Purmah v The State of Western Australia - [2024] WASCA 88

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION:   PURMAH -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2024] WASCA 88
CORAM:   BUSS P
HALL JA

HEARD:   22 JULY 2024
DELIVERED          :   31 JULY 2024
FILE NO/S:   CACR 53 of 2024
BETWEEN:   KARAN SINGH PURMAH
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction              :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram:   MIOCEVICH DCJ
File Number            :   IND 2160 of 2019

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Threats with intent to compel a person to do an act that they are lawfully entitled to abstain from doing - Where appellant threatened to publish intimate photographs of a woman with whom he had been in an online relationship - Where appellant made threats with intent to compel the complainant to promise to do work for him, pay him money, not bring legal proceedings against him and respond to his communications - Where appellant denied the offences and was convicted after trial - Whether sentence of 18 months' immediate imprisonment manifestly excessive - Whether sentencing judge erred by finding that the appellant was not remorseful - Whether sentencing judge erred by finding that a suspended sentence was not open

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA), s 338A(d)

Result:

Application to extend time refused
Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant	:	In person
Respondent	:	No appearance

Solicitors:

Appellant	:	In person
Respondent	:	Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321
Fogg v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 11
Kabambi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44
McIntyre v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 150
Nayna v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 169
Rowsell v State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 2
Singh v The Queen [2021] WASCA 135
Skipworth v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 64
Smith v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 73
The State of Western Australia v Egeland [2018] WASCA 228
The State of Western Australlia v LSM [2023] WASCA 132

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:

In 2017, the appellant commenced an online relationship with the complainant. At the appellant's request, the complainant provided nude photographs of herself. When the relationship broke down, the appellant threatened to send the photographs to her family and friends and publish them more broadly unless she complied with his demands. Those demands included that she complete his university assignments, that she give him money when she did any work and that she not bring any legal proceedings against him. Threats were made on three occasions before the complainant went to the police and the appellant was arrested and charged.
The appellant was convicted after a trial of three counts of making a threat with intent to compel the complainant to do an act that she was lawfully entitled to abstain from doing, contrary to s 338A(d) of the Criminal Code (WA) (Code). On 25 March 2024, he was sentenced to 18 months' immediate imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently. Accordingly, the total effective sentence was 18 months' immediate imprisonment. An order was made that the appellant be eligible for parole.
The appellant seeks leave to appeal against his sentence. The notice of appeal was filed on 4 June 2024. The last date for filing an appeal was 15 April 2024 and an extension is required. The delay is relatively short but no explanation for it has been provided. Whether an extension is granted depends on the merits of the grounds of appeal.
The appellant is self‑represented. In essence, the grounds are that the individual sentences of 18 months' immediate imprisonment are manifestly excessive, that the sentencing judge made an express error by finding that the appellant was not remorseful and that the sentencing judge erred by concluding that a suspended sentence was not open. The appellant also asserts that the sentencing judge failed to take into account that an immediate term of imprisonment would cause particular hardship because the appellant was likely to be highly anxious and at risk of victimisation.
Leave to appeal is required for each ground of appeal. This court cannot grant leave to appeal on a ground unless it is satisfied that the ground has a reasonable prospect of succeeding. Unless leave to appeal is granted on at least one ground of appeal, the appeal is taken to have been dismissed.[1]
[1] Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 27(1), s 27(2), s 27(3).
For the reasons that follow, none of the grounds of appeal has a reasonable prospect of succeeding. Leave to appeal must be refused on all grounds and, accordingly, the appeal is taken to be dismissed.

The facts

As the appellant was convicted after trial, it was necessary for the sentencing judge to make findings as to the facts. His Honour's findings in that regard are not disputed by the appellant. They can be summarised as follows.
In 2017, the appellant was a 27‑year‑old Mauritian citizen studying in Perth on a student visa. The complainant was a 22‑year‑old woman residing in Mauritius.[2]
[2] ts 1139.
In May 2017, the appellant and the complainant commenced a long‑distance relationship over the internet. As the relationship progressed, the appellant requested nude photographs of the complainant. The complainant complied with that request. The complainant said that she felt obliged to do this, but the sentencing judge did not make a finding that the appellant forced her to do so.[3]
[3] ts 1139.
The relationship started to break down after about 12 months and there was jealousy on both sides. Whenever they argued, the appellant would threaten to send the nude photographs to the complainant's family and friends. These threats were made in electronic messages.[4]
[4] ts 1139.
On 20 May 2018, the complainant told the appellant that the relationship was at an end. On the same day, the appellant spoke to the complainant and told her that she had to write a letter agreeing to do three things. Those things were that she had to complete all of his university assignments, give him money when she worked and never file a legal case against him. The appellant stated that unless she provided the letter, he would release the nude images of the complainant to everyone, including her family, friends and residents of the town where she lived. This threat was the subject of count one on the indictment.[5]
[5] ts 1139.
Communication continued and the appellant made further threats in relation to the release of the photographs. The complainant stopped responding to the appellant. On 25 May 2018, the appellant sent a message on the WhatsApp platform stating that he would post the nude images of the complainant on Facebook unless she replied to him. This threat was the subject of count 2 on the indictment.[6]
[6] ts 1139.
The appellant continued to make threats to the complainant and on 5 June 2018, sent a message by email to her. In that email, he stated that he would place the nude photographs on a public website. He said, 'I will add everyone to see you're a prostitute in the entire world on pornographic films if you don't talk to me now'. The website he referred to was one that the appellant said he had created.[7]
[7] ts 1139 - 1140.
The State accepted that the appellant did not in fact distribute the nude photographs. He did, however, go to considerable lengths to persuade the complainant that he would do so and that he had in fact done so.[8] This included sending her images that purported to show that the photographs had been loaded onto websites that were accessible by others.[9] He also sent messages encouraging the complainant to kill herself.[10]
[8] ts 1140.
[9] ts 1117, 1119.
[10] ts 1118, 1141.
The complainant reported the matter to the Mauritian authorities but they declined to take any action. She then contacted Australian authorities and the matter was investigated by the Western Australia Police. This resulted in the appellant being arrested on 12 September 2019. He was interviewed and denied the offences, saying that he did not know the complainant.[11]
[11] ts 1140.
The appellant's mobile telephone was seized at the time of his arrest. An examination of that mobile telephone showed that it retained some, but not all, of the messages that the appellant had sent to the complainant and also nude images of the complainant.[12]
[12] ts 1140.
The appellant entered pleas of not guilty to the charges and the matter proceeded to trial. The trial was listed on four occasions and vacated before commencing on 26 February 2024. Two of the trial dates were vacated at the appellant's request.[13]
[13] ts 1137, 1140.

Personal circumstances

The appellant was 27 years old at the time of the offences and 33 years old at the time of sentencing. He was born in Mauritius and did his schooling in that country. His parents continue to reside in Mauritius. He has a sister who lives in Western Australia with her family. His parents have travelled to Australia for holidays.[14]
[14] ts 1126, 1139, 1141.
The appellant completed high school in 2010 and then moved to Canada in 2011, where he remained for two years.[15]
[15] ts 1125.
In 2013, the appellant travelled to Australia to study nursing on a student visa. He completed a course in nursing which qualified him as an enrolled nurse. In 2016, the appellant started studying a Bachelor of Business and was part of the way through that course when he was charged with these offences. It was in relation to that course that he sought to coerce the assistance of the complainant to complete his assignment work.[16]
[16] ts 1125 - 1126, 1140.
Whilst studying the appellant commenced work with a pharmacy chain store. He originally worked part time and later progressed to full time. He remained working at that pharmacy business until he was sentenced.[17]
[17] ts 1125, 1142.
After being charged with these offences on 12 September 2018, the appellant's student visa was cancelled. He was then placed on a bridging visa and then a criminal justice visa. As a result, he placed his studies on hold and commenced working longer hours at the pharmacy.[18]
[18] ts 1126.
The appellant was not in a relationship at the time of sentencing and has no dependants. He has no prior criminal record. His sister provided a reference attesting to his good character.[19]
[19] ts 1125 - 1126, 1138, 1142.

Victim impact

The complainant provided a victim impact statement. In it she referred to feeling mentally tortured and blackmailed. She said that she felt hopeless knowing that the pictures could be released to her family and neighbours. She stated that in her community a girl's reputation was very precious and because of that she felt obliged to talk to the appellant so that he would not share the photographs.
The impact of the offences on the complainant included an inability to concentrate on her studies, suicidal thoughts, feelings of embarrassment, depression and sleeplessness. She described the time the offences occurred as 'the worse phase of my life'. Even with the passage of years, she still felt uncomfortable to communicate with or be in front of people who she believed may have seen the pictures and this impacted her social life. She feared that the appellant may try to harm her or her family if he returned to Mauritius.

The sentencing proceedings

In a pre‑sentence report, it was stated that the appellant 'struggles to explain his behaviour and presents as self‑victimising'.[20] The appellant provided an account of the offences to the report writer that was inconsistent with the sentencing judge's findings. In that account, he claimed that the complainant had agreed to assist him with his assignments for a fee of $2,000. He claimed that it was at the instigation of the complainant that she sent nude photographs and that she had ridiculed him and questioned his sexual identity. He said that she then refused to help him further with his assignments and he became fearful of failure and that it was in that context that he made the first threat. The pre‑sentence report author noted that the appellant 'feels he has been wronged by the victim' and that 'he has expressed regret in terms of the impact his behaviour has had for himself and is fearful of what the outcome might be'.[21]
[20] Pre-sentence report, 1.
[21] Pre-sentence report, 1 - 2.
Under the heading of 'Health', the pre‑sentence report states: [22]
Whilst [the appellant] does not appear to have issues of concern in respect of either his physical or mental health at present. He is likely to be highly anxious and at risk of victimisation if a custodial sentence is to result and would warrant close monitoring in that event.
[22] Pre-sentence report, 3.
The appellant provided a letter to the sentencing judge. In that letter, the appellant stated: [23]
Upon reflecting on our recent interactions, I have come to realize the impact of my behaviour and I am truly sorry for any discomfort or frustration the complainant have [sic] experienced as a result.
I acknowledge that the words used were hurtful were [sic] and I take full responsibility of [sic] the messages whether by myself or someone else.
It was not my intention to compel the complainant in any bad ways, and I deeply regret any harm that may have come from it. I take full responsibility of [sic] my actions and understand the importance of treating others with respect and consideration at all [sic].
[23] Letter to Miocevich DCJ, dated 22 March 2024, 1.
The appellant went on to say that he had been unable to participate in in‑person programs but had taken free online quizzes on domestic violence and anger management. He said that he would use the experience as an opportunity for personal growth and reflection. He then said, 'I sincerely hope complainant forgive me and any other person responsible involved and that we move on better terms'.[24] The 'other person' referred to was not identified.
[24] Letter to Miocevich DCJ, dated 22 March 2024, 1.
In the course of sentencing submissions, the appellant's lawyer stated that the appellant had had 'an eleventh‑hour change of heart' and that he had now accepted that he had committed the offences. The sentencing judge noted the contents of the pre‑sentence report and the appellant's letter and said that he did not accept that the appellant was genuinely remorseful. His Honour noted that the appellant still appeared to believe that he was the victim.[25]
[25] ts 1126 - 1127, 1141.
The appellant's counsel acknowledged that the conduct of the appellant was deplorable and said that the appellant knew that 'deep down' but that he was a person who was unable to accept that he had done these things and that was why he had given conflicting versions of the events.[26]
[26] ts 1128.
It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the delay between charging and the trial was evidence of rehabilitation in that the appellant had committed no further offences in that time. The sentencing judge noted that during that period, the appellant had been subject to protective bail conditions, preventing him from contacting the complainant and that there was nothing to indicate that he had displayed genuine insight into the wrongfulness of his conduct.[27]
[27] ts 1129 - 1130, 1134.

Sentencing remarks

The sentencing judge referred to the explanation advanced by the appellant and said that he rejected that explanation. He noted that the appellant did not give evidence at the trial and did not give that explanation to the police in his interview. His Honour said that the explanation did not fit with 'the clear evidence of the messages between the two of you'. His Honour said that this indicated that the appellant was not truly remorseful for his actions and that he was engaging in 'victim blaming'.[28]
[28] ts 1140, 1145.
In regard to the seriousness of the offences, the sentencing judge said:[29]
This was a young girl who you were in a long distance relationship with, who, at the very least, trusted you with intimate images of herself.
You abused that trust and you would - whenever you would argue, you'd threaten to release those images to friends and family as a way of controlling her behaviour. This was a form of domestic violence. This court has an intolerance and an abhorrence of domestic violence and threatened violence in relationships and former relationships.
Your acts were intended to compel the victim to do things she was entitled not to do. She is not your property. You do not own her and you cannot control her. This was persistent, premeditated, calculated offending on your part. There were serious consequences for the victim if she did not comply with your demands.
There were significant efforts made by you to make [the complainant] believe you would carry out your threats. You knew the effects your threats would make on her, given the importance [the complainant] would place on her reputation, including threats or messages as to her hanging herself.
Taking into account all the circumstances, your offending on this occasion was particularly serious.
[29] ts 4 ‑ 5.
The sentencing judge referred to the appellant's personal circumstances and to the pre‑sentence report. In that regard, his Honour made specific mention of that part of the pre‑sentence report that referred to the appellant being highly anxious and at risk of victimisation if a custodial sentence was imposed. His Honour noted that the appellant had no prior record and that he was of previous good character. However, his Honour said that he could not treat the offending as an uncharacteristic aberration, given that the threats were repeated.[30]
[30] ts 1141 - 1142.
The sentencing judge concluded that only an immediate term of imprisonment for each of the offences was appropriate. His Honour considered whether the total sentence could be suspended. In that regard, he said:[31]
Given the seriousness of the offending, your complete lack of remorse and victim blaming, I am positively satisfied that it is not appropriate to suspend the terms of imprisonment imposed.
[31] ts 1145.
The sentencing judge then imposed sentences of 18 months' immediate imprisonment on each count and ordered that those sentences be served concurrently. The total effective sentence was, therefore, 18 months' immediate imprisonment. An order that the appellant be eligible for parole was made. The appellant had spent no time in custody prior to sentencing so no backdating of the sentence was required.[32]
[32] ts 1145.

Grounds of appeal

There are three grounds of appeal:[33]
1.An individual sentence is manifestly excessive having regard to the circumstances of the offense [sic] and the personal circumstances of the appellant - myself Karan Singh Purmah.
2.The Judge overlooked or made a mistake about my personal circumstances and that affected the sentence I was given.
3.Other sentences were reasonably open such as a suspended sentence.
[33] Appellant's case, filed 20 June 2024, 2.
We have taken ground 1 as being an allegation that the individual sentences of 18 months' imprisonment on each count were manifestly excessive. It is apparent from the appellant's written submissions that ground 2 refers to the appellant's expression of remorse in his letter and to the potential impact of imprisonment referred to in the pre‑sentence report. We have taken ground 3 to be an allegation that it was not reasonably open to the sentencing judge to conclude that a suspended sentence was excluded in the circumstances of this case.

Merits of the appeal

As ground 2 alleges an express error, it is convenient to deal with that ground first. It is plainly not the case that the sentencing judge overlooked the appellant's letter or the contents of the pre‑sentence report. His Honour referred to both of those documents in some detail. There was no failure on the part of the sentencing judge to understand the purport of those documents. Nor is there any reason to think that he failed to take them into account and give them such weight as he considered appropriate.

It was plainly open to the sentencing judge to come to the conclusion that notwithstanding the appellant's expressions of remorse in the letter, he was not genuinely remorseful. That conclusion was supported by the terms of the letter and the explanation of the offending provided to the pre‑sentence report author. Whilst the appellant expressed in the letter that he was sorry and took responsibility for his actions, there were other statements that he made which stood in stark contrast, including seeking to apportion at least some of the blame to the complainant, positioning himself as the victim and referring to the responsibility of an unnamed 'other'.
This court has said on other occasions that an expression of remorse by an offender does not have to be taken at face value.[34] Whether remorse is genuine is a judgment that the sentencing judge has to make bearing in mind all of the relevant circumstances, including what other things the offender has said, done or not done.[35] There is no reason for thinking that the sentencing judge in this case made any error in that regard.
[34] Rowsell v State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 2 [17].
[35] The State of Western Australia v Egeland [2018] WASCA 228 [39].
The appellant also refers in his written submissions to the impact that imprisonment would have on him. He submits that the sentencing judge did not take into account the statement made in the pre‑sentence report referred to at [27]. That is incorrect. The sentencing judge did refer to this in his sentencing remarks. In any event, if it has any significance at all it is in assessing whether the sentences were manifestly excessive.
There is no merit in ground 2.
As to ground 1, the relevant principles relating to appeals against sentence where there is a claim that a sentence is manifestly excessive are well established. Those principles have been stated many times and have been conveniently summarised in Kabambi v The State of Western Australia.[36] It is not necessary to repeat them.
[36] Kabambi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44 [21].
The maximum penalty for an offence of making a threat with intent to compel the doing of an act by a person who is lawfully entitled to abstain from doing that act is 7 years' imprisonment.[37]
[37] Code, s 338A(d), s 338A(f)(ii).
The offending in this case was serious because it involved the making of threats to effectively destroy the reputation of the complainant if she did not do things that the appellant wanted her to do. The appellant had obtained access to intimate images of the complainant by reason of their relationship. He threatened to publish the images to her family, friends and the broader Mauritian community unless she completed his university coursework, promised to pay him money, promised not to commence legal proceedings against him and responded to his messages when he demanded that she do so. He ruthlessly exploited personal information in an attempt to obtain benefits for himself.
Whilst the appellant was to be sentenced on the basis that he did not actually distribute the messages, he plainly wanted the complainant to believe that he would and, in fact, that he had done so. He knew that publication of those photographs would cause great distress to the complainant. Further, he knew that his threats to publish caused the complainant distress and he urged her to commit suicide. Fortunately, the complainant had the strength of character to resist the appellant and report the matter. However, the offending has had a serious impact on the complainant.
This was not the case of an isolated offence, but a course of conduct which may be properly characterised as an abusive relationship. The three offences occurred in the context of that relationship. The appellant sought to control the complainant by threatening to inflict, and actually inflicting, harm upon her.
There was nothing in the personal history of the appellant that mitigated the offending. Whilst the appellant had no prior criminal history, his good character is offset by the fact that this was not isolated offending and could not be said to be an aberration. The appellant did not have the mitigating factor of pleas of guilty. It was not accepted that there was evidence of rehabilitation or genuine remorse. Indeed, the appellant's attempt to express remorse betrayed his true feelings that he considered himself to be the victim. There was plainly a need for both personal and general deterrence to be reflected in the penalty. The suggested impact of imprisonment on the appellant was not such as to justify the imposition of a sentence different from that imposed.
The appellant did not refer to any comparable cases. It is not a barrier to this court arriving at a conclusion that a sentence was manifestly excessive that there are no directly comparable cases. In such circumstances, this court will have regard to the maximum penalty for the offence, the seriousness of the offence and the personal circumstances of the appellant.
There are some cases that deal with sentences for threat offences, usually threats to kill, but they are cases where threats have occurred in the context of other offending.[38] Furthermore none of those cases are factually similar to the present case. That does not mean that offences like this can be considered unlikely to recur. There is increasing use of the internet and social media to conduct relationships. The exchange of intimate images is relatively common for those who conduct relationships in this way. The potential for image‑based abuse is real and requires that general deterrence be incorporated into sentencing for matters of this nature.
[38] For example, The State of Western Australlia v LSM [2023] WASCA 132.
In the sentencing proceedings, the case of Singh v The Queen[39] was referred to. In that case, the appellant was convicted on his plea of guilty of one count of using a carriage service in a way that reasonable persons would regard as being in all the circumstances menacing, harassing or offensive and which involved the transmission, publication and distribution of private sexual material contrary to s 474.17A(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth). The maximum penalty for that offence is 5 years' imprisonment and/or a fine not exceeding $63,000.
[39] Singh v The Queen [2021] WASCA 135.
Although Singh involved a different offence, the facts were similar. In that case, the offender had been in an intimate relationship with a woman, which later broke down. Over a two‑week period the offender communicated abusive and threatening messages to the victim. Amongst other things, he threatened to send photographs of himself and the victim having sex to a member of her family. He carried through on that threat and later threatened to send more such photographs. He later uploaded similar material to a public online pornographic website, along with the victim's personal identity documents, showing her full name and personal details. He made an online complaint to the victim's employer, falsely alleging that she had prostituted herself, was blackmailing him and had taken his credit cards. He sent screenshots of what he had done to the victim. When arrested, the offender admitted the offending and pleaded guilty at the first reasonable opportunity.
In Singh, a sentence of 20 months' immediate imprisonment with a pre‑release period of 10 months was imposed. An appeal against that sentence was dismissed, with this court stating that the sentence was commensurate with the seriousness of the offending.
The fact that the offence in Singh was different in nature and had a different maximum penalty to the offences of which the appellant was convicted makes it an inappropriate comparator. In Singh, the offence was to use a carriage service in a way that was menacing, harassing or offensive. It was not an element of that offence that any threats were made in order to cause the complainant to act in a way that she was entitled not to do. In Singh, the offender was convicted of one offence that had a maximum penalty of 5 years' imprisonment, whereas the appellant committed three offences, each of which had a maximum penalty of 7 years' imprisonment. Furthermore, as the sentencing judge noted, while the appellant was not to be sentenced on the basis that he distributed any of the images (unlike the offender in Singh), he went to considerable effort to convince the complainant that he would do so, and that he had in fact done so.
Having regard to the maximum penalty, the circumstances of the offence and the personal circumstances of the appellant, the sentences of 18 months' immediate imprisonment on each count were plainly open to the sentencing judge. The sentences of 18 months' immediate imprisonment imposed on each count were not unreasonable or plainly unjust.
There is no merit in ground 1.
As to ground 3, a sentencing judge must not impose a term of immediate imprisonment unless satisfied having regard to the sentencing principles set out in div 1 of pt 2 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) that it is not appropriate to impose suspended or conditional suspended imprisonment.[40] A sentencing judge must be positively satisfied that it is not appropriate to suspend or conditionally suspend a term of imprisonment before the term can be ordered to be served immediately. In a borderline case, it may be reasonably open to impose different types of sentences.[41] The discretion to suspend or conditionally suspend a term of imprisonment is not confined by considerations relating to rehabilitation.[42] The objective features of an offence may in a particular case outweigh the personal considerations of rehabilitation.[43]
[40] Sentencing Act, s 39(2), s 39(3).
[41] See Skipworth v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 64; Fogg v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 11 [9].
[42] See Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321.
[43] Dinsdale [86].
The critical question in an appeal such as the present is whether it was reasonably open to the sentencing judge to be positively satisfied that a suspended or conditionally suspended term of imprisonment was not an appropriate sentencing option, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the particular case and all relevant sentencing factors and principles.[44]
[44] See McIntyre v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 150 [19]; Nayna v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 169 [53]; Smith v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 73 [25].
In the present case, it was plainly open to the sentencing judge to be positively satisfied that suspended or conditionally suspended imprisonment was not an appropriate sentencing option. The seriousness of the offences, the repeated nature of the threats and the lack of any real mitigating factors, justified that conclusion. The imposition of an immediate sentence of imprisonment was not unreasonable or plainly unjust.
There is no merit in ground 3.

Conclusion

In the circumstances the application to extend time should be refused, leave to appeal should be refused on all grounds and the appeal dismissed.

Orders

1.Application to extend time refused.
2.Leave to appeal refused.
3.Appeal dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
ID
Associate to the Honourable Justice Hall
31 JULY 2024