Fogg v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   FOGG -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2011] WASCA 11

CORAM:   McLURE P

NEWNES JA
MAZZA J

HEARD:   7 DECEMBER 2010

DELIVERED          :   18 JANUARY 2011

FILE NO/S:   CACR 59 of 2010

BETWEEN:   BRAD ALLAN DEREK FOGG

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :MURRAY J

File No  :INS 16 of 2010

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Sentencing - Offender and co­offender forced way into complainant's home - Convicted of aggravated armed robbery, deprivation of liberty and other offences - Effective sentence of 2 years' imprisonment - Offender aged 18 years - No prior convictions - Plea of guilty - Whether imprisonment should have been suspended

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Application for leave to appeal allowed
Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr J A Sutherland

Respondent:     Mr B Fiannaca SC

Solicitors:

Appellant:     McDonald & Sutherland

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

A Child v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 285

Coal and Allied Operations v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47; (2000) 203 CLR 194

Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321

Duong v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 110; (2006) 32 WAR 246

JTP v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 191

Lovatt v The State of Western Australia [2004] WASCA 265

Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665

Robinson v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 45

Satonick v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 145

The State of Western Australia v Johnson [2010] WASCA 187

The State of Western Australia v Wells [2005] WASCA 23

TL (a child) v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 173

Wood v The Queen [2002] WASCA 95; (2002) 130 A Crim R 518

  1. McLURE P:  I agree with Newnes JA that the appeal should be dismissed.  I propose to make some short additional comments.

  2. As explained by the appellant's counsel at the hearing of the appeal, the express error relied on in ground 1 is that, after indicating that a sentence of imprisonment would be imposed, the sentencing judge failed to determine the length of each term before considering and determining whether to suspend (conditionally or otherwise) the terms.  The appellant claimed this approach was inconsistent with what the High Court required in Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321. As I have explained elsewhere, Dinsdale does not in my view mandate the order in which relevant matters under s 6(4), s 39(3) and s 76 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) are to be considered: Duong v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 110 [12]. What is critical to the sentencing process is not the order in which relevant matters are considered but that all relevant matters are…

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Details
Case
[2011] WASCA 11
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Fogg v The State of Western Australia involved a dispute over the sentencing of Fogg, who was convicted of aggravated armed robbery, deprivation of liberty, and other related offences. Fogg and a co-offender had forced their way into a complainant's home while armed. The case focused on whether the sentencing judge was correct in imposing a term of immediate imprisonment of two years, or if the sentence should have been suspended. The appeal raised questions about the discretion of the sentencing judge under Section 39(2) and (3) of the Sentencing Act and the effect of concessions made by the State during sentencing.

The legal issues centred on the interpretation of the Sentencing Act, particularly Section 39(3), which mandates that a court must not use a sentencing option unless satisfied it is not appropriate to use any of the options listed before that option. The court needed to determine whether the sentencing judge had correctly exercised the discretion to impose a term of immediate imprisonment. The appeal also examined whether the concessions made by the State during sentencing influenced the judge's decision improperly.

The court found that the sentencing judge had correctly exercised the discretion to impose a term of immediate imprisonment. The decision to suspend the sentence or not lies within the sentencing judge's discretion, and the court could not find that the decision was unreasonable or unjust. The concessions made by the State were noted, but the court held that the sentencing judge was not bound by these and had to make an independent determination based on all relevant considerations. The court concluded that the sentencing judge's decision was within the sound exercise of the sentencing discretion.

The final orders of the court were to uphold the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge. The appeal was dismissed, and the term of immediate imprisonment was confirmed as appropriate.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 39(2) of the Sentencing Act sets out the sentencing options. The ultimate option is a term of immediate imprisonment and the two preceding it are conditional suspended imprisonment and suspended imprisonment respectively. Under s 39(3) a court must not use a sentencing option in subs (2) unless satisfied that it is not appropriate to use any of the options listed before that option. Thus, a sentencing judge has to be positively satisfied that suspension of the term of imprisonment is not appropriate before a term of immediate imprisonment can be imposed. The term 'appropriate' in its statutory context signifies the conclusion reached by the decision‑maker after the exercise of the sentencing discretion. The concept of a discretion is explained by the High Court in Coal and Allied Operations v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194. Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ said:'Discretion' is a notion that 'signifies a number of different legal concepts'. In general terms, it refers to a decision-making process in which 'no one [consideration] and no combination of [considerations] is necessarily determinative of the result.' Rather, the decision-maker is allowed some latitude as to the choice of the decision to be made. The latitude may be considerable as, for example, where the relevant considerations are confined only by the subject matter and object of the legislation which confers the discretion. On the other hand, it may be quite narrow where, for example, the decision-maker is required to make a particular decision if he or she forms a particular opinion or value judgment [19]. Reasonable people may legitimately differ as to what is an appropriate sentence within the sound discretionary range. In some (limited) circumstances such as in borderline cases, different types of sentence may be reasonably open. That can be so even though the actual decision‑maker has to be positively satisfied that a lesser sentence is not appropriate. In the absence of express error, the sentencing judge's latitude as to the choice of sentence is preserved from appellate intervention by the requirement that the outcome not be unreasonable or unjust. Thus the State is correct in its submission that the question for this court is whether the sentencing judge impliedly erred in concluding that a term of immediate imprisonment was the appropriate sentencing option. A further issue of principle arising in the appeal is the consequence of a State concession before the sentencing judge as to the appropriate sentencing option. In this case counsel for the State, after identifying the different sentencing factors relevant to the co‑offender and the appellant said:[W]e would submit that there is sufficient to justify a different sentence in relation to [the appellant], one that your Honour might properly suspend on conditions (ts 21). A sentencing judge (and an appeal court) is not bound by concessions made by the Director of Public Prosecutions on behalf of the State: Wood v The Queen [2002] WASCA 95; (2002) 130 A Crim R 518 [100]. Indeed the sentencing judge is obliged to make an independent determination as to the appropriate sentence, having regard to all relevant sentencing considerations and the submissions made on behalf of the parties. Those submissions may inform, but cannot dictate, the sentencing judge's assessment and judgment as to the appropriate sentence.