Fesl v Delegate of the Native Title Registrar

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Fesl v Delegate of the Native Title Registrar [2008] FCA 1469

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Application for judicial review of decision by a delegate of the Native Title Registrar to register an Indigenous Land Use Agreement – whether it was part of delegate’s function to decide if agreement presented was an Indigenous Land Use Agreement – whether conclusion that agreement was an Indigenous Land Use Agreement was amenable to judicial review – whether there was no evidence or other material to justify the delegate’s registration decision – whether failure by delegate to consider relevant considerations – whether agreement did not make lawful provision for cultural heritage duty of care - application dismissed

NATIVE TITLE - whether there was no evidence or other material to justify the delegate’s conclusion that the making of the Indigenous Land Use Agreement had been authorised by the native title group – proper construction of statutory provisions for authorising an Indigenous Land Use Agreement by a native title group – relationship between Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Act 2003 (Qld) and Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 13
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ss 3, 11, 23, 24, 24CA, 24CB, 24CC, 24CD, 24CE, 24CF, 24CG, 24CH, 24CI, 24CJ, 24CK, 24CL, 24EB, 24OA, 25, 26, 33, 61, 223, 224, 226, 227, 233, 251A, 251B, 253
Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth)
Native Title Amendment Bill 1997 (Cth)
Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Act 2003 (Qld) ss 7, 23, 24, 25, 26, 35, 86
Water Act 2000 (Qld)
Water Regulation 2002 (Qld) ss 82, 87

Australian Retailers Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2005) 148 FCR 446 considered
Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110 considered
Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 106 FCR 157 considered
Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1980-1981) 147 CLR 297 applied
Curragh Queensland Coal Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 applied
Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99 considered
Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 9) (2007) 238 ALR 1 considered
Kemp v Native Title Registrar (2006) 153 FCR 38 distinguished
Lawson on behalf of the ‘Pooncarie Barkandji (Paakantyi) People) v Minister for Land & Water Conservation (NSW) [2002] FCA 1517 considered
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1985-1986) 162 CLR 24 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 considered
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 considered
Noble v Mundraby, Murgha, Harris and Garling [2005] FCAFC 212 considered
R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13 considered
The Australian Heritage Commission v Mount Isa Mines Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 297 applied

EVE MUMEWA FESL, NURDON SERICO and TEX CHAPMAN v LINDA BLUE, DELEGATE OF THE NATIVE TITLE REGISTRAR and QUEENSLAND WATER INFRASTRUCTURE PTY LTD

QUD157 OF 2008

LOGAN J
1 OCTOBER 2008
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1469
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Fesl v Delegate of the Native Title Registrar, the applicants sought judicial review of the Delegate's decision to register the Traveston Dam Agreement as an Indigenous Land Use Agreement (ILUA) under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). The applicants argued that the agreement did not meet the statutory criteria for registration and that the Delegate had failed to consider relevant matters. The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation of the Native Title Act and the application of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) in the context of ILUA registration. The court examined whether the Delegate had correctly applied the statutory conditions for registration and whether she had failed to consider relevant matters in making her decision.

The court found that the applicants' grounds for review were without merit. Specifically, the court rejected the applicants' arguments that the Delegate had failed to consider relevant matters or had improperly exercised her power in making the registration decision. The court held that the Delegate had correctly applied the statutory criteria for registration and had taken into account all relevant considerations. The court emphasised that the Delegate was not bound to accept the applicants' view that the Gubbi Gubbi people were separate from the Kabi Kabi people, and that the applicants had an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process.

The court concluded that the application for judicial review should be dismissed, as the Delegate's decision to register the Traveston Dam Agreement as an ILUA was legally sound. The applicants' arguments that the agreement did not meet the statutory criteria for registration and that the Delegate had failed to consider relevant matters were not substantiated by the evidence or the law.

ORDERS:
1. The application is dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Further, that there may be other means of challenge to whether the Traveston Dam Agreement is an ILUA, e.g. by way of an application to this Court for declaratory relief under s 39B(1A)(c) Judiciary Act 1903, does not mean that it is not open for the Applicants in this proceeding to raise grounds going to whether the Traveston Dam Agreement is in law an ILUA.No evidence grounds – 1(a), 1(c), 1(e) and 1(f) One ground upon which an order of review may be sought under the AD(JR) Act is that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision: s 5(1)(h) AD(JR) Act. Subsection 5(3) of the AD(JR) Act provides that:The ground specified in paragraph (1)(h) shall not be taken to be made out unless: (a)the person who made the decision was required by law to reach that decision only if a particular matter was established, and there was no evidence or other material (including facts of which he or she was entitled to take notice) from which he or she could reasonably be satisfied that the matter was established; or (b)the person who made the decision based the decision on the existence of a particular fact, and that fact did not exist. As Weinberg J observed in Australian Retailers Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2005) 148 FCR 446 at 587, [577], s 5(3)(a) of the AD(JR) Act “seems merely to restate the doctrine of jurisdictional fact”. Where the material “jurisdictional fact” is a state of administrative satisfaction that does not leave much scope for the operation of s 5(3)(a). When one recalls the impact of the use of the word “considers” in relation to the “second condition” for which s 24CL provides and that it is evident from the Delegate’s reasons that she “considered” that the second condition was satisfied, the “particular matter” to which s 5(3)(a) of the AD(JR) Act refers is, in that language of that paragraph, “established”. In Australian Retailers Association v Reserve Bank of Australia, Weinberg J also offered (148 FCR at 587, [578]), a succinct summary of the views expressed by Black CJ (with whom Spender and Gummow JJ agreed) in Curragh Queensland Coal Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 in what has become a seminal judgment as to the effect of s 5(3)(b) of the AD(JR) Act. It was there held that s 5(3)(b) could only be satisfied if:·the decision was "based on" the existence of a "particular fact", meaning a fact that was "critical to the making of the decision";·there was no evidence or other material to support the finding of that particular fact; and·it could be shown that the particular fact did not exist. The views expressed in Curragh Queensland Coal Mining in relation to s 5(3)(b) of the AD(JR) Act were cited with approval by various members of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam (2002) 210 CLR 210 at 234. [33] per Gleeson CJ; at 257-258, [115] – [118] per Kirby J; at 267, [140] per Callinan J. Grounds 1(a), 1(c), 1(e) and 1(f) each seek to challenge the opinion of the Delegate that the “second condition” was met.

Decision

Reasons for decision

LOGAN J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LOGAN J

There is no merit in grounds 1(a), 1(c), 1(e) and 1(f) of the application. Failure to take into account allegedly relevant considerations – grounds 1(b), 1(d) and 1(g) The review ground of an improper exercise of a power in the making of a decision for which s 5(1)(e) of the AD(JR) Act provides may, inter alia, be established by the taking of an irrelevant consideration into account in the exercise of that power (s 5(2)(a) AD(JR) Act) or by a failure to take into account in the exercise of that power a relevant consideration (s 5(2)(b) AD(JR) Act). A consideration will be “relevant” or, as the case may be, “irrelevant” if the legislation concerned either expressly or by necessary implication either requires or, as the case may be, forbids it to be taken into account by a administrative decision-maker in the making of a decision: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1985-1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-40. Section 24CL of the Native Title Act makes provision for registration of an agreement only if particular conditions are satisfied, and forbids registration if they are not. The conditions for which s 24CL provides are “relevant considerations”. Of those conditions, what is made “relevant”, so far as the “second condition” is concerned, is that the Registrar (or a delegate) considers that the requirements of s 24CG(3)(b) are met. In turn, in considering that question, it is s 24CG(4) which supplies matters which are “relevant”. For reasons which I have already given when discussing the statutory scheme, whether the requirements of s 24CG(3)(b) were in fact met is not a “relevant consideration” in the exercise of the power to register an area agreement. I have already noted that the conditions in s 24CL are imposed in respect of what is an “agreement” for the purposes of Subdiv C of Div 3 of Pt 2 of the Native Title Act and that it is only such an “agreement” that the Registrar (or a delegate) is empowered under s 24CJ to register. In my opinion, it necessarily follows that whether the application concerns such an “agreement” is also a “relevant consideration”. Ground 1(b) in the grounds of review evidences a misconception of what constitutes a “relevant consideration” for the purposes of the AD(JR) Act in relation to the registration decision which the Delegate made under s 24CJ of the Native Title Act. Materially, s 24CL(3) obliged the Delegate to consider whether the persons who had in this case been identified as the members of the “native title group” had, in terms of s 251A, “authorised” the making of the Traveston Dam Agreement, The Delegate’s reasons prove that she did consider that the agreement had been so authorised and that, in making her registration decision, she took that fact, i.e. her opinion that this requirement had been met into account. She did therefore take into account a “relevant consideration”. Grounds 1(b), 1(d) and 1(g) assume, wrongly, that the Delegate was bound on the evidence before her to conclude that what the Applicants term “the Gubbi Gubbi people” were separate from the Kabi Kabi people. The evidence on this subject was not all one way. The Delegate was entitled to reach the conclusion which she did as to there being but one clan or tribal group. Moreover, the Applicants each had an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process in relation to the Traveston Dam Agreement. The extent to which they availed themselves of that opportunity was entirely a matter for them. There was no obligation on the part of the Delegate in the circumstances to afford what the Applicants term the Gubbi Gubbi people a separate opportunity to consider whether or not to authorise the making of that agreement.