Daw v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship

Link copied
Case Copied 17 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Daw v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 705

Citation: Daw v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 705
Appeal from: [2012] AATA 70
Parties: ACHEN DAW v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 240 of 2012
Judge: EDMONDS J
Date of judgment: 5 July 2012
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal – sole ground being denial of procedural fairness for Tribunal’s refusal to grant adjournment sought to accommodate legal representative’s wish for further time to prepare applicant’s case for hearing – consideration of statutory scheme in respect of decision to be made and other relevant facts

Held: No denial of procedural fairness; appeal dismissed

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 500, 501
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 39, 43
Cases cited: Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 32 applied
Weti v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1531 followed
Russell v Duke of Norfolk [1949] 1 All ER 109 followed
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs & Anor; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 followed
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 followed
Goldie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 111 FCR 378 applied
White v Hall (1983) ASC 56-247 referred to
Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 101 FCR 20 referred to
Warrell v Fair Work Australia [2012] FCA 267 distinguished
Hutley v Meigan [1996] NSWSC 636 distinguished
Hodgkinson v Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board (1994) 50 FCR 504 distinguished
Date of hearing: 26 April 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 31
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr LJ Karp
Solicitor for the Applicant: Kinslor Prince Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr S Free
Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 240 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

ACHEN DAW
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 JULY 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 240 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

ACHEN DAW
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE:

5 JULY 2012

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) affirming a decision of the first respondent (“the Minister”) to cancel the applicant’s Class XB, Subclass 202 (Global Special Humanitarian) visa pursuant to s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).

  2. The applicant challenges the decision of the Tribunal on the sole ground…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Daw v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2012] FCA 705
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Daw, the applicant, sought judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) to dismiss his application for an adjournment of a hearing of his visa cancellation matter. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where Gilmour J was tasked with reviewing the Tribunal's decision. The central legal issue in this case was whether the Tribunal's refusal to grant the applicant an adjournment of the hearing was unreasonable and thus a breach of procedural fairness.

Gilmour J began by noting that the Tribunal's refusal to grant an adjournment was not unreasonable given the statutory scheme and the circumstances of the case. The applicant had ample time to prepare for the hearing and his solicitor had been notified of the hearing dates well in advance. The Tribunal had also indicated that it was not inclined to grant an adjournment, providing the solicitor with an opportunity to make a submission in support of the adjournment. Despite these opportunities, no persuasive reasons were provided for the adjournment. Gilmour J found that the Tribunal's decision was consistent with its practice direction and did not amount to a breach of procedural fairness.

Gilmour J further explained that the Tribunal was under a strict time requirement to make its decision within a certain timeframe, and granting an adjournment could have had serious practical implications. The Tribunal had to balance the need for procedural fairness with its statutory obligations, and Gilmour J found that it had done so appropriately. The Court dismissed the applicant's appeal, finding that the Tribunal's refusal to grant an adjournment was not unreasonable and did not prevent the applicant from having a reasonable opportunity to present his case.

Gilmour J concluded by dismissing the appeal and ordering the applicant to pay the Minister's costs of the proceeding in the Federal Court, as the appeal was found to be without merit.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Nothing in the Tribunal’s reasons for decision touches on the question of an adjournment. The evidence that an application for an adjournment was made and rejected is contained in the affidavit of David John Prince, solicitor, sworn 27 March 2012, and the annexures thereto (Ex 1).RELEVANT FACTSBackground The applicant was born in Sudan, in the part of the country that now forms the independent state of South Sudan. He entered Australia together with his wife and two children on a Class XB, Subclass 202 (Global Special Humanitarian) visa on 23 June 2006. From 25 September 2008 to 27 May 2011 the applicant was convicted of several criminal offences involving violence against a person for which he was sentenced to various terms of imprisonment of up to eighteen months. There has never been any issue that the applicant failed the character test in s 501(6) of the Act. By notice of visa cancellation served on the applicant on 22 November 2011, the Minister cancelled the applicant’s visa.The Adjournment Application The applicant placed heavy reliance on the attempts made by his solicitor, Mr Prince, to assist the applicant and appear on his behalf at the Tribunal hearing. Mr Prince deposed that he had a standing arrangement with the Sydney Registry of the Tribunal that he was prepared to provide pro bono advice to unrepresented applicants before the Tribunal involving character cases under s 501 of the Act. Mr Prince was first notified of the applicant’s application for review and provided with documents relating to the application, by email, on 5 December 2011 (Ex 1, p 7). The email noted that:(a)the application was scheduled for a telephone directions hearing before Senior Member Allen on 12 December 2011 at 9:30 am; (b)the applicant could be contacted at Villawood Immigration Detention Centre on a phone number provided and would require the assistance of an Arabic (Sudanese) interpreter, notwithstanding that he “does have some limited English”. On 15 December 2011 Mr Prince was informed by Deputy District Registrar Allan Teves that the matter had been listed for hearing on 24 and 25 January 2011 and that the date by which the Tribunal was required to make its decision in relation to the application or otherwise be deemed to affirm the Minister’s decision pursuant to s 500(6L) (commonly termed “the 84-day period”) was 14 February 2012 (Ex 1, [4]). By email, Mr Prince was provided with additional documents relating to the application described as “the documents provided by Mr Daw that had been served on him by the decision maker” (Ex 1, p 11). On 6 January 2012 Mr Prince, absent an interpreter, attended the Villawood Immigration Detention Centre for the purposes of a “legal visit” with the applicant (Ex 1, [7] and p 13). By 12 January 2012 Mr Prince had accepted instructions to act for the applicant. On that day Mr Prince sought to have the matter listed for a telephone directions hearing and formally notified Deputy District Registrar Teves of his intention to seek an adjournment of the hearing date (Ex 1, p 16). Deputy District Registrar Teves advised by email to Mr Prince on the same date that Senior Member Allen had indicated that at that stage he was “not prepared to accede to [Mr Prince’s] request to have the hearing dates in this matter rescheduled”. Deputy District Registrar Teves requested that, to “allow SM Allen to fully consider” the request for an adjournment, Mr Prince provide submissions in support of the request (Ex 1, p 21).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

This is not a case where an adjournment was required in order for the applicant to deal with an issue that he was not aware of until the hearing. The applicant gains no assistance from Hutley v Meigan [1996] NSWSC 636 in which Rolfe J concluded that the refusal by the Consumer Claims Tribunal to grant an adjournment to enable parties to deal with critical evidence, the importance of which only became apparent at the hearing, was enough to constitute a breach of procedural fairness. To similar effect in Hodgkinson v Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board (1994) 50 FCR 504 Drummond J reasoned that a breach of procedural fairness would occur if a Tribunal declined to grant an adjournment in circumstances where a party was labouring under a bona fide misapprehension as to the issues in the case, such that in the absence of an adjournment there would not be a reasonable opportunity to respond to those issues.CONCLUSION Having regard to the statutory scheme within which the decision of the Tribunal was to be made and the relevant facts and circumstances outlined above, I am of the view that the Tribunal’s refusal to grant an adjournment to a “date as late as humanly possible” was not unreasonable, nor did it prevent the applicant from having a reasonable opportunity to present his case. The appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

These restrictions provide important context for the applicant’s request to the Tribunal on 20 January 2012 to adjourn the scheduled hearing. Any adjournment would have had serious practical implications for the Tribunal in completing its review within the scheduled time, particularly in light of the prospect of the applicant seeking to rely on new material (which would need to be subject to each of the two-day rules) and the need for the Tribunal to produce a reasoned decision on or before 14 February 2012. The Tribunal was required to provide reasons for its decision, either orally or in writing: s 43(2) of the AAT Act.CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICANT’S CASE The applicant invoked the proposition, referred to by Hunt J in White v Hall (1983) ASC 55-247 at 56,250, that “[w]here the unreasonable refusal to grant an adjournment prevents a party from properly presenting his case, there is a denial of natural justice”. The proposition should not be taken out of context. In White v Hall, Hunt J concluded that a breach of procedural fairness had occurred because a referee declined a party an opportunity to bring forward crucial evidence in an admissible form. Hunt J noted that no reason was given for the refusal to grant an adjournment to allow for that evidence to be prepared and the refusal was “plainly unreasonable” (at 56,251). As the second limb of this makes clear, the proposition is founded in the requirement of procedural fairness that a party must be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard, which may be translated in a judicial or quasi judicial setting as a reasonable opportunity to present one’s case. A hearing will miscarry in a procedural fairness sense by reason of a refusal of an adjournment only if the refusal is unreasonable and has the consequence that a party is prevented from having a reasonable opportunity to present its case. The Tribunal’s refusal to grant an adjournment in the present case cannot on any fair view be criticised as “unreasonable”. The applicant, through his solicitor, delayed without explanation in making an application for an adjournment, notwithstanding clear signs from the Tribunal that the granting of an adjournment was far from a formality and the Tribunal would need to be persuaded of the reasons for the adjournment. No explanation was offered for the delay; neither did the application furnish any persuasive reasons why the applicant was unable to proceed on the scheduled hearing date. No explanation was given as to why the applicant and his solicitor did not proceed with urgent preparations for the hearing on 24 January 2012, having been told on 12 January 2012 that the Senior Member was not disposed to grant the adjournment. The Tribunal was subject to a strict time requirement that meant that, even if the hearing proceeded as scheduled, the Tribunal was required to produce a reasoned decision within 14 business days. The Tribunal dealt with the application in a way which was consistent with the Tribunal practice direction (Ex C), which itself describes entirely orthodox and reasonable propositions about the handling of adjournment applications.