Duskwood Pty Ltd v Bellara Willows Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

CITATION:   DUSKWOOD PTY LTD -v- BELLARA WILLOWS PTY LTD & ORS [2001] WASC 26

CORAM:   STEYTLER J

HEARD:   1-3, 6-7, 9-10 & 13 NOVEMBER 2000

DELIVERED          :   2 FEBRUARY 2001

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2310 of 1998

BETWEEN:   DUSKWOOD PTY LTD

Plaintiff

AND

BELLARA WILLOWS PTY LTD
First Defendant

COLIN MADDEN
Second Defendant

GOH CHEE KHEN
Third Defendant

FILE NO/S              :CIV 1601 of 1999

BETWEEN              :DUSKWOOD PTY LTD

Plaintiff

AND

BELLARA WILLOWS PTY LTD
Defendant

Catchwords:

Contract - Contract for sale of land - Trade Practices Act 1974 s 52 - Whether misleading or deceptive conduct of defendant caused loss or damage to plaintiff - Turns on own facts

Contract - Construction and interpretation of contracts - Contract for sale of land - Intention to contract - Whether plaintiff a party to contract - Signature of party - Whether extrinsic evidence admissible in respect of capacity in which party signed - Admissibility of extrinsic evidence generally - Admissibility of pre and post-contractual negotiations - Whether ambiguity exists

Legislation:

Trade Practices Act 1974, s 52

Result:

Plaintiff's claim in each action dismissed

Representation:

CIV 2310 of 1998

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr M H Zilko

First Defendant             :     Mr B R S Kendall QC & Mr B E S Lauri

Second Defendant         :     Mr B R S Kendall QC & Mr B E S Lauri

Third Defendant           :     Mr B R S Kendall QC & Mr B E S Lauri

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Shane Brennan

First Defendant             :     Pryles & Defteros

Second Defendant         :     Pryles & Defteros

Third Defendant           :     Pryles & Defteros

CIV 1601 of 1999

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr M H Zilko

Defendant:     Mr B R S Kendall QC & Mr B E S Lauri

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Shane Brennan

Defendant:     Pryles & Defteros

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Adelaide City Corporation v Altmann (1987) 46 SASR 186

Air Great Lakes Pty Ltd v K S Easter (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 309

Anaconda Nickel Ltd v Tarmoola Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 22 WAR 101; [2000] WASCA 27

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540

Bank of New Zealand v Simpson [1900] AC 182

Barrier Wharfs Ltd v W Scott Fell & Co Ltd (1908) 5 CLR 647

Barroora Pty Ltd v Provincial Insurance (Aust) Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 170

Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd v GR Securities Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 622

Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337

Danziger v Thompson [1944] KB 654

Dillon v Nash [1950] VLR 293

Drughorn (Fred) Ltd v Rederiaktiebolaget Trans‑Atlantic [1919] AC 203

DTR Nominees Pty Ltd v Mona Homes Pty Ltd (1978) 138 CLR 423

Epps v Rothnie [1945] KB 562

Formby Bros v Formby (1910) 102 LT 116

Geebung Investments Pty Ltd v Varga Group Investments No 8 Pty Ltd (1995) 7 BPR 14,551

Humble v Hunter [1848] 12 QB 310

Macdonald v Longbottom [1859] 1…

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Details
Case
[2001] WASC 26
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Duskwood Pty Ltd sought relief against Bellara Willows Pty Ltd, primarily for breach of a contract for the sale of land, and for misleading or deceptive conduct under the Trade Practices Act 1974. The primary dispute centred on the validity and enforceability of the contract, as well as the alleged misleading or deceptive conduct by Bellara Willows. The court was required to determine whether the contract was valid and enforceable, whether Duskwood was indeed a party to the contract, and whether Bellara Willows engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct. Additionally, the court had to assess the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in respect of the capacity in which a party signed the contract, and whether there was any ambiguity in the contract terms.

The court examined the contract between the parties and found that it was not sufficiently complete or certain to be enforceable, primarily due to the absence of several essential terms. The court held that a binding contract cannot exist if essential terms are left to be settled by future agreement, or if the language used is so obscure that the court cannot attribute any particular contractual intention to the parties. Furthermore, the court held that while ambiguity does not equate to uncertainty, the absence of clarity in the terms could render the contract uncertain. The court also addressed the admissibility of extrinsic evidence, ruling that such evidence could be considered to clarify the capacity in which a party signed the contract. The court concluded that Bellara Willows had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct, which caused loss or damage to Duskwood.

In summary, the court found that the contract was not enforceable due to its incomplete and uncertain nature. The court held that extrinsic evidence could be considered to clarify the capacity in which a party signed the contract, but did not find it necessary to admit such evidence in this case. The court also found that Bellara Willows had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct, which caused loss or damage to Duskwood. The court ordered Bellara Willows to compensate Duskwood for the loss or damage caused by its conduct.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

That said, the position remains, as Gleeson CJ has said in the Australian Broadcasting Corporation case, above, at 548, that:"[I]n the ordinary case, as a matter of fact and common sense, other things being equal, the more numerous and significant the areas in respect of which the parties have failed to reach agreement, the slower a court will be to conclude that they had the requisite contractual intention." As to the second question, being that which raises issues of incompleteness and uncertainty, it is convenient to quote what has recently been said by Ipp J (with the concurrence of Pidgeon J) in Anaconda Nickel, above, at 111 ‑ 113, as follows:"Once the court has determined that the requisite intention is present, it is then necessary to go on to consider whether the contract is so incomplete or uncertain as to be void. The following statement by Sugerman J, approved by Menzies J in Thorby v Goldberg (1964) 112 CLR 597 at 607 is often cited in this connection:'It is a first principle of the law of contracts that there can be no binding and enforceable obligation unless the terms of the bargain, or at least its essential and critical terms, have been agreed upon. So, there is no concluded contract where an essential or critical term is expressly left to be settled by future agreement of the parties. Again, there is no binding contract where the language used is so obscure and incapable of any precise or definite meaning that the court is unable to attribute to the parties any particular contractual intentions.'As Barwick CJ stated in Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling & Freezing CoLtd (1968) 118 CLR 429 at 436 ‑ 437, 'a contract is affected by uncertainty only if its essential terms are uncertain or lacking.'It does not follow that any omission will make a contract incomplete or uncertain in the sense of rendering it invalid. It is only the omission of an essential term that will have that effect. As to the meaning of 'essential' in this context, the following words of Lloyd LJ (with whom the other members of the Court of Appeal agreed) in Pagnan SpA v Feed Products Ltd [1987] 2 Lloyds Rep 601 at 619 are helpful:'It is sometimes said that the parties must agree on the essential terms and that it is only matters of detail which can be left over. This may be misleading, since the word "essential" in that context is ambiguous. If by "essential" one means a term without which the contract cannot be enforced then the statement is true: the law cannot enforce an incomplete contract. If by "essential" one means a term which the parties have agreed to be essential for the formation of a binding contract, then the statement is tautologous. If by "essential" one means only a term which the court regards as important as opposed to a term which the court regards as less important or a matter of detail, the statement is untrue. It is for the parties to decide whether they wish to be bound and, if so, by what terms, whether they are important or unimportant. It is the parties who are, in the memorable phrase coined by the judge, "the masters of their contractual fate". Of course, the more important the term is the less likely it is that the parties will have left it for future decision. But there is no legal obstacle which stands in the way of the parties agreeing to be bound now while deferring important matters to be agreed later. It happens every day when parties enter into so‑called "heads of agreement".'In determining whether essential terms are uncertain, it is important to bear in mind that ambiguity does not mean uncertainty: see McDermott v Black (1940) 63 CLR 161 at 175. The approach to be adopted was expressed by Barwick CJ in Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling & Freezing Co Ltd (at 436):'But a contract of which there can be more than one possible meaning or which when construed can produce in its application more than one result is not therefore void for uncertainty. As long as it is capable of a meaning, it will ultimately bear that meaning which the courts, or in an appropriate case, an arbitrator, decides is its proper construction: and the court or arbitrator will decide its application. The question becomes one of construction, of ascertaining the intention of the parties, and of applying it. … So long as the language employed by the parties, to use Lord Wright's words in G Scammell & Nephew Ltd v Ouston [1941] AC 251 is not "so obscure and so incapable of any definite or precise meaning that the court is unable to attribute to the parties any particular contractual intention", the contract cannot be held to be void or uncertain or meaningless. In the search for that intention, no narrow or pedantic approach is warranted, particularly in the case of commercial arrangements. Thus will uncertainty of meaning, as distinct from absence of meaning or of intention, be resolved.'In Meehan v Jones (1982) 149 CLR 571 Gibbs CJ pointed out that the fact that opinions may differ as to which of two possible meanings is to be given to the words of a clause in a contract does not mean that the clause is uncertain. 'It is only if the court is unable to put any definite meaning on the contract that it can be said to be uncertain.'In this regard, it is to be emphasised that the number of arguments that may be raised on both sides when a point of construction is raised are usually irrelevant to whether the clause is certain. A good example of this is again Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling & Freezing Co Ltd, a case involving a contract to build a bridge at cost. Barwick CJ pointed out (at 436) that the arguments, for and against, as to whether or not some item of expenditure is a cost may be 'endless' but, generally speaking 'the concept of a cost of doing something is certain in the sense that it provides a criterion by reference to which the rights of the parties may ultimately and logically be worked out, if not by the parties then by the courts'. For a contract to be uncertain, the language must be 'so obscure and so incapable of any definite or precise meaning that the court is unable to attribute to the parties any particular contractual intention'."