JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: DINH -v- COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA [2021] WASCA 127
CORAM: BUSS P
MURPHY JA
MITCHELL JA
HEARD: 22 - 23 APRIL 2021
DELIVERED : 22 JULY 2021
FILE NO/S: CACV 1 of 2020
BETWEEN: ANNE TRAN DINH
Appellant
AND
COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent
PETER DINH
Second Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: ARCHER J
Citation: COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA -v- DINH [No 2] [2019] WASC 456
File Number : CIV 1376 of 2014
Catchwords:
Banking and finance - Loan agreement - Appellant defaulted under loan agreement secured by mortgage - Whether respondent breached clauses of the Code of Banking Practice incorporated into the loan agreement - Whether breach of Code of Banking Practice caused loss to the appellant
Equity - Unconscionable conduct - Whether loan agreement should be set aside on basis of unconscionable conduct - Where appellant had poor English skills - Whether appellant under special disadvantage - Whether respondent unconscientiously took advantage of a special disadvantage
Legislation:
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 12CB
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | N Lucarelli QC and J Paterson |
| First Respondent | : | M D Cuerden SC and C H Thompson |
| Second Respondent | : | No appearance |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Forbes Kirby |
| First Respondent | : | Dentons Australia |
| Second Respondent | : | No appearance |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Doggett [2014] VSC 423
Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2015] VSCA 351; (2015) 47 VR 302
Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640
Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118
Gooley v NSW Rural Assistance Authority [2020] NSWCA 156
Haynes v St George Bank [2018] SASCFC 51; (2018) 130 SASR 551
Lee v Lee [2019] HCA 28; (2019) 266 CLR 129
Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott [2016] HCA 22; (2016) 90 ALJR 679
Sam Management Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2009] NSWCA 320
Smart v Power [2019] WASCA 106
Contents
Summary
Facts found by the trial judge
The appellant, Peter Dinh and Andrew Dinh
Appellant's financial experience and knowledge
Property portfolio at the time of the Loan Agreement
History of farming in Carnarvon
Discussions with the Bank in November 2008
Mr Pollard's assessment of the loan application
General approach
'Projected performance' spreadsheet
Assessment of estimated income
Assessment of estimated Plantation expenditure
Assessment of funds for servicing loans
Assessment of the Dinhs' capacity to service loans
The questionnaire
The $50,000
Conditional approval of the loan on 2 January 2009
Early possession of the Plantation on 4 January 2009
Contract of sale of the Plantation on 10 January…
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- Case
- [2021] WASCA 127
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues primarily revolved around the interpretation of clause 2.2 of the Code and whether it imposed an obligation on the Bank to ensure the appellant understood the financial documents and transactions. The appellant argued that the Bank's failure to ensure understanding constituted a breach of the Code. Conversely, the Bank contended that clause 2.2 did not impose such an obligation.
The Court of Appeal found that clause 2.2 could not be reasonably read as imposing an obligation on the Bank to ensure the appellant understood the nature and terms of the financial documents and transactions. The language of clause 2.2 was too general to imply a promise by the Bank to ascertain the subjective understanding of the customer. Additionally, no other part of the transaction documents evidenced a contractual obligation on the Bank to ensure understanding. The Court concluded that no reasonable businessperson would interpret the general words of clause 2.2 as requiring the Bank to ensure the appellant's subjective understanding was correct. The Court further held that the trial judge's findings on the credibility of witnesses, particularly regarding the Bank's practice of explaining loan documents, were reasonable and should not be disturbed on appeal.
The Court of Appeal upheld the primary judge's decision, finding no error in the primary judge's interpretation of clause 2.2 and the findings related to the Bank's practice of explaining loan documents. The appeal was dismissed, and the primary decision was affirmed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
However, in our view, cl 2.2 cannot be reasonably read, either in general or in its application to the circumstances of this case, as imposing an obligation on the Bank to ensure the appellant understood the nature and terms of the Bill Facility, the overdraft and mortgages, or the nature and effect of facilities of that kind. The generality of the language of cl 2.2 is inconsistent with a construction that it conveys or incorporates a promise by the Bank to ascertain the subjective understanding of the customer. There is nothing elsewhere in the transaction documents evidencing the contractual arrangements between the Bank and the appellant in this case which would put a different complexion on cl 2.2. No reasonable business-person would understand the general words of cl 2.2 as involving an obligation on the Bank to ensure that the appellant's subjective understanding of the nature and effect of the finance documents was correct.[161] [161] As to the general principles of contractual construction, see Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640 [35]. In our view, ground 4 of the respondent's notice of contention is established to the extent that it contends that cl 2.2 of the Code did not require the Bank to ensure that the appellant understood the essential nature, terms or effect of the transaction or the documents that evidenced it. In the present case, the relevant breach of cl 2.2 pleaded by the appellant was a failure to ensure that the appellant understood the nature and terms of the Bill Facility, the overdraft and mortgages, or the nature and effect of facilities of that kind.[162] Our construction of cl 2.2 means that this pleaded case must fail. The substantive question raised by the appellant's ground 16 is whether the trial judge erred in finding that, at the meeting on 12 February 2009, Mr Pollard followed his usual practice of giving a simple explanation of the terms of the Loan Agreement.[163] [163] A finding made at [147] and [605] of the primary decision. The trial judge expressly rejected the appellant's evidence about what occurred at the meeting on 12 February 2009 on credibility grounds.[164] The trial judge preferred Mr Pollard's evidence over the evidence of Peter Dinh and Andrew Dinh. Mr Pollard gave evidence as to his usual practice when having customers sign loan documents. Understandably, when giving evidence many years after the event about what for him was a regular occurrence, Mr Pollard could not recall the particular occasion on which documents were signed on 12 February 2009. In our view, it was a reasonable inference, having regard to her Honour's findings as to Mr Pollard's credibility, that Mr Pollard followed his usual practice on that particular occasion. We would draw the same inference as that drawn by the trial judge.[164] Primary decision [128] - [141]. Even if we had not drawn the same inference, ground 16 (which, like other grounds discussed below, challenges a credibility‑based finding of fact) would fail. In the case of a finding that is based, at least to any substantial degree, on an assessment of the credibility of one or more witnesses, an appellate court will not interfere with the finding unless it is demonstrated to be wrong by reference to incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony, or because the finding is glaringly improbable or contrary to compelling inferences, or because the trial judge failed to use, or has palpably misused, their advantage as trial judge.[165][165] Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118 [28] ‑ [29]; Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott [2016] HCA 22; (2016) 90 ALJR 679 [43]; Smart v Power [2019] WASCA 106 [104].