De Pardo v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee
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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DE PARDO v LEGAL PRACTITIONERS COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE [2000] FCA 335
SUMMARY
The following is a summary of the judgments of the Full Court of the Federal Court in the case of De Pardo v Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal. It does not form part of the Reasons for Judgment which must be derived from reading the judgments themselves.
In this case a Western Australian barrister was instructed by a solicitor to represent a client in the Family Court of Western Australia which exercises its jurisdiction under Federal and State law. The case settled and the barrister sent the solicitor a bill. The solicitor complained to the Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee that the bill was so excessive as to amount to unprofessional conduct. The Committee referred the complaint to the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal, which is set up under the Legal Practitioners Act 1893, a law of the State of Western Australia.
The barrister took out an application in this Court and argued before Justice Lee that the Tribunal, as a body set up under State law, had no power to inquire into a complaint of gross overcharging in proceedings under the federal Family Law Act. He argued that:
1.The federal Family Law Act provides complete coverage on issues about costs charged by barristers and solicitors in family law proceedings and so displaces the State law for the disciplining of practitioners in that regard.
2.The Tribunal’s inquiry would involve it acting as a court purporting to exercise federal jurisdiction which it is not authorised to do under the Constitution.
Justice Lee dismissed the barrister’s application. The barrister appealed to the Full Court and the Full Court has today dismissed the appeal. Justices French and Carr wrote separate judgments with which Justice Whitlam agreed.
In dismissing the appeal the Court pointed out that the function of the Tribunal in deciding whether there has been unprofessional conduct by gross overcharging is quite different from the function of the Family Court in deciding what is the charge that can properly be made between barristers and solicitors and solicitors and their clients in family law cases. Also the ability of a lawyer to practise in a federal court ultimately depends upon the lawyer being qualified to practise under State law and that is a matter for which State law and the State Supreme Courts and tribunals set up under the State law have traditionally taken responsibility. There is therefore no inconsistency between the State law regulating the conduct of practitioners admitted in Western Australia and the federal Family Law Act.
The Full Court also held that the Tribunal was not exercising any federal jurisdiction in inquiring into the complaint and so no question could arise of it exercising federal judicial power contrary to the Constitution.
Perth, 23 March 2000
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
De Pardo v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [2000] FCA 335
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – inconsistency – State law regulating legal practitioners – Tribunal established under State law to…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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In the case of De Pardo v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee, Nino Anthony De Pardo, a legal practitioner admitted to practise law in Western Australia, sought to restrain the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal from continuing with its inquiry into his conduct. The dispute centred on whether the Tribunal's authority to investigate allegations of unprofessional conduct in family law matters fell under state or federal jurisdiction, specifically whether it contravened Commonwealth statutes such as the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The appeal arose after Lee J dismissed De Pardo's application to prevent the Tribunal from proceeding with its inquiry. The central legal issues before the court were whether the Legal Practitioners Act 1893 was inconsistent with the provisions of the Judiciary Act and the Family Law Act, and whether the Tribunal's determination would constitute an exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth.
The court examined the statutory framework provided by the Judiciary Act, which includes the establishment of a Register of Practitioners and conditions for practicing in federal courts. Lee J concluded that the disciplinary provisions of the Legal Practitioners Act were not inconsistent with federal legislation. The court reasoned that while federal law defines practitioners' entitlement to practise in federal courts, state legislation remains applicable to disciplinary matters, unless federal law explicitly excludes it. The court held that the Tribunal's function in this case was to determine whether De Pardo had engaged in unprofessional conduct, rather than adjudicating on the existing legal rights of parties in federal matters, thus it did not exercise federal judicial power. This reasoning led to the dismissal of De Pardo's appeal and the affirmation of the Tribunal's authority to proceed with its inquiry.
The court's final orders were to dismiss the appeal and for De Pardo to pay the costs of the appeal to the Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee. This decision underscores the concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts in disciplinary matters concerning legal practitioners, affirming that state tribunals can exercise disciplinary powers without encroaching on federal jurisdiction unless explicitly restricted by federal law.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The Appellant is to pay the First Respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Proceedings were instituted in this Court to restrain the Tribunal from continuing with its inquiry on the basis, broadly stated, that the question of overcharging involved the assessment of costs in proceedings in a court exercising federal jurisdiction and that this was an area covered entirely by federal law, namely the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The question of unprofessional conduct in such a case was also said to be covered by the provisions of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). These Commonwealth Acts, covering the field of the Tribunal’s inquiry, were said to have rendered inoperative the State law under which the Tribunal operates, to the extent that that law authorises such an inquiry. Further, it was contended that the proposed inquiry was an impermissible exercise by the Tribunal of the judicial power of the Commonwealth, a power which could only be exercised by a federal court created under the Constitution, or by a State court invested with the relevant federal jurisdiction. Lee J at first instance dismissed the application. The barrister, Mr De Pardo, now appeals against that decision.Factual Background Nino Anthony De Pardo is admitted as a legal practitioner of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. He practices in the area of family law as a barrister. He is registered as a practitioner of the High Court on the Register of Practitioners maintained under s 55B of the Judiciary Act. On or about 18 December 1991, De Pardo was instructed by Mr C W Marais, the principal of C W Marais & Co, Barristers and Solicitors of Bunbury, to act on Marais’ instructions for his client, Walter Bruce Hearman. Mr Hearman was a party to proceedings in the Family Court of Western Australia involving: (a)An application for dissolution of marriage.(b)Custody, access and maintenance of children.(c)Settlement of property.De Pardo accepted the instructions and thereafter acted for Hearman on instructions from Marais in what became contested proceedings in the Family Court. Ultimately those proceedings were settled by consent orders on 4 March 1993, the first day of what had been listed for four days as a contested hearing. In the course of his retainer, De Pardo rendered three memoranda of professional fees, including one on 23 June 1992 and another on 5 March 1993. According to De Pardo, counsel fees which he charged to CW Marais & Co for the Hearman case were calculated in accordance with rates agreed between Marais and Hearman, namely $1,500 per day or for an appreciable part thereof for court appearances plus $180 per hour for each hour taken up with phone calls, conferences and in the general preparation of the matter for any hearing or conference. Each of the memoranda of fees which he submitted to CW Marais & Co was paid. In addition, according to De Pardo, Marais expressly agreed to pay him a reservation fee for the days that he set aside for the anticipated trial. In or about September 1993, Hearman complained about the fees which he had been charged by CW Marais & Co including counsel fees. As a result of proceedings taken by Hearman: (a)On or about 16 August 1995, the Family Court of Western Australia ordered that the costs agreement made between Marais and Hearman dated 3 January 1992 be set aside.(b)A taxation of the costs rendered by Marais to Hearman was conducted by a Deputy Registrar of the Family Court of Western Australia on 8 May 1996. The Deputy Registrar’s decision, with reasons, was delivered on 20 June 1996, resulting in the costs as claimed being significantly reduced.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
FRENCH, WHITLAM AND CARR JJ
The application came on before Lee J on 21 August 1998 and his Honour delivered judgment on 26 May 1999. He dismissed the application with costs. De Pardo now appeals against the dismissal of the application.The Judgment at First Instance His Honour identified as the crucial questions before him: 1.Whether the Legal Practitioners Act 1893 when applied to the circumstances of this case was inconsistent with the provisions of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). 2.Whether a determination by the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal in the circumstances of this case would constitute an exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth by a body in which that power could not be vested under s 71 of the Constitution.His Honour referred to provisions of the Judiciary Act establishing a Register of Practitioners, inclusion on which is a condition of a person’s entitlement to practise in a Federal Court. He did not accept that the disciplinary provisions of the Legal Practitioners Act are inconsistent with the provisions of the Judiciary Act or the Family Law Act. While the Commonwealth legislation defines persons entitled to practise in Federal Courts and State Courts exercising federal jurisdiction, its recognition of their entitlement is complementary and governed substantially by continuation of a person’s entitlement to practice law in the Supreme Court of the State. Although the Judiciary Act provides for the Supreme Court of a State to exercise disciplinary procedures in respect of a practitioner who has a right of audience in State Courts exercising federal jurisdiction, his Honour held that the context in which that provision appears does not suggest an intention to exclude the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to determine such issues under relevant State legislation. He also held that the disciplinary power granted to the High Court under the Judiciary Act was not intended to exclude the disciplinary function of the Supreme Court in respect of any conduct by any practitioner admitted to practise by the Supreme Court, who by reason of that admission is also entitled to practise as a barrister or solicitor in a federal court. The jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by the Judiciary Act is to be read as providing for an additional disciplinary power appropriate for exercise in certain circumstances. Where legislation of a State or Territory provides for taxation proceedings to resolve disputes in respect of costs rendered by a practitioner that jurisdiction, in his Honour’s opinion, is to be regarded as concurrent with the jurisdiction to regulate charges levied by practitioners exercisable by a Federal Court under federal legislation. In other than special circumstances disputes over costs incurred in relation to the exercise of federal jurisdiction can be resolved under the provisions of the State or Territory laws. His Honour therefore rejected the inconsistency argument. His Honour then turned to the question whether the hearing and determination by the Tribunal of the Reference from the Committee would constitute a purported exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. De Pardo had asserted that the assessment or taxation of the counsel fees rendered by him was part of a “matrimonial cause” and that only a court on which federal jurisdiction in respect of such matters had been conferred could determine the reasonableness of such fees. He had submitted that determination by the Tribunal would inevitably involve an inquiry into and an adjudication upon a matrimonial cause, namely what were proper, fair and reasonable costs chargeable for the services provided by De Pardo with respect to that matrimonial cause. His Honour rejected De Pardo’s contention, holding that the hearing and determination by the Tribunal of the Committee’s complaint would not have the character of an exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. He said: “The task of the Tribunal is to ascertain whether De Pardo has been guilty of unprofessional conduct and if so whether to deal with De Pardo under s 29A(3) or make, and transmit, a report to the Supreme Court under s 29A(2). No part of that procedure will determine the existing rights at law of parties in dispute in a matter of federal jurisdiction.”Whether in the performance of its functions the Tribunal used the trappings of the exercise of judicial power was immaterial, for it was not an adjudication involving the exercise of a judicial power of the Commonwealth.Statutory Framework – The Judiciary Act 1903