Noble v Mundraby, Murgha, Harris and Garling

Link copied
Case Copied 15 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Noble v Mundraby, Murgha, Harris and Garling [2005] FCAFC 212

NATIVE TITLE – application for leave to appeal, or alternatively appeal from primary judge’s decision under s 66B of Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) removing applicant in claimant application – whether removal authorised pursuant to s 251B – whether decision made by native title claim group in accordance with a “process of decision-making agreed to and adopted”

Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), ss 61(1), 66B and 251B

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 referred to

FREDERICK CHARLES NOBLE v VINCENT MUNDRABY, LESLIE MURGHA, STEWART HARRIS AND CHARLES THOMAS GARLING and STATE OF QUEENSLAND

QUD 4 OF 2005

NORTH, WEINBERG & GREENWOOD JJ
30 SEPTEMBER 2005

BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BRISBANE DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD 4 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

FREDERICK CHARLES NOBLE
APPELLANT

AND:

VINCENT MUNDRABY, LESLIE MURGHA, STEWART HARRIS AND CHARLES THOMAS GARLING
FIRST RESPONDENT

STATE OF QUEENSLAND
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

NORTH, WEINBERG AND GREENWOOD JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

30 SEPTEMBER 2005

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.If leave to appeal the order of Spender J, made on 16 December 2004, is required, such leave be refused.

2.If leave to appeal the order of Spender J, made on 16 December 2004, is not required and the appeal be as of right, the appeal be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BRISBANE DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD 4 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

FREDERICK CHARLES NOBLE
APPELLANT

AND:

VINCENT MUNDRABY, LESLIE MURGHA, STEWART HARRIS AND CHARLES THOMAS GARLING
FIRST RESPONDENT

STATE OF QUEENSLAND
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

NORTH, WEINBERG AND GREENWOOD JJ

DATE:

30 SEPTEMBER 2005

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. Mr Frederick Noble applies for leave to appeal, or alternatively, appeals against an order made by Spender J on the 16 December 2004, which read as follows:

    ‘The current applicant for the Native Title claim group, namely, the following group of persons acting jointly: Vincent Mundraby, Les Murgha, Stewart Harris and Frederick (‘Ricko’) Noble, be replaced by a new applicant pursuant to s 66B(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) consisting of the following group of persons acting jointly: Vincent Mundraby, Les Murgha, Stewart Harris, Charles Thomas Garling.’

  2. The order determined an application by a motion filed by Vincent Mundraby, Les Murgha and Stewart Harris on 18 November 2004 against, inter alia, Mr Noble, which was brought under s 66B(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (the Act).

    STATUTORY CONTEXT

  3. Persons who may apply for a native title determination described in a table under s 61(1) of the Act which includes the following:

    ‘A person or persons authorised by all the persons (the native title claim group) who, according to their traditional laws and customs, hold the common or group rights and interests comprising the particular native title claimed, provided the person or persons are also included in the…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Noble v Mundraby, Murgha, Harris and Garling and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2005] FCAFC 212
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Noble v Mundraby, Murgha, Harris and Garling, the dispute centred around the authorisation of a group of individuals to act as the applicants in a native title determination claim. The applicants, Mr Mundraby, Mr Murgha, Mr Harris, and Mr Garling, sought leave to appeal or, alternatively, to appeal from the primary judge’s decision under section 66B of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). The central legal issue was whether the removal of Mr Noble as an applicant was authorised under section 251B of the Act and whether the decision was made by the native title claim group in accordance with a process of decision-making agreed to and adopted by the group.

The court examined the process of decision-making adopted by the native title claim group to determine whether the removal of Mr Noble was authorised. The primary judge found that the group had agreed to a vote as the process of decision-making, as evidenced by the meeting minutes. The court held that section 251B does not require a formal system of decision-making but rather proof of the process used for the specific decision. The evidence supported the primary judge's conclusion that the claim group agreed to a vote to determine the authorisation, with all members voting in favour and no dissent recorded. Therefore, the requirements of section 251B were satisfied.

Given the evidence supporting the primary judge's findings, the appeal was dismissed. The court concluded that if leave to appeal was required, it should be refused; otherwise, the appeal should be dismissed outright. This decision underscores the importance of following agreed-upon processes within native title claim groups to ensure the legitimacy of decisions affecting their members.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. If leave to appeal the order of Spender J, made on 16 December 2004, is required, such leave be refused.

2. If leave to appeal the order of Spender J, made on 16 December 2004, is not required and the appeal be as of right, the appeal be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The evidence supports these findings. The minutes show that there was discussion about traditional methods of decision-making in the sub-groups of the people who made up the combined claim group. At the end of that discussion Mr Mundraby made reference to the “claimant group”. The minutes then record: ‘He noted that the claimant group makes up every other group and that everyone needs to make a decision.’ (emphasis added) The matter was then put to the vote. On the basis of this evidence, it was open to his Honour to conclude that by voting on the motions, those present agreed to a process of authorisation under s 251B(b) by a vote of all the members of the native title claim group. Section 251B does not require proof of a system of decision-making beyond proof of the process used to arrive at the particular decision in question. The section accommodates a situation where a native title claim group agrees to follow a particular procedure for a particular decision even if other procedures are normally used for other decisions. Nor does s 251B require a formal agreement to the process adopted for the making of a particular decision. Agreement within the contemplation of s 251B may be proved by the conduct of the parties. There was evidence in this case that the claim group conducted itself at the meeting on the basis that it agreed to a vote by the members of the group to determine the question of authorisation. All persons present voted in favour of the motion. Nobody is recorded as leaving the meeting or refusing to vote or in any other way conducting to indicate dissent from the course adopted. There was thus evidence from the conduct of the claim group on which the primary judge could base his conclusion that the requirements of s 251B were satisfied. Consequently, Mr Noble could not succeed in an appeal on this ground, and, if leave is required, such leave should be refused. If leave is not required, the appeal on this ground should be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Noble argues that there was evidence in the minutes of the meeting that there was a dispute about the authority of the meeting to authorise Mr Mundraby, Mr Murgha, Mr Harris and Mr Garling to constitute “the applicant” for the purpose of bringing the native title determination claim. For instance, the minutes record “Evelyn Noble spoke and noted that everyone in the clans speaks for their own area and not any other clans area” and “Bobby Sam … noted that the Christian family needed to make a decision about who is to talk about the group. He went on to say that the people who chose Ricko are the same people who should take Ricko off …”. It is submitted that the primary judge should have received evidence of the authorisation process and made findings of fact as to whether the process of consideration by a community meeting was one which had been agreed to and adopted by the native title claim group. Mr O’Gorman, who appeared with Mr Harper, for Mr Noble, adopted the written submissions but elaborated upon them in one respect. He contended that s 251B refers to “a process of decision-making”, and that this requires proof of some system of decision-making, and not merely evidence of the way in which a “one off” decision was made.CONSIDERATION The primary judge appreciated the need to identify the appropriate decision-making process, and to determine whether that process had been followed. He said so in the concluding sentence of [41] extracted at [12] of these reasons. His Honour rejected the argument that individual sub-group processes governed authorisation for the combined claim. Finally, his Honour stated that the conditions for the making the order had been met. Against this background, the conclusion of the primary judge involved the finding that members of the claim group agreed that the vote of the community meeting was a process of decision-making for the purpose of authorising the applicant for the native title determination claim, and that the members of the claim group then adopted that process. The evidence supports these findings. The minutes show that there was discussion about traditional methods of decision-making in the sub-groups of the people who made up the combined claim group. At the end of that discussion Mr Mundraby made reference to the “claimant group”. The minutes then record: ‘He noted that the claimant group makes up every other group and that everyone needs to make a decision.’ (emphasis added) The matter was then put to the vote. On the basis of this evidence, it was open to his Honour to conclude that by voting on the motions, those present agreed to a process of authorisation under s 251B(b) by a vote of all the members of the native title claim group. Section 251B does not require proof of a system of decision-making beyond proof of the process used to arrive at the particular decision in question. The section accommodates a situation where a native title claim group agrees to follow a particular procedure for a particular decision even if other procedures are normally used for other decisions. Nor does s 251B require a formal agreement to the process adopted for the making of a particular decision. Agreement within the contemplation of s 251B may be proved by the conduct of the parties. There was evidence in this case that the claim group conducted itself at the meeting on the basis that it agreed to a vote by the members of the group to determine the question of authorisation. All persons present voted in favour of the motion. Nobody is recorded as leaving the meeting or refusing to vote or in any other way conducting to indicate dissent from the course adopted. There was thus evidence from the conduct of the claim group on which the primary judge could base his conclusion that the requirements of s 251B were satisfied.