Eastgate Properties P/L v J Hutchinson P/L

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  Eastgate Properties P/L v J Hutchinson P/L [2005] QSC 196
PARTIES:  EASTGATE PROPERTIES PTY LTD
(ACN 099 706 215)
(plaintiff)
v
J HUTCHINSON PTY LTD
(ACN 009 778 330)
(defendant)
FILE NO:  S8870 of 2003
DIVISION:  Trial Division
PROCEEDING:  Trial
ORIGINATING 
COURT: 
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:  30 June 2005
DELIVERED AT:  Brisbane
HEARING DATE:  14, 15 and 17 June 2005
JUDGE:  Muir J
ORDER: 
CATCHWORDS:  DEED – ESCROW – ALTERATION OF DEED AFTER
EXECUTION – where deed formulated to remedy defendant
builder’s encroachment of neighbouring lots and plaintiff’s
failure to pay defendant – where meeting took place and
defendant demanded payment of full amount arising under
contract, mortgage and deed – where dispute as to
construction of deed – whether deed abandoned – whether
deed delivered as deed or escrow – whether existence of
condition precedent that prevented deed coming into
existence
MORTGAGES – RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE – where defendant
appointed receivers and managers as a result of plaintiff’s
breach of deed – where plaintiff alleges appointment caused
it loss and damage – whether defendant waived plaintiff’s
breaches of the deed and as a consequence defendant’s action
void – whether moneys paid by plaintiff to defendant moneys
paid under duress and returnable to plaintiff
CONTRACTS – CONSIDERATION – WHAT AMOUNTS TO CONSIDERATION – EXISTING OBLIGATION OR DUTY – where meeting took place between plaintiff and defendant wherein an oral agreement reached as to operation of deed – where dispute as to content and effect of agreement after the event – whether there was a variation of contractual terms – whether what was promised was an existing obligation or duty – whether valuable consideration by the defendant to the plaintiff for the alleged variation
Land Sales Act 1984 (Qld)
Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea v
Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353,
André et Compagnie SA v Marine Transocean Ltd (The
Splendind Sun) [1981] QB 694
Avenhouse v Hornsby Shire Council (1998) 44 NSWLR 1
Bellamy v Debenham (1890) 45 Ch D 481,
Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306
Central Estates (Belgravia) Ltd v Woolgar [1971] 3 All ER
647,
Cockburn v Edwards (1881)18 Ch D 449,
DTR Nominees Pty Ltd v Mona Homes Pty Ltd (1978) 138
CLR 423
Ficom SA v Sociédad Cadex Ltd [1980] 2 Lloyds Rep 118
Fitzgerald v Masters (1956) 95 CLR 420
Gange v Sullivan (1966) 116 CLR 418
GR Securities Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty
Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 631,
Hobartville Stud Pty Ltd v Union Insurance Co Ltd (1991) 25
NSWLR 358,
Integrated Computer Services Pty Ltd v Digital Equipment
Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 11,
Lustre Hosiery Ltd v York (1935) 54 CLR 134,
Marminta Pty Ltd v French [2003] QCA 541,
Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353,
Maynard v Goode (1926) 37 CLR 529,
Meates v Attorney-General [1983] NZLR 308,
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Details
Case
[2005] QSC 196
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Eastgate Properties P/L v J Hutchinson P/L involves a dispute between Eastgate Properties P/L, the plaintiff, and J Hutchinson P/L, the defendant. The central issue revolves around the interpretation and enforcement of a deed and the subsequent obligations of the parties under it. The case was heard by the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The primary legal issues the court was required to decide involved the interpretation of the terms of the deed, the obligations of the parties under it, and whether there was a valid agreement between the parties to alter the terms of the deed post-execution. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the defendant was entitled to payment under the deed and whether there was an agreement to pay interest on the outstanding balance. The court also had to consider the impact of the defendant's mortgage over the plaintiff's property and the implications of the dispute with Yellowrock on the plaintiff's ability to secure finance.

The court examined the evidence provided by various witnesses, including Mr. George, Ms. Williams, and Mr. Hutchinson. It found that while there was some inconsistency in the accounts of the witnesses, the weight of the evidence supported the existence of an agreement to pay $4,130,000 on the drawdown of funds. The court concluded that the meeting on 16 September 2003 did not result in an agreement that amounted to little more than "business as usual" under the deed. Instead, the court found that there was a genuine agreement between the parties concerning the payment terms.

In summary, the court held that the defendant was entitled to payment under the deed and that the plaintiff had failed to meet its obligations. The court's findings were based on the evidence that the plaintiff had insufficient funds to discharge its obligations and the defendant's entitlement to payment secured by the mortgage. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the defendant was not entitled to payment until the encroachment was removed, finding that the dispute with Mr. Reichert and the defendant's mortgage over the property had significantly impacted the plaintiff's ability to secure finance and settle sales of land in the estate.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The sum of $4,130,000 was to be paid on 19 September. Ms Williams’ Evidence Ms Williams, in her affidavit evidence, recalls discussion about “interest payable under the Building Contract”. Mr Norton made some calculations in that regard which Mr George rejected. “The question of interest was left on the basis that the plaintiff would consider any claim for interest payable under the Building Contract.” She recalls Mr Hutchinson saying that the defendant wanted to be paid for $4,130,000 when the loan settlement occurred and his asking Mr George what was to be done for the balance. Mr George replied that the balance of $223,171 would be paid to the defendant either from a GST refund which Mr George said was due on or about 31 October 2003 or from proceeds of sale of some of the lots. She wrote a diary note at the time of a meeting. Under the heading “Outstanding Items:-” appeared: Further on in the note she wrote: She explained that the “Outstanding items” part of the document was written whilst the meeting was in progress. The day after the meeting, Ms Williams wrote a file note in respect of the meeting which stated, inter alia: “In summary the following was agreed: Mr George said that interest calculated by Mr Norton was far too high and that “he would consider interest as per the Building Contract”. She recalls agreement as to the payment of $4.13 million on settlement with the balance to be paid out of settlement proceeds or from a GST payment due on 31 October. She does not recall Mr George saying that the drawdown would be made in accordance with the Deed. Mr Hutchinson’s account Mr Hutchinson recalls that after he returned to the meeting, having made a telephone call or telephone calls, he said words to the effect, “You guys can’t meet the conditions of the Deed … You can’t pay us. What are you going to do?” He demanded to know what moneys the plaintiff was going to receive from the drawdown of funds from Perpetual Trustees. There was discussion around this point and he said that the defendant wanted the $4.13 million which Mr George had said was becoming available. He asked Mr George what was needed to meet the defendant’s obligations under the Deed and was told that it would be sufficient if the defendant provided the contracts of sale for the encroached areas and the subdivisional plans in registrable form. Mr George affirmed that when those things were provided the defendant’s “obligations will be at an end”. Mr Hutchinson said that all of the material would be available by the end of the following week. He concedes that Mr George said words to the effect that he was happy to consider the payment of interest.[16] He does not recall Mr George saying words to the effect that the Deed covers what the defendant is to receive on settlement. In response to the question “He certainly said throughout the meeting that he was placing reliance on the terms of the Deed”. He responded, “I don’t think that’s correct. He had to not place reliance on the terms of the Deed because he couldn’t meet it”. [16] T 137.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I accept that there is a degree of inconsistency between the accounts of witnesses called on behalf of the defendant concerning the alleged agreement to pay interest. Although I accept that some of the defendant’s representatives believed that there was an agreement as to the payment of interest, I am not confident that any such agreement was reached. I think it probable, however, that Mr George made a number of conciliatory assertions about the payment of interest so as to lead those present to the view that a claim for interest would not present a difficulty. The fact that an agreement in that respect was alleged in the letter of 17 September along with the other matters assists the plaintiff’s argument. On the other hand, the fact that Mr George denies an agreement to pay the sum of $4,130,000 on draw down of the finance tells against Mr George’s credibility. Mr King’s evidence supports the existence of an agreement in this respect as does the evidence of Messrs Hutchinson, Quinn, Norton and Williams. I find that there was such an agreement. In my view, the weight of the evidence is against the conclusion that the meeting produced a result which amounted to little more than “business as usual” under the Deed. Conclusions in relation to the encroachment agreement Mr George’s primary account of events at the meeting is contained in his affidavit sworn on 10 October 2003. The meeting was thus reasonably fresh in his mind when the affidavit was sworn. Much of its contents were accepted as accurate or broadly accurate by Messrs Quinn and Norton and by Ms Williams. Their recollections, however, supported to a degree by contemporaneous writings, varied from Mr George’s account in some critical respects. Mr George said in cross- examination, in effect, that he could not now remember what was discussed in the second half of the meeting but that the contents of his affidavit would have been his best recollection at that time. What the affidavit represents, however, is a version of events calculated to put a favourable gloss on matters from the plaintiff’s perspective. It was unlikely to, and I find it does not, intentionally record conversations and events at the meeting which Mr George regarded as harmful to the case the plaintiff was mounting at the time. I consider also that Mr George’s references to the Deed in the course of the meeting were unlikely to have arisen from any genuinely held belief on his part that the terms of the Deed were being or ought to be observed. The plaintiff had been in serious breach of its terms from within days of its having been entered into. Also, as I have pointed out, the defendant held the Mortgage and was able to exercise its powers under it. It also had freedom of action under clause 9. Additionally, I consider it likely that Mr George did not regard an agreement, particularly an oral one, as imposing an absolute constraint on the plaintiff’s freedom of action should the plaintiff not be able to meet its terms.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The inability to secure finance meant that the earliest the plaintiff could have sold lots in the land affected by the encroachment was late September 2003, but the defendant had its Mortgage over that land supported by a consent caveat. It would not have permitted any sales to occur until it was paid and Yellowrock Pty Ltd (“Yellowrock”) would also have insisted on payment out of its mortgage. The encroachment is a red herring. That is how it was always regarded by Mr Hutchinson. Consideration of the plaintiff’s argument It is reasonably clear that the dispute with Reichert made it difficult for the plaintiff to secure finance and I find that until the dispute was resolved substantially on about 6 August 2003 the plaintiff was seriously handicapped in its ability to secure finance. Even if finance could have been obtained, it is probable that there would have been considerable delays. In one of his affidavits Mr George swore: “There was little point in resolving the encroachment problem with the defendant unless the dispute with Yellowrock could also be settled so that the existing titles could be utilised as security for finance.” The deed of compromise entered into on 6 August 2003 between Yellowrock, Reichert, George, King and their respective companies and Eastgate Properties Pty Ltd (“Eastgate”) contemplated that Yellowrock be repaid out of sales of lots in the estate after payment to the defendant of $4,353,171, payment by Eastgate to any of the parties to the deed of compromise of any sums expended by such parties for the benefit of Eastgate and payment by Eastgate of its costs, charges and its expenses in developing the Estate. Despite the entering into of the deed of compromise, troubles with Mr Reichert continued. It was a term of the loan agreement for the finance negotiated with Australian Unity Funds Management Limited that Mr Reichert give a guarantee. He declined to do so. Yellowrock registered its mortgage after entering into the deed of compromise and that also stood in the way of finance. Messrs King and George alleged that this was in breach of the terms of the deed of compromise, The evidence of the surveyor Mr O’Brien shows that the subject plans were not lodged with the Council until 31 July 2003. The plaintiff in June, July, August and for much of September 2003 had insufficient funds to discharge its obligations to the defendant and Yellowrock. The plaintiff’s contention that the defendant was not entitled to payment under the Deed or under the Building Contract until the encroachment was removed is erroneous. Because of the dispute with Mr Reichert, which was not compromised until 6 August 2003, and because of the defendant’s entitlement to payment secured by the Mortgage, the plaintiff was not in a position to settle sales of land in the Estate other than on terms dictated by the defendant and Yellowrock. The evidence suggests that Mr Reichert would not have abandoned readily a means of bringing pressure to bear on Messrs George and King, and there is no doubt that the defendant was most anxious to secure payment. It is likely that the defendant would have required any proceeds of sale to be applied in satisfaction of the plaintiff’s obligations to it in consideration of any partial release of the Mortgage. The consequences of these findings are discussed later. The 16 September 2003 meeting – introductory observations