Fittock v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner (No 2)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court: Civil)

FITTOCK v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER (No 2)

[2015] SASCFC 167

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Sulan, The Honourable Justice Blue and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)

19 November 2015

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE - DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEALS

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE - PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT AND UNSATISFACTORY PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT - GENERALLY

The appellant was found guilty of three counts of unprofessional conduct.  The conduct related to the non-payment of fees owing to a psychologist who had been instructed by the practitioner's firm on behalf of the client.

Count 1 alleged that the practitioner failed to take any or any adequate action to protect the client from the psychologist's recovery for fees claim.  The psychologist had threatened to sue the client and default judgment was subsequently entered in the Magistrates Court.  Count 2 alleged that the practitioner had misused the client's trust money.  Count 3 alleged that the practitioner had allowed his interests to conflict with the client's interests.

The Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal found him guilty of unprofessional conduct on the first count, and imposed a $15,000 fine and costs order.  The Tribunal did not address or make any findings on counts 2 and 3.

The practitioner appealed.  He contended that he took adequate action to protect his client from threatened and actual fee recovery proceedings.  The practitioner further contended that his conduct did not constitute unprofessional conduct.

Held, allowing the appeal (the Court):

1.  The Court sets aside the decision of the Tribunal that the practitioner was guilty of unprofessional conduct, and substitutes a finding of unsatisfactory conduct as to counts 1 and 2.

2.  The order of a fine of $15,000 is set aside.

3.  Count 3 is dismissed.

4.  The practitioner is reprimanded.

5.  The order for costs is not set aside.

Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 5 (definition of 'unprofessional conduct') (repealed), s 5 (definition of 'unsatisfactory conduct') (repealed), s 82(2), s 82(6), s 82(6)(a) (amended); Legal Practitioners (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2013 (SA) Sch 2, s 14(2); Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice r 9.1.1 (repealed); Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice r 26; Solicitors' Conduct Rules r 12.1, referred to.
Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union (1979) 27 ALR 367; Palser v Grinling [1948] AC 291, discussed.
BT Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266; Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337; Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 QB 750, considered.

WORDS AND PHRASES CONSIDERED/DEFINED

"substantial"

FITTOCK v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER (No 2)
[2015] SASCFC 167

Civil:       Sulan, Blue and Nicholson JJ

  1. THE COURT:      This is an appeal against a decision of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal in respect of the conduct of Laurence John Fittock, a solicitor. The conduct related to a…

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Details
Case
[2015] SASCFC 167
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia considered an appeal by a legal practitioner against a finding of unprofessional conduct and a penalty imposed by the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal. The dispute arose from the practitioner's engagement of a psychologist, Ms Koulos, to provide medico-legal reports for his personal injury clients. The practitioner argued that he was acting as an agent for his clients and was therefore not personally liable for Ms Koulos' fees, particularly in circumstances where the clients were on a "no win no fee" basis and the firm's fee agreement stipulated that disbursements were the client's responsibility.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether the practitioner had engaged in unprofessional conduct by failing to adequately inform Ms Koulos of the payment arrangements for her services, and whether the Tribunal had erred in its imposition of a fine and an order for costs. Specifically, the Court had to determine the practitioner's personal liability for Ms Koulos' fees, considering the terms of the retainer, the firm's standard fee agreement, and the relevant professional conduct rules in force at the time. The Court also considered whether the practitioner's impecuniosity, as an undischarged bankrupt, should have influenced the Tribunal's decision regarding costs.

The Court reasoned that while the practitioner's conduct did not amount to deliberate misconduct or dishonesty, his failure to clearly communicate the payment arrangements to Ms Koulos, particularly in light of Rule 26 of the then-prevailing Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice, constituted unsatisfactory professional conduct. This rule required practitioners to either accept personal liability for fees to third parties or clearly inform them of the payment arrangements. The Court found that the practitioner's reliance on his fee agreement with his clients and his agency argument did not absolve him of this professional obligation. The Court also determined that impecuniosity is not a ground for refusing an order for costs in disciplinary proceedings, although the Commissioner indicated no intention to pursue payment unless the practitioner had the means.

Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's finding of unprofessional conduct and the fine imposed, substituting it with a finding of unsatisfactory conduct. The Court administered a reprimand to the practitioner and upheld the order for the practitioner to pay the Commissioner's costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

In April 2015, the Tribunal delivered a report making a finding of unprofessional conduct, fining the practitioner $15,000 and ordering that he pay the legal costs of the Commissioner in the proceedings.Background At all relevant times the practitioner carried on a legal practice, including personal injury claims, trading as Fittock Barristers and Solicitors (“the firm”) in Adelaide. The firm employed Linden Fairclough and Anne Marie Donaldson as clerks. The firm had an arrangement with Ms Koulos that it would send personal injuries clients with psychological claims to her for assessment and a medico‑legal report. The firm sent over 36 clients to Ms Koulos for this purpose over a two year period. Ms Koulos was generally prepared to forbear payment of her fee until the end of the matter and be paid out of the proceeds of the claim if the defendant’s insurer did not make interim payment.[3] [3] An issue is raised on appeal whether this was a term of the retainer of Ms Koulos or she merely forbore insisting on payment according to her strict legal rights. Sometimes Ms Koulos took on as her patient a client who had been referred for a medico-legal report. The practitioner made it clear to Ms Koulos that the firm was not responsible for her fees for providing psychological services to its clients in their capacity as patients. The firm used a standard fee agreement for all of its matters. The firm often agreed to act on the basis its costs would not be paid until the conclusion of the matter or that it would not charge unless the client was successful (“no win no fee”). This was designated by including the words (“Deferred Fee”) below the title of the Fee Agreement. However, the substantive provisions of the Fee Agreement were the same as in a fee agreement in which accounts were to be rendered and paid progressively even though some of those clauses were not apposite to a deferred fee arrangement. Relevant provisions of the standard fee agreement included:4.The client understands disbursements as being expenditure incurred by Fittock and on behalf of the Client in conducting the matter. The Client acknowledges that disbursements include, but are not limited to, payments for medical reports, police reports and any other third party services required for that matter.8.Unless otherwise agreed the Client will be responsible for all disbursements including … medical and professional reports and counsel fees (in house or chambers) and such GST as may be applicable.15. Fittock will render accounts, including accounts for disbursements, as and when Fittock sees fit. The Client hereby confirms that having rendered any accounts to the Client, Fittock will be at liberty to deduct such sums that Fittock is holding in Trust, to the Client’s credit, in payment of the accounts. In 2009, the firm was engaged to act for Mr Begic in relation to a claim for injuries suffered in a motor vehicle accident on 5 December 2007.[4] It appears that Mr Begic dealt initially with Mr Fairclough. It appears that it was agreed that the firm would conduct the matter on a “no win no fee” basis.[4] It is not clear when the firm commenced to act for Mr Begic. It was not later than July 2009 when the firm wrote to him saying it was about to issue proceedings in the District Court and requesting that he pay the filing fee of $870. The firm’s file before October 2010 was not tendered.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On 1 November 2012 Mr Begic attended at the Port Adelaide Magistrates Court and the judgment against him was set aside and Ms Koulos’ claim was dismissed.Evidence before the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal Mr Begic was called by the Commissioner to give evidence. His evidence was largely uncontested and has been summarised above. The practitioner gave evidence. His evidence also was largely uncontested and has been summarised above. Leaving aside his contention that Mr Begic and not his firm was the party to the contract with Ms Koulos, which was essentially a question of law as opposed to an account of his contemporaneous state of mind, his evidence was candid and he made appropriate concessions against his interests including that in retrospect he could have addressed the situation in which he found himself in better ways. The practitioner contended, by his counsel and in his evidence, that as a matter of law, in retaining Ms Koulos to assess Mr Begic and provide a report, he was acting as Mr Begic’s agent and therefore bore no contractual liability for the fees. During evidence however, as noted above, the practitioner accepted that in any event he had a professional responsibility to pay Ms Koulos’ fees if the insurer refused to do so. The practitioner contended by his counsel that even if he were responsible for payment of Ms Koulos’ fees, in the circumstances he did all that was reasonably required to protect Mr Begic from Ms Koulos’ claim.The Tribunal’s reasons The Tribunal identified the practitioner’s primary contention as being that in acting for Mr Begic he was acting as his agent and was therefore not personally liable for Ms Koulos’ fees. The Tribunal referred to a passage from Halsbury’s Laws of Australia relied on by the practitioner that “where a non‑client who contracts with a lawyer knows the lawyer is acting as agent for a client, the lawyer is not generally liable”. The Tribunal observed that the passage went on to say that, in exceptional circumstances, a lawyer may be liable notwithstanding that the non-client is aware that the lawyer is acting as agent for the client and gave examples and went on to say “the requirements of professional practice may also impose obligations upon lawyers with respect to non-clients.” The Tribunal referred to rule 26 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice prevailing in 2009 which provided that:A practitioner who deals with a third-party on behalf of a client for the purpose of obtaining some service in respect of the client’s matter must inform the third-party when the service is requested that the practitioner will accept personal liability for payment of the fees to be charged for the service or, if the practitioner is not to accept personal liability, the practitioner must inform the third-party of the arrangements intended to be made for payment of the fees. The Tribunal referred to the practitioner’s contention that clauses 4 and 8 of the Fee Agreement provided that disbursements such as medical reports were a liability of the client.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is unnecessary to decide for the purposes of this appeal whether the amendments apply when a charge is found proved after the amending Act came into operation but the conduct occurred and the charge was laid before the amending Act came into operation. This is because we consider that the same penalty should be imposed in the circumstances of this case regardless of the applicable penalty regime.The Tribunal rightly considered that this was not a case calling for the commencement of disciplinary proceedings in this Court and it was inappropriate to suspend or impose conditions on the practitioner’s practising certificate or order inspection of his records in circumstances in which he is not practising, does not hold a practising certificate and will be required to re-apply for a practising certificate if he wishes to resume legal practice. This leaves only a reprimand or fine as an available penalty if the new penalty regime applies.The practitioner’s conduct was in the nature of negligence rather than deliberate misconduct and did not involve any dishonesty or intention to improperly obtain personal gain. He cooperated in the investigation and gave straightforward evidence before the Tribunal and had a good previous record as a practitioner. In the circumstances, the practitioner should be reprimanded rather than a fine being imposed on him.CostsThe practitioner also appeals against the order made by the Tribunal that the practitioner pay the legal costs of the Commissioner in the proceedings.The practitioner acknowledges that the award of costs was in the discretion of the Tribunal. His principal contention is that the Tribunal wrongly exercised its discretion by both imposing a fine and ordering payment of costs and he was doubly penalised. Whatever the merits of that contention, it is not applicable now that the fine is to be set aside.The practitioner also contends that the Tribunal wrongly exercised its discretion by failing to have regard to his impecuniosity because he is an undischarged bankrupt. The Commissioner informed the Court that he does not intend to pursue payment of costs unless the practitioner is discharged from his bankruptcy and has the means to pay the costs.In ordinary civil litigation, it is accepted that impecuniosity is not a ground on which an order for costs should not be made. While disciplinary proceedings are sui generis, there is no reason why a different approach should be taken to an order for costs in disciplinary proceedings.The practitioner’s challenge to the costs order fails.Conclusion We set aside the decision of the Tribunal that the practitioner was guilty of unprofessional conduct and the fine imposed. We substitute a finding that the practitioner was guilty of unsatisfactory conduct on counts 1 and 2 and not guilty on count 3. We administer a reprimand to the practitioner. We do not set aside the costs order.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court addressed several key issues in the case of Fittock v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner (No 2). The first issue considered was whether the practitioner was acting as an agent for Mr Begic when he retained Ms Koulos, and if so, whether this exempts him from personal liability for her fees. The court examined the nature of the relationship between the practitioner, Mr Begic, and Ms Koulos. It found that the practitioner's contention that he acted as Mr Begic's agent was not supported by the evidence. The court relied on the standard fee agreement which indicated that the client would be responsible for all disbursements, including medical and professional reports. The practitioner accepted that he had a professional responsibility to pay Ms Koulos' fees if the insurer refused to do so, thus he was personally liable for Ms Koulos' fees. The court distinguished the situation from the exceptional circumstances where a lawyer may be liable despite acting as an agent, and held that the practitioner was personally liable for Ms Koulos' fees.

The second issue was whether the practitioner breached any rules of professional conduct by not ensuring that Mr Begic's fees to Ms Koulos were paid. The court referred to rule 26 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice, which states that a practitioner must inform a third-party if they will accept personal liability for payment of fees or inform of the arrangements intended for payment of fees. The court found that the practitioner did not fulfill this obligation, and therefore breached the rules of professional conduct.

Regarding the practitioner's impecuniosity as an undischarged bankrupt, the court held that this was not a ground to refuse an order for costs. The court reasoned that while disciplinary proceedings are sui generis, the approach to an order for costs in disciplinary proceedings should not differ from that in ordinary civil litigation. The court noted that the Commissioner did not intend to pursue payment of costs unless the practitioner was discharged from bankruptcy and had the means to pay, thus the issue of impecuniosity did not affect the Tribunal's discretion to order him to pay the Commissioner's legal costs.

The fourth issue was whether the Tribunal was correct in imposing both a fine and an order for costs on the practitioner, or if this constituted a double penalty. The court found that the practitioner's contention of a double penalty was not applicable once the fine was set aside. The court held that the Tribunal had the discretion to impose both a fine and an order for costs, and did not err in its decision.

Lastly, the court considered whether the practitioner should be reprimanded or fined for his conduct, given the circumstances of the case and his previous record as a practitioner. The court concluded that the practitioner's conduct was in the nature of negligence rather than deliberate misconduct, and did not involve dishonesty or intent to improperly obtain personal gain. Given his cooperation with the investigation, straightforward evidence before the Tribunal, and good previous record, the court found that a reprimand was more appropriate than a fine. Therefore, the court set aside the Tribunal's decision of unprofessional conduct and the imposed fine, substituting it with a finding of unsatisfactory conduct and administering a reprimand to the practitioner.