Weti v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Weti v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCA 1531

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming cancellation of visa under s 501(2) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether failure to grant other than a one day adjournment was a denial of natural justice or a breach of s 39 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) as a failure to realistically provide the applicant with an opportunity to obtain legal representation at the hearing – whether failure to consider relevant considerations: (1) denial of procedural fairness in responding to original notice of intent to cancel, and (2) disruptive effects on family and other ties to Australian community

MIGRATION LAW – cancellation of visa on character grounds – previous warning on same ground – notice of intention to cancel

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 39, 40(1)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499, 501(2), (6), (7)

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 referred to
Kuswardana v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1981) 35 ALR 186 referred to
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 referred to
Sales v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1807 considered
Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323 considered

ANYA FRANCISCA WETI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

NSD 13 OF 2007

EDMONDS J
5 OCTOBER 2007
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 13 OF 2007

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY THE HON R N J PURVIS AM QC, DEPUTY PRESIDENT

BETWEEN:

ANYA FRANCISCA WETI
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 OCTOBER 2007

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 13 OF 2007

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY THE HON R N J PURVIS AM QC, DEPUTY PRESIDENT

BETWEEN:

ANYA FRANCISCA WETI
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE:

5 OCTOBER 2007

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), N2006/1237 dated 8 December 2006 constituted by the Hon R N J Purvis AM QC, Deputy President, affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“the Minister”) to cancel the applicant’s Special Category Visa Subclass TY-444 on character grounds under subs 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).

    BACKGROUND

  2. The applicant – a New Zealand citizen – was born on 15 November 1981 and arrived in Australia with her parents on 19 June 1985.  She was three years and seven months old.…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 1531
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Weti v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the applicant, a New Zealand citizen who had lived in Australia since the age of three and a half, appealed a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship's decision to cancel her Special Category Visa on character grounds. The primary issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had failed to provide the applicant with a reasonable opportunity to present her case, which could amount to a denial of natural justice. The applicant argued that the Tribunal did not give her a sufficient adjournment to find alternative legal representation, rendering her unrepresented at the hearing and depriving her of a fair hearing. The court considered the circumstances under which the applicant's original solicitor was unable to appear and the Tribunal member's availability. Despite the applicant's unrepresented status, the court found that the Tribunal had not failed to provide her with a reasonable opportunity to present her case because the application for adjournment was not opposed and no prejudice to the Minister would have resulted from an adjournment.

The court also examined whether the Tribunal failed to consider a relevant matter, specifically that the applicant was denied procedural fairness in responding to the original Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation of her visa. The applicant claimed that she was in criminal detention, did not use a lawyer or migration agent, was given only 14 days to respond, and was not granted an extension of time despite not requesting one. The court noted that the Tribunal had not considered this alleged procedural unfairness, but held that such a failure did not necessarily constitute an error of law, as the statute does not require the decision-maker to take into account all considerations. The court concluded that the Tribunal's failure to consider this matter did not amount to an error of law warranting judicial review.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered the applicant to pay the Minister's costs. The court found that the Tribunal had not failed to provide the applicant with a reasonable opportunity to present her case and that the failure to consider the alleged procedural unfairness did not constitute an error of law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), N2006/1237 dated 8 December 2006 constituted by the Hon R N J Purvis AM QC, Deputy President, affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“the Minister”) to cancel the applicant’s Special Category Visa Subclass TY-444 on character grounds under subs 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).BACKGROUND The applicant – a New Zealand citizen – was born on 15 November 1981 and arrived in Australia with her parents on 19 June 1985. She was three years and seven months old. Since that time she has only left Australia on six occasions. On two occasions in 1986 and 1987 she left the country for a period of less than one month. On all remaining occasions – with just one exception – she left the country for less than two months. The one exception being in 1989 when she left the country for four months when she was eight years old. The last occasion she left Australia for a brief period was in 1996. The applicant attended school in Sydney to Year 10, leaving school when she was aged about 16. Her parents have divorced and each has remarried. She has a brother, now aged about 20 years, a half sister, the daughter of her mother, aged about five years, and two half brothers, the sons of her father, aged about four years and three years respectively. The applicant’s natural parents both live with their current spouses in suburbs of Sydney. The applicant started using drugs in about 1996, whilst still at school. It was then cigarettes and marijuana. Later it became heroin. The applicant had many convictions between 1996 and 2005 and was first sentenced to a term of imprisonment in 2002. On 14 February 2005 the Minister notified the applicant that her visa may be liable for cancellation on character grounds. In March 2005, whilst serving another term of imprisonment, the applicant claimed that she had rehabilitated herself. On 5 April 2005 the Minister notified the applicant that he had decided not to cancel her visa but issued her a warning that “conviction for any further offences will result in a fresh assessment being made to again consider cancellation of your visa”. After this warning and her release from prison the applicant re-offended and was convicted of seven counts of shoplifting and two counts of larceny and sentenced to further terms of imprisonment. The applicant was notified on 29 August 2006 of the Minister’s intention to consider cancelling her visa. The applicant responded by facsimile on 12 September 2006 claiming that:(a)she had lived in Australia for 22 years with her immediate family;(b)she had no contact with her family members in New Zealand and, if deported, would be going to a country that was unfamiliar to her; and(c)she had addressed her negative behaviour and drug problem whilst in custody and if given the opportunity would be able to prove that she was “now a valuable member of society”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Both parties referred me to the provisions of s 39 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (“the AAT Act”), which provides:“39 Opportunity to make submissions concerning evidence(1)Subject to sections 35, 36 and 36B, the Tribunal shall ensure that every party to a proceeding before the Tribunal is given a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case and, in particular, to inspect any documents to which the Tribunal proposes to have regard in reaching a decision in the proceeding and to make submissions in relation to those documents.(2) This section does not apply to a proceeding in the Security Appeals Division to which section 39A applies.”The Tribunal is specifically empowered to adjourn a proceeding when reviewing a decision (under s 40(1)(c) of the AAT Act). The applicant submitted that the Tribunal failed to provide her with a reasonable opportunity to present her case for the reasons outlined in [20(1)] – [20(11)] above. I have some difficulty with this submission. The matters outlined in [20(1)] – [20(11)] above are undoubtedly relevant to the issue of the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion to only grant a very limited adjournment, but, apart from [20(10)], they do not seem to me to be reasons why the Tribunal’s decision constituted a failure to provide the applicant with a reasonable opportunity to present her case. I was referred to what was said by Deane J in Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323 at 342, namely:“Section 39 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act provides, for present purposes, that ‘the Tribunal shall ensure that every party to a proceeding before the Tribunal is given a reasonable opportunity to present his case’. In dealing with an application for review, the Tribunal is plainly under a duty to act judicially, that is to say, with judicial fairness and detachment. In these circumstances, the requirement contained in s 39 that the Tribunal shall ensure that a party to the proceedings before it be given a reasonable opportunity to present his case constitutes statutory recognition of an obligation which the law would, in any event, imply. Where a Tribunal is under a duty to act judicially, the principle that a party must be given a reasonable opportunity to present his case is at the heart of the requirements of natural justice which it is obliged to observe (see R v Moodie (1977) 17 ALR 219 at 225).” A little later (at 343) his Honour said:“A refusal to grant an adjournment can constitute a failure to give a party to proceedings the opportunity of adequately presenting his case. … The absence of any application for an adjournment does not, however, necessarily conclude the issue adversely to the appellant. The failure of a tribunal which is under a duty to act judicially to adjourn a matter may, conceivably, constitute a failure to allow a party the opportunity of properly presenting his case even though the party in question has not expressly sought an adjournment.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

EDMONDS J
Ms Weti gave oral evidence and was cross-examined at the hearing.TRIBUNAL’S DECISION In his decision affirming the cancellation of the applicant’s visa, the Deputy President:(a)expressly had regard to the submissions made by the applicant’s solicitor;(b)made factual findings entirely in conformity with the written evidence;(c)found that he could have little confidence in the applicant’s statements about rehabilitation given her past behaviour;(d)had regard to the fact that her living in Australia was not a right but a privilege and the abuse of that privilege by non-citizens should be discouraged;(e)considered that the community was entitled to be protected from the applicant’s repetitive criminal conduct;(f)had regard to the consequences of cancellation on the applicant’s family circumstances.THE AMENDED APPLICATION TO THIS COURT The applicant filed an amended application in this Court on 30 May 2007, which raises four grounds of review:(1)The applicant was denied natural justice in the Tribunal in that without reasonable cause the case was not adjourned on her application for sufficient period to enable her to find alternative legal representation.(2)Further or in the alternative the Tribunal failed to give proper consideration to a relevant matter namely that the applicant was denied procedural fairness in responding to the original Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation (“the NOICC”) of her visa under s 501 of the Act.(3)Further or in the alternative the Tribunal failed to give proper consideration to the full descriptive effects of visa cancellation on the applicant’s family and other ties to the Australian community.(4)Furthermore or in the alternative the Tribunal’s decision was motivated by an improper purpose in that it placed undue emphasis in its decision on consideration of “general deterrence” so as to render the decision to cancel the applicant’s visa punitive in nature and involved double punishment of the applicant contrary to the common law principle of double jeopardy. On the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the applicant indicated that ground (4) was not pressed, by which I have taken to mean “abandoned”.Ground 1 – Denial of Natural Justice – Failure to Adjourn Resulted in Applicant not Receiving a Fair Hearing The relevant facts are summarised in the applicant’s written submissions and are largely not in dispute. However, there are some, such as in (4) below, where, on a reading of the transcript of the proceedings before the Tribunal on 27 November 2006, I would draw a different conclusion from that submitted by the applicant.(1)As indicated in [11] above, on 6 November 2006 Mr Christopher Levingston, solicitor, gave written notice to the Tribunal that he was unable to appear for the applicant on the hearing of the matter. He informed the applicant that a “step-in” solicitor would appear for her.(2)The matter had been listed for hearing before the Deputy President on 27 and 28 November 2006. About five days before the hearing was to commence, the applicant was informed that the “step-in” solicitor who was to appear in lieu of Mr Levingston was not available to appear.(3)The application for the adjournment was not opposed. There was no suggestion that any prejudice would have been caused to the Minister by an adjournment.(4)The Deputy President indicated that he was unavailable from 11 to 20 December. This is based on the following excerpt from the transcript:“THE D. PRESIDENT: If somebody is going to assist you the date would need to be convenient to that person as well. As you have heard from Mr Palfrey, we really have got three weeks. 20th is a Wednesday, yes, just over three weeks to have a hearing and to give a decision. It’s hard enough to give a decision, let alone one very short period of time. So the matter really would have to be heard next week, some day. Is 8 December convenient to you, Mr Palfrey, it is a Friday? That is Friday week.MR PALFREY: I don’t have another hearing on that date. I have from the 11th a two week hearing.THE D. PRESIDENT: From the 11th at the moment I don’t have a free day, certainly up to the 20th. I do not have a free day. The only free day I possibly have is Friday week.”I do not read this as the Deputy President saying he is only unavailable from 11 to 20 December. His words: “[F]rom the 11th” are really a reference back to what Mr Palfrey has said: “I have from the 11th a two week hearing”. The Deputy President is saying: “[A]t the moment I don’t have a free day, certainly up to the 20th. I do not have a free day. The only free day I possibly have is Friday week [8 December].”(5)The Deputy President indicated that he was possibly available on 8 December 2006, however, no hearing room was found to be available on that day. The Deputy President said: “Indeed there are no days available seemingly up until 20 December”, which, in context, could only be read as meaning that there were no days up until 20 December 2006 on which a hearing room was available.(6)The applicant observes that the Deputy President did not canvass the possibility of having the matter heard before a different Tribunal member in order to accommodate the adjournment application; but presumably this was because no hearing rooms were available on any day up until 20 December 2006.(7)The Deputy President did not canvass the possibility of having the matter heard either before himself or another member of the Tribunal between 1 – 7 December 2006 inclusive; but presumably this was because, in the case of the Deputy President, his only free day up until 20 December was 8 December, and in any case, because no hearing room was available.(8)On 27 November 2006 when the adjournment application was made, the Deputy President was not part-heard in the matter.(9)The matter was accordingly listed for hearing on 28 November 2006 whereupon the applicant was unrepresented.(10)The applicant gave evidence at the proceeding without the benefit of a legal representative to assist her in adducing her evidence in chief nor to protect her interests during her cross-examination or to conduct re-examination or make submissions in reply on her behalf.(11)The consequences of a failure to overturn the decision to cancel the applicant’s visa are extremely grave for the applicant putting her at risk of deportation. The task before the applicant was an extremely onerous one especially without the benefit of legal representation.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: EDMONDS J

The first ground of review cannot be sustained.Ground 2 – Failure to Consider a Relevant Consideration The second ground of review was that the Tribunal failed to give proper consideration to a relevant matter, namely, that the applicant was denied procedural fairness in responding to the original NOICC of her visa under s 501 of the Act. The alleged denial of procedural fairness in responding to the NOICC was particularised in the applicant’s amended application in the following way:(a)The applicant was in criminal detention at the time that she was required to respond to the NOICC; and(b)the applicant did not use a lawyer or migration agent in providing that response; and(c)the applicant was only granted 14 days to respond to the NOICC (that is, she was not granted an extension of time beyond the 14 days, notwithstanding that she did not formally request an extension); and(d)the applicant was not afforded any other opportunity to respond to the NOICC. The applicant’s case on this ground relied almost if not entirely on the decision of Allsop J in Sales v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1807 where his Honour held that in the facts and circumstances of that case, the 14 day response period specified in a letter to Mr Sales, informing him that he was liable to the possibility of visa cancellation and deportation, was “plainly inadequate for him to address the task before him” (at [32]) and “was not procedural fairness” (at 36]). Counsel for the applicant submitted that although Sales involved a decision made by the Minister personally, the circumstances of this case include all of the above criteria. Furthermore, like the applicant in Sales, neither the applicant nor her mother could be described as “people of wide or deep resources, or otherwise of significant education” (at [23]). In Sales, Allsop J described Direction 21 as “a comprehensive and careful document” and that the “task to prepare material for a consideration of such matters, objectively understood, is wide-reaching and significant” (at [14]). I was referred to the remarks of Allsop J at [31] to [34] with the submission that they are all applicable to the applicant with the exception that she has not spent “most” of her adult life in prison, however, she has certainly spent a significant part of her adult life in prison. The fact that this alleged failure had not been raised in the Tribunal was no bar to its qualification as an error of law on the part of the Tribunal according to counsel for the applicant. In this regard I was referred to what was said by Bowen CJ in Kuswardana v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1981) 35 ALR 186 at 194; see too Fox J at 199; although Deane J at 205 was troubled as to whether the appellant’s failure in that case to raise the issue in the Tribunal precludes the intervention of the court on appeal. Counsel for the Minister accepted that failure to consider a relevant consideration is, as Mason J explained in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39, “one instance of an abuse of discretion entitling a party with sufficient standing to seek judicial review of ultra vires administrative action”; but noted that failure by a decision-maker to take into account relevant considerations is only an error where the statute makes the considerations ones which the decision-maker is “bound to take into account in making that decision”.