Young v Tibbits

Case [1912] HCA 23


14 CLR 114

YOUNG AND OTHERS

DEFENDANTS,

TIBBITS AND OTHERS

RESPONDENTS. PLAINTIFFS,

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF

NEW SOUTH WALES. Principal and agent-Employment of agent-Claim for commission-Evidence-

In an action by the plaintiffs claiming commission on a sale of the defen- April 17, 18,

dants' property effected by the plaintiffs and in respect of which sale they 19; May 16.

alleged they had been employed as agents by the defendants,

Held, by Griffith C.J. and Barton J. (Isaacs J. dissenting) that there was no evidence fit to be submitted to a jury of such employment, the evidence

14 CLR 115

showing only the employment of the plaintiffs by another agent of the defendants on the terms that the plaintiffs were to receive from that other agent one-half the commission which he received from the defendants.

Silence is not evidence of an admission that a statement of fact is true unless there are circumstances which render it more reasonably probable that the person whom it affects would deny its truth than that he would be silent.

Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales reversed.

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

An action was brought in the Supreme Court of New South Wales by Walter Charles Tibbits, James Wilfred Tibbits and Edgar Cockburn Tibbits against Robert John Young, Walter James Young and Stephen Stephen Ralli, claiming commis- sion upon the sale for £33,000 of Yarrandale Estate by the plaintiffs for the defendants, at their request. The action was tried before Pring J. and a jury, who found a verdict for the plaintiffs for £465. A motion to the Full Court by the defend- ants to set aside the verdict and to enter a nonsuit, or a verdict for the defendants, or to grant a new trial, was dismissed with costs.

From that decision the defendants now appealed to the High Court.

The facts are fully set out in the judgments hereunder. Knox K.C. (with him Brissenden), for the appellants. When W. C. Tibbits showed the telegram of 28th May 1910 to Gillespie's representative as his firm's authority to sell, he fixed the rights between the appellants and Broughton &Co., who then became entitled to commission on any sale made through the respondents, and liable to pay the respondents as sub-agents half that commis- sion. Having acted on that telegram the respondents are estopped from afterwards saying that they were employed by the appel- lants as their agents, Nothing that happened afterwards affected that position.

Thomson (with him Mitchell), for the respondents. There was evidence fit to go to the jury that the respondents were employed by the appellants as their agents. The evidence of what hap- pened after 28th May 1910 is such that the jury might properly

14 CLR 116

find that there was privity of contract between the appellants and

the respondents. Under the circumstances the jury might, from the omission of the appellants to reply to the respondent's letter of 30th May,…

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Young v Tibbits [1912] HCA 23
Case
[1912] HCA 23
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

In an action brought in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the plaintiffs, commission agents, sought to recover commission on the sale of the defendants' property, alleging they had been employed as agents by the defendants. The defendants denied any direct contractual relationship with the plaintiffs. The case proceeded to trial before a judge and jury, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiffs. A subsequent motion by the defendants to set aside the verdict was dismissed by the Full Court, leading to the present appeal to the High Court.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether there was sufficient evidence of a contract of agency between the plaintiffs and the defendants to be submitted to a jury. Specifically, the court had to determine if the plaintiffs' actions and communications, particularly a letter dated 30 May 1910, and the defendants' subsequent silence, could reasonably support an inference of direct employment and an agreement to pay the plaintiffs the full commission.

The majority of the High Court, comprising Griffith C.J. and Barton J., found that the evidence did not support a finding of direct employment. Their reasoning was that the plaintiffs had been engaged by another agent of the defendants, Broughton & Co., on terms that they would receive half the commission earned by Broughton & Co. The plaintiffs' letter of 30 May, which asserted they were dealing directly with the defendants and would not recognise Broughton & Co., was considered to be contrary to the known facts and their prior engagement as sub-agents. The court applied the principle that silence is not evidence of an admission unless circumstances make it more probable that the statement would have been denied if untrue. They concluded that the defendants' silence in response to the plaintiffs' letter did not constitute evidence of a direct agency agreement, as the plaintiffs were aware of the true agency arrangements. Isaacs J. dissented, finding that there was evidence from which a jury could infer a direct contract.

Consequently, the High Court reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, ordering that the verdict for the plaintiffs be set aside and a nonsuit entered for the defendants.

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