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Dunkley-Price v The Queen

Dunkley-Price v The Queen

Case [2015] VSCA 310 23 November 2015

Causation

Criminal Liability

Criminal Law

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S APCR 2015 0006

TRAVIS DUNKLEY-PRICE	Applicant
V
THE QUEEN	Respondent

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JUDGES:	REDLICH, KAYE JJA and GINNANE AJA
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	28 October 2015 (Further submissions by appellant on 11 November 2015. Response to further submissions by respondent on 17 November 2015).
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	23 November 2015
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2015] VSCA 310
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM:	DPP v Dunkley-Price (County Court of Ballarat, Judge Pullen, 25 September 2013).

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CRIMINAL LAW – Culpable driving – Negligently causing serious injury – Causation – Applicant’s vehicle stopped in left lane of busy highway to make telephone calls – Victim’s vehicle blocked behind applicant’s vehicle – Co-accused’s vehicle collided with rear of victim’s vehicle – Co-accused convicted of dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing serious injury – Whether open to jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that applicant’s driving was a substantial and operative cause of accident.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Applicant	Mr D Dann	Ms M Walker
For the Crown	Mr R Gibson	Ms V Anscombe, Acting Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

REDLICH JA:

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the reasons of Kaye JA and for those reasons agree that leave should be refused.

KAYE JA:

The applicant was convicted, by the jury empanelled on his trial, of one charge of culpable driving, and one charge of negligently causing serious injury. He also pleaded guilty to a summary charge of driving while his licence was suspended. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective term of 7 years and 3 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 5 years and 3 months.

The applicant’s co-accused, Brett Stevenson, was also found guilty, by the same jury, of one charge of dangerous driving causing death, and one charge of driving causing serious injury. He was sentenced to a total effective term of 2 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 18 months. Mr Stevenson’s appeal against his conviction was dismissed in a separate appeal.[1]
[1]Stevenson v R [2014] VSCA 247.

The applicant seeks leave to appeal against his convictions on one ground, namely, that the guilty verdicts of the jury on the charges of culpable driving and negligently causing serious injury are unsafe and unsatisfactory, in that a jury, acting reasonably, must have had a reasonable doubt that it was the driving of the applicant, as opposed to the driving of Mr Stevenson, that caused the death and serious injury.

The accident, which was the subject of the charges, occurred at 6.15 pm on 19 July 2010 on the Western Highway at Myrniong, a short distance before the Myrniong exit. At that point, the Western Highway was a divided road. The highway consisted of an emergency lane, and two parallel running lanes, on each side. The speed limit applicable to that section of the Western Highway was 110

kilometres per hour. The accident happened shortly after it had become…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Dunkley-Price v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Dunkley-Price v The Queen [2015] VSCA 310
Case: [2015] VSCA 310
Decision Date: 23 November 2015

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Dunkley-Price was charged with negligently causing serious injury by culpable driving, following a multi-vehicle accident on a busy highway. The incident involved Dunkley-Price's vehicle being stopped in the left lane to make a series of telephone calls, with the victim's vehicle blocked behind it. A subsequent collision involving the victim's vehicle and another vehicle driven by a co-accused resulted in the victim's death. The co-accused was convicted of dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing serious injury. Dunkley-Price's trial raised questions about the legal sufficiency of the Crown's case concerning his culpability in the accident, specifically whether the jury could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that his driving was a substantial and operative cause of the accident.

The court examined whether Dunkley-Price's actions, specifically stopping his vehicle in a non-emergency lane of a busy highway to make phone calls, constituted culpable driving. The central issue was whether the jury could find, beyond reasonable doubt, that Dunkley-Price's actions were a substantial and operative cause of the accident. This involved considering the direct and indirect causation of the accident and whether Dunkley-Price's actions were sufficiently connected to the harm suffered by the victim.

The court held that it was open to the jury to conclude that Dunkley-Price's driving was a substantial and operative cause of the accident. The court found that stopping a vehicle in a non-emergency lane of a busy highway, especially to engage in activities such as making phone calls, could reasonably be considered a dangerous act that contributed to the chain of events leading to the accident. The court emphasised the foreseeability of the risk of harm from such actions and the direct link between the initial act and the subsequent collision. This reasoning supported the jury's ability to determine that Dunkley-Price's actions were a contributing factor in the accident.

The court's decision affirmed the jury's verdict that Dunkley-Price was guilty of negligently causing serious injury by culpable driving. The court did not overturn the conviction, and Dunkley-Price's appeal was dismissed. The case underscores the importance of considering the foreseeability and directness of causation in determining culpability in cases of negligent driving.

Orders