FCFY v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FCFY v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2019] FCA 1990

Appeal from: Application for judicial review of the AAT decision delivered on 8 November 2018 by Dr L Bygrave
File number: NSD 852 of 2019
Judge: THAWLEY J
Date of judgment: 26 November 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – original decision by delegate of Minister not to revoke mandatory visa cancellation under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether jurisdictional error – whether the Tribunal thought “primary considerations” had to be given greater weight than “other considerations” under Direction 65 – whether Tribunal erred in giving less weight to the applicant’s length of residence because the applicant had not spent time positively contributing to the Australian community – whether Tribunal failed to deal with critical claims raised – whether Tribunal made factual findings without evidence – application allowed
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 43

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476A, 477A, 499, 500, 501, 501CA

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352

Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic (1993) 43 FCR 280

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088

FCFY v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1222

FKP18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1555

Goundar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1203

Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 33

Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 225

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123

Lu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 141 FCR 346

McAuliffe v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1992) 28 ALD 609

Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo (2018) 362 ALR 48

Minister for Home Affairs v HSKJ (2018) 363 ALR 325

Minister for Home Affairs v Omar [2019] FCAFC 188

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 93 ALJR 252

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1995) 57 FCR 432

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

Plaintiff M161/2010E v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319

SFGB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 231

Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3

Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney (2012) 207 FCR 277

Suleiman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 594

SZTMD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 150 ALD 34

Viane v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 263 FCR 531

Wei v Minister for…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1990
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of FCFY v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2), the applicant, FCFY, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to uphold the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs not to revoke a mandatory visa cancellation under section 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The primary legal issues revolved around whether the AAT had made a jurisdictional error by misapplying the principles in Direction 65 regarding the weight to be given to various considerations, and whether the AAT had erred in its factual findings.

The court examined whether the AAT had correctly interpreted the requirement in Direction 65 that primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than other considerations. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had misconstrued the law by treating the requirement as absolute rather than general, thereby excluding the possibility that other considerations might outweigh primary considerations in specific circumstances. Additionally, the applicant contended that the AAT had failed to give appropriate weight to his length of residence in Australia and had made certain factual findings without evidentiary support.

The court found that the AAT had indeed erred in interpreting Direction 65 as requiring it to always give greater weight to primary considerations, ignoring the possibility that other considerations might prevail in particular circumstances. The court also noted that while the AAT had not explicitly stated that the word "generally" was missing from its reasoning, its conclusion seemed to be based on an absolute interpretation of the principle. Consequently, the AAT's decision was quashed, and the matter was remitted for reconsideration in accordance with the law. The Minister was ordered to pay the applicant's costs as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. There issue absolute in the first instance a writ of certiorari directed to the second respondent, quashing its decision made on 8 November 2018.

2. There issue absolute in the first instance a writ of mandamus directed to the second respondent, requiring it to determine the applicant’s application for review according to law.

3. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Ground two is made out.Ground Three – No Evidence The applicant submitted with respect to ground three that the Tribunal’s findings at T[39] and T[63] were made without any evidence. Those paragraphs stated (emphasis added):[39]Considering the relevant factors set out in paragraph 13.1.1 of the Direction, I find that:•…The applicant received a written warning from the Department in 2012 that any further offending would result in the cancellation of his visa.… [63]There is no question the Australian community would have extensive empathy for the applicant due to the significant length of time he has lived in Australia and his substantial extended family in Australia, including children, with whom he has close relationships. However, this must be weighed against the applicant’s behaviour of committing serious and violent offences over a period of 30 years and his continued disregard for the Australian law and judicial system after he was warned in 2012 that his behaviour would result in the cancellation of his visa. The formal warning issued by the Department dated 21 May 2012 was extracted in full in the Tribunal’s reasons at T[36]. It read (emphasis added): Please note that visa cancellation may be reconsidered if you commit further offences or otherwise breach the character test in future. Disregard of this warning will weigh heavily against you if your case is reconsidered. The applicant signed the following acknowledgement on 23 May 2012:I, [the applicant], acknowledge that I have received the Notice of decision not to cancel a visa under subsection 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958.I understand that I can again be considered for refusal or cancellation of any visa granted to me if further information of relevance comes to the attention of the Department at any time in the future and that if this happens, my past conduct and previous relevant information can also be reconsidered. The applicant submitted that there was no evidentiary basis in the formal warning letter or otherwise for a conclusion that the committing of further offences by the applicant “would” result in the cancellation of his visa as the Tribunal had concluded. It was submitted that the warning letter or formal warning “went no further than indicating that a possible consequence of further offending by the applicant was that his visa might be cancelled”. The Minister implicitly accepted the applicant’s submission that the letter only indicated that the visa might be cancelled. The Minister characterised the Tribunal’s decision as involving “no more than loose language”. The letter must be read as a whole. More specifically, the word “may” in the first sentence must be understood in light of the final sentence of the formal warning. Reading the two sentences together might indicate to a reasonable reader that the word “may” in the first sentence was used simply to inform the applicant that the Department would have a discretion available to it if the applicant committed further offences, but not to describe the likelihood of the outcome of the exercise of that discretion. While the first sentence of the formal warning addressed the existence of the discretion, the final sentence might be read as relating to the likelihood that the discretion would be exercised against the applicant’s interests if he re‑offended. The word “would” as used by the Tribunal at T[39] and T[63] was not an adaptation of the word “may” from the first sentence of the formal warning. It was the Tribunal’s interpretation or understanding of the whole letter. The conclusion that the discretion was likely to or “would” be exercised against the applicant’s interests can properly be drawn from the formal warning as a whole, in particular from the second sentence. It was open to the Tribunal to read the letter in this way, with the result that ground three cannot succeed.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 501CA(4) of the Act provides a discretion to the Minister to revoke a mandatory cancellation decision made under s 501(3A). Section 501CA (1), (3) and (4) provide:501CA Cancellation of visa – revocation of decision under subsection 501(3A) (person serving sentence of imprisonment)(1)This section applies if the Minister makes a decision (the original decision) under subsection 501(3A) (person serving sentence of imprisonment) to cancel a visa that has been granted to a person.…(3)As soon as practicable after making the original decision, the Minister must: (a)give the person, in the way that the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances: (i) a written notice that sets out the original decision; and (ii) particulars of the relevant information; and (b)invite the person to make representations to the Minister, within the period and in the manner ascertained in accordance with the regulations, about revocation of the original decision. (4) The Minister may revoke the original decision if:(a)the person makes representations in accordance with the invitation; and(b) the Minister is satisfied:(i)that the person passes the character test (as defined by section 501); or(ii)that there is another reason why the original decision should be revoked. The applicant made representations to the Minister in accordance with an invitation made by the Minister under s 501CA(3). Accordingly, there was no issue that paragraph (a) of s 501CA(4) was satisfied. There was also no issue that the applicant did not pass the character test, meaning that subparagraph (b)(i) did not apply. Therefore the central issue for the delegate was whether subparagraph (b)(ii) applied, namely whether the decision-maker was satisfied that there was “another reason” why the mandatory cancellation decision under s 501(3A) should be revoked. This was also the central question for the Tribunal on review of the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal had jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision by reason of s 500(1)(ba) of the Act. Both the delegate and the Tribunal were bound in performing their respective functions to comply with Direction No 65 – Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s 501 CA (Direction 65) – see: ss 499(1) and (2A). Section 1 of Direction 65 is headed “Preliminary”. Of present relevance, it includes:6.1 Objectives(1)The objective of the Act is to regulate, in the national interest, the coming into, and presence in, Australia of non-citizens.…(3)Under subsection 501(3A) of the Act, the decision-maker must cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if the decision-maker is satisfied that the person does not pass the character test because of the operation of paragraph (6)(a) (on the basis of paragraph (7)(a), (b) or (c) or paragraph (6)(e)) and the non-citizen is serving a sentence of imprisonment on a full-time basis in a custodial institution, for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory. A non-citizen who has had his or her visa cancelled under section 501(3A) may request revocation of that decision under section 501CA of the Act. Where the discretion to consider revocation is enlivened, the decision‑maker must consider whether to revoke the cancellation given the specific circumstances of the case.…6.3Principles(1)Australia has a sovereign right to determine whether non-citizens who are of character concern are allowed to enter and/or remain in Australia. Being able to come to or remain in Australia is a privilege Australia confers on non‑citizens in the expectation that they are, and have been, law-abiding, will respect important institutions, such as Australia's law enforcement framework, and will not cause or threaten harm to individuals or the Australian community.(2)The Australian community expects that the Australian Government can and should refuse entry to non-citizens, or cancel their visas, if they commit serious crimes in Australia or elsewhere.(3)A non-citizen who has committed a serious crime, including of a violent or sexual nature, and particularly against vulnerable members of the community such as minors, the elderly or disabled, should generally expect to be denied the privilege of coming to, or to forfeit the privilege of staying in, Australia.(4)In some circumstances, criminal offending or other conduct, and the harm that would be caused if it were to be repeated, may be so serious, that any risk of similar conduct in the future is unacceptable. In these circumstances, even other strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify not cancelling or refusing the visa.(5)Australia has a low tolerance of any criminal or other serious conduct by people who have been participating in, and contributing to, the Australian community only for a short period of time. However, Australia may afford a higher level of tolerance of criminal or other serious conduct in relation to a non-citizen who has lived in the Australian community for most of their life, or from a very young age.(6)Australia has a low tolerance of any criminal or other serious conduct by visa applicants or those holding a limited stay visa, reflecting that there should be no expectation that such people should be allowed to come to, or remain permanently in, Australia.(7)The length of time a non-citizen has been making a positive contribution to the Australian community, and the consequences of a visa refusal or cancellation for minor children and other immediate family members in Australia, are considerations in the context of determining whether that non-citizen’s visa should be cancelled, or their visa application refused.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal concluded:74.The first and third primary considerations weigh heavily against the revocation of the cancellation decision. The second primary consideration weighs for the applicant but, for the reasons set out in paragraph 54 above, I place minimal weight on this consideration.75.In regard to the other considerations, I find both the applicant’s ties to Australia and the impediments to his removal from Australia weigh for revoking the cancellation of the applicant’s visa.76.Noting the requirement that primary considerations should be given greater weight than the other considerations, I am satisfied on balance of the primary and other considerations that it is not appropriate to revoke the decision to cancel the applicant’s visa.CONSIDERATION OF GROUNDS OF REVIEWGround One – Misunderstanding of the law The applicant identified two strands of error relating to ground one:(1)first, that the Tribunal erred by concluding that it was required by Direction 65 to give greater weight to “primary considerations” than to “other considerations”: at T[76]; and(2)secondly, that the Tribunal misconstrued cl 14.2(1)(a)(ii) of Direction 65 in concluding that it was required to place less weight on the “strength, nature and duration of ties” to Australia because of the applicant’s limited positive contribution to the Australian community: at T[69].The first strand As noted earlier, cl 8(4) of Direction 65 provided:Primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than the other considerations. The applicant submitted that cl 8(4) of Direction 65 did not require that primary considerations always be given greater weight. Clause 8(4) left open that the particular facts of a case may be such that primary considerations should not be given greater weight than other considerations or, put another way, that an “other consideration” is not incapable of outweighing a primary consideration in particular circumstances. This submission may in general terms be accepted – see: Suleiman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 594 (Colvin J); Minister for Home Affairs v HSKJ (2018) 363 ALR 325 at [35] (Greenwood, McKerracher and Burley JJ), noting that the Full Court was not asked to consider the correctness of Suleiman and that its view in this respect was obiter. The respondent did not contend on this application that the applicant’s submission was incorrect. The word “generally” in cl 8(4) must be given effect. When the Tribunal came to balancing the various primary and other considerations after examining which of them individually counted for or against revocation, the Tribunal stated at T[76]:Noting the requirement that primary considerations should be given greater weight than the other considerations, I am satisfied on the balance of the primary and other considerations that it is not appropriate to revoke the decision to cancel the applicant’s visa. On the basis of what the Tribunal stated at T[76], including that the word “generally” was missing, the applicant submitted that the Tribunal erred by approaching its task on the basis that it was required to give greater weight to the “primary considerations” and excluded the possibility that the other considerations might not be outweighed in the particular circumstances.