FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Daw v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 705
Citation: Daw v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 705 Appeal from: [2012] AATA 70 Parties: ACHEN DAW v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 240 of 2012 Judge: EDMONDS J Date of judgment: 5 July 2012 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal – sole ground being denial of procedural fairness for Tribunal’s refusal to grant adjournment sought to accommodate legal representative’s wish for further time to prepare applicant’s case for hearing – consideration of statutory scheme in respect of decision to be made and other relevant facts
Held: No denial of procedural fairness; appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 500, 501
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 39, 43Cases cited: Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 32 applied
Weti v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1531 followed
Russell v Duke of Norfolk [1949] 1 All ER 109 followed
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs & Anor; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 followed
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 followed
Goldie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 111 FCR 378 applied
White v Hall (1983) ASC 56-247 referred to
Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 101 FCR 20 referred to
Warrell v Fair Work Australia [2012] FCA 267 distinguished
Hutley v Meigan [1996] NSWSC 636 distinguished
Hodgkinson v Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board (1994) 50 FCR 504 distinguishedDate of hearing: 26 April 2012 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 31 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr LJ Karp Solicitor for the Applicant: Kinslor Prince Lawyers Counsel for the Respondents: Mr S Free Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 240 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: ACHEN DAW
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
EDMONDS J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 JULY 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 240 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: ACHEN DAW
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
EDMONDS J
DATE:
5 JULY 2012
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) affirming a decision of the first respondent (“the Minister”) to cancel the applicant’s Class XB, Subclass 202 (Global Special Humanitarian) visa pursuant to s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).
The applicant challenges the decision of the Tribunal on the sole ground…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 705
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Gilmour J began by noting that the Tribunal's refusal to grant an adjournment was not unreasonable given the statutory scheme and the circumstances of the case. The applicant had ample time to prepare for the hearing and his solicitor had been notified of the hearing dates well in advance. The Tribunal had also indicated that it was not inclined to grant an adjournment, providing the solicitor with an opportunity to make a submission in support of the adjournment. Despite these opportunities, no persuasive reasons were provided for the adjournment. Gilmour J found that the Tribunal's decision was consistent with its practice direction and did not amount to a breach of procedural fairness.
Gilmour J further explained that the Tribunal was under a strict time requirement to make its decision within a certain timeframe, and granting an adjournment could have had serious practical implications. The Tribunal had to balance the need for procedural fairness with its statutory obligations, and Gilmour J found that it had done so appropriately. The Court dismissed the applicant's appeal, finding that the Tribunal's refusal to grant an adjournment was not unreasonable and did not prevent the applicant from having a reasonable opportunity to present his case.
Gilmour J concluded by dismissing the appeal and ordering the applicant to pay the Minister's costs of the proceeding in the Federal Court, as the appeal was found to be without merit.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
These restrictions provide important context for the applicant’s request to the Tribunal on 20 January 2012 to adjourn the scheduled hearing. Any adjournment would have had serious practical implications for the Tribunal in completing its review within the scheduled time, particularly in light of the prospect of the applicant seeking to rely on new material (which would need to be subject to each of the two-day rules) and the need for the Tribunal to produce a reasoned decision on or before 14 February 2012. The Tribunal was required to provide reasons for its decision, either orally or in writing: s 43(2) of the AAT Act.CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICANT’S CASE The applicant invoked the proposition, referred to by Hunt J in White v Hall (1983) ASC 55-247 at 56,250, that “[w]here the unreasonable refusal to grant an adjournment prevents a party from properly presenting his case, there is a denial of natural justice”. The proposition should not be taken out of context. In White v Hall, Hunt J concluded that a breach of procedural fairness had occurred because a referee declined a party an opportunity to bring forward crucial evidence in an admissible form. Hunt J noted that no reason was given for the refusal to grant an adjournment to allow for that evidence to be prepared and the refusal was “plainly unreasonable” (at 56,251). As the second limb of this makes clear, the proposition is founded in the requirement of procedural fairness that a party must be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard, which may be translated in a judicial or quasi judicial setting as a reasonable opportunity to present one’s case. A hearing will miscarry in a procedural fairness sense by reason of a refusal of an adjournment only if the refusal is unreasonable and has the consequence that a party is prevented from having a reasonable opportunity to present its case. The Tribunal’s refusal to grant an adjournment in the present case cannot on any fair view be criticised as “unreasonable”. The applicant, through his solicitor, delayed without explanation in making an application for an adjournment, notwithstanding clear signs from the Tribunal that the granting of an adjournment was far from a formality and the Tribunal would need to be persuaded of the reasons for the adjournment. No explanation was offered for the delay; neither did the application furnish any persuasive reasons why the applicant was unable to proceed on the scheduled hearing date. No explanation was given as to why the applicant and his solicitor did not proceed with urgent preparations for the hearing on 24 January 2012, having been told on 12 January 2012 that the Senior Member was not disposed to grant the adjournment. The Tribunal was subject to a strict time requirement that meant that, even if the hearing proceeded as scheduled, the Tribunal was required to produce a reasoned decision within 14 business days. The Tribunal dealt with the application in a way which was consistent with the Tribunal practice direction (Ex C), which itself describes entirely orthodox and reasonable propositions about the handling of adjournment applications.