SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court: Civil)
FITTOCK v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER (No 2)
[2015] SASCFC 167
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Justice Sulan, The Honourable Justice Blue and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)
19 November 2015
PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE - DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEALS
PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE - PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT AND UNSATISFACTORY PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT - GENERALLY
The appellant was found guilty of three counts of unprofessional conduct. The conduct related to the non-payment of fees owing to a psychologist who had been instructed by the practitioner's firm on behalf of the client.
Count 1 alleged that the practitioner failed to take any or any adequate action to protect the client from the psychologist's recovery for fees claim. The psychologist had threatened to sue the client and default judgment was subsequently entered in the Magistrates Court. Count 2 alleged that the practitioner had misused the client's trust money. Count 3 alleged that the practitioner had allowed his interests to conflict with the client's interests.
The Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal found him guilty of unprofessional conduct on the first count, and imposed a $15,000 fine and costs order. The Tribunal did not address or make any findings on counts 2 and 3.
The practitioner appealed. He contended that he took adequate action to protect his client from threatened and actual fee recovery proceedings. The practitioner further contended that his conduct did not constitute unprofessional conduct.
Held, allowing the appeal (the Court):
1. The Court sets aside the decision of the Tribunal that the practitioner was guilty of unprofessional conduct, and substitutes a finding of unsatisfactory conduct as to counts 1 and 2.
2. The order of a fine of $15,000 is set aside.
3. Count 3 is dismissed.
4. The practitioner is reprimanded.
5. The order for costs is not set aside.
Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 5 (definition of 'unprofessional conduct') (repealed), s 5 (definition of 'unsatisfactory conduct') (repealed), s 82(2), s 82(6), s 82(6)(a) (amended); Legal Practitioners (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2013 (SA) Sch 2, s 14(2); Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice r 9.1.1 (repealed); Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice r 26; Solicitors' Conduct Rules r 12.1, referred to.
Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union (1979) 27 ALR 367; Palser v Grinling [1948] AC 291, discussed.
BT Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266; Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337; Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 QB 750, considered.
WORDS AND PHRASES CONSIDERED/DEFINED
"substantial"
FITTOCK v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER (No 2)
[2015] SASCFC 167Civil: Sulan, Blue and Nicholson JJ
THE COURT: This is an appeal against a decision of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal in respect of the conduct of Laurence John Fittock, a solicitor. The conduct related to a…
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- Case
- [2015] SASCFC 167
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the Court were whether the practitioner had engaged in unprofessional conduct by failing to adequately inform Ms Koulos of the payment arrangements for her services, and whether the Tribunal had erred in its imposition of a fine and an order for costs. Specifically, the Court had to determine the practitioner's personal liability for Ms Koulos' fees, considering the terms of the retainer, the firm's standard fee agreement, and the relevant professional conduct rules in force at the time. The Court also considered whether the practitioner's impecuniosity, as an undischarged bankrupt, should have influenced the Tribunal's decision regarding costs.
The Court reasoned that while the practitioner's conduct did not amount to deliberate misconduct or dishonesty, his failure to clearly communicate the payment arrangements to Ms Koulos, particularly in light of Rule 26 of the then-prevailing Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice, constituted unsatisfactory professional conduct. This rule required practitioners to either accept personal liability for fees to third parties or clearly inform them of the payment arrangements. The Court found that the practitioner's reliance on his fee agreement with his clients and his agency argument did not absolve him of this professional obligation. The Court also determined that impecuniosity is not a ground for refusing an order for costs in disciplinary proceedings, although the Commissioner indicated no intention to pursue payment unless the practitioner had the means.
Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's finding of unprofessional conduct and the fine imposed, substituting it with a finding of unsatisfactory conduct. The Court administered a reprimand to the practitioner and upheld the order for the practitioner to pay the Commissioner's costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court addressed several key issues in the case of Fittock v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner (No 2). The first issue considered was whether the practitioner was acting as an agent for Mr Begic when he retained Ms Koulos, and if so, whether this exempts him from personal liability for her fees. The court examined the nature of the relationship between the practitioner, Mr Begic, and Ms Koulos. It found that the practitioner's contention that he acted as Mr Begic's agent was not supported by the evidence. The court relied on the standard fee agreement which indicated that the client would be responsible for all disbursements, including medical and professional reports. The practitioner accepted that he had a professional responsibility to pay Ms Koulos' fees if the insurer refused to do so, thus he was personally liable for Ms Koulos' fees. The court distinguished the situation from the exceptional circumstances where a lawyer may be liable despite acting as an agent, and held that the practitioner was personally liable for Ms Koulos' fees.
The second issue was whether the practitioner breached any rules of professional conduct by not ensuring that Mr Begic's fees to Ms Koulos were paid. The court referred to rule 26 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice, which states that a practitioner must inform a third-party if they will accept personal liability for payment of fees or inform of the arrangements intended for payment of fees. The court found that the practitioner did not fulfill this obligation, and therefore breached the rules of professional conduct.
Regarding the practitioner's impecuniosity as an undischarged bankrupt, the court held that this was not a ground to refuse an order for costs. The court reasoned that while disciplinary proceedings are sui generis, the approach to an order for costs in disciplinary proceedings should not differ from that in ordinary civil litigation. The court noted that the Commissioner did not intend to pursue payment of costs unless the practitioner was discharged from bankruptcy and had the means to pay, thus the issue of impecuniosity did not affect the Tribunal's discretion to order him to pay the Commissioner's legal costs.
The fourth issue was whether the Tribunal was correct in imposing both a fine and an order for costs on the practitioner, or if this constituted a double penalty. The court found that the practitioner's contention of a double penalty was not applicable once the fine was set aside. The court held that the Tribunal had the discretion to impose both a fine and an order for costs, and did not err in its decision.
Lastly, the court considered whether the practitioner should be reprimanded or fined for his conduct, given the circumstances of the case and his previous record as a practitioner. The court concluded that the practitioner's conduct was in the nature of negligence rather than deliberate misconduct, and did not involve dishonesty or intent to improperly obtain personal gain. Given his cooperation with the investigation, straightforward evidence before the Tribunal, and good previous record, the court found that a reprimand was more appropriate than a fine. Therefore, the court set aside the Tribunal's decision of unprofessional conduct and the imposed fine, substituting it with a finding of unsatisfactory conduct and administering a reprimand to the practitioner.