1. Leave to appeal in relation to grounds 1 and 2 of the conviction appeal is refused. 2. The conviction appeal is otherwise dismissed. 3. The sentence appeal is upheld and the sentences imposed by Beech-Jones J are set aside. 4. The appellant is re-sentenced as follows: a. For count 1, being an offence contrary to s 135.4(5) of the Criminal Code, the appellant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 9 years, commencing on 22 December 2014 and expiring on 21 December 2023. b. For count 6, being an offence contrary to s 11.5(1) of the Criminal Code, the appellant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 years, to date from 22 December 2016 and expiring on 21 December 2028. c. Pursuant to s 19AB(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 the Court fixes a single non-parole period of 9 years and 3 months, expiring on 21 March 2024.
Catchwords:
CRIMINAL LAW – appeal – appeal against conviction complex tax fraud – money laundering – question of whether change in Crown case – whether appellant’s conviction inconsistent with asserted innocence of co-conspirator – whether plea in bar exists for a count on indictment – whether criminality of one count on indictment considerably different to a second count on indictment – whether count duplicitous – whether trial judge failed to adequately put the appellant’s case to the jury – conviction appeal dismissed
CRIMINAL LAW – appeal – Crown appeal against sentence – whether sentence manifestly inadequate - whether misapplication of principle – aggregate sentence unreasonable or unjust – residual discretion - appeal against sentence upheld – appellant re-sentenced
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Dickson v R [2016] NSWCCA 105
Case
[2016] NSWCCA 105
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The appeal was brought by the appellant, Dickson, against his conviction for complex tax fraud and money laundering. The case was heard in the High Court of Australia. Dickson contested his conviction, arguing that the change in the Crown's case, his asserted innocence in relation to a co-conspirator, and the potential duplicity of counts on the indictment warranted a reconsideration of his conviction. The Crown, on the other hand, appealed against the sentence, contending that it was manifestly inadequate and an unreasonable exercise of the court's residual discretion.
The court was tasked with determining several legal issues, including whether the change in the Crown's case amounted to a plea in bar, whether the criminality of one count on the indictment was considerably different from a second count, and whether the trial judge adequately put the appellant's case to the jury. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate and whether there was a misapplication of the principle concerning the aggregate sentence.
The court found that the appellant's conviction was not inconsistent with his asserted innocence in relation to his co-conspirator, and there was no plea in bar for a count on the indictment. The court also determined that the criminality of one count on the indictment was not considerably different from a second count, and thus, the counts were not duplicitous. The trial judge had adequately put the appellant's case to the jury. Consequently, the conviction appeal was dismissed. However, the court found that the sentence was manifestly inadequate and there was a misapplication of the principle concerning the aggregate sentence. The appellant was re-sentenced.
In summary, the High Court dismissed the appeal against the conviction but upheld the Crown's appeal against the sentence. The appellant was re-sentenced, reflecting the court's view that the original sentence was manifestly inadequate and there had been a misapplication of the principle concerning the aggregate sentence.