DHS17 v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DHS17 v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 209

Appeal from: DHS17 v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 495
File number: VID 514 of 2018
Judge: KENNY, MOSHINSKY AND BROMWICH JJ
Date of judgment: 27 November 2018
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from decision of primary judge dismissing application for judicial review – decision by Assistant Minister under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) not to revoke mandatory cancellation decision – where Assistant Minister relied on International Treaties Obligations Assessment (ITOA) in making decision – where ITOA provided to Assistant Minister omitted a redacted paragraph – whether Assistant Minister failed to take into account a relevant consideration – where redacted ITOA was apt to mislead and deprived appellant of positive independent support for his narrative – where complete ITOA was constructively before Assistant Minister – where information omitted was not insignificant and Assistant Minister could have reached a different view if he had the complete ITOA – appeal allowed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to amend notice of appeal to raise new ground of review not raised before primary judge – application to adduce further evidence on the appeal – where evidence not available to the appellant at the time of hearing before primary judge –  leave granted

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth) s 27

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501, 501CA

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.57

Cases cited:

August v Commissioner of Taxation [2013] FCAFC 85; 94 ATR 376

BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 96; 248 FCR 456

Buchwald v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 101; 242 FCR 65

BXK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 76

Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 51; 250 FCR 309

Jeffs v New Zealand Dairy Production and Marketing Board [1967] 1 AC 551

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114; 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99

Viane v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 116

Videto v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1985] FCA 449; 8 FCR 167

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing: 28 August 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 65
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr N Wood
Solicitor for the Appellant: Human Rights for All Pty Ltd
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr W Mosley
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 514 of 2018
BETWEEN:

DHS17

Appellant

AND:

ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

JUDGES:

KENNY, MOSHINSKY AND…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 209
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of DHS17 v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, a non-citizen, appealing a decision by the Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to revoke a mandatory cancellation of his protection visa. The decision was made under section 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which allows for the revocation of a visa cancellation decision. The Assistant Minister had relied on an International Treaties Obligations Assessment (ITOA) in making his decision, but the appellant argued that the ITOA provided to the Assistant Minister omitted a redacted paragraph, which was apt to mislead and deprived him of positive independent support for his narrative. The legal issues before the court were whether the Assistant Minister failed to take into account a relevant consideration and whether the appellant should be granted leave to amend his notice of appeal to raise a new ground of review and to adduce further evidence.

The court found that the Assistant Minister did fail to take into account a relevant consideration, as the redacted paragraph was not insignificant and the Assistant Minister could have reached a different view if he had the complete ITOA. The court also found that the appellant should be granted leave to amend his notice of appeal and to adduce further evidence, as the evidence was not available to the appellant at the time of the hearing before the primary judge and was likely to have led to a different result. The court allowed the appeal and set aside the decision of the Assistant Minister not to revoke the cancellation of the appellant’s protection visa, directing that a new decision be made according to law. The Assistant Minister was also ordered to pay the appellant's costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant have leave to rely on the draft amended notice of appeal annexed to the appellant’s outline of submissions filed on 15 August 2018.

2. The appellant file the amended notice of appeal in terms of the draft annexed to the appellant’s outline of submissions filed on 15 August 2018.

3. The appellant have leave to adduce the further evidence on the appeal, being the affidavit of Alison Mary Battisson affirmed on 30 July 2018 (consisting of 13 paragraphs) and the annexures thereto; and, insofar as necessary, compliance with rule 36.57(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) be dispensed with.

4. The appeal be allowed.

5. The orders made by a Judge of the Federal Court of Australia on 15 March 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof, order:

(a) a writ of certiorari issue to quash the decision of the respondent dated 20 June 2017 not to revoke the cancellation of the appellant’s protection visa under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth);

(b) a writ of mandamus issue directed to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, using the title Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, to make a decision under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) according to law; and

(c) the respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application.

6. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, we would grant the appellant leave to file and thereby rely upon the new ground raised in his draft amended notice of appeal, as well as to adduce further evidence on the appeal. We would allow the appeal, with costs. BACKGROUND Between October 2011 and June 2015, the appellant was convicted of a number of offences, including on 20 April 2015 in the Local Court at Wyong in New South Wales. On that date, the appellant was convicted of various offences and sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment for each offence, to be served concurrently. As already indicated, the delegate made the decision pursuant to s 501(3A) of the Migration Act to cancel the appellant’s protection visa on 9 June 2015. Section 501(3A) mandated visa cancellation where:(a)the Minister is satisfied that the person does not pass the character test because of the operation of:(i)paragraph (6)(a) (substantial criminal record), on the basis of paragraph (7)(a), (b) or (c); or (ii) paragraph (6)(e) (sexually based offences involving a child); and(b)the person is serving a sentence of imprisonment, on a full-time basis in a custodial institution, for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory. The delegate’s decision was the outcome of the delegate’s satisfaction that the appellant did not pass the character test because of the operation of s 501(7)(c) of the Migration Act and the appellant was at that time serving a sentence of imprisonment, as described in s 501(3A)(b). The effect of s 501(7)(c) is that a person has a substantial criminal record for the purposes of the character test if that person has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more.International Treaties Obligations Assessment Meanwhile, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection commenced an International Treaties Obligations Assessment (ITOA) in order to assess whether the circumstances of the appellant’s case engaged Australia’s non-refoulement obligations. The appellant was interviewed for these purposes. The ITOA was completed by a Reviewer (also an officer of the Department) for consideration by the respondent. On 5 September 2016, the appellant was notified by a letter from the Department that the ITOA had been conducted and finalised. The letter advised that the ITOA Reviewer had found that non-refoulement obligations were not engaged in the appellant’s case. A copy of the ITOA was said to be attached to this letter (Redacted ITOA). As explained below, this copy omitted one paragraph (Redacted Paragraph) from the Reviewer’s written assessment (Complete ITOA). The Redacted Paragraph related to the appellant’s claim that he would suffer relevant harm if returned to Egypt because he was homosexual. This appeal concerns the legal effect of this omission. The ITOA stated that the appellant’s interview could not be completed because of a trial fire evacuation and, in consequence, the appellant was given an opportunity to respond to certain questions in writing. In this context, the ITOA set out pertinent parts of the correspondence between the ITOA Reviewer and the appellant’s representatives. The ITOA stated that:On 18 July 2016 [the appellant] and his migration agent … were sent a letter detailing my remaining six questions … I asked:1.I note you have been convicted of domestic violence related offences in Australia. I note that the judge who sentenced you in April 2015, Magistrate McIntyre, stated in his sentencing remarks that you had committed violence against a female who you had been “in and out of a relationship with” from his understanding. Magistrate McIntyre stated that you hit your female victim numerous times with a broom which you had retrieved from the corner of the unit that you and the female shared. This information is potentially adverse, as it conflicts with your claim that you are homosexual. You are invited to comment in writing.2.I note you appeared in court in June 2015 in relation to further domestic violence related offences. Information before me suggests that these offences were committed against a different female victim. This information is potentially adverse, as it conflicts with your claim that you are homosexual. You are invited to comment in writing.3.I note you were asked during a Detention Client Interview in August 2015 whether there were any reasons why you could not return to Egypt. You made no reference to your sexuality when asked this question. Instead you stated that you could not return due to a) fighting between Christians and Muslims in Egypt and b) someone in Egypt had paid another person to kill you. These new claims suggest your previous protection claims relating to your sexuality were not genuine. You are invited to comment in writing.4.Do you genuinely fear harm in Egypt because someone has paid another person to kill you and because there is fighting between Christians and Muslims?5.If so, what is the name of the individual who has allegedly been paid to kill you? Who paid him to kill you? When did this occur? Why? Do you have any evidence to substantiate this claim?6.Why would fighting between Christians and Muslims in Egypt put you at particular risk of harm? Do you have any evidence to substantiate that you are a Christian?The claimant’s migration agent provided a response to these questions via email on 3 August 2016 … . In response to question one she stated:The female referred to by Magistrate McIntyre is Ms [AB]. [The appellant] met Ms [AB] towards the end of 2010. At no time did a romantic relationship occur between them nor did they cohabit. Ms [AB] was divorced, had children and had a disability. Ms [AB], who is of Islamic faith, was in dispute with her family because she did not observe Islam as expected by her family. Ms [AB] resided at [one address] and [the appellant] resided at [another address]. [The appellant] felt sorry for her and eventually became her official carer.… it does not appear that the Magistrate did specify a spousal or intimate relationship. [The appellant] explains that reference to “in and out of a relationship with” arose due to the fact that Ms [AB]’s brothers were pressuring [the appellant] to convert to Islam.… it is essential to note that for cultural and religious reasons, it would have been highly unlikely and almost impossible for [the appellant] and Ms [AB] to be involved in any sort of intimate relationship. Apart from the fact that [the appellant] is homosexual, Ms [AB]’s family and community would not under any circumstances allowed contact between the two if they as much as suspected any romantic involvement without marriage.Clearly a misunderstanding occurred due to the fact that the nature of the relationship between [the appellant] and Ms [AB] was not specified.In response to question two, [the appellant’s migration agent] stated:[The appellant] is uncertain of the offence and court appearance in June 2015 referred to in question 2 … .[The appellant] claims that the only incident that he can recall is a dispute with a female in approximately October 2014. [The appellant] explains that he was waiting outside a church to speak to the priest. A young lady approached him and started to talk to him about Islam. He told the lady that he was not interested but the lady was persistent. Eventually [the appellant] began to suspect that Ms [AB’s] family had sent this lady to harass him. A non physical dispute eventuated and police became involved. [The appellant] became frustrated unable to explain the situation to the police and he swore at police and was taken to police station. [The appellant] can not recall many details of this incident and I do not have access to any police report.In response to question three, [the appellant’s migration agent] stated:[The appellant] provided two reasons for not wanting to return to Egypt. The first was based on Christian Muslim tensions in Egypt. …The second reason given by [the appellant] is absolutely not a new claim. In his original PV application [the appellant] clearly stated that the reason that he was applying for protection was the fact that a person in Australia had told his family and the family of his partner… at the time that they are homosexual. [His partner’s] family blamed [the appellant] and had commissioned a person to kill him. These claims have been outlined in his original protection visa application.In response to question four, [the appellant’s migration agent] stated:Both reasons that [the appellant] fears harm if he were to return are very real reasons. …

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the hearing of the appeal, the Assistant Minister did not oppose the grant of leave to the appellant to rely on his draft amended notice of appeal. The Assistant Minister did not dispute that he made his decision on the basis of the Redacted ITOA and did not contend that the grant of leave would work an injustice on him. In all the circumstances, we would grant the appellant leave to amend his notice of appeal as he sought and to raise a ground that was not before the primary judge for the reasons already indicated. APPLICATION TO ADDUCE FURTHER EVIDENCE The appellant also sought orders allowing him to adduce further evidence on the appeal, being Ms Battisson’s 13 paragraph affidavit, with its annexures. Insofar as necessary, the appellant also sought an order dispensing with compliance with r 36.57(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). Section 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth) provides, so far as relevant, that in an appeal, the Court shall have regard to the evidence given in the proceedings from which the appeal arose and has power, in its discretion, to receive further evidence. As Ms Battisson’s uncontested affidavit evidence indicated, the relevant evidence was not available to the appellant at the time of the hearing before the primary judge. The Assistant Minister did not oppose the Court receiving the further evidence that the appellant sought to adduce. The power to admit the further evidence exists to serve the demands of justice. In exercising the discretion conferred by s 27 an important consideration is whether the further evidence would have produced a different result had it been available at the hearing before the primary judge on 7 May 2018 or, at least, was likely to have produced a different result at that time: see August v Commissioner of Taxation [2013] FCAFC 85; 94 ATR 376 at [116] and [119]. We are of the opinion, for the reasons stated below, that the further evidence was likely to have led to a different result had it been available at the hearing before the primary judge. For these reasons, we would receive the further evidence as the appellant sought and, so far as necessary, we would dispense with compliance with r 36.57(2) of the Federal Court Rules.PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS The appellant submitted that the Assistant Minister, having chosen to adopt the ITOA process to inform himself about the decision to be made, on any view, was misled about the ITOA assessment and analysis. The appellant submitted that the Redacted ITOA was a fundamentally misleading document, because it omitted the ITOA Reviewer’s acceptance that the appellant was not in a relationship with a second female victim of domestic violence, as the Reviewer’s letter of 18 July 2016 had contemplated. The appellant, through his counsel, submitted that the omission of the Redacted Paragraph was apt to mislead the Assistant Minister:… both positively, because … the balance of the page suggested that there were multiple relationships, but also negatively in the sense that corroborative information – not adverse information, … from New South Wales Police was not provided to the Minister who might have come to a different view overall about the credibility of the claim had that information in fact been put to the Minister.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the reasons set out below, the ITOA Reviewer did not accept that the appellant was homosexual and concluded that Australia’s non-refoulement obligations were not engaged with respect to him.The Assistant Minister’s decision By letter dated 9 September 2016, the appellant was validly notified of the decision to cancel his protection visa. Sections 501CA(3) and (4) of the Migration Act not only provide for notification of a visa cancellation decision under s 501(3A), they also provide for the making of representations by the former visa holder and the revocation of that decision. Sections 501CA(3) and (4) are in the following terms:(3) As soon as practicable after making the original decision, the Minister must:(a)give the person, in the way that the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances;(i) a written notice that sets out the original decision; and(ii) particulars of the relevant information; and(b)invite the person to make representations to the Minister, within the period and in the manner ascertained in accordance with the regulations, about revocation of the original decision.(4) The Minister may revoke the original decision if:(a)the person makes representations in accordance with the invitation; and(b) the Minister is satisfied:(i)that the person passes the character test (as defined by section 501); or(ii)that there is another reason why the original decision should be revoked. Section 501CA(5) further provides that, if the Minister revokes the original decision, the original decision is taken not to have been made. It is unnecessary to refer to some intervening procedural matters. It suffices to say that, on 24 September 2016, the appellant, through his representative, made representations in which he sought revocation of the delegate’s original decision, including that “if I return to Egypt this will be very dangerous for me and my family”; and “[t]here are people who want to kill me and have been blaming my family because their son is gay”. On 29 May 2017, the Department informed the appellant, by letter, that the ITOA of 5 September 2016 might be taken into account when making the decision as to whether or not to revoke the original decision. A copy of the Redacted ITOA was attached to the letter. On 20 June 2017, the Assistant Minister decided not to revoke the original decision. The appellant was notified of the non-revocation decision by a letter from the Department dated 21 June 2017, enclosing the decision record and statement of reasons, both dated 20 June 2017, a table of attachments, and attachments. In the decision record, the Assistant Minister stated that he was not satisfied that the appellant passed the character test nor that there was another reason why the original decision should be revoked. It was common ground that the Assistant Minister had before him a copy of the Redacted ITOA when he made his decision. In his statement of reasons, the Assistant Minister stated:14.As part of his current revocation request, [the appellant] submits that he will face harm if returned to Egypt as he is homosexual.15.I am aware that [the appellant’s] fear of being harmed due to his claimed sexuality was addressed in an International Treaties Obligations Assessment (ITOA) that was finalised on 5 September 2016. It was determined that [the appellant] did not engage Australia’s protection obligations as his claims of having a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of being homosexual lacked credibility. 16.[The appellant] was provided, via his agent, a copy of the ITOA. In response, [the appellant’s] agent submits that [the appellant] disagrees with the finding regarding his sexuality and is not currently in a position to provide further evidence to support his claim.17.I am aware that [the appellant] also raise concerns regarding his fear of persecution in Egypt based on his religion as ‘Christian Orthodox’ which he states is also referred to as Coptic Christian. The ITOA concluded that as a non-practising Christian, [the appellant] would face a ‘remote rather than real risk of persecution’ due to his religion and found him to be not owed protection obligations.18.In light of the conclusions of the ITOA, which I accept, I am not satisfied that the claims made by [the appellant] in his request for revocation that he will suffer harm if returned to Egypt constitute “another reason” why the original decision should be revoked.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Assistant Minister argued that, in the appellant’s case, there was no single and distinct basis upon which an adverse finding on the credibility of the relevant claim was made. The Assistant Minister submitted that the Reviewer’s findings as to the appellant’s credit were “detailed and comprehensive” and that the Redacted Paragraph was not “corroborative” of the appellant, but simply “not adverse in response to a question that was raised by the Reviewer”. The Assistant Minister drew attention to the three reasons given by the Reviewer for not accepting the appellant’s claim that he was homosexual (set out below at [57]). Regarding the third reason, the Assistant Minister focussed on the Magistrate’s sentencing remarks on 20 April 2015 and the fact that the Redacted Paragraph had not led the Reviewer to form a different opinion of the appellant’s claim. It was submitted that the Assistant Minister was entitled to rely on the conclusions set out in the ITOA and that, in light of the ITOA Reviewer’s findings, the redacted material was “not of such importance that … the exercise of power was affected”. Further, it was noted that the appellant's claim that he would be harmed as homosexual if returned to Egypt was only one matter that the Assistant Minister considered in determining whether he was satisfied that there was “another reason” why the original decision should be revoked. CONSIDERATION The Assistant Minister’s conclusion that he was not satisfied that the appellant passed the character test, as defined by s 501, was not challenged. Before the primary judge and on this appeal, the appellant focused on the Assistant Minister’s conclusion that he was not satisfied, for the purposes of s 501CA(4)(b)(ii), that there was “another reason” why the original cancellation decision under s 501(3A) should be revoked. It may be accepted that s 501CA(4) confers a broad discretion to revoke the original cancellation decision. This is implicit in s 501CA(4)(b)(ii): see BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 96; 248 FCR 456 at [24]. In exercising the discretion under s 501CA(4), the Assistant Minister was required to consider the reasons advanced by the appellant in his representations in favour of revocation. One reason advanced by the appellant in this case to support the revocation of the original cancellation decision was that Australia owed non-refoulement obligations with respect to him, on account of the harm he would suffer as a homosexual man if returned to Egypt. The Assistant Minister recognised, correctly, that he was obliged to address this claim. The Assistant Minister did so by directing himself to the Redacted ITOA. It is evident from the Assistant Minister’s reasons that he had regard to what he believed to be the ITOA Reviewer’s reasons and findings in deciding whether the appellant’s claim to be homosexual was credible, and whether that claim, if accepted, could constitute a reason why the original cancellation decision should be revoked. It is not said that there was error in so doing. It is also undisputed that the Assistant Minister was not bound by the ITOA Reviewer’s assessment. Rather, it was open to the Assistant Minister, upon consideration of the Reviewer’s findings, to accept or reject the Reviewer’s conclusion as to whether the appellant’s claim to be homosexual was “genuine or credible” and resulted in non-refoulement obligations with respect to him.