FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DHS17 v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 209
Appeal from: DHS17 v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 495 File number: VID 514 of 2018 Judge: KENNY, MOSHINSKY AND BROMWICH JJ Date of judgment: 27 November 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of primary judge dismissing application for judicial review – decision by Assistant Minister under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) not to revoke mandatory cancellation decision – where Assistant Minister relied on International Treaties Obligations Assessment (ITOA) in making decision – where ITOA provided to Assistant Minister omitted a redacted paragraph – whether Assistant Minister failed to take into account a relevant consideration – where redacted ITOA was apt to mislead and deprived appellant of positive independent support for his narrative – where complete ITOA was constructively before Assistant Minister – where information omitted was not insignificant and Assistant Minister could have reached a different view if he had the complete ITOA – appeal allowed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to amend notice of appeal to raise new ground of review not raised before primary judge – application to adduce further evidence on the appeal – where evidence not available to the appellant at the time of hearing before primary judge – leave granted
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth) s 27
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501, 501CA
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.57
Cases cited: August v Commissioner of Taxation [2013] FCAFC 85; 94 ATR 376
BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 96; 248 FCR 456
Buchwald v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 101; 242 FCR 65
BXK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 76
Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 51; 250 FCR 309
Jeffs v New Zealand Dairy Production and Marketing Board [1967] 1 AC 551
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114; 230 FCR 431
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99
Viane v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 116
Videto v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1985] FCA 449; 8 FCR 167
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588
Date of hearing: 28 August 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 65 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr N Wood Solicitor for the Appellant: Human Rights for All Pty Ltd Counsel for the Respondent: Mr W Mosley Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
VID 514 of 2018 BETWEEN: DHS17
Appellant
AND: ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGES:
KENNY, MOSHINSKY AND…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read DHS17 v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protec... and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 209
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Assistant Minister did fail to take into account a relevant consideration, as the redacted paragraph was not insignificant and the Assistant Minister could have reached a different view if he had the complete ITOA. The court also found that the appellant should be granted leave to amend his notice of appeal and to adduce further evidence, as the evidence was not available to the appellant at the time of the hearing before the primary judge and was likely to have led to a different result. The court allowed the appeal and set aside the decision of the Assistant Minister not to revoke the cancellation of the appellant’s protection visa, directing that a new decision be made according to law. The Assistant Minister was also ordered to pay the appellant's costs of and incidental to the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appellant have leave to rely on the draft amended notice of appeal annexed to the appellant’s outline of submissions filed on 15 August 2018.
2. The appellant file the amended notice of appeal in terms of the draft annexed to the appellant’s outline of submissions filed on 15 August 2018.
3. The appellant have leave to adduce the further evidence on the appeal, being the affidavit of Alison Mary Battisson affirmed on 30 July 2018 (consisting of 13 paragraphs) and the annexures thereto; and, insofar as necessary, compliance with rule 36.57(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) be dispensed with.
4. The appeal be allowed.
5. The orders made by a Judge of the Federal Court of Australia on 15 March 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof, order:
(a) a writ of certiorari issue to quash the decision of the respondent dated 20 June 2017 not to revoke the cancellation of the appellant’s protection visa under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth);
(b) a writ of mandamus issue directed to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, using the title Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, to make a decision under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) according to law; and
(c) the respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application.
6. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Assistant Minister argued that, in the appellant’s case, there was no single and distinct basis upon which an adverse finding on the credibility of the relevant claim was made. The Assistant Minister submitted that the Reviewer’s findings as to the appellant’s credit were “detailed and comprehensive” and that the Redacted Paragraph was not “corroborative” of the appellant, but simply “not adverse in response to a question that was raised by the Reviewer”. The Assistant Minister drew attention to the three reasons given by the Reviewer for not accepting the appellant’s claim that he was homosexual (set out below at [57]). Regarding the third reason, the Assistant Minister focussed on the Magistrate’s sentencing remarks on 20 April 2015 and the fact that the Redacted Paragraph had not led the Reviewer to form a different opinion of the appellant’s claim. It was submitted that the Assistant Minister was entitled to rely on the conclusions set out in the ITOA and that, in light of the ITOA Reviewer’s findings, the redacted material was “not of such importance that … the exercise of power was affected”. Further, it was noted that the appellant's claim that he would be harmed as homosexual if returned to Egypt was only one matter that the Assistant Minister considered in determining whether he was satisfied that there was “another reason” why the original decision should be revoked. CONSIDERATION The Assistant Minister’s conclusion that he was not satisfied that the appellant passed the character test, as defined by s 501, was not challenged. Before the primary judge and on this appeal, the appellant focused on the Assistant Minister’s conclusion that he was not satisfied, for the purposes of s 501CA(4)(b)(ii), that there was “another reason” why the original cancellation decision under s 501(3A) should be revoked. It may be accepted that s 501CA(4) confers a broad discretion to revoke the original cancellation decision. This is implicit in s 501CA(4)(b)(ii): see BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 96; 248 FCR 456 at [24]. In exercising the discretion under s 501CA(4), the Assistant Minister was required to consider the reasons advanced by the appellant in his representations in favour of revocation. One reason advanced by the appellant in this case to support the revocation of the original cancellation decision was that Australia owed non-refoulement obligations with respect to him, on account of the harm he would suffer as a homosexual man if returned to Egypt. The Assistant Minister recognised, correctly, that he was obliged to address this claim. The Assistant Minister did so by directing himself to the Redacted ITOA. It is evident from the Assistant Minister’s reasons that he had regard to what he believed to be the ITOA Reviewer’s reasons and findings in deciding whether the appellant’s claim to be homosexual was credible, and whether that claim, if accepted, could constitute a reason why the original cancellation decision should be revoked. It is not said that there was error in so doing. It is also undisputed that the Assistant Minister was not bound by the ITOA Reviewer’s assessment. Rather, it was open to the Assistant Minister, upon consideration of the Reviewer’s findings, to accept or reject the Reviewer’s conclusion as to whether the appellant’s claim to be homosexual was “genuine or credible” and resulted in non-refoulement obligations with respect to him.