FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Teuila v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 171
Citation: Teuila v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 171 Appeal from: Teuila v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1056 Parties: MALE TAMMY TEUILA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 1505 of 2012 Judges: EDMONDS, FLICK AND MCKERRACHER JJ Date of judgment: 28 November 2012 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – grounds of review – procedural fairness – hearing rule – obligation to advise affected person of relevant considerations – extent to which unrepresented persons must be put on notice
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeals – conduct of appeal – arguments not canvassed before primary Judge – requirement to obtain leave – relevance of fact that argument requires no further evidence and can be run based on the material already before the court – relevance of expediency
Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) ss 33, 39
Migration Act1958 (Cth) ss 499, 501Direction [no.41]–Visa refusal and cancellation under s501
Cases cited: Daw v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 705, cited
De Simone v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCAFC 181, 51 AAR 161, cited
Kasupene v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1609, 49 AAR 77, cited
Kenso Marketing (M) SDN BHD v Chief Executive Officer of Customs [2011] FCAFC 26, cited
Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal [2012] HCA 36, 290 ALR 750, applied
SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 361, 194 ALR 749, applied
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Verney [2000] FCA 570, 60 ALD 737, cited
Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323, considered
Teuila and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship; Re [2012] AATA 351, affirmed
Teuila v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1056, affirmed
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158, appliedDate of hearing: 20 November 2012 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 37 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G T Johnson SC Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1505 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: MALE TAMMY TEUILA
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
EDMONDS, FLICK AND MCKERRACHER JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
28 NOVEMBER 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
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- Case
- [2012] FCAFC 171
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues the court had to address were whether the Tribunal's failure to consider the best interests of the child constituted a denial of procedural fairness and whether the appellant was adequately informed about the reliance on her past offences. Additionally, the court had to consider the procedural aspect of introducing new arguments on appeal that were not previously raised before the primary judge.
The court found that the first ground of appeal, concerning procedural fairness, was indeed a new argument and required leave to be addressed. The court considered that leave should be granted as it could be resolved based on existing material and was expedient in the interest of justice. However, the court concluded that there was no denial of procedural fairness as the Tribunal had considered the relevant factors and the appellant had not demonstrated any prejudice due to the lack of specific reference to the best interests of her child. The second ground of appeal, which pertained to the notification of offences committed during minority, was rejected as it was found that sufficient information had been provided to the appellant.
Ultimately, neither of the grounds of appeal was successful. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the costs of the first respondent. This decision was based on the reasoning that the Tribunal had adequately fulfilled its procedural obligations, and no significant procedural unfairness or error had occurred that would warrant a reversal of the Minister's decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: YATES J
On 3 June 2009 a “written direction” was given by the then Minister for Immigration and Citizenship: Direction [no.41]–Visa refusal and cancellation under s501. Paragraph [10] of that Direction provides in part as follows: The primary considerations(1)In deciding whether to refuse to grant a person a visa or cancel a person’s visa, the following (the primary considerations) are to be considered: (a)the protection of the Australian community from serious criminal or other harmful conduct, particularly crimes involving violence;(b)whether the person was a minor when they began living in Australia;(c)the length of time that the person has been ordinarily resident in Australia prior to engaging in criminal activity or other relevant conduct; and(d)relevant international obligations, including but not limited to: (i)the best interests of the child, as described in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC); ……A DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS The first Ground of Appeal is expressed differently to the manner in which the Appellant sought to advance her denial of procedural fairness argument before the primary Judge. Before the primary Judge, the Appellant argued that the denial of procedural fairness arose by reason of the Tribunal’s failure to inform her that it would rely upon the offences committed whilst she was a minor. The argument now seems to have shifted to an argument that the primary Judge erred in not concluding that the Tribunal denied her procedural fairness by failing to consider the best interests of her child, Ezekiel. If the manner in which the first Ground of Appeal is expressed raises an argument different to that resolved by the primary Judge, Senior Counsel on behalf of the Minister did not oppose leave being given to raise the argument as it is now expressed. The Ground, it is considered, does in fact raise a new argument and, accordingly, leave is necessary and should be given. It is an argument which can be addressed by reference to the same material that was before the primary Judge (cf. Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal [2012] HCA 36 at [30]-[33], 290 ALR 750 at 760 per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) and it is “expedient in the interests of justice” to permit the argument to be now resolved (VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158 at [46]-[48] per Kiefel, Weinberg and Stone JJ). A ground alleging a denial of procedural fairness by the Tribunal is ultimately to be founded upon the obligation set forth in s 39 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth). That section expresses the requirement as a duty to “… ensure that every party is given a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case …”. The section, it has been said, “reflects the common law requirement of procedural fairness”: Daw v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 705 at [3] per Edmonds J. Whether the requirement imposed upon the Tribunal by s 39 is co-extensive with the common law requirements is a question which may presently be left to one side. The section, it has long been recognised, does not require the Tribunal to ensure that a party takes the “best advantage” of the opportunity: Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Verney [2000] FCA 570 at [45], 60 ALD 737 at 748. See also: Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323 at 343 where Deane J (with whom Fisher J agreed) observed that “[n]either the Act nor the common law imposes upon the Tribunal the impossible task of ensuring that a party takes the best advantage of the opportunity to which he is entitled”. Appl’d: De Simone v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCAFC 181 at [15], 51 AAR 161 at 167 per Sundberg, Stone and Edmonds JJ; Kenso Marketing (M) SDN BHD v Chief Executive Officer of Customs [2011] FCAFC 26 at [45] per Keane CJ, Downes and Gordon JJ.