Garlett v Director of Public Prosecutions

[2021] WASC 353

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CRIMINAL

CITATION:   GARLETT -v- DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS [2021] WASC 353

CORAM:   MCGRATH J

HEARD:   14 OCTOBER 2021

DELIVERED          :   20 OCTOBER 2021

FILE NO/S:   SJA 1029 of 2021

BETWEEN:   WESLEY PAUL GARLETT

Appellant

AND

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   MAGISTRATE G RANDAZZO

File Number            :   MI 3399 of 2021; MI 3400 of 2021; MI 3404 of 2021 and MI 3405 of 2021

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal - Being armed with a dangerous weapon in a way that may cause fear - Appeal against immediate term of imprisonment - Whether sentence manifestly excessive - Express error - Breach of procedural fairness - Appeal dismissed

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 14(2)
Criminal Code (WA), s 68(1), s 172(2), s 444(1)(b)
Criminal Investigation (Identifying People) Act 2002 (WA), s 16(8)
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 6(1), s 6(2), s 6(4), s 9AA, s 39(2), s 39(3), s 76(1), s 76(2)

Result:

Leave to appeal not granted on grounds 1 and 2
Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant	:	Mr A G Elliott
Respondent	:	Ms H K Watson

Solicitors:

Appellant	:	William Gerard Legal
Respondent	:	Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Cartwright v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 4

Chan v The Queen (1989) 38 A Crim R 337

Chow v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 28 NSWLR 593

Cleminson v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 58

Crotty v Peck [2021] WASC 51

Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321

Fogg v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 11

Golding v Gaunt [2020] WASC 361

Hayward v Martin [2014] WASC 309

Hume v Jefferd [2018] WASC 272

King v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 131

Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550

Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665

Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357

Munda v The State of Western Australia [2013] HCA 38; (2013) 249 CLR 600

Parker v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 28 NSWLR 282

Roberts v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 239

Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473

Teakle v The State of Western Australia (2007) 33 WAR 188

MCGRATH J:

Introduction

1. The appellant was convicted on his own plea of one offence of being armed with a dangerous weapon in circumstances that were likely to cause fear to any person contrary to s 68(1) of the Criminal Code (WA). The learned magistrate imposed a 7 month term of immediate imprisonment.

2. The appellant now seeks leave to appeal against the sentence of immediate imprisonment on two grounds.  First, the appellant contends that the learned magistrate imposed a sentence that was manifestly excessive in that a different type of sentence should have been imposed, namely a suspended term of imprisonment or a community based order.

3. Second, the appellant contends that the learned magistrate made an error of law, or there was a miscarriage of justice occasioned, by denying the appellant procedural fairness during the sentencing hearing.

4. For the following reasons, I have determined that leave to appeal is not granted on either ground 1 or 2 and that the appeal should be dismissed.

5. In these reasons for decision I will consider the following:

   1.The Magistrates Court proceedings.

   2.The grounds of appeal.

   3.The merits of the appeal. 

The Magistrates Court proceedings

1. On 10 May 2021, the appellant appeared in the Magistrates Court, represented by counsel, and pleaded guilty to the charge of being armed with a dangerous weapon in circumstances likely to cause fear. In addition, the appellant pleaded guilty to three other charges, being giving false details to police contrary to s 16(8) of the Criminal Investigation (Identifying People) Act 2002 (WA),[1] criminal damage contrary to s 444(1)(b) of the Criminal Code,[2] and obstructing a police officer contrary to s 172(2) of the Criminal Code.[3]  The learned magistrate imposed fines in respect of the three offences.[4]  The appellant does not appeal the sentences imposed on the further charges.

   [1] MI 3400/2021.

   [2] MI 3404/2021.

   [3] MI 3405/2021.

   [4] ts 12 (10/05/2021).

2. The facts upon which the appellant was sentenced are as follows:[5]

   With the charge of being armed in a way that may cause fear.  12.19 pm on 6 May this year, the accused is walking southbound on Roe Highway approximately 500 metres south of Maida Vale Road in High Wycombe.  While there, the accused is armed with a pitchfork which resulted in multiple calls from the public to the police, fearful of the actions the accused may commit.  Police attended and engaged with the accused, directing him to drop the pitchfork.

   The accused turned and was initially aggressive towards police but became compliant after a short interaction with police.  He was subsequently arrested and taken to a police station.  And when at the police station he was asked to provide his personal details, he provided the name of Axel Foley Barry Garlett Exell and a different date of birth.  No person matched this name and date of birth found on the police information database.

   He was informed it was an offence to provide false details to police and that they are required to provide those details to police.  The accused continued to state that false name and date of birth.  Subsequently, he was taken to Perth watchhouse where he stated his actual name is Wesley Paul Garlett and correct date of birth.  For the charge of criminal damage, 6 May this year the accused is detained at Perth watchhouse.  At 7.19 pm, the accused was inside holding cell D1.  The accused was given a mattress and blanket.  Whilst the accused was seated inside the cell, the accused used his hands to tear a piece of the blanket.

   …

   The accused used a torn piece of blanket to wrap it around his foot.  The action was recorded on CCTV and the blanket was removed from  the accused.  The blanket is property of [the] [C]ommissioner of [P]olice and the accused did not have permission to damage the blanket.  Explanation provided was, 'I will get out of here somehow.'  There is a request of reparation of $50.

   And a further charge of obstruction subsequent to that, the accused was moved to another cell due to having concerns for his welfare.  Police had cause to place the accused in safety clothing and request the accused to remove his clothing and place the safety clothing on himself.  The accused refused and walked to the rear of the cell.  Several police officers had to use physical force to remove the accused's clothing.

   The accused resisted the officers by actively resisting and using his body weight to prevent officers from removing the accused's clothing.  Subsequently, he was placed on the ground and his clothing was removed.  His actions were captured on CCTV. 

   [5] ts 4 - 5 (10/05/2021).

3. In mitigation counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant had spent five days in custody in respect of the offending and that he pleaded guilty at the first reasonable opportunity.[6]  Counsel submitted that the appropriate disposition, given the circumstances of the offending, was a community based order or a fine.[7]

   [6] ts 7 (10/05/2021).

   [7] ts 5 - 6 (10/05/2021).

4. The learned magistrate made a number of factual findings including that the appellant was armed with a pitchfork, which was a dangerous weapon, and that the offence occurred in a suburban area of metropolitan Perth.[8]  Further, that multiples calls were made to the police from civilians and that clearly the conduct of the appellant caused fear.  In addition, upon the arrival of the police the appellant was initially aggressive before becoming compliant.[9]  The learned magistrate accepted that the appellant was under the influence of methylamphetamine at the time that he committed the offence.[10]

   [8] ts 9 (10/05/2021).

   [9] ts 9 (10/05/2021).

   [10] ts 9 (10/05/2021).

5. The learned magistrate gave a discount of 20% for the plea of guilty pursuant to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA). The learned magistrate observed the criminal record of the appellant showed a continuing pattern of disobedience to the law and that therefore, personal deterrence was a significant sentencing factor.[11]  His Honour referred to a number of sentencing authorities and principles including that the imposition of a term of imprisonment was the sentence of last resort.  His Honour stated that a community based disposition or fine would be wholly inappropriate having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offending in light of the appellant's antecedents.[12]  His Honour then expressly considered whether the term of imprisonment should be suspended, determining that it 'was wholly inappropriate' to suspend the term.

   [11] ts 11 (10/05/2021).

   [12] ts 12 (10/05/2021).

Appeal

1. The appellant relies upon two grounds of appeal in the following terms:[13]

   [13] Notice of Appeal filed 12 May 2021.

   1.The learned magistrate made an error of law by imposing a sentence on the Appellant for the offence which was, in all the circumstances, manifestly excessive.

   2.The learned magistrate made an error of law, or there was a miscarriage of justice occasioned, by denying the Appellant procedural fairness.

   Particulars

   i.      The appellant was represented by the duty lawyer.

   ii.The duty lawyer requested that the offence be dealt with by way of a fine or community based order.

   iii.The learned magistrate did not during the duty lawyer's submissions indicate that he was considering imposing a term of imprisonment.

   iv.The prosecutor did not make any submissions in response to the duty lawyer's requested disposition.

   v.The learned magistrate's failure to indicate that he was considering imposing a term of imprisonment denied the Appellant procedural fairness in that, through his counsel, he was:

   a.Deprived of the opportunity to request an adjournment in order to take further instructions on the Appellant's background and the availability of any supporting materials such as letters of support.

   b.Deprived of the opportunity to make submissions on whether any term of imprisonment ought to be suspended, and whether a term of imprisonment was appropriate by reference to relevant authorities cited by the learned magistrate.

Legal principles

1. This is an appeal under pt 2 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), which means that leave to appeal is required.[14]  An appeal may be made on the basis that the court of summary jurisdiction made an error of law or fact, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, that it imposed a sentence that was inadequate or excessive, or that there has been a miscarriage of justice.[15]

   [14] Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 9(1).

   [15] Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 8.

2. The court must not grant leave to appeal unless a ground has a reasonable prospect of success.[16]  A reasonable prospect of success means that the ground has a real, rational and logical prospect of succeeding and is more than arguable.[17]

   [16] Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 9(2).

   [17] Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473 [56] (Steytler P, Wheeler & Roberts-Smith JJA).

3. The court may dismiss or allow the appeal and may set aside or vary the sentence and substitute a sentence that should have been imposed.[18] Section 14(2) of the Criminal Appeals Act provides that even if a ground of appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, the court may dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred.  That is, the appellate jurisdiction to intervene in an appeal that alleges an express error will only be enlivened if the error is material and the court determines that a different sentence should have been imposed.[19]

   [18] Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 14.

   [19] Roberts v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 239 [47].

Assessment of grounds of appeal

Ground 1

1. By ground 1 the appellant contends that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.  A sentence may be manifestly excessive because the wrong type of sentence has been imposed or because the length of the term of imprisonment is manifestly long.  To succeed on a ground pleading that a sentence is manifestly excessive requires the court to be satisfied that the sentence is unreasonable or plainly unjust.[20]

   [20] Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321, 324 - 325.

2. The appellant contends that the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment, whether immediate or suspended, was not within the learned magistrate's discretion.  That is, in all the circumstances, including those personal to the appellant, the sentence imposed was not one which was open in the exercise of a sound sentencing discretion.

3. To determine whether a sentence is excessive involves considering the maximum sentence prescribed by law for the crime, the standards of sentencing customarily observed with respect to the offence, the place which the criminal conduct occupies on a scale of seriousness of crimes of the kind in question and the personal circumstances of the offender.[21]  The range of sentences customarily imposed for a crime does not establish the range of a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion.  There is no single correct sentence.  What is important is the unifying principles which sentences in comparable cases reveal and reflect.

   [21] Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6; Chan v The Queen (1989) 38 A Crim R 337, 342 (Malcolm CJ); Munda v The State of Western Australia [2013] HCA 38; (2013) 249 CLR 600, 613.

4. Section 6(1) of the Sentencing Act requires that a sentence imposed on an offender be commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. By s 6(2) of the Sentencing Act, the seriousness of the offence must be determined by taking into account the statutory penalty for the offence, the circumstances of the commission of the offence, any aggravating and mitigating factors and the vulnerability of any victim of the offence.

5. Pursuant to s 6(4) of the Sentencing Act, a court must not impose a sentence of imprisonment on an offender unless it decides that the seriousness of the offence is such that only imprisonment can be justified or that the protection of the community requires it.

6. The relevant principles with respect to the imposition of a suspended term of imprisonment are uncontroversial.[22] The sentencing options available to the court are set out in s 39 of the Sentencing Act. The ultimate option is a term of immediate imprisonment. The two preceding options are conditional suspended imprisonment and suspended imprisonment respectively. Under s 39(3) of the Sentencing Act, a court must not use a sentencing option in s 39(2) unless satisfied that it is not appropriate to use any of the options listed before that option.

   [22] Cartwright v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 4 [8].

7. Pursuant to s 76(2) of the Sentencing Act, a suspended term of imprisonment is not to be imposed unless imprisonment for a term or terms equal to that suspended would, if it were not possible to suspend imprisonment, be appropriate in all the circumstances. Given that s 76(1) of the Sentencing Act permits suspension where a court sentences an offender to a term, or aggregate terms, of imprisonment of up to five years, suspension may be ordered in cases involving serious offending.

8. The same considerations that are relevant to the imposition of a term of imprisonment must be revisited in determining whether to suspend the term of imprisonment.[23]  That is, all circumstances must be revisited.  The court must be positively satisfied that it is not appropriate to suspend or conditionally suspend a term of imprisonment before the term can be ordered to be served immediately.

   [23] Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321 [18], [26], [84] - [85].

9. In considering ground 1, I am mindful that an appellate court must not substitute its own opinion for that of the sentencing magistrate merely because the appellate court would have exercised the sentencing discretion in a manner different from the sentencing magistrate.  There is no single correct sentence and the magistrate must be allowed as much flexibility in sentencing as is consonant with consistency of approach and as accords with the statutory regime that applies.[24]

   [24] Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665 [15]; Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357 [27].

10. I now turn to consider the factors in determining whether the sentence imposed by the learned magistrate was manifestly excessive.

Maximum penalty

1. The statutory maximum penalty for the offence is 7 years' imprisonment.[25]  The summary conviction penalty is 3 years' imprisonment and a fine of $36,000.

Personal circumstances

[25] Criminal Code (WA) s 68(1).

1. In this type of offending general deterrence is an important sentencing consideration.  Further, personal deterrence is a significant sentencing factor in respect of the appellant.

2. The appellant has a significant criminal record that includes convictions for assaulting public officers including persons working in hospitals; dishonesty offences including aggravated armed robbery, burglary and stealing motor vehicles; escaping lawful custody; criminal damage and breaching court orders including violence restraining orders.  The appellant was released from imprisonment a week and a half prior to the offending the subject of this appeal, after completing a term of imprisonment that included a six month term for being armed or pretending to be armed in public to cause fear. 

Seriousness of the offence

1. The appellant committed the offence during the day in the presence of numerous members of the public who had such concern that they informed the authorities.  The learned magistrate observed that the weapon involved, a pitchfork, was a dangerous weapon.[26]  The appellant whilst armed with the dangerous weapon was intoxicated with methylamphetamine and was initially aggressive towards the police.  Whilst the appellant did not threaten any person, this constitutes an absence of an aggravating factor.

Plea of guilty and remorse

[26] ts 9 (10/05/2021).

1. The learned magistrate afforded the appellant a 20% discount pursuant to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act for the plea of guilty at the first reasonable opportunity.  The appellant accepted responsibility for his offending and was remorseful.  Counsel for the appellant submitted in mitigation at the sentencing hearing that the appellant was committed to reconnecting with his family.

Range of sentences customarily imposed

1. The learned magistrate was of the view that given the circumstances and seriousness of the offence, and in light of the appellant's antecedents, significant weight must be given to personal deterrence and that the matter was too serious to impose a non-custodial sentence.  The learned magistrate observed that a sentence of imprisonment was a sentence of last resort and then indicated that he was positively satisfied that it was not appropriate to suspend the term of imprisonment.[27]

   [27] ts 12 (10/05/2021).

2. The appellant referred to a number of cases in his submissions including Hume v Jefferd,[28] Hayward v Martin,[29] King v The State of Western Australia,[30] and Crotty v Peck.[31]  The respondent submitted that whilst the conduct of the offender in each case was arguably more serious the cases do not support a finding that the imposition of a term of imprisonment was manifestly excessive.

   [28] Hume v Jefferd [2018] WASC 272.

   [29] Hayward v Martin [2014] WASC 309.

   [30] King v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 131.

   [31] Crotty v Peck [2021] WASC 51.

3. I have considered each of the cases.  I do not accept that the cases support the appellant's contention that a different type of sentence should be imposed.  There is no established sentencing pattern for the offence.[32]  In Hayward, Jenkins J referred to King v The State of Western Australia,[33] observing that in the cases cited therein, the sentencing outcomes ranged between 8 and 16 months' immediate imprisonment.  In each of the cited cases either a term of imprisonment or suspended term of imprisonment was imposed.

   [32] Cleminson v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 58 [30].

   [33] King v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 131 [13] - [21].

1. The appellant submitted that in each of the cited cases the offender was in close proximity to members of the public whilst the appellant was walking along a highway.  Further, he was not engaging in any other criminal behaviour, he was merely armed in public.  Counsel contended that the fact that the appellant was intoxicated with methylamphetamine was not an aggravating factor for the reason that the appellant was not in close proximity to other persons.

2. Contrary to the submissions of the appellant, his intoxication with methylamphetamine was an aggravating factor.  The risk of harm to the public was significantly increased due to the appellant being intoxicated with methylamphetamine.  The appellant, whilst not confronting any person whilst armed, did cause fear or at least real concern given that members of the public informed the authorities.  Further, the appellant was initially aggressive to the police.  Personal deterrence was a significant sentencing factor given that the appellant had only days prior to committing this offence been released from a term of imprisonment for similar offending.

3. The respondent correctly observed that the sentence imposed on the appellant was approaching the high end of an appropriate sentence.  The imposition of an immediate term of imprisonment was within the discretion of the learned magistrate. The sentence is not unreasonable or plainly unjust in all the circumstances.  Leave to appeal is not granted in respect of ground 1.

Ground 2

1. By ground 2 the appellant contends that the learned magistrate denied the appellant procedural fairness for the reason that his Honour did not inform counsel that he was considering imposing a term of imprisonment.  There is no merit in this contention.  The learned magistrate afforded the appellant procedural fairness. 

2. With respect to procedural fairness, in Kioa v West, Mason J stated:[34]

   What is appropriate in terms of natural justice depends on the circumstances of the case and they will include, inter alia, the nature of the inquiry, the subject-matter, and the rules under which the decision-maker is acting …

   In this respect the expression 'procedural fairness' more aptly conveys the notion of a flexible obligation to adopt fair procedures, which are appropriate and adapted to the circumstances of the particular case.

   [34] Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 584 - 585.

3. In Teakle v State of Western Australia, Buss JA stated:[35]

   Absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary, a statutory power conferred on a court must be exercised with procedural fairness … The rules of procedural fairness are concerned with procedures rather than outcomes, and they are therefore rules which govern what a court must do in the course of deciding how a statutory power should be exercised. In other words, the rules of procedural fairness are to be applied to the procedures by which a decision pursuant to the exercise of the statutory power will be made.

   [35] Teakle v The State of Western Australia (2007) 33 WAR 188, 205.

4. A court must afford an offender procedural fairness during the sentencing hearing.  In the context of a sentencing hearing, a court must be, and appear to be, impartial, and must provide each party to the proceedings before it with an opportunity to be heard, to advance their respective cases, and to answer the case put against them.  His Honour did so.

5. A magistrate must make a determination as to the appropriate sentence having regard to all relevant sentencing considerations.  Submissions by counsel may assist the magistrate.  The submissions may inform, but cannot dictate, the sentencing magistrate's assessment and judgment as to the appropriate sentence.[36]

   [36] Fogg v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 11 [12].

6. Circumstances that arise in a particular sentencing hearing may have the consequence that procedural fairness requires that considerations of importance to the judicial officer's determination should be drawn to the attention of the parties affected or their counsel so that a fair opportunity is presented for contrary argument to persuade the judicial officer to a different view.[37]

   [37] Parker v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 28 NSWLR 282, 296 (Kirby P).

7. In Chow v Director of Public Prosecutions, Kirby P stated:[38]

   [C]ircumstances may exist where a failure on the part of a judge to disclose matters of concern, or a course of conduct contemplated, will [itself] amount to a departure from the rules of procedural fairness … There is a fine line between excessive and unjudicial intervention (on the one hand) and candid disclosure of matters of concern to invite response (on the other).

   [38] Chow v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 28 NSWLR 593, 606.

8. The present case was not one in which the learned magistrate was required to positively state that he was considering imposing a term of imprisonment.  The appellant relied upon Golding v Gaunt[39] in support of this ground.  In Golding v Gaunt I observed that in the specific circumstances of the case, the learned magistrate was obliged, as a matter of procedural fairness, to alert the defence counsel that she did not necessarily accept the position agreed to by the parties, being that a suspended term of imprisonment was an appropriate disposition.[40]  I determined that procedural fairness had not been denied as defence counsel had been so alerted.[41] 

   [39] Golding v Gaunt [2020] WASC 361.

   [40] Golding v Gaunt [2020] WASC 361 [34].

   [41] Golding v Gaunt [2020] WASC 361 [35].

9. In the present case the appellant was represented by counsel who requested an adjournment to take further instructions.[42]  Having done so counsel informed the learned magistrate that the appellant intended to  plead guilty.  Counsel then delivered a plea in mitigation that primarily addressed the appropriate disposition.  Counsel submitted that the appropriate disposition was a community based order or a fine.  In support of that submission counsel stated that the offence did not involve any direct threat to any person.  It is abundantly clear that counsel understood that the offence of being armed with a dangerous weapon in circumstances that were likely to cause fear was an offence that may be dealt with by the imposition of an immediate term of imprisonment.  Accordingly, counsel addressed that possibility by expressly making submissions concerning the type of sentence that was appropriate.  The learned magistrate engaged in discourse with counsel.  His Honour then delivered detailed, meticulous sentencing remarks. 

   [42] ts 2 (10/05/2021).

10. The appellant contends that the learned magistrate referred to a number of authorities during his remarks and should have alerted counsel to those authorities during discourse.  That submission is misconceived.  The learned magistrate stated that 'there is no customary sentence or tariff to be imposed in respect of any of these offences'.  His Honour then stated that he is ‘conscious of decisions of single judges of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal’ and then cited three cases.  It was not necessary for the learned magistrate to alert counsel to the three cited cases.

11. Further, it was not necessary for the learned magistrate to inform counsel, prior to delivering his sentencing remarks, as contended by the appellant, that the type of sentence that was to be imposed was a term of immediate imprisonment. 

12. The appellant was afforded procedural fairness at the sentencing hearing.  His counsel, being aware that imprisonment may be imposed for this type of offending, made submissions in support of alternative sentencing options available under the Sentencing Act.  The learned magistrate exercised his discretion to impose an immediate term of imprisonment. Leave to appeal is not granted in respect of ground 2.

Conclusion

1. Accordingly, given that leave to appeal is not granted in respect of grounds 1 and 2, the appeal is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

AS

Associate to the Honourable Justice McGrath

20 OCTOBER 2021