Dinh v Commonwealth Bank of Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   DINH -v- COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA [2021] WASCA 127

CORAM:   BUSS P

MURPHY JA

MITCHELL JA

HEARD:   22 - 23 APRIL 2021

DELIVERED          :   22 JULY 2021

FILE NO/S:   CACV 1 of 2020

BETWEEN:   ANNE TRAN DINH

Appellant

AND

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA

First Respondent

PETER DINH

Second Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   ARCHER J

Citation: COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA -v- DINH [No 2] [2019] WASC 456

File Number            :   CIV 1376 of 2014


Catchwords:

Banking and finance - Loan agreement - Appellant defaulted under loan agreement secured by mortgage - Whether respondent breached clauses of the Code of Banking Practice incorporated into the loan agreement - Whether breach of Code of Banking Practice caused loss to the appellant

Equity - Unconscionable conduct - Whether loan agreement should be set aside on basis of unconscionable conduct - Where appellant had poor English skills - Whether appellant under special disadvantage - Whether respondent unconscientiously took advantage of a special disadvantage

Legislation:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 12CB

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : N Lucarelli QC and J Paterson
First Respondent : M D Cuerden SC and C H Thompson
Second Respondent : No appearance

Solicitors:

Appellant : Forbes Kirby
First Respondent : Dentons Australia
Second Respondent : No appearance

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Doggett [2014] VSC 423

Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2015] VSCA 351; (2015) 47 VR 302

Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640

Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118

Gooley v NSW Rural Assistance Authority [2020] NSWCA 156

Haynes v St George Bank [2018] SASCFC 51; (2018) 130 SASR 551

Lee v Lee [2019] HCA 28; (2019) 266 CLR 129

Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott [2016] HCA 22; (2016) 90 ALJR 679

Sam Management Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2009] NSWCA 320

Smart v Power [2019] WASCA 106

Thorne v Kennedy [2017] HCA 49; (2017) 263 CLR 85

Zerjavic v Chevron Australia Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 40

Contents

Summary

Facts found by the trial judge

The appellant, Peter Dinh and Andrew Dinh

Appellant's financial experience and knowledge

Property portfolio at the time of the Loan Agreement

History of farming in Carnarvon

Discussions with the Bank in November 2008

Mr Pollard's assessment of the loan application

General approach

'Projected performance' spreadsheet

Assessment of estimated income

Assessment of estimated Plantation expenditure

Assessment of funds for servicing loans

Assessment of the Dinhs' capacity to service loans

The questionnaire

The $50,000

Conditional approval of the loan on 2 January 2009

Early possession of the Plantation on 4 January 2009

Contract of sale of the Plantation on 10 January…

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Details
Case
[2021] WASCA 127
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Dinh v Commonwealth Bank of Australia, the dispute centred on the obligations of the Bank under a Code of Banking Practice, specifically clause 2.2, in relation to ensuring the appellant understood the financial documents and transactions. The Court of Appeal was tasked with reviewing the primary judge's decision on whether the Bank breached its obligations under the Code by not ensuring that the appellant understood the nature and terms of the Bill Facility, the overdraft, and mortgages.

The legal issues primarily revolved around the interpretation of clause 2.2 of the Code and whether it imposed an obligation on the Bank to ensure the appellant understood the financial documents and transactions. The appellant argued that the Bank's failure to ensure understanding constituted a breach of the Code. Conversely, the Bank contended that clause 2.2 did not impose such an obligation.

The Court of Appeal found that clause 2.2 could not be reasonably read as imposing an obligation on the Bank to ensure the appellant understood the nature and terms of the financial documents and transactions. The language of clause 2.2 was too general to imply a promise by the Bank to ascertain the subjective understanding of the customer. Additionally, no other part of the transaction documents evidenced a contractual obligation on the Bank to ensure understanding. The Court concluded that no reasonable businessperson would interpret the general words of clause 2.2 as requiring the Bank to ensure the appellant's subjective understanding was correct. The Court further held that the trial judge's findings on the credibility of witnesses, particularly regarding the Bank's practice of explaining loan documents, were reasonable and should not be disturbed on appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the primary judge's decision, finding no error in the primary judge's interpretation of clause 2.2 and the findings related to the Bank's practice of explaining loan documents. The appeal was dismissed, and the primary decision was affirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

However, in our view, cl 2.2 cannot be reasonably read, either in general or in its application to the circumstances of this case, as imposing an obligation on the Bank to ensure the appellant understood the nature and terms of the Bill Facility, the overdraft and mortgages, or the nature and effect of facilities of that kind. The generality of the language of cl 2.2 is inconsistent with a construction that it conveys or incorporates a promise by the Bank to ascertain the subjective understanding of the customer. There is nothing elsewhere in the transaction documents evidencing the contractual arrangements between the Bank and the appellant in this case which would put a different complexion on cl 2.2. No reasonable business-person would understand the general words of cl 2.2 as involving an obligation on the Bank to ensure that the appellant's subjective understanding of the nature and effect of the finance documents was correct.[161] [161] As to the general principles of contractual construction, see Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640 [35]. In our view, ground 4 of the respondent's notice of contention is established to the extent that it contends that cl 2.2 of the Code did not require the Bank to ensure that the appellant understood the essential nature, terms or effect of the transaction or the documents that evidenced it. In the present case, the relevant breach of cl 2.2 pleaded by the appellant was a failure to ensure that the appellant understood the nature and terms of the Bill Facility, the overdraft and mortgages, or the nature and effect of facilities of that kind.[162] Our construction of cl 2.2 means that this pleaded case must fail. The substantive question raised by the appellant's ground 16 is whether the trial judge erred in finding that, at the meeting on 12 February 2009, Mr Pollard followed his usual practice of giving a simple explanation of the terms of the Loan Agreement.[163] [163] A finding made at [147] and [605] of the primary decision. The trial judge expressly rejected the appellant's evidence about what occurred at the meeting on 12 February 2009 on credibility grounds.[164] The trial judge preferred Mr Pollard's evidence over the evidence of Peter Dinh and Andrew Dinh. Mr Pollard gave evidence as to his usual practice when having customers sign loan documents. Understandably, when giving evidence many years after the event about what for him was a regular occurrence, Mr Pollard could not recall the particular occasion on which documents were signed on 12 February 2009. In our view, it was a reasonable inference, having regard to her Honour's findings as to Mr Pollard's credibility, that Mr Pollard followed his usual practice on that particular occasion. We would draw the same inference as that drawn by the trial judge.[164] Primary decision [128] - [141]. Even if we had not drawn the same inference, ground 16 (which, like other grounds discussed below, challenges a credibility‑based finding of fact) would fail. In the case of a finding that is based, at least to any substantial degree, on an assessment of the credibility of one or more witnesses, an appellate court will not interfere with the finding unless it is demonstrated to be wrong by reference to incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony, or because the finding is glaringly improbable or contrary to compelling inferences, or because the trial judge failed to use, or has palpably misused, their advantage as trial judge.[165][165] Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118 [28] ‑ [29]; Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott [2016] HCA 22; (2016) 90 ALJR 679 [43]; Smart v Power [2019] WASCA 106 [104].