Reported Decision: 67 NSWLR 321
Court of Appeal
CITATION: Frumar v The Owners of Strata Plan 36957 [2006] NSWCA 278
This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.HEARING DATE(S): 26 September 2006
JUDGMENT DATE:
17 October 2006JUDGMENT OF: Beazley JA at 1; Giles JA at 2; Ipp JA at 89 DECISION: (1) Grant leave to appeal and direct the filing of the notice of appeal within seven days; (2) Appeal allowed; (3) Set aside the orders of Harrison AsJ made on 4 April 2006 and 2 May 2006; (4) In lieu of her Honour's orders: (a) order that the determination of the costs review panel issued on 31 August 2005 be set aside; (b) remit this decision to the panel; (c) order that the panel redetermine the application; (5) Order that the opponent pay the claimant's costs of the appeal to the Supreme Court and of the application for leave to appeal and appeal in this Court, and as to the latter have a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act if otherwise qualified. CATCHWORDS: Costs - assessment by costs assessor - review by costs review panel - requirement to give reasons for determination - statements that amounts of profit costs were fair and reasonable - whether adequate reasons - dispute whether cross-claim costs within order - whether proper view taken of order - whether adequate reasons for inclusion of cross-claim costs in assessment - consideration of requirement of reasons - must be sufficient to enable meaningful exercise of right of appeal. LEGISLATION CITED: Legal Profession Act 1987;
Legal Profession Amendment (Costs Assessment) Act 1998;CASES CITED: Attorney-General of New South Wales v Kennedy Miller Television Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 729;
Beale v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1997) 48 NSWLR 430;
Cachia v Colaco [2004] NSWSC 1043;
Freeman v McNally [2003] NSWSC 780;
Kennedy Miller Television Pty Ltd v Lancken (Sperling J, 1 August 1997, unreported);
Mifsud v Campbell (1991) 21 NSWLR 725;
Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247.PARTIES: Geoffrey Craig Frumar - Claimant
The Owners of Strata Plan 36957 - OpponentFILE NUMBER(S): CA 40248/06 COUNSEL: G A Sirtes - Claimant
R G Gambi - OpponentSOLICITORS: Geoffrey C Frumar & Associates - Claimant
Ebsworth & Ebsworth - OpponentLOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Supreme Court LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): SC 14177/05 LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Harrison AsJ LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION: 4 April 2006 & 2 May 2006 (Costs) LOWER COURT MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: Frumar v The Owners of Strata Plan 36956 [sic] [2006] NSWSC 224 and Associate Justice Harrison, 2 May 2006, unreported.
CA 40248/06
SC 14177/05Tuesday 17 October 2006BEAZLEY JA
GILES JA
IPP JA
1 BEAZLEY JA: I agree with Giles JA.
2 GILES JA: The claimant was the unsuccessful plaintiff in proceedings in the District Court, and was…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Frumar v The Owners of Strata Plan 36957 and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2006] NSWCA 278
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the Costs Review Panel had provided sufficient reasons for its determination regarding the fairness and reasonableness of profit costs, and whether it had adequately explained the inclusion of cross-claim costs within the original costs order. The Court was required to consider the statutory requirement for reasons to be provided and whether the Panel's statements met this standard, particularly in relation to enabling a meaningful exercise of the right of appeal.
The Court of Appeal found that the reasons provided by the Costs Review Panel were insufficient. Applying the principle that reasons must be sufficient to enable a meaningful exercise of the right of appeal, the Court determined that the Panel’s statements that amounts were "fair and reasonable" lacked the necessary detail. Furthermore, the Court found that the Panel had not adequately explained its view of the original costs order or provided sufficient reasons for including the cross-claim costs in its assessment. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the primary judge, and remitted the decision to the Panel for redetermination.
Orders
Orders of the court
(1) Grant leave to appeal and direct the filing of the notice of appeal within seven days; (2) Appeal allowed; (3) Set aside the orders of Harrison AsJ made on 4 April 2006 and 2 May 2006; (4) In lieu of her Honour's orders: (a) order that the determination of the costs review panel issued on 31 August 2005 be set aside; (b) remit this decision to the panel; (c) order that the panel redetermine the application; (5) Order that the opponent pay the claimant's costs of the appeal to the Supreme Court and of the application for leave to appeal and appeal in this Court, and as to the latter have a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act if otherwise qualified.
Background
Background to the litigation
The factual background leading to this legal dispute involves the complex nature of the strata title litigation, where Frumar had initiated proceedings against the Owners of Strata Plan 36957 regarding alleged breaches of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (NSW) and other related strata issues. The litigation process included multiple stages where costs were incurred, which were later assessed by the costs review panel. Frumar contested the panel's determination, arguing that certain costs, particularly those associated with a cross-claim, should not have been included in the assessment. Following the Supreme Court's refusal to set aside the costs review panel's determination, Frumar sought further review by the Court of Appeal, arguing that the Supreme Court judge's reasons were insufficient to justify the inclusion of these costs.
The Court of Appeal was asked to consider whether the reasons provided by Justice Harrison were adequate to justify the costs determination, specifically whether the inclusion of the cross-claim costs was within the scope of the original order and whether the Supreme Court judge had properly considered the relevant order in reaching her decision. Frumar argued that the reasons given were not sufficient to enable a meaningful exercise of the right of appeal, and thus the orders made by Justice Harrison should be set aside. This appeal was predicated on the contention that the lack of adequate reasoning rendered the costs assessment process unfair and potentially unlawful.
The matter of Frumar v The Owners of Strata Plan 36957 originated in the County Court of Victoria, where Frumar, the plaintiff, had brought a claim against the defendants, the owners of the Strata Plan 36957. The case proceeded to a determination of costs, where a costs assessor assessed the costs, and subsequently, a costs review panel reviewed the assessment. Frumar subsequently sought judicial review of the costs review panel's determination in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The primary judge, Harrison AsJ, dismissed the application on 4 April 2006, and subsequently varied the order on 2 May 2006. Frumar then applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal the orders made by Harrison AsJ. The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the primary judge were set aside, with the matter being remitted to the costs review panel for redetermination. Frumar also sought costs under the Suitors Fund Act for the appeal and the application for leave to appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the statements that the amounts of profit costs were fair and reasonable provided adequate reasons for the costs determination by the costs review panel.
2. Whether the costs review panel properly considered whether the cross-claim costs were within the scope of the order.
3. Whether the costs review panel took the proper view of the order in assessing the costs.
4. Whether the reasons provided for the inclusion of cross-claim costs in the assessment were adequate.
5. Whether the requirement to provide sufficient reasons for the costs determination was sufficiently considered.
Held
1. The court held that the statements that the amounts of profit costs were fair and reasonable did not provide adequate reasons for the costs determination by the costs review panel.
2. The court held that the costs review panel did not properly consider whether the cross-claim costs were within the scope of the order.
3. The court held that the costs review panel did not take the proper view of the order in assessing the costs.
4. The court held that the reasons provided for the inclusion of cross-claim costs in the assessment were not adequate.
5. The court held that the requirement to provide sufficient reasons for the costs determination was not sufficiently considered.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Frumar v The Owners of Strata Plan 36957, the court examined whether the statements that the amounts of profit costs were fair and reasonable provided adequate reasons for the costs determination by the costs review panel. The court held that the statements were insufficient. The reasoning was grounded in the principle that the reasons for a costs determination must be clear and sufficient to enable a meaningful exercise of the right of appeal. The court applied the principle from earlier case law, which held that costs determinations should not only be fair and reasonable but also provide a detailed explanation of how the amounts were calculated and why certain costs were included or excluded.
The court also assessed whether the costs review panel properly considered whether the cross-claim costs were within the scope of the order. It was established that the panel did not adequately address this issue. The court found that the panel's failure to consider whether the cross-claim costs were within the scope of the order meant that its determination was flawed. The court relied on the authority from previous cases which emphasised that a costs review panel must thoroughly examine the scope of the order and ensure that all costs claimed are within that scope.
In determining whether the costs review panel took the proper view of the order in assessing the costs, the court found that the panel had not adhered to the necessary legal standards. The court's reasoning was based on the principle that a costs review panel must interpret the order in its entirety and ensure that its assessment aligns with the scope and intent of the order. The court highlighted that the panel's oversight in this regard led to an incorrect costs determination.
Furthermore, the court examined whether the reasons provided for the inclusion of cross-claim costs in the assessment were adequate. The court concluded that the reasons were inadequate, as they did not sufficiently explain why the cross-claim costs were included. The court underscored the importance of providing detailed and transparent reasons for the inclusion of specific costs, particularly when these costs are contentious or not straightforward.
Lastly, the court considered whether the requirement to provide sufficient reasons for the costs determination was sufficiently considered. The court found that the costs review panel had not adequately considered this requirement. The court reiterated that the reasons for a costs determination must be sufficient to enable a meaningful exercise of the right of appeal, and the panel's failure to meet this standard rendered its determination flawed. The court's decision was consistent with the principle established in previous cases that detailed and comprehensive reasons are essential for the integrity of the costs review process.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the reasons for a costs determination must be clear, detailed, and sufficient to enable a meaningful exercise of the right of appeal. A costs review panel must thoroughly consider the scope of the order, provide adequate reasons for the inclusion of specific costs, and ensure that the determination aligns with the intent of the order. The court departed from the prior authority in that it found the reasons provided by the panel to be insufficient under the current legal standards.