FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CTY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 197
ORDERS
NSD 1345 of 2017 BETWEEN: CTY15
First Appellant
ADM15
Second AppellantADN15
Third AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRY J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 FEBRUARY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 23 February 2017 be set aside and in lieu thereof:
(a)the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 6 November 2015 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Administrative Appeals…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 197
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issue was whether the wife's implicit claim of fear based on not adhering to the Islamic dress code was sufficiently clear and arose from the material before the AAT. The court had to determine if the AAT's failure to consider this claim constituted a material error. The appellants argued that the Tribunal's oversight was significant, as the claim was apparent in the evidence presented.
The court found that the wife's implicit claim was indeed apparent from the material before the AAT, but the Tribunal failed to consider it. The court held that this omission was a material error as the claim was central to the wife's case for protection. The failure to consider this claim amounted to a jurisdictional error, leading to the conclusion that the appeal should be allowed. The matter was remitted to the AAT for reconsideration.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 23 February 2017 be set aside and in lieu thereof:
(a) the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 6 November 2015 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal differently constituted for determination according to law; and
(b) the first respondent is to pay the appellants’ costs in the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.
3. The first respondent is to pay the appellants’ costs as agreed or assessed including its costs on the application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge dismissed this contention, finding that the wife never advanced a case in support of her protection visa application on the basis that she would defiantly not comply with the dress code, either for political or religious reasons or for any reason (FCC reasons at [39]). The primary judge also addressed other particulars to the general ground of appeal, finding as follows:(1)the Tribunal did not err in reaching a view as to what may happen in the future if the wife were returned to Iran having regard to her prior compliance with the dress code (FCC reasons at [46]-[49]); (2)the Tribunal did not err in finding at [89] of its reasons that there was no country information to indicate that women in Iran are required to wear a chador, as the choice of country information and the weight given to it are matters for the Tribunal and the finding was incidental to the Tribunal’s decision (FCC reasons at [50]-[51]);(3)contrary to the appellants’ submissions, no part of the Tribunal’s reasons indicates that it required or expected the wife to take reasonable steps to avoid persecutory harm or be discreet on return to Iran (FCC reasons at [53]); and (4)while the delegate had considered that the dress code was a generally applicable law in Iran applying to the whole population and was therefore not persecutory, the Tribunal did not find it necessary to consider this issue and therefore did not fall into error in failing to address it (FCC reasons at [54]-[57]). 3. CONSIDERATION Mr Williams for the appellants appeared to accept that there was no claim by the wife expressly to the effect that she feared persecution as a member of a particular social group, namely, women in Iran who do not wish to abide by Islamic extremism including the dress code. As I have mentioned, the central issue is whether, as Mr Williams contended, this claim squarely arose from the material before the Tribunal. Turning first to the applicable principles, it is well established that a decision-maker is required to correctly construe and consider claims (and their component integers) made by an applicant or apparent on the material before the decision-maker: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389 (Dranichnikov) at [24] (Gummow and Callinan JJ (Hayne J agreeing at [95])). As Allsop J (as his Honour then was) held in Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 233 FCR 136 (Htun) at [42]:To make a decision without having considered all the claims is to fail to complete the exercise of jurisdiction embarked on. The claim or claims and its or their component integers are considerations made mandatorily relevant by the Act for consideration in the sense discussed in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323. See also Sellamuthu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 90 FCR 287 at [18], [19], [21] and [50]. It is to be distinguished from errant fact finding.