARTHOLOMEW WIRTH, JAMES DOUGLAS HAIG MUIR, JOSEPH RUDZYN, SUSAN RUDZYN, PETER BRUCE RIES, PETER RIES SUPERANNUATION PTY LTD ACN 123 435 101, REMY SAGE, SAMUEL RUDZYN, ROBYN RUDZYN, WILLIAM ROBERT ECCLESTON, GEORGE DOUGLAS, MICHAEL GRAHAM SHIELDS, AMANDA JOY SHIELDS, MICHAEL MATTHEW MOORE, ANTHONY JOHN THOMAS MOORE and WEIDONG CHEN v BABCOCK & BROWN LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 108 614 955 and DAVID LOMBE
File number(s): NSD 2070 of 2012
Judge(s): PERRAM J
Date of judgment: 4 March 2015
Catchwords:

CORPORATIONS – basis of obligations to make continuous disclosure – whether first defendant breached obligations of continuous disclosure – whether first defendant obliged to disclose payment of dividends from capital – whether accounts gave a true and fair view – whether first defendant obliged to disclose if accounts did not – whether first defendant insolvent at specified date – whether first defendant obliged to disclose if it was – whether dividend funded from asset revaluation

DAMAGES – whether plaintiffs can recover for overpayment for shares in circumstances – proof of loss – whether plaintiffs can rely on indirect theory of causation

Legislation: Companies Act 1955 (Vic)
Company Law Review Act 1998 (Cth)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Joint Stock Companies Registration and Regulation Act 1844, 7 & 8 Vic, c 110
Cases cited:

ABN AMRO Bank AV v Bathurst Regional Council (2014) 309 ALR 445 discussed
Arthur Murray (NSW) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 114 CLR 314 cited
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (No 5) (2009) 264 ALR 201 cited
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345 cited
Bluebottle UK Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 232…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Grant-Taylor v Babcock & Brown Ltd (in liq) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] FCA 149
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Grant-Taylor v Babcock & Brown Ltd (in liq) involves the plaintiffs, who are former shareholders of Babcock & Brown Limited (BBL), suing BBL for alleged breaches of continuous disclosure obligations and seeking damages for overpayment of share prices. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The legal issues before the court included whether BBL breached its obligations of continuous disclosure by not disclosing certain financial details, specifically the payment of dividends from capital, the true and fair view of its accounts, and its insolvency status. The court also considered whether the plaintiffs could recover for overpayment of shares and if they could rely on an indirect theory of causation.

The court found that BBL did breach its continuous disclosure obligations by not adequately disclosing the payment of dividends from capital, the lack of a true and fair view in its accounts, and its insolvency status. The court determined that these disclosures were necessary to prevent misleading information from being presented to the market. Regarding damages, the court held that the plaintiffs could not recover for overpayment of shares due to insufficient proof of loss and the failure to establish a direct causal link between the alleged breaches and the overpayment.

The application was dismissed with costs, as the plaintiffs did not meet the criteria for damages or the requisite causation for their claims. The court's decision highlights the importance of continuous disclosure in maintaining market integrity and protecting investors.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons which follow the application should be dismissed with costs.II The background to BBL A firm known as Babcock & Brown was first formed in San Francisco in 1977. The group’s initial focus was as an advisor but it also arranged structured asset-backed finance transactions usually leveraged leases. Over the following 25 years it expanded into a global investment and advisory firm with offices in 19 countries and 440 staff. By 2004 it was forecasting net total revenue of $424 million. By then its activities fell into four categories:(i)arrangement/syndication:the firm would identify an investment, negotiate as a principal, arrange finance but syndicate equity to third party investors prior to the transaction closing;(ii)underwriting: the firm would commit capital to underwrite a transaction and thereafter sell down its position. This included the provision of short term loans with a view to finding longer term finance;(iii)investment/asset management: the firm would manage an asset. Often enough this service would be provided as part of a syndication under (i); and(iv)principal investment: the firm would invest its own money in particular assets sometimes in conjunction with a co-investor or with an equity syndication under (i). It will be seen that although the firm had begun life as an advisor and arranger it began, in due course, to derive revenue from the deployment of its own capital. This created within the firm an expanding appetite for capital which, when the credit and capital markets tightened during the global financial crisis, caused many of the difficulties which the firm, as then structured, encountered. The various raisings of both debt and equity capital which the original firm and, after its float in 2004, BBL undertook have some relevance to the issues of solvency with which BBL was confronted in November 2008. They also provide the context for some aspects of the capital structure of the group which explain the accounting events which gave rise to the 2005, 2006 and 2007 final dividends being paid out of capital. The first significant external injection of capital for the Babcock and Brown group, as it then was, occurred in 2000 when a German bank, Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG (‘HVB’) acquired a 20% interest in the firm for US$120 million. The second occurred in 2004 when a decision was made to raise $550 million of equity capital by way of an initial public offering (‘IPO’) of shares on the ASX. Prior to the offering Babcock and Brown had been owned as to 80% by its executive shareholders and as to 20% by HVB. The proposal under the IPO was that these current proprietors of the business would hold 30% of the business and that 70% would be held by the public. This outcome would be achieved by floating 100% of BBL on the ASX. BBL would then own 70% of Babcock & Brown International Pty Ltd (‘BBIPL’) with the other 30% held by HVB and the executive stakeholders. BBIPL was to be, and ultimately did become, the operating company for the group resulting in a group structure which was only 70% owned by its listed holding entity (‘the Babcock and Brown group’). It would have been possible, of course, to set BBL up with its former owners holding 30% of the freshly issued shares in BBL but this course was not taken for reasons which were related to perceived adverse tax consequences in the United States for the executive stakeholders.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In light of that conclusion, I do not accept that the capital reduction information consisted simply of the mere fact that for each year part of each final dividend had been paid out of capital. The whole situation had to be disclosed. It would have been quite misleading to have disclosed that the dividend payment had resulted in an unauthorised reduction of capital (with the alarming connotation such words naturally engender) without also disclosing that this was without any economic consequence. If disclosure was to be made what was to be disclosed (using the 2005 year as an example) was that: (i)the declaration of the dividend by BBL contravened s 254T because the retained profits for the 2005 financial year for BBL on a stand-alone basis were less than the proposed dividend; but(ii)the Babcock and Brown group had sufficient retained earnings on a consolidated basis to pay the dividend and the issue only arose because any dividend declared by BBIPL for the 2005 year would only be received as income in the 2006 year; such that(iii)it was purely an accounting issue; and(iv)it had no impact on the value of shares in BBL.(d) Whether persons who commonly invest in securities would be influenced in their investment decisions by such information The debtor to the banking syndicate was BBIPL but the debtor to the note holders was BBL. The notes had been raised in two series known as BBSN and BBSN2. The interest on BBSN was a floating rate of 2.20% over the bank bill swap rate and BBSN2 was fixed at 2.20% over the five year swap rate. Both required semi-annual interest payments: BBSN of 15 May and 15 November; BBSN2 of 15 March and 15 September. The BBSN notes matured on 15 November 2015 when BBL would be required to pay out their face value of around $416.2 million. The BBSN2 notes matured on 15 September 2016 when their face value of NZ$225 million would be due. The four dates for interest payments are of some significance. From where BBL was at the beginning of November 2008 it had to meet interest payments on the notes on 15 November 2008, 15 March 2009 and 15 May 2009. Looking somewhat further into the future, BBL needed to be able to pay $416.2 million on 15 November 2015 (then 7 years away) and a further NZ$225 million nearly eight years later on 15 September 2016. Of critical significance to the disposition of these proceedings is the subordinated nature of the notes. As will be seen, many of the plaintiffs’ arguments on this part of the case proceeded without an appreciation of just how subordinated the notes were. So far as BBIPL was concerned, whilst it was liable to the noteholders under the guarantee of BBL’s obligations under the notes, BBIPL’s obligation was, as the concept of subordination might ordinarily connote, ranked behind the bank debt. The terms of the subordination arrangement went somewhat further than this, however, and had the further effect that whilst BBIPL owed any money to the banking syndicate any debt to the noteholders under the guarantee would not exist. In practical terms this meant that the noteholders were irrelevant to BBIPL’s financial position and would not have any claim on it because, for the foreseeable future, no matter how the restructuring proceeded, BBIPL was not going to be relieved of all of its bank debt.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the obligations of continuous disclosure under the Corporations Act and determined that the first defendant did not breach these obligations. The court found that the declaration of the dividends by BBL contravened s 254T because the retained profits for the relevant financial years for BBL on a stand-alone basis were less than the proposed dividends. However, the Babcock and Brown group had sufficient retained earnings on a consolidated basis to pay the dividend, making the issue purely an accounting one with no impact on the value of shares in BBL.

Regarding the disclosure of dividends from capital, the court held that the first defendant was not obliged to disclose such information as it would not influence the investment decisions of typical investors. The court also ruled that the accounts gave a true and fair view and that the first defendant was not required to disclose any perceived lack thereof. The court did not find the first defendant insolvent at the specified date and thus saw no obligation to disclose such a status.

The court further determined that there was no obligation for the first defendant to disclose if the dividend was funded from an asset revaluation, as this information would not affect investment decisions. The plaintiffs' claim for overpayment of shares was dismissed, as the court held that the plaintiffs could not rely on an indirect theory of causation to prove their loss. The court concluded that the application should be dismissed with costs, based on the reasoning outlined above.