R v Lauren Cranston

[2023] NSWSC 454

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Lauren Cranston [2023] NSWSC 454

Hearing dates:

28 April 2023

Date of orders:

1 May 2023

Decision date:

01 May 2023

Jurisdiction:

Common Law - Criminal

Before:

Payne JA

Decision:

(1)   Ms Cranston is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 4 years to commence on 14 March 2023 and expire on 13 March 2027 for the tax fraud conspiracy;

(2)   Ms Cranston is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 6 years to commence on 14 March 2025 and expire on 13 March 2031 for the money laundering conspiracy;

(3) Under s 19AB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) a single non-parole period of 5 years is fixed;

(4)   The offender is first eligible for parole on 13 March 2028.

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – sentence – federal offenders – conspiracy to cause loss to the Commonwealth – money laundering conspiracy – significant loss to the Commonwealth – persistent course of conduct

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1, Criminal Code

Cases Cited:

Alpha v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 292

Arenilla-Cepeda v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 267

Bar-Mordecai v Rotman [2000] NSWCA 123

Cheung v R (2001) 209 CLR 1; [2001] HCA 67

Dickson v R (No 18) [2015] NSWSC 286

Dickson v R [2016] NSWCCA 105

Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Beattie [2017] NSWCCA 301; 270 A Crim R 556

Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Gregory (2011) 34 VR 1; [2011] VSCA 145

DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194

DPP (Cth) v Estrada (2015) 45 VR 286; [2015] VSCA 22

Elomar v The Queen (2014) 316 ALR 206; [2014] NSWCCA 303

Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47; [2015] HCA 29

Ha v R [2008] NSWCCA 141

Hili v R; Jones v R (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45

Leach v The Queen (2007) 230 CLR 1; [2007] HCA 3

Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25

Ngo v R [2018] NSWCCA 296

O'Neil-Shaw v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 42

Pearce v R (1988) 194 CLR 610

R v Agius; R v Zerafa [2012] NSWSC 978; 87 ATR 528

R v Anquetil [2020] NSWSC 995

R v Glynatsis [2013] NSWCCA 131; (2013) 230 A Crim R 99

R v Gregory (2011) 34 VR 1; [2011] VSCA 145

R v Hammond [2020] NSWSC 888

R v Huang; R v Siu [2007] NSWCCA 259; 174 A Crim R 370

R v Huston; R v Fox; R v Henke; ex parte Cth DPP [2011] QCA 350; 219 A Crim R 209

R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374

R v Issakidis [2018] NSWSC 378

R v Jiao [2015] NSWCCA 95; 251 A Crim R 236

R v Kitson [2019] NSWSC 1109

R v Lin [2014] NSWCCA 254

R v Nguyen [2010] NSWCCA 331

R v Pilley (1991) 56 A Crim R 202

R v Todd [1982] 2 NSWLR 517

R v Want [2013] NSWCCA 2

Sabra v R [2015] NSWCCA 38

Savvas v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 1

Shi v R [2014] NSWCCA 276; 246 A Crim R 273

Strbak v The Queen (2020) 267 CLR 494; [2020] HCA 10

The Queen v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54

Totaan v R [2022] NSWCCA 75

Tyler v R; R v Chalmers [2007] NSWCCA 247; (2007) 173 A Crim R 458

Weininger v The Queen (2003) 212 CLR 629; [2003] HCA 14

Category:

Sentence

Parties:

Rex (Crown)
Lauren Anne Cranston (Offender)

Representation:

Counsel:
P McGuire SC with J Paingakulam and C Tran (Crown)
TD Anderson SC (Offender)

Solicitors:
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Greg Willis Criminal Defence Lawyer (Offender)

File Number(s):

2017/148185

Publication restriction:

(1) Pursuant to s 7 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) the parts of these reasons for judgment which are marked as redacted on the file copy of the judgment initialled by Payne JA are not to be published (other than to the parties and their legal representatives) until further order of the Court.

(2) Order (1) is made on the ground specified in s 8(1)(c) of the Act.

(3) Pursuant to s 11(2) of the Act, order (1) applies throughout the Commonwealth of Australia.

Judgment – EX TEMPORE

[Amended in accordance with the principles in Bar-Mordecai v Rotman [2000] NSWCA 123 at [194]]

1. PAYNE JA: On 26 April 2022, Ms Lauren Cranston was arraigned before a jury on the following counts:

1. Between about 1 March 2014 and about 18 May 2017, at Sydney in the State of New South Wales and elsewhere, conspiring with each other, Simon Paul Anquetil, Devyn Michelle Hammond, Joshua Meredith Kitson, Peter Larcombe, Daniel Rostankovski and divers others with the intention of dishonestly causing a loss to a third person, namely the Commonwealth.

Contrary to section 135.4(3) of the Criminal Code (Cth).

2. Between about 1 March 2014 and about 18 May 2017, at Sydney in the State of New South Wales and elsewhere, conspiring with each other, Simon Paul Anquetil, Devyn Michelle Hammond, Joshua Meredith Kitson, Peter Larcombe and divers others to deal with money of a value of $1,000,000 or more believing it to be the proceeds of crime.

Contrary to sections 11.5(1) and 400.3(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth).

2. On 13 March 2023, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts. On 14 March 2023, Ms Cranston’s bail was revoked and she was remanded in custody.

3. The maximum penalty for the offence under s 135.4(3) of the Criminal Code is imprisonment for 10 years and/or a fine of $108,000. The maximum penalty for the offence under ss 11.5(1) and 400.3(1) of the Criminal Code is imprisonment for 25 years, and/or a fine of $270,000.

4. In what follows I make findings of fact for the purposes of sentence. The principles I have applied in making those findings of fact are as follows:

1. A sentencing judge has a duty to make, as far as possible, findings of fact relevant to the issues that will inform the sentence: The Queen v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54 at [1]; Weininger v The Queen (2003) 212 CLR 629; [2003] HCA 14 at [16]-[17]; R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374 at 378;

2. Sometimes, however, it may be impossible for the sentencer to resolve a given factual question in a way that tends to either increase or decrease the sentence. In that case, the sentencer must leave that matter to one side and proceed on the basis of what can be found Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47; [2015] HCA 29 at [70];

3. The sentencing judge is not constrained to matters formally proved or admitted by one or other of the parties during the sentencing hearing: Weininger at [21]; R v Pilley (1991) 56 A Crim R 202 at 204;

4. The Court is not bound to accept one party’s view of the facts simply because that view is uncontradicted by any other party: Weininger at [20]. Sometimes, a party’s uncontradicted interpretation of the facts may be rejected because it is implausible: O'Neil-Shaw v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 42 at [26];

5. If a party at sentencing seeks to rely on a particular fact, that party has the onus of proving the fact in question: Olbrich at [25]. There is, however, no general joinder of issue in sentencing and, unlike at the trial, no generalised onus of proof: Olbrich at [25];

6. If the prosecution seeks to rely on a fact, they must prove it beyond reasonable doubt. If the offender seeks to rely on a fact, the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities: Olbrich at [27]-[28]; Leach v The Queen (2007) 230 CLR 1; [2007] HCA 3 at [41]; Filippou at [64], [66]; Strbak v The Queen (2020) 267 CLR 494; [2020] HCA 10 at [32];

7. After a jury returns a verdict of guilty, the sentencer is constrained to making findings of fact that are consistent with the jury’s verdict: Cheung v R (2001) 209 CLR 1; [2001] HCA 67 at [14], approving R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374 at 376-377;

8. A sentencer cannot know, in many cases, exactly what facts the jury found or what evidence they accepted. The sentencer is constrained by a verdict only when that verdict, by necessary implication, reveals that the jury accepted particular evidence or resolved facts in a particular way: Cheung at [17];

9. Within this constraint, the sentencer can make findings as they see fit: Savvas v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 1 at 8. There is no requirement to accept all of the Crown’s case as put to the jury: Cheung at [7]. Nor is the judge required to take a view of the facts most favourable to the offender: Isaacs at 377D.

5. The following evidence was led in the sentence proceedings:

1. The Crown relied on:

1. an affidavit affirmed on 14 April 2023 by Edward Brendan McGinness, the Acting Principal Federal Prosecutor at the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. This affidavit addressed the procedural history of the prosecution and the trial.

2. The Crown also relied on all of the evidence given in the trial.

2. The offender relied on:

1. a report dated 20 April 2023 by forensic psychologist Stephanie Bennett;

2. an affidavit affirmed on 19 April 2023 by Andrew Mark Kubacki, the offender’s ex-partner and father of her daughter;

3. an affidavit affirmed on 19 April 2023 by Robyn Anne Cranston, the offender’s mother;

4. character references in the form of:

1. a letter to the Court from Tania Waterhouse of Waterhouse Lawyers, the offender’s former employer;

2. a statement made by Gloria Cassimatis, the wife of the offender’s father and a senior ATO officer;

3. a statement made by Karen Mark, a paternal aunt of the offender; and

4. a statement made by Jennifer Parker, another of the offender’s paternal aunts.

6. I have taken into account all the material relied upon by the parties on sentence and will refer to it where appropriate.

Relevant facts

7. For the purposes of sentencing, the facts identified are found in accordance with the principles I have outlined at [4] above.

8. In September 2016, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) commenced an investigation into an alleged conspiracy between several persons to dishonestly cause a loss to the Commonwealth (the tax fraud conspiracy). The tax fraud conspiracy involved the establishment and operation of a payroll services company, named Plutus Payroll Australia Pty Ltd (Plutus) and a number of apparently unrelated subcontracting companies, which were in truth controlled by a number of the conspirators. The purpose of establishing this structure was to deprive the Commissioner of Taxation of Pay As You Go Withholding (PAYGW) amounts and Goods and Services Tax (GST).

9. Between 2014 and 2017, Plutus collected from its legitimate clients $141,291,923.08 in PAYGW and GST that it was obliged to remit to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). At least $105,625,304.36 was misappropriated as a result of the conspiracy (74.7% of all PAYGW and GST amounts collected by Plutus). Only $30,883,342.47 was ever remitted to the ATO and a further $4,783,276.25 was later garnisheed by the ATO.

10. The conspirators agreed to launder the money which should have been paid to the ATO (the money laundering conspiracy). In furthering the money laundering conspiracy, in ways I will explain in greater detail, various entities were used to receive, conceal and divert the misappropriated taxes derived from the tax fraud conspiracy, essentially for the benefit of a number of the conspirators.

11. The offender was not involved in the initial planning and set up of Plutus or the conspiracies. The architects of the scheme were Jason Onley, the offender’s older brother Adam Cranston, Peter Larcombe and Simon Anquetil. Later, Dev Menon was a significant participant in the conspiracies. By April 2014, the offender was working for the apparently unrelated Plutus subcontracting company, Keystone, under Patrick Willmott’s direction, and was involved in processing Plutus’ first “trial pay run”.

12. As I will explain, whilst I harbour strong suspicions about the offender’s state of knowledge at the beginning of the conspiracies, I am not able to find beyond reasonable doubt that the offender knowingly participated in the conspiracies as early as April 2014, the time suggested by the Crown. I am, however, satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender knowingly participated in the conspiracies no later than February 2015. This is well before July 2016, the time the offender’s counsel, Mr Anderson SC submits I should find that the offender knowingly participated in the conspiracies.

The tax fraud conspiracy

13. Between February and March 2014, at least five of the conspirators, Messrs Onley, Adam Cranston, Anquetil, Kitson and Peter Larcombe (now deceased) had meetings at so called “gentlemen’s clubs” in the Sydney CBD during which they discussed a scheme which involved operating a payroll business as a means to misappropriate PAYGW amounts and GST that was payable to the ATO. Lauren Cranston did not participate in these meetings and there is no evidence that she knew of these meetings.

14. A payroll company, Plutus, was incorporated on 23 April 2014 with Mr Anquetil as the sole director. Legitimate clients of Plutus included initially, contractors, and later, larger companies and even government agencies. The principal incentive for contractors and companies to sign as clients of Plutus was the fact that Plutus did not charge any fee for its services.

15. The tax fraud conspiracy operated and was implemented as follows:

1. Legitimate client companies made regular transfers of gross payroll amounts to Plutus pursuant to contractual arrangements. Gross payroll comprised wages and salaries, PAYGW amounts and superannuation. GST was paid by the legitimate clients on the total gross payroll amounts. Plutus was obliged under contracts with legitimate clients to pay the wages and salaries of the relevant employees and contractors, withhold and remit to the ATO the required PAYGW and GST amounts, as well as remit the employees’ superannuation contributions to their superannuation funds.

2. Between July 2014 and March 2016, Plutus transferred the gross payroll monies, in full, to companies incorporated and controlled by the conspirators and referred to by the conspirators as the “bots” or “bottom companies” or subcontracting companies (the 2nd tier companies). The conspirators then processed the relevant payments through these companies. The conspirators arranged for vulnerable and unsophisticated people who did not understand the operations of the 2nd tier companies to be appointed as sole shareholders and directors of the 2nd tier companies. The conspirators then arranged for apparently unrelated third parties to "manage" the 2nd tier directors. Originally, that “manager” role was filled by an Egon or “John” Strauss. In the period from mid-2015 to mid-2016, that role was filled by Mr Simon McIntyre. Mr McIntyre, under the direction of Mr Adam Cranston, Mr Larcombe, Mr Onley and Mr Willmott, was responsible for recruiting and managing the directors of the 2nd tier companies and ensuring they had no unsupervised involvement in the operations of those companies. In the period from mid-2016 to February 2017, Mr Rostankovski, under the direction of Mr Adam Cranston, Mr Menon and Mr Onley, became responsible for recruiting and managing the directors of the 2nd tier companies and ensuring they had no unsupervised involvement in the operations of those companies. While at times she purported to act in the name of one or other of the directors, and was involved in payments made to them, Ms Cranston was not involved in the recruitment of the 2nd tier directors. In their liaison with Plutus staff, accountants and other third parties, Ms Cranston, Ms Hammond and Mr Willmott signed off as the named directors of the 2nd tier companies or as “bookkeepers” assisting the directors in email communications.

3. In the period April 2014 to February 2015, Ms Cranston and Mr Willmott were principally involved in the operation of the 2nd tier companies’ accounts from a “back office”, at the instruction of Messrs Onley, Larcombe, Adam Cranston.

4. In the period from February 2015 to May 2016 Ms Hammond and Mr Willmott were principally involved in the operation of the 2nd tier companies’ accounts from a “back office”, at the instruction of Messrs Onley, Larcombe, Adam Cranston and later, Mr Menon. Although Ms Cranston’s involvement in the management of the 2nd tier companies was less intense during this period, she was nevertheless involved in important aspects of the conspiracies during this period. During this period, Ms Cranston continued to perform tasks for the conspirators to give effect to the aims of the conspiracies and and accepted a trusted and responsible position in the conspiracies.

5. On 26 August 2015 Mr Larcombe left Australia, never to return. Mr Larcombe had little involvement in the conspiracies after August 2015. Mr Larcombe died in Los Angeles on 19 August 2016.

6. In the period from May 2016, when Mr Willmott was dismissed from involvement with Aventis and the 2nd tier companies by Mr Adam Cranston, until their arrest on 17 or 18 May 2017, Mr Onley and Adam Cranston, together with Mr Menon, were responsible for the operations of the 2nd tier companies. Ms Cranston and Ms Hammond were engaged in conducting the day to day management and operation of the 2nd tier companies throughout that period.

7. Although the legitimate client companies’ agreements with Plutus contained a clause enabling Plutus to assign or subcontract its obligations, Plutus did not inform its legitimate clients about the subcontracting arrangement it had put in place with the 2nd tier companies. This is because the subcontracting arrangement was a mechanism designed by the conspirators to misappropriate amounts Plutus was obliged to pay the ATO. While the 2nd tier companies would pay the contractors and employees of the legitimate companies amounts representing their net wages and superannuation, the 2nd tier companies would, from the very beginning, not remit all of the taxes required to be paid to the ATO. Instead, for the entire period of the conspiracies a large proportion of these taxes would be retained by the 2nd tier companies and not paid to the ATO but distributed according to the instructions of the conspirators.

8. The 2nd tier companies paid the amounts which should have been paid to the ATO to other entities controlled by Messrs Onley, Larcombe, Adam Cranston and Anquetil, often as payments of fabricated “invoices”, as well as to individuals including the conspirators. The 2nd tier companies in some cases made payments back to Plutus. Over time the liabilities of the 2nd tier companies to the ATO grew at an alarming rate. Annexed to these reasons and marked Annexure 1 is Exhibit II from the trial which shows the dramatically increasing obligations of the 2nd tier companies to the ATO and the extent to which the 2nd tier companies fell further and further behind in their tax payment obligations.

9. In 2016, Plutus began to retain a portion of the funds it received from legitimate clients before the gross payroll amount plus GST was remitted to the 2nd tier companies (the Plutus cut). The Plutus cut was also used to make payments of PAYGW and GST, not to the ATO, but for lavish personal items at the direction of the conspirators. After 1 July 2016, regular payments were made to a newly incorporated company controlled by Messrs Cranston and Onley, Synep Ltd (Synep). From this point in 2016, amounts which should have been remitted to the ATO were dishonestly retained and not paid to the ATO via both the Plutus cut and the 2nd tier companies.

10. Mr Menon was an accountant and a lawyer. He was a partner at Clamenz Lawyers (Clamenz) which was initially located in the same building as Plutus. From mid 2016, Mr Menon was actively involved in ensuring that the subcontracting arrangement and front office facade was maintained and the back office dealings of the 2nd tier companies were not exposed.

11. While Plutus lodged Business Activity Statements (BASs), throughout the period of the tax fraud conspiracy, the 2nd tier companies either lodged their BASs late (up to 13 months late) or did not lodge a BAS at all.

16. There were eight 2nd tier companies involved in these conspiracies:

1. ACN 169 184 909 Pty Ltd (t/as Keystone Pay) (Keystone)

2. Uneek Consulting Services Pty Ltd (later renamed Keystone Payroll Australia Pty Ltd, then later PPA Contractors Australia Pty Ltd) (Uneek)

3. Sonar Consultants Pty Ltd (later renamed PPA Services Australia Pty Ltd) (Sonar)

4. PP Aus Holdings Pty Ltd

1. PP Australia NSW Pty Ltd

2. PP Services (WA) Pty Ltd

3. PPA (SA) Pty Ltd

4. PPA NT Pty Ltd

17. Companies (4) to (8) are referred to as the PP Companies.

18. Annexed to these reasons as Annexure 2 are exhibits PP, QQ and RR which illustrate diagrammatically how money was moved as part of the conspiracies in the three taxation years which the conspiracies spanned.

19. On 8 June 2016, Keystone was placed into liquidation. The ATO investigation into the conspiracies only commenced in earnest in the second half of 2016. On 8 and 22 December 2016, two bank accounts held in the name of Uneek were garnisheed by the ATO. Sonar never had a separate bank account and used Uneek’s accounts. On 24 January 2017, the ATO garnisheed the five PP 2nd tier companies’ accounts. After 24 January 2017, Plutus managed its obligations to its legitimate clients by paying salary, wages and superannuation directly from Plutus.

20. Between December 2016 and the end of January 2017, video and audio footage was recorded on covert surveillance devices at the “back office” in Miranda (the Regus office). In these recordings, Ms Cranston and Ms Hammond contemporaneously operated the email and bank accounts of the 2nd tier companies, posed as the directors, and made payments on behalf of the conspirators of amounts which should instead have been paid to the ATO.

21. Between January and May 2017, a number of discussions between the conspirators were recorded by surveillance devices installed at Clamenz, at the MLC Centre in Martin Place, Sydney. During these discussions, the conspirators spoke in explicit terms about the fraud, including its history, key features, how it was implemented and the conspirators’ respective involvement and financial gains. Ms Cranston attended some of these meetings.

22. On 1 February 2017, at Clamenz, Mr Rostankovski issued the principal conspirators with a blackmail demand for $5 million. Mr Rostankovski threatened media exposure of the fraud and violence if the blackmail sum was not paid. After the blackmail demand of $5 million had been almost completely paid via instalments, a further blackmail demand was made for an additional $20 million. Over 12 weeks, a total of $24.24 million in PAYGW and GST which should have been paid to the ATO was retained by the conspirators and was transferred from Plutus to the trust account of a law firm, Lands Legal, to satisfy the blackmail demands. Although Ms Cranston clearly knew about the blackmail demand shortly after it was made (on the recordings she identified, correctly, Mr Hausman as a principal figure behind the blackmail) she was not a decision maker in relation to paying the blackmail demand.

23. On 26 April 2017, the ATO served a garnishee order on bank accounts operated by Plutus. The conspiracy concluded after the AFP arrested a number of people, including the offender, on 17 and 18 May 2017.

The money laundering conspiracy

24. The conspirators agreed that taxes dishonestly withheld from the Commonwealth would not be paid to the ATO but would instead be dealt with for the ultimate benefit of the conspirators. The quantum of misappropriated taxes increased each financial year. The means by which monies were misappropriated adapted and evolved. In furtherance of the money laundering conspiracy, monies were received, concealed and disposed of through bank accounts owned by companies associated with the conspirators (not including Ms Cranston).

25. Acts in furtherance of the money laundering conspiracy included:

1. The PAYGW and GST amounts withheld by the 2nd tier companies by the “back office” were transferred to a number of entities’ accounts, controlled by and associated with, in particular, Messrs Adam Cranston, Onley and Anquetil and used to purchase real property, luxury cars, a boat, an aeroplane and other luxury items in which conspirators were joint or principal beneficiaries. At times, funds transfers were also accompanied by false invoices and false descriptions such as loans. Ms Cranston and Ms Hammond made these transfers at the instruction of others, in particular Messrs Adam Cranston, Onley and Menon.

2. Some of the PAYGW and GST which should have been paid to the ATO was also transferred by the 2nd tier companies to other entities owned by Mr Anquetil, and some of those amounts were transferred back to Plutus to make Plutus appear to be a legitimate and profitable company.

3. From at least October to December 2014 large sums of PAYGW and GST amounts which should have been paid to the ATO were transferred by the 2nd tier companies to a company controlled by Mr Anquetil named Media and Marketing Group (MMG) and transferred by MMG back to Plutus to make Plutus appear to be a legitimate and profitable company. As I will explain, it is clear that Ms Cranston was knowingly involved in this period making payments of PAYGW and GST to MMG rather than the ATO.

4. From 1 July 2016, the Plutus cut was transferred through Synep which became the parent company of Plutus, and other entities, for the benefit of (at least) Messrs Onley, Adam Cranston and Anquetil.

26. The main financial beneficiaries of the money laundering conspiracy were Messrs Cranston, Onley and Anquetil. An example of the tracing of the proceeds of the money laundering conspiracy for the benefit of Adam Cranston is at Annexure 3 to these reasons which is the “Aventis Pipeline" (Diagram 5 of Trial Exhibit LL). Annexure 4 to these reasons is an example of the use of taxes which should have been paid to the ATO but were instead used by Adam Cranston to purchase real property (Diagram 24 of Trial Exhibit LL).

Ms Cranston’s role in the conspiracies

27. As I have said, Ms Cranston was not involved in the initial planning and set up of Plutus. In the period late April 2014 until February 2015, Mr Willmott and Ms Cranston undertook payroll work for the 2nd tier companies in Double Bay. In April-May 2014, Ms Cranston was involved in the initial Plutus trial pay run. Ms Cranston was involved in processing the pay runs at Mr Willmott’s direction during the period April 2014-February 2015. To give some idea of the scope of that undertaking, there were 748 pay runs from July 2014 until February 2015.

28. Ms Hammond began working for Mr Willmott in the Double Bay office during February 2015. As I have said, in the period February 2015 to May 2016, Ms Cranston was less involved with the 2nd tier companies but continued knowingly to participate in the conspiracies:

1. Ms Cranston would process payroll when Ms Hammond needed help;

2. Ms Hammond dealt directly with Ms Cranston on a number of issues during this period, particularly as Ms Cranston had bank access to the 2nd tier companies for this period and (for the initial part) Ms Hammond did not;

3. In August 2015, Ms Cranston assisted in payment of invoices for hundreds of thousands of dollars addressed to the “straw” director of Uneek, Mr Spencer;

4. Throughout this period Ms Cranston continued to make numerous payments from the 2nd tier companies for the benefit of her brother, Adam Cranston. These were PAYGW and GST amounts which should instead have been paid to the tax office. Ms Cranston also made a number of payments from the 2nd tier companies for the benefit of Mr Larcombe during this period.

29. Ms Cranston worked full time for the 2nd tier companies after May 2016 when Adam Cranston dismissed Patrick Willmott.

30. Perhaps the most important factual issue debated in the written and oral submissions on sentence was the submission made by Mr Anderson SC that Ms Cranston was not knowingly participating in the tax fraud conspiracy or the money laundering conspiracy until July 2016, when Ms Cranston commenced attending regular meetings to discuss spreadsheets she and Ms Hammond had prepared of taxes not paid. In addressing this submission, Mr Anderson SC invited me to infer that his client was at the time young, unsophisticated and lacking in curiosity. In the absence of recordings, which did not commence until October 2016 or an admission by Ms Cranston, it was submitted that I should infer she was not knowingly participating in the conspiracies until July 2016 when there is spreadsheet evidence of the non-payment of millions of dollars in tax. Whilst I accept that Ms Cranston was young at the commencement of the conspiracies and lacking a professional qualification, on all of the evidence I find that from at least late 2014 she had a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of the tax obligations of the 2nd tier companies to participate meaningfully in discussions with her co-conspirators about the mechanics of payments made and not made of tax which should have been paid to the ATO. I do not accept that, at any time, Ms Cranston was lacking in curiosity about what she was doing. Ms Cranston, on all of the evidence, was knowledgeable about the detailed operations of the second-tier companies and payments of amounts which should have been paid to the ATO to third parties. In those transactions Ms Cranston was astute to attempt to protect her co-conspirators, particularly her brother.

31. Mr Anderson also relied heavily upon evidence given at the trial by Ms Hammond, to the effect that the time at which Ms Hammond first knew of any impropriety, let alone active involvement in the conspiracies, was unclear. Accepting that Ms Hammond expressed some confusion in her evidence at the trial about when it was she knew that what she was doing was “illegal” or “criminal” does not lead me to doubt the correctness of the facts Ms Hammond agreed to be sentenced upon, much less to attribute Ms Hammond’s expressed state of mind at the trial to Ms Cranston.

32. I find that Ms Cranston, unlike Ms Hammond, had worked processing payroll for the 2nd tier companies on behalf of the principal conspirators, including her brother, from the very beginning of the Plutus tax fraud conspiracy in April 2014. In processing payroll for Keystone, I accept [redacted] evidence that Ms Cranston was sent by Plutus Recipient Created Tax Invoices (RCTIs), invoices showing GST paid and reports which showed the breakdown of payments made by Plutus to Keystone into wages and salaries, superannuation and PAYGW amounts for each Plutus client. GST payable was shown on an attached invoice.

33. In processing payroll from April 2014, Ms Cranston was privy to the granular details of the amounts paid by Plutus for wages and salaries, superannuation, PAYGW and GST. Ms Cranston arranged payment of the wages and salary and superannuation amounts, in full, but instead of remitting PAYGW and GST to the ATO paid it to apparently unrelated companies secretly controlled by the conspirators. Critically, prior to Ms Hammond’s appointment, Ms Cranston was a trusted participant in the conspiracies and was allowed access to the bank account of the initial 2nd tier company, Keystone, and the bank account of Aventis, a company not related to Keystone on paper but also controlled by Messrs Lacombe, Cranston and Onley. As I have said, for some time after the initial period of her employment Ms Hammond was not trusted by the conspirators with access to the bank accounts of the 2nd tier companies. Further, the Aventis bank account was, during the first stage of the conspiracies, one into which significant deposits of funds were made by Keystone of PAYGW and GST which should have been paid to the ATO. Ms Cranston was given access to the Aventis bank account and was responsible for making payments from that account. Ms Cranston herself identified her early knowing involvement in the conspiracies when at p 2093 of MFI 6 on 14 February 2017, at a time that the ATO investigation of the conspiracies was no longer covert, Ms Cranston says, "I think I regret it when I started working for Aventis".

34. I find that Ms Cranston was a knowing participant in the conspiracies no later than the time Ms Hammond was employed in February 2015. I accept [redacted] evidence that in the months that followed the initial ESG Media trial run in April–May 2014, he would deal with the offender on issues concerning day-to-day processing of payroll and the use of the Keystone account and would send her RCTIs, reports and invoices relevant to payments made by Plutus to Keystone. The day-to-day operation of the tax fraud and money laundering conspiracies was, during this initial period, centrally concerned with Keystone and the non-remittance by that firm of PAYGW and GST amounts which should have been paid to the ATO. I do not accept Mr Anderson’s submission that the offender could only have understood that PAYGW and GST paid to Keystone was required to be paid to the ATO if she understood all of Adam Cranston’s business dealings.

35. I find that the offender was involved day-to-day in processing the payroll for the second-tier company Keystone from April – May 2014 to February 2015. As a person intimately familiar with payroll processing, I find that by no later than February 2015 the offender was aware that the 2nd tier companies were not paying to the ATO the full amount of PAYGW and GST that should have been paid. Ms Cranston’s role in the tax fraud conspiracy was to process payroll received from Plutus which included making payments of wages and superannuation out of the Keystone bank account, while withholding entirely or underpaying the amounts the 2nd tier companies should have paid to the ATO. I accept [redacted] evidence that at this early stage he regularly sent the offender documents showing a breakdown of the gross wages into net wages, superannuation, and PAYGW. GST payable was shown separately on the invoices sent to the offender. Ms Cranston did not need a University degree or an understanding of all of the conspirators’ business dealings to understand that amounts paid to Keystone by Plutus and identified in documents sent to her as PAYGW and GST had to be paid to the tax office and not transferred by her to third parties at the direction of her brother or his associates.

36. The conclusion that the offender was knowingly involved in the conspiracies by no later than February 2015 is underlined by the fact that on 2 December 2014, Mr Anquetil emailed the offender chasing payment of an MMG invoice that he had sent on the previous Friday, 28 November 2014. Mr Anquetil told the offender that the funds were to be used to pay for rebate cards, which were incentives given to Plutus customers paid for from funds which should have been remitted to the ATO. As I have explained, the payment of funds by 2nd tier companies of monies which should have been paid to the ATO to MMG was, at least initially, a critical feature of the tax fraud and money laundering conspiracies. I find that as at December 2014, the offender sufficiently understood how the tax fraud and money laundering conspiracies operated for that message about the MMG invoice to be meaningful to her.

37. It is also of significance that in February 2015, the offender contacted Mr Larcombe to obtain a bank token number so that she could pay the Aventis wages. Aventis was one of the pipeline companies into which large amounts of money which should have been paid by Keystone to the ATO in 2014 and 2015 was paid. The offender’s responsibility for payments out of the Aventis account, into which considerable proceeds of the tax fraud conspiracy had been paid underscores the offender’s position of trust amongst the principal conspirators, the Aventis partners, Adam Cranston, Mr Onley and Mr Larcombe.

38. While Ms Cranston acted on instructions, I find that at all relevant times she understood the mechanics of the 2nd tier companies’ accounts. Ms Cranston knew that she had a central role in facilitating the tax fraud and money laundering conspiracies. For example, on 22 December 2016 Ms Hammond is recorded as saying to the offender “Adam [Cranston] does nothing, nothing other than this, which he doesn’t even have control over”. The offender agrees that “he doesn’t even know how to do it”, and wonders what would happen “if we both just picked ourselves up and walked out”.

39. At all times during her participation in the conspiracies (including the 2014-2015 period) Ms Cranston was aware of the true nature of the subcontracting arrangement. She knew the named directors had no control over or knowledge about the daily operations of the 2nd tier companies. Ms Cranston transferred money to straw directors of the 2nd tier companies and she spoke about how much they should be paid. Ms Cranston also received mail and used banking tokens addressed to the straw directors of the 2nd tier companies.

40. Ms Cranston knew the directors had no control or knowledge of the daily operations of the 2nd tier companies. For example, as recorded on surveillance devices located at the Regus office, on 12 January 2017, Ms Cranston and Ms Hammond are recorded discussing the need to move $1 million to stop a 2nd tier company director, Danielle McDonnell, withdrawing those funds without authorisation from the principal conspirators to do so:

1. Ms Cranston said: “Can’t just fucking move a mill”. Ms Hammond said that they could not move that much money in one go and Ms Cranston continued “coz they’ll call her…they [the Bank] call her whenever it’s big”.

2. Ms Cranston is recorded opining about the directors “being stupid”, and joking that Ms McDonell was on a “bender”. Ms Hammond asked her “do you reckon they’re just fucking, like, like people who buy off them and shit, like druggies and shit . Like how the fuck does he even come across these people?” Ms Cranston responded ”I’ve got no fucking idea”.

41. Whist Mr Anderson SC is correct that the precise number of occasions cannot be identified, it is clear that Ms Cranston assumed the identity of the 2nd tier directors in communications for the benefit of the conspirators. She and Ms Hammond signed off emails and correspondence in the names of the various directors, maintained a list of the directors’ contact details and passwords when operating the bank accounts and possessed and used banking tokens and mobile phones in the name of the directors. Ms Cranston kept track of the various changes in directors and entities’ name changes through maintenance of spreadsheets which she and Ms Hammond updated.

42. From about July 2016, Ms Cranston and Ms Hammond also maintained spreadsheets to keep track of how much tax ought to have been paid, how much tax was paid and how much was owing, as well as the payment by some companies of monies owed by other companies. These schedules also recorded payments made to side companies from the unpaid tax.

43. Ms Cranston’s detailed participation in the conspiracies is underlined by numerous recorded interactions involving Ms Cranston:

1. Ms Cranston prepared spreadsheets, from mid-2016, Exhibit D460 being an example showing precisely how much GST and PAYGW ought to have been paid by the 2nd tier companies. The spreadsheets also calculate the 60% of tax payable which the conspirators aimed for in various recordings, and the even lesser amount, that is less than the 60%, which is the amount that was actually paid to the ATO;

2. Ms Cranston also procured the preparation of false invoices which were designed to and did conceal the truth. At MFI 6, p 234 Ms Cranston tells a Ms Amber Grice, referring to work being done at Adam Cranston’s property at Burraneer Bay, to put the name of PPA, a 2nd tier company, on the invoices and not the name “Cranston”;

3. Ms Cranston also knew in detail about the straw directors. In numerous conversations, Ms Cranston volunteers her opinion about them, including that they are “maniacs” and “crazy”. At MFI 6, p 800, after Mr Menon described a 2nd tier director, Mr Alaban, as “retarded” and “illiterate”, Ms Cranston says this: “Yeah, right. Oh my god. [pause]. Where did we find him?” Ms Cranston knew, from her various comments about them, that the 2nd tier directors were people who had various drug and mental health issues. I find that Ms Cranston knew from no later than February 2015 that the use and misuse of straw directors was a device to conceal the dishonest non-payment of tax by the 2nd tier companies;

1. Ms Cranston knew that millions of dollars which should have been paid in tax to the ATO was not paid. Ms Cranston knew that the money was not paid to the ATO and was not just sitting in a bank account ready to be paid into the tax office at some time in the future, but that Mr Cranston, Mr Onley and their associates were spending that money, to Ms Cranston’s knowledge, on lavish luxury items; 

2. From mid-2016 Ms Cranston attended meetings with other conspirators during which they discussed the tax liabilities of the 2nd tier companies, liquidating 2nd tier companies without paying those liabilities, starting new 2nd tier companies in their place and avoiding detection. At those meetings Ms Cranston would look at spreadsheets that she and Ms Hammond maintained, showing the PAYGW and GST tax positions for each of the 2nd tier companies, before responding to questions from others about the tax liabilities, the amounts paid to the ATO and the amounts withheld. Both Ms Cranston and Ms Hammond were, according to Ms Hammond’s evidence which I accept, “across all of the 2nd tier companies”.

44. There are also numerous instances in the recordings, in late 2016 and 2017 referring back to earlier years which demonstrate Ms Cranston’s earlier knowledge of the tax fraud and involvement in money laundering the proceeds. For example:

1. at MFI 6 at page 2096, Ms Cranston volunteers how to help cover her brother’s tracks when she says this: “Creating jobs and invoices [pause] like we did previously. Create credit reports and shit like that. [Pause] I’ve did it – I’ve done it before. I’ll just copy what I did before.” 

2. On 23 December 2016, Ms Cranston said that at least the situation is “not as bad as last year”, which I find is referring to 2015. Ms Hammond agreed and referenced the historical nature of the scheme – “at least we are actually paying some taxes”. After noting that “this one’s actually paid its tax every day”, Ms Cranston said, in relation to one of the 2nd tier companies, “I’ve upped it to 70% so. And now they’re paying fucking Uneek and Sonar’s tax as well…”. As I have explained, Uneek and Sonar were the 2nd tier companies in the period June 2015-July 2016 and I find that Ms Cranston is here referring to that period of the conspiracies operation.

45. In furtherance of the tax fraud conspiracy, Ms Cranston and Ms Hammond liaised with Plutus staff, accountants and other third parties who were ignorant of the fraud. For example:

1. Between 26 and 27 July 2016, Ms Cranston and Ms Hammond sent a series of precedent template emails engaging various accountants to prepare BASs on behalf of the five newly incorporated PP 2nd tier companies. Ms Cranston had previously been directly involved in the incorporation of those new companies by filling out the registration details with ASIC. In each email, Ms Cranston and Ms Hammond introduced themselves as a “bookkeeper” acting on behalf of the particular director of the 2nd tier company and said that they were referred to the accountant “by a friend of mine, Dev”. Each director was, to Ms Cranston’s knowledge, a vulnerable person who had no control whatever over the new PP company. The new PP companies were controlled by Messrs Cranston, Onley and Menon. Notwithstanding requests from third parties, including an accounting firm, Aura Partners, and a landlord to have telephone or face to face conversations with named directors of 2nd tier companies, Ms Cranston took steps to ensure the named directors avoided physical appointments so it would not be discovered that Ms Cranston and Ms Hammond were actually operating the email accounts and passing on the instructions given to them by the true controllers of the 2nd tier companies, Messrs Cranston, Onley and Menon.

2. By 23 December 2016, the ATO had garnisheed the Uneek bank accounts and Ms McDonell had locked the PPA NT account. Ms Cranston and Ms Hammond formulated emails to send to Plutus staff from the email accounts of Uneek and PPA NT to facilitate processing of payroll via other accounts. These emails were then sent by Ms Hammond to Plutus employees.

46. Ms Cranston’s knowledge of the extent of the taxes not paid to the ATO as they should have been is also demonstrated in the conversations captured on the surveillance devices installed in the ‘back office’ in December 2016 and January 2017. About this time, the 2nd tier companies started to attract the attention of the ATO and some of the conversations between Ms Cranston and Ms Hammond concerned the need to pay more tax. For example:

1. On 22 December 2016, Ms Cranston said to Ms Hammond, “I’m paying 70% of tax, I don’t give a fuck anymore” (referring to increasing the tax to be paid to 70% of what actually was required to be paid). Ms Hammond agreed, saying “we may as well, ‘cause we’ve always got leftover”. Ms Cranston said “we’ve got to catch yourselves anyway” and Ms Hammond agreed.;

2. On 4 January 2017, there were insufficient funds to make payments, in part due to fact that the ATO had garnisheed a number of the bank accounts for the 2nd tier companies, and payments being made into locked bank accounts. Faced with a cashflow problem, Ms Cranston said to Ms Hammond “So, I’m going to have to drop the tax down, back to sixty percent…and not do seventy percent anymore…. I’ve been doing 70%, so I’ll drop it to sixty”;

3. Later, on 9 January 2017, Ms Cranston asked Ms Hammond whether they should reduce the ”tax payments to sixty” from 70 percent. Ms Cranston said: “the thing is we shouldn’t have anything left, we should be budgeting to have fuck all left.” Ms Hammond agreed, but later in the conversation suggested that if they can afford it – which Ms Cranston agreed they could – they should keep the percentage of tax and other payments as is. Ms Cranston suggested that they “just drop it to sixty on Friday, just to get the account built back up and that’s it”;

4. On 13 January 2017, Ms Cranston and Ms Hammond agreed to pay more PAYGW that quarter. Ms Cranston said: “I’d rather be, even if we fucking pay more than we should in the first fucking quarter, I don’t really give a fuck.” Later on, Ms Cranston read aloud balances for 2nd tier companies and she and Ms Hammond agreed that they had not paid enough PAYGW to reduce down balances. Ms Cranston and Ms Hammond agreed that the estimated $40 million, and $10 million per quarter, for one of the 2nd tier companies should at least “cover the first fucking quarter, so they [the ATO] don’t look into it”.

Concealing the conspiracy, destroying records

47. I find that Ms Cranston participated in numerous steps to conceal the conspiracies and to ensure the destruction of records.

48. Following the ATO garnisheeing some of the 2nd tier companies’ bank accounts in late January 2017, Ms Cranston participated in a series of emergency meetings with the other conspirators held at Clamenz. In a conversation on 24 January 2017 between Mr Menon, Mr Cranston, Mr Onley, Ms Hammond and Ms Cranston, they discussed ways in which they could keep the ATO from investigating or uncovering the conspiracies. They agreed the director in name only of Sonar, a Mr Anthony Palumberi, would not sound convincing if interviewed by the ATO and it would be best if he were paid to leave the country.

49. A number of architects of the conspiracies discussed which 2nd tier companies should be wound up and which should be retained. Mr Menon suggested that PPA NT would lodge tax returns and then be liquidated. Mr Menon confirmed that five corporate keys had been requested and would be sent to the accountants, for the five new straw directors Mr Paul had obtained for the PP companies. Consistent with their earlier discussion in December and early January, Ms Cranston and Ms Hammond confirmed to the others that they had paid 60-70% of the PAYGW and GST to the ATO. Ms Cranston said “these meetings make me nervous”.

50. On the instruction of Mr Menon, Mr Cranston and others, Ms Cranston actively took steps to conceal the conspiracies, including attempted and actual destruction of records, managing perceptions of Plutus staff and third parties. I reject the submission, made on the offender’s behalf, that “there is no evidence that Ms Cranston destroyed any records”. Examples of her participation in the attempted and actual destruction of records include:

1. On footage recorded at the Regus office on 31 January 2017, Ms Cranston, Ms Hammond and Mr Paul were captured removing records and computers, in an attempt to destroy evidence and conceal the conspiracies. Ms Cranston whispered to Ms Hammond: “In all honesty, I don’t think they’ll come guns blazing just yet ...that’s just my opinion ... But just in case they do.” Ms Hammond also confirmed via WhatsApp to Mr Menon at 8:53pm that evening: “ ...just dropped Lauren home and nothing left in Miranda”;

2. On 14 February 2017 Mr Menon, Ms Cranston, Ms Hammond, Mr Cranston and Mr Paul were present at Clamenz for a, discussion about meeting with Jorge Ward, an Omni staff member, to collect his paperwork and his laptop. Mr Paul gave evidence that he also attended Ms Cranston’s house to get her laptop and some banking tokens, because she was “spooked” about the ATO investigation;

3. On 14 February 2017 at Clamenz, Ms Cranston was present when Mr Menon hold her, Ms Hammond and Mr Cranston that it would be impossible to detect and decipher the financial aspects of the scheme:

MENON: There’s no forensic accountant in the world, without even, without even, I can’t even fucking piece this together. Like it’s impossible... Like mate, they will never figure it out… Like that’s the only thing that I’m actually, like a blessing in disguise was that it was such a cluster fuck, that no one will figure this out because even I, even me sitting down with you three, all of us together trying to piece it together now is fucking hard, and we know.

4. On a number of occasions the conspirators discussed blaming the scheme on Peter Larcombe who was deceased. On 14 February 2017 in a conversation with Mr Cranston, Ms Hammond, Ms Cranston and Mr Paul, Mr Menon said:

MENON: So we’ve covered all this now and that but basically what we are saying is Peter [Larcombe] ran the whole thing. Okay. You guys had no idea what was happening, if this ever comes to it. I just want you guys to start thinking about the stories, if, obviously, Adam, this goes for you too Loz, Adam, Jay Onley, (indistinct), protects everyone right, me, every single person.

5. Later on 6 April 2017, Mr Menon discussed with Ms Cranston and Ms Hammond how to ensure deleted emails could not be retrieved.

Ms Cranston’s financial gain

51. The Crown submitted that the financial gain Ms Cranston derived from her participation in the tax fraud and money laundering conspiracies was not less than $199,630. These amounts comprised salary, reimbursements and monies received by Ms Cranston used to pay a 10% deposit and stamp duty to purchase a house in Picton. In the absence of further details about what the $17,991.33 “re-imbursements” comprised, I am prepared to assume, in Ms Cranston’s favour that the financial gain Ms Cranston derived was $199,630 less the reimbursements, being a total of $181,639.96.

Consideration

52. The offender is to be sentenced for offences against Commonwealth law and the Court is required to apply the terms of Part IB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The guiding principle under s 16A(1) of the Crimes Act is the imposition of a sentence which is of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offence. The Court must consider the matters identified in s 16A(2) of the Crimes Act, to the extent that they are relevant.

53. Given the length and detail of the submissions made by the Crown and the offender I will deal with the respective submissions when addressing each of the matters required to be taken into account by Part IB of the Crimes Act.

54. The offences of which Ms Cranston has been found guilty by the jury, carry the following maximum penalties: for the offence against s 135.4(3) of the Criminal Code, imprisonment for 10 years and/or a fine of $108,000; for the offence against ss 11.5(1) and 400.3(1) of the Criminal Code, imprisonment for 25 years, and/or a fine of $270,000.

55. The maximum penalty serves as a yardstick: Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25 at [30]-[31]. It is important to have regard to the maximum penalty to determine the degree to which the offender’s conduct offends against the legislative object of ensuring compliance with taxation laws. In addressing this question, care should be taken to ensure that what the offender actually did is considered, rather than any shorthand labels: The Queen v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54. I take the maximum penalty in each case into account as an important guidepost.

56. I take into account the approach to sentencing for a conspiracy charge which was summarised by Simpson J (with whom Spigelman CJ and Harrison J agreed) in Tyler v R; R v Chalmers [2007] NSWCCA 247; (2007) 173 A Crim R 458 at [78]-[85]. It was held in Tyler at [83]-[84] that sentencing for specific acts alone would:

[83] … be a negation of the complex inter-connection between the various participants, and the organisational nature of a conspiracy. It would represent too literal an application of the decisions that identify the ‘role’ of any participant as a relevant factor in the sentencing exercise. It would be to ignore the essential feature of the offence of conspiracy – the agreement to participate in an organised criminal activity.

[84] That is not to say that the physical acts of the offender whose sentence is under consideration are irrelevant. They are relevant, as one part of a complex tapestry…

57. Those remarks have been approved on numerous subsequent occasions: R v Nguyen [2010] NSWCCA 331 at [46]-[50]; Arenilla-Cepeda v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 267 at [75]; Alpha v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 292 at [69]-[70]; Elomar v The Queen (2014) 316 ALR 206; [2014] NSWCCA 303 at [684]; DPP (Cth) v Estrada (2015) 45 VR 286; [2015] VSCA 22 at [45].

58. These conspiracies demonstrate the “dangerousness” of individuals working in concert for a common unlawful end. I also proceed on the basis that it is axiomatic that general deterrence is a critical consideration in relation to white collar offences like these which are difficult to detect, investigate and successfully prosecute.

59. I turn now to the list of factors I must take into account under s 16A(2) of the Crimes Act. I will not address those factors that the parties agreed did not apply here.

Section 16A(2)(a): The nature and circumstances of the offence

60. The two conspiracies fall towards the highest range of objective seriousness of offences of this kind, albeit Ms Cranston’s role fell at or near the bottom of the hierarchy of known conspirators in each.

61. The tax fraud and money laundering conspiracies involved a significant level of sophistication, premeditation, planning and deception and a high degree of dishonesty and corresponding breach of trust. The conspiracies involved the conspirators setting up a large number of corporate entities via which the conspiracies could be implemented and mechanisms could be put in place to conceal the involvement of the conspirators.

62. The conspiracies’ success depended upon the appearance of Plutus as a legitimate company so that it could attract a large number of legitimate clients together with an effective “back office” of 2nd tier companies that processed the thousands of payroll payments and disbursed the tax fraud proceeds.

63. The tax fraud conspiracy involved the drafting of a number of agreements between Plutus and the 2nd tier entities so that a “paper trail” could be established to create the appearance of legitimacy.

64. The money laundering conspiracy involved the creation and exchange of hundreds of false invoices to launder the tax fraud proceeds. The legitimate clients that engaged Plutus to perform the payroll services were not informed that these services were subcontracted to the 2nd tier entities.

65. Most of the staff that worked for Plutus were not aware of the true nature of the business and were deliberately misinformed about certain aspects of how Plutus operated. Unsophisticated and vulnerable people were appointed as directors to the 2nd tier entities to provide a layer of concealment and to create the appearance that the subcontracting arrangement was at “arm’s length”. In reality, these directors had no role in managing the companies of which they were directors. It was intended by the conspirators that upon detection of the conspiracies those directors would be held responsible for any outstanding tax liability. Third parties, Mr McIntyre and later Mr Rostankovski, were engaged to manage the straw directors so that those directors had no interactions with or knowledge about, the true controllers of the second-tier companies, namely Adam Cranston, and Jason Onley. When the ATO served the directors with millions of dollars in director penalty notices and requests for interview, the conspirators planned that the straw directors would not be able to identify them. Elaborate plans were made by the conspirators to falsely accuse the deceased Peter Larcombe and blame him for everything if they were ever questioned by authorities.

66. Ms Cranston was not a principal of the scheme. As I have said, her role fell at or towards the bottom of the hierarchy of known conspirators. She was not involved in the initial planning, deception and set-up of the sophisticated corporate structures, and she had no role in the Plutus “front-office” operation within the conspiracies.

67. I accept Mr Anderson SC’s submission that the role played by the offender in these conspiracies was a subordinate one. The scheme to defraud was devised by Messrs Onley, Cranston, Anquetil and Larcombe. Messrs Kitson and later Menon were also heavily involved in important aspects of the evolution of the scheme.

68. The principal participants devised the scheme between February and March 2014. As I have found, from at least February 2015, Ms Cranston knowingly participated in a dishonest scheme to deprive the ATO of taxes which should have been paid to it and knowingly participated in laundering the proceeds of that dishonest scheme. With that knowledge, Ms Cranston continued to perform her role and accepted a trusted and responsible position in the conspiracies for over 2 years. The success of the tax fraud and money laundering conspiracies depended in part on the offender’s participation.

69. The amount of money involved and the length of time over which the fraudulent offending occurred are significant relevant considerations when determining the objective seriousness and gravity of fraud-related offending: R v Hawkins (1989) 45 A Crim R 430. During the period of the offender’s participation, the loss caused to the Commonwealth was at least $101,584,925, the amount agreed by Ms Hammond as loss occasioned during the shorter period of her knowing participation in the conspiracies. I reject the submission by Mr Anderson SC that a lesser sum, about $60 million, was the true amount of the loss occasioned during Ms Cranston’s knowing participation in the conspiracies.

70. In furtherance of the money laundering conspiracy, the offender and Ms Hammond were collectively responsible for facilitating the laundering of $49,084,316.55 of tax fraud proceeds from the 2nd tier companies to other companies and individuals, principally for the benefit of the principal conspirators.

71. The offender was actively involved in both conspiracies. This was a consistent and persistent demonstration of fraud over a significant period which is to be taken into account when considering the criminality of the offence.

72. Unlike the principal conspirators, Ms Cranston received comparatively small remuneration. Whilst Ms Cranston received almost $182,000 for her involvement in the conspiracies, I do not conclude that she was principally motivated by greed.

60. The offender was 21 at the commencement of the indictment period. She had limited training. She was not a professional. I have concluded that whilst greed, in the receipt of over $181,000 for her involvement in the conspiracies, forms part of the explanation for Ms Cranston’s conduct, her participation was primarily the result of a misguided sense of loyalty to the people directing the conspiracies, particularly her brother, Adam Cranston.

61. In R v Glynatsis [2013] NSWCCA 131; (2013) 230 A Crim R 99 at [48] Hoeben CJ at CL said:

[48] … The distinction between an offence committed for motives of personal greed and committed for the benefit of some other person is real. This is not to say that such a circumstance is exculpatory, rather it can indicate a less serious level of criminality as it did in this case.

75. The circumstances in this case are quite different to those in Glynatsis, nevertheless as a matter of principle the objective seriousness of Ms Cranston’s offending is ameliorated to some extent by her relative inexperience and her misplaced loyalty to her brother.

76. Ms Cranston was not an instigator or architect of these conspiracies and acted under instructions. Her financial reward, whilst significant, was not her sole motivation for participation. Having said that, there was a significant amount of tax loss caused. The monies laundered place the conspiracies at the upper range of offences previously dealt with by this Court. There was also a significant and sustained period of involvement by this offender. Given all of these matters, and what Ms Cranston actually did in furtherance of these conspiracies, I have concluded that her offending falls just below the mid-range of objective seriousness for offences of this kind.

77. Put another way, the conspiracies themselves fall at the highest range of objective seriousness of offences of this kind, but Ms Cranston’s position in the conspiracies is at or towards the bottom.

78. I have given consideration to the question of whether, as the Crown submits, Ms Cranston’s role in the conspiracies was “slightly above” Ms Hammond or whether, as Mr Anderson SC submits, her role was “below” Ms Hammond. I have concluded that Ms Cranston’s role was materially indistinguishable from Ms Hammond’s role. Ms Hammond was sentenced on the basis of her admission that she was aware from mid-2015 that what she was doing on behalf of the principal conspirators would be regarded by ordinary people as dishonest. Ms Cranston’s knowing participation in the conspiracies was for a slightly longer time but, on the other hand, she had a lesser involvement in the conspiracies between February 2015 and May 2016 compared to Ms Hammond. The amounts obtained by Ms Hammond and Ms Cranston were similar. The roles performed, even when examined in the minute detail suggested by Mr Anderson SC, were materially indistinguishable. Ms Hammond dealt more frequently with Mr Menon. Ms Cranston dealt more frequently with her brother. Ms Hammond dealt more frequently with Plutus staff. Ms Cranston was more intimately involved with the money laundering conspiracy, for example by making payments for her brother for luxury cars or lavish building projects and in ensuring that the name “Cranston” was removed from invoices dealing with Adam Cranston’s Burraneer Bay property.

79. Ms Cranston and Ms Hammond each performed essential facilitative roles in the conspiracies. Examined either at the level of generality or by reference to the minutiae, I find that the roles in the conspiracies of Ms Hammond and Ms Cranston were essentially the same.

Section 16A(2)(c): If the offence forms part of a course of conduct consisting of a series of criminal acts of the same or a similar character – that course of conduct

80. In R v Agius; R v Zerafa [2012] NSWSC 978; 87 ATR 528 at [62] Simpson J found that the offenders in a conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth, which included the filing of false income tax returns over a number of years, had engaged in a course of criminal conduct for the purposes of s 16A(2)(c).

81. The offender’s knowing participation in the conspiracies occurred over a period exceeding 2 years. This was not an isolated instance of offending, but rather a persistent course of conduct.

Section 16A(2)(e): Any injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence

82. There is no doubt that revenue fraud on the scale here has a corrosive effect on our society. Our system of tax collection relies on taxpayers acting honestly. If the perception became widespread that the payment of millions of dollars in tax was in effect voluntary, and non-payment of tax was effectively risk free, no doubt others would structure their affairs to avoid paying tax. The burden on other taxpayers would be correspondingly increased.

83. The injury suffered by this offending is a collective financial injury for all taxpayers. The loss to the Commonwealth of over $100 million will need to be made up from additional taxes levied on other taxpayers, by borrowings which must be repaid with interest by taxpayers in the future or by cuts to government spending.

84. The non-payment of over $100 million in tax occurred in the years immediately prior to the pandemic. During that period, the calls on services supplied by government were as urgent as they have been at any time since the Great Depression. The loss of over $100 million which would otherwise have been available to fund government services is a very significant injury suffered by all Australians.

Section 16A(2)(f): The degree to which the person has shown contrition for the offence

85. Ms Cranston pleaded not guilty and put the Crown to proof, as was her right. According to the psychologist's report, Ms Cranston continues to assert her innocence.

86. In the material tendered on sentence and the instructions given to her Senior Counsel, there was no acknowledgement by Ms Cranston, or on her behalf, that any crime had been committed here, by anybody, much less that she was contrite, even in hindsight, for the dishonest taking by the conspirators of over $100 million of amounts that should have been paid to the ATO.

87. I find that Ms Cranston has shown no contrition for the offending.

Section 16A(2)(h): The degree to which the person has co‑operated with law enforcement agencies in the investigation of the offence or of other offences

88. The willingness of an offender to facilitate the course of justice by making sensible admissions and conducting the defence of her case efficiently is able to be taken into account as co-operation: R v Doff [2005] NSWCCA 119. Mr Anderson SC’s conduct of the trial on behalf of Ms Cranston was exceptionally co-operative and helpful and I record my gratitude to him and his client for that. I take into account in Ms Cranston’s favour this important degree of co-operation in the conduct of the trial.

89. I also take into account in Ms Cranston’s favour the “uncertain suspense” for Ms Cranston created by the period of years between charge in 2017 and sentence in 2023: R v Todd [1982] 2 NSWLR 517; Sabra v R [2015] NSWCCA 38. The time taken was the product of the complexity of the investigation and numerous delays brought about by the COVID 19 pandemic. The understandable anxiety felt by Ms Cranston about delays to which she did not contribute is taken into account in her favour here.

Sections 16A(2)(j) and (ja): The deterrent effect that any sentence or order under consideration may have on the person or on other persons

90. It was common ground that general deterrence is a fundamental consideration in the present sentencing exercise. That applies to both offences proved against Ms Cranston. Fraud on the Commonwealth revenue is easy to commit, difficult to detect and comes at a great cost to the community: Hili v R; Jones v R (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45 at [63].

91. In R v Huston; R v Fox; R v Henke; ex parte Cth DPP [2011] QCA 350; 219 A Crim R 209; the Queensland Court of Appeal held at [58] that sentences must do more than pay lip service to the need for general deterrence, that the conspiracy to evade tax was a form of corruption that has an “insidious corroding effect on society” and that effective deterrents are required to vindicate taxpayers and prevent this type of offending.

92. Further it is relevant that tax fraud is often committed by white collar criminals. This group is more likely to be first time offenders, fearful of incarceration and capable of rational cost-benefit analysis. There is a real prospect that a substantial sentence will deter offenders with similar characteristics from committing similar crimes: Director of Public Prosecutions v Gregory (2011) 34 VR 1; [2011] VSCA 145 at [53]-[54].

93. Money laundering, similarly, involves serious criminal activity: R v Jiao [2015] NSWCCA 95; 251 A Crim R 236 at [31]. Money laundering is vital to the success of conspiracies such as the present, because it moves the proceeds of crime to third parties, making the detection of the underlying crime more difficult: Shi v R [2014] NSWCCA 276; 246 A Crim R 273 at [109]. It also prevents the recovery of funds even if the original fraud is detected: Shi at [109]; R v Lin [2014] NSWCCA 254 at [63]. As I have said, that has proved to be the case here. The need for general deterrence is therefore high.

94. In relation to the deterrent effect on the offender, Mr Anderson SC submitted that specific deterrence is less important in this case as “the offending conduct was very much an aberration for Ms Cranston”. In this regard, I note that the psychological report of Ms Bennett tendered by the offender assesses her risk of re-offending as low. I am not so sanguine. The offender appears still to believe that she and her co-conspirators have done nothing wrong. Although I accept the submission that specific deterrence is less important than general deterrence in this case, a sentence having a sufficient deterrent effect on the offender is warranted.

Section 16A(2)(k): The need to ensure that the person is adequately punished for the offence

95. Section 17A of the Crimes Act provides that a court shall not pass a sentence of imprisonment on any person for a federal offence unless the court, after having considered all other available sentences, is satisfied no other sentence is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case. Sentences for offences in the nature of tax evasion should have both a deterrent and punitive effect. This is particularly so in cases such as the present where the fraud is calculated, systematic and persisted in for some time.

96. As the Victorian Court of Appeal said in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Gregory (2011) 34 VR 1; [2011] VSCA 145:

[57] A sentence imposed for fraud upon the taxation revenue is intended to reaffirm basic community values that all citizens according to their means should fairly share the burden of incidence of taxation so as to enable government to provide for the community, that the revenue must accordingly be protected and that the offender should be censured through manifest denunciation.

97. I have concluded that a sentence of full-time imprisonment is the only appropriate sentence to impose in this case. Given the gravity and objective seriousness of the offending, a significant sentence of full-time imprisonment must be imposed. Senior Counsel for Ms Cranston accepted that the imposition of a full-time custodial sentence was here inevitable.

Section 16A(2)(m): The character, antecedents, age, means and physical or mental condition of the person

98. I make the following findings about Ms Cranston’s subjective case:

1. The offender is a person of prior good character which should be taken into account in her favour: Ha v R [2008] NSWCCA 141 at [43].

2. At the time when the offender was first employed by the conspirators, she was 21 years old and 22 in February 2015 when she began to knowingly participate in the conspiracies. I accept, as Senior Counsel for Ms Cranston submitted, that her trust in her brother provided a substantial explanation for her continued participation in the conspiracies after February 2015.

3. The relative youth of an adult offender may impact upon the sentencing discretion in a number of ways, including the assessment of the objective gravity of an offence and considerations of the prospects of rehabilitation and general deterrence: Ngo v R [2018] NSWCCA 296 at [91] per Price J (with whom Hoeben CJ at CL and Rothman J agreed).

4. Since the commission of the offences the offender has commenced a supportive relationship. She is a good mother to her young daughter. She continues to enjoy the love and support of her family and her parents.

5. Ms Stephanie Bennett, the forensic psychologist, describes the offender’s current state in the following terms:

1. She has suffered from “fluctuating symptoms of generalised anxiety throughout her adulthood”, reaching a high intensity during “stressful periods”;

2. Her “recent incarceration” and “upcoming sentencing” have caused an “exacerbation of psychological symptoms”;

3. That exacerbation includes worry, physical symptoms of anxiety, poor sleep, poor concentration and low self-esteem;

4. Despite suffering two panic attacks during the trial, the offender does not meet the diagnostic criteria for panic disorder, and has not been diagnosed with any other mental health condition.

99. I take Ms Bennett’s report into account but give it relatively little weight. I am not persuaded that the report of Ms Bennett provides support for a finding that the offender suffers from a mental condition of the kind addressed in DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194. I am, however, prepared to take into account the fact that the offender will find her first time in custody a confronting experience and to the extent that Ms Bennett’s report identifies anxiety issues they may, at least initially, be exacerbated by her imprisonment.

100. The following character references were given on the offender’s behalf:

1. Tania Waterhouse of Waterhouse Lawyers Pty Ltd hired the offender as an administrative assistant, after she was recommended by her father, an employee of Waterhouse Lawyers. The offender worked at this firm intermittently during her trial. Ms Waterhouse describes the offender as “loyal”, “supportive” and “respectful”, with a “can-do attitude” and a loving relationship with her daughter. She says the offender is “essentially honest”, and that she would not hesitate to re-employ her when she is released from custody;

2. Gloria Cassimatis, the offender’s step-mother and a senior officer of the ATO, writes that she has known the offender since she was 18. She is, according to Ms Cassimatis, “a ‘no fuss’ honest person” who lives a simple life and is happy with the basics. Ms Cassimatis views the offender as an “excellent loving mother” whose main goal is to provide a “loving family environment” for her daughter and partner;

3. Karen Mark, one of the offender’s paternal aunts, describes the offender as a family-oriented person, who used to organise frequent family events and was caring towards her extended family. Ms Mark describes the offender as “courteous, reliable, trustworthy and a delight to have around”;

4. Jennifer Parker, the offender’s other paternal aunt, has also known the offender for her whole life. She comments on the offender’s close bond with her daughter, whose care Ms Parker believes the offender has prioritised even amid the stress of her prosecution. According to Ms Parker, she has “strong values of respect and honesty” and is a “mature” and “responsible” person.

101. I take all of these references into account as tending in Ms Cranston’s favour.

Section 16A(2)(n): The prospects of rehabilitation of the person

102. Mr Anderson SC submitted that by reason of her good character and the opinion expressed by Ms Bennett I should conclude that Ms Cranston has a low risk of reoffending.

103. Despite her prior good character, I am not able to conclude that Ms Cranston has good prospects of rehabilitation. I remain troubled that even now, Ms Cranston asserts she has done nothing wrong and does not even acknowledge that any of her co-conspirators have done anything wrong.

104. The offender does not appear to understand or accept the gross violation of societal norms involved in dishonestly taking over $100 million of taxes which should have been available to spend by government on behalf of the community which must now be recouped cuts to government services or from increased taxes paid by other taxpayers – either now or in the future.

105. On the other hand it is true, as Ms Bennett argues in her report, that it is likely that the principal conspirators, including her brother, are likely to be in prison for a considerable period of time, reducing the risk that offending of the same kind can readily be engaged in by Ms Cranston upon her release. I find that, on balance, the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation are fair rather than good.

Section 16A(2)(p): The probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration would have on any of the person’s family or dependents

106. It is clear that, under s 16A(2)(p) the Court may take into account any probable effect on the offender’s family or dependents, and not only those effects that rise to the level of “exceptional hardship”: Totaan v R [2022] NSWCCA 75 at [77]-[93] per Bell CJ, Gleeson JA, Harrison, Adamson and Dhanji JJ agreeing.

107. I find that the probable effect of the sentence under consideration would have on any of the person’s family or dependents is relevant in three ways:

1. The effect on Ms Cranston’s daughter;

2. The effect on Ms Cranston’s mother; and

3. The effect on Ms Cranston’s former partner.

108. The most important probable consequence of the sentence under consideration is upon Ms Cranston’s 5-year-old daughter, who will now reside full time with her father. For a 5-year-old to lose full-time contact with a mother for some years is a tragic consequence of the present offending.

109. A second probable consequence of the sentence under consideration is upon Ms Cranston’s mother Robyn Cranston. I accept Robyn Cranston’s evidence that she will be required to undertake physically and financially onerous part time carer responsibilities for her grand daughter despite a recent medical diagnosis.

110. I also take in to account the consequences of the sentence under consideration for the child’s father, Mr Kubacki, who will likely encounter difficulties in juggling his caring responsibilities with his full-time employment, and to the disruptive effects this will have on the offender’s daughter.

111. I take all of these matters into account in Ms Cranston’s favour.

Comparable cases

112. In Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45 the High Court reiterated that consistency in federal sentencing is achieved with regard to what has been done in other cases through the work of the intermediate courts of appeal. Some of the cases which at a very high level are relevant here are:

1. Dickson v R [2016] NSWCCA 105. In that case the offender was found guilty following a trial of two serious offences. Count 1 related to a complex tax fraud with net losses to the Commonwealth in excess of $100 million. The other count related to money laundering of over $63 million. The offender’s personal gain was found to be $19,616,996.37. The offending occurred over a period of about 6 years. Mr Dickson was originally sentenced by Beech-Jones J to 11 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 7 years (see R v Anthony James Dickson (No 18) [2015] NSWSC 268) but was later re-sentenced following a Crown sentence appeal by the Court of Criminal Appeal to a total effective term of 14 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 9 years and 3 months (see Dickson v R [2016] NSWCCA 105). Mr Dickson obtained an exponentially greater personal gain than Ms Cranston.

2. R v Issakidis [2018] NSWSC 378. This case involved Mr Dickson’s co-conspirator. Mr Issakidis’ personal gain was approximately $15,738,020. Like Mr Dickson he faced two serious charges. A single non-parole period of 7 years and 6 months was imposed. Mr Issakidis’ conviction-only appeal was dismissed by the Court of Criminal Appeal: Issakidis v The Queen [2019] NSWCCA 302.

1. R v Huang; R v Siu [2007] NSWCCA 259; 174 A Crim R 370. In that case the offender pleaded guilty to one offence in contravention of s 400.3(1) of the Criminal Code. The loss to the Commonwealth was $3,088,311 and Mr Huang’s total financial benefit was $30,000. Mr Huang was imprisoned for 5.5 years with a non-parole period of 3 years and 4 months. The Court allowed a total reduction of 50% in the sentence due to Mr Huang’s plea of guilty, contrition and past and future assistance.

113. The Crown submitted that there were no appellate authorities that would assist the Court, mainly because of wide factual differences between Ms Cranston’s offending and other reported cases. In relation to the money laundering offence, the Crown relied on the Court of Criminal Appeal’s observation in R v Want [2013] NSWCCA 2 at [33]:

the wide range of circumstances in which money laundering offences may be committed make comparisons with other cases virtually impossible and the sentences imposed in such cases of limited assistance.

114. The most significant sentences I have taken into account are those imposed on the offender’s co-conspirators. The most relevant of those is the sentence I imposed on Ms Hammond: R v Hammond [2020] NSWSC 888. I do not accept, as Mr Anderson SC submitted, that the evidence of Ms Hammond at the trial was significantly different to the facts upon which she was sentenced nor that the sentence I imposed on her would have been a lesser one had I heard the evidence Ms Hammond gave at the trial. Without descending to minute detail, I regard Ms Hammond’s evidence before me in the trial as essentially consistent with the admissions made upon which she was sentenced in 2020. The cross-examination of Ms Hammond at the trial upon which reliance was placed addressed a variety of topics including whether she thought she was “doing anything “criminal” or “illegal” before she was arrested by the police. The cross examination did not address Ms Hammond’s state of mind by reference to the elements of the offences, in particular when Ms Hammond knew that what she was doing would be regarded as dishonest by ordinary people. The same can be said of the elements of the money laundering offence to which Ms Hammond pleaded guilty. I am satisfied that had Ms Hammond given the evidence she ultimately gave at the trial in the sentence proceedings, the sentence I imposed would have been the same.

115. For Ms Hammond’s role in the tax fraud scheme and the money laundering scheme, Ms Hammond pleaded guilty to the same two counts as the offender. Ms Hammond had and knew she had a central role in the scheme, even though she operated on instructions from the principal conspirators. Ms Hammond understood the scheme and its mechanics, including how much tax was withheld as well as the role of the directors of the 2nd tier companies. Ms Hammond took steps to conceal the conspiracies, including by destroying and attempting to destroy documents. Ms Hammond’s total financial gain of $177,910.74 was similar in size to Ms Cranston’s.

116. The indicative sentences imposed on Ms Hammond were 6 years for the money laundering offence and 4 years for the tax fraud offence. Ms Hammond received considerable discounts. The aggregate sentence imposed, but for those discounts, was 8 years and a non-parole period of 5 years. Ms Hammond and Ms Cranston had very similar subjective cases. But for the element of hardship, particularly to Ms Cranston’s daughter, I would have concluded that Ms Hammond’s subjective case was stronger than Ms Cranston’s. Taking hardship into account in Ms Cranston’s favour, however, leads me to conclude that her subjective case is materially indistinguishable from Ms Hammond’s.

117. The other sentences imposed on the offender’s co-conspirators are less relevant. In R v Kitson [2019] NSWSC 1109, Mr Kitson, was sentenced to a period of 9 years and a non-parole period of 6 years, before discounts [redacted]. Mr Kitson was charged with only one offence, a tax fraud contravention of s 135.4(3) of the Criminal Code. Mr Kitson’s personal gain was approximately $1.3 million and he was near the top of the hierarchy in the tax fraud conspiracy. The head sentence, 9 years, is near the top of the range for offending of this kind. Ms Cranston, unlike Mr Kitson, was also convicted of a very serious money laundering charge where the legislative guidepost is imprisonment for 25 years. The sentence imposed on Mr Kitson does not give me any real assistance in identifying an appropriate sentence for the money laundering offence Ms Cranston faces.

118. The Crown also referred to the sentence I imposed on Simon Anquetil: R v Anquetil [2020] NSWSC 995. Mr Anquetil pleaded guilty to the same two offences proved against Ms Cranston. For the tax fraud offence, the starting point was 9 years and 4 months imprisonment. For the money laundering offence, the starting point was 12 years imprisonment. Mr Anquetil operated at the apex of the tax fraud conspiracy, as one of its principal architects and as the operator of Plutus itself. In laundering the money involved, Mr Anquetil incorporated various entities and falsified documents. His personal gain was at least $12,218,148.55. His involvement in both conspiracies was much greater than Ms Cranston.

119. Two other cases, R v O’Leary (District Court (NSW), 4 June 2020, unrep) and R v Paul (District Court (NSW), 21 February 2020, unrep), peripherally related to the present conspiracies, were agreed by the parties not to shed any real light on the relevant sentence to be imposed here. I agree.

120. Having regard to all of the matters I have set out above, I have determined that the appropriate sentences to be imposed on Ms Cranston are 4 years imprisonment for the tax fraud conspiracy and 6 years imprisonment for the money laundering conspiracy.

121. I have given consideration to the principle of totality and the principles explained by the High Court in Pearce v R (1988) 194 CLR 610. I have also taken into account the remarks of Beech-Jones J in Dickson v R (No 18) [2015] NSWSC 286, noting that his Honour’s sentence in that case was ultimately found to be manifestly inadequate: Dickson v R [2016] NSWCCA 105. Whilst every case turns on its own facts, I have adopted the same legal principles as those explained in Dickson (No 18).

122. In Ms Hammond’s case on the issue of totality, but for the discounts I gave her, I would have imposed a notional 2 years period of accumulation. After discounts, I applied a notional period of accumulation of 1 year. Mr Anderson SC submitted that “the inevitable sentence of imprisonment imposed for the offences should be served largely concurrently”. I have determined that in Ms Cranston’s case there should be a degree of accumulation between the sentences imposed here for the two counts sufficient to reflect the separate serious criminality involved. I have decided that two years is the appropriate degree of accumulation to reflect the total criminality of the offender’s conduct. As I have explained, the money laundering offence here involved separate and very serious criminality. Under s 19AB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) I impose a single non-parole period for both offences of 5 years.

123. This sentence is of a severity appropriate for the offences and provides a minimum period that Ms Cranston must spend in custody appropriate to all the relevant elements of punishment, including rehabilitation, the objective seriousness of her offences and her subjective circumstances.

Conclusion and sentence

124. Having regard to all of the matters identified in these reasons, I make the following orders:

1. Ms Cranston is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 4 years to commence on 14 March 2023 and expire on 13 March 2027 for the tax fraud conspiracy;

2. Ms Cranston is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 6 years to commence on 14 March 2025 and expire on 13 March 2031 for the money laundering conspiracy.

3. Under s 19AB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) a single non-parole period of 5 years commencing on 14 March 2023 is fixed;

4. The offender is first eligible for parole on 13 March 2028.

125. I am required by s 16F of the Crimes Act to explain the sentences I have imposed. I have imposed an effective head sentence of 8 years imprisonment commencing on 14 March 2023 and expiring on 13 March 2031. As required by the Commonwealth Crimes Act, I have fixed a single non-parole period for both offences. The single non parole period is a term of 5 years, also commencing 14 March 2023. That means that Ms Cranston will be imprisoned for not less than 5 years. If she is granted parole at the end of that time, or before the expiration of the head sentence for the money laundering conspiracy, she will serve the balance of the sentence in the community. If she is granted parole, the order will be subject to conditions determined by the relevant federal parole authority and may be amended or revoked. If she fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the conditions of her parole, her parole may be revoked and she may be taken back into custody to serve the remainder of her head sentence.

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Annexure 1 - Exhibit II

Annexure 2 - Exhibits PP to RR

Annexure 3 - Exhibit LL Diagram 5

Annexure 4 - Exhibit LL Diagram 24

Decision last updated: 01 May 2023