CTY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 38 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CTY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 197

Appeal from: CTY15 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 282
File number: NSD 1345 of 2017
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 25 February 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – where Federal Circuit Court dismissed application seeking judicial review of decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming the decision not to grant protection visas to the appellants – whether appellant wife implicitly claimed to fear harm as an Iranian female who does not wish to abide by the laws of Islamic extremism, including the dress code – where implied claim arose squarely from the material before the Tribunal – where claim not considered by the Tribunal – where failure to consider claim was material – appeal allowed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71; (2003) 216 CLR 473

CTY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1354

DFC16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 56

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 233 FCR 136

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA [2014] HCA 45; (2014) 254 CLR 317

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; (2013) 210 FCR 505

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRMA [2013] FCAFC 161; (2013) 219 FCR 287

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs(No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1

NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695

Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 41; (2010) 243 CLR 319

WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593

Date of hearing: 21 May 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 57
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr J Williams
Solicitor for the Appellants: Barriston Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr H P T Bevan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper

ORDERS

NSD 1345 of 2017
BETWEEN:

CTY15

First Appellant

ADM15
Second Appellant

ADN15
Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 FEBRUARY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 23 February 2017 be set aside and in lieu thereof:

(a)the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 6 November 2015 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Administrative Appeals…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read CTY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] FCA 197
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of CTY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellants, a husband and wife, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which affirmed the decision not to grant them protection visas. The central dispute was whether the wife implicitly claimed to fear harm as an Iranian female who does not wish to abide by the laws of Islamic extremism, including the dress code, and whether this claim was adequately considered by the AAT. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed the application for judicial review, but the appellants appealed to the court.

The key legal issue was whether the wife's implicit claim of fear based on not adhering to the Islamic dress code was sufficiently clear and arose from the material before the AAT. The court had to determine if the AAT's failure to consider this claim constituted a material error. The appellants argued that the Tribunal's oversight was significant, as the claim was apparent in the evidence presented.

The court found that the wife's implicit claim was indeed apparent from the material before the AAT, but the Tribunal failed to consider it. The court held that this omission was a material error as the claim was central to the wife's case for protection. The failure to consider this claim amounted to a jurisdictional error, leading to the conclusion that the appeal should be allowed. The matter was remitted to the AAT for reconsideration.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 23 February 2017 be set aside and in lieu thereof:

(a) the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 6 November 2015 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal differently constituted for determination according to law; and

(b) the first respondent is to pay the appellants’ costs in the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

3. The first respondent is to pay the appellants’ costs as agreed or assessed including its costs on the application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, I consider that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in failing to consider a claim that arose with sufficient clarity on the material. The appeal must therefore be allowed and the matter remitted to the Tribunal differently constituted, given not only the errors which I have upheld but other concerning aspects of the manner in which the Tribunal dealt with the appellants’ claims. 2. BACKGROUND2.1 Relevant statutory framework The Act provides for the circumstances in which a person who is not a citizen of Australia (a non-citizen) may enter and remain in Australia. The Act provides for different classes of visa, one of which is a protection visa under s 36. At the relevant time when the Tribunal made its decision, the Act provided that a protection visa may be granted where the criteria in s 36(2)(a) are met, namely, where the Minister is satisfied that the person is a person to whom protection obligations are owed because she or he is a refugee as defined in article 1A(2) of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, [1954] ATS 5 (entered into force 22 April 1954) as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267, [1973] ATS 37 (entered into force 4 October 1967) (collectively, the Refugees Convention). Article 1A(2) defines a refugee relevantly as a person who:… owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country … Further, at the relevant time, by virtue of s 91R(1), the persecution feared must involve “serious harm” to the appellant and systematic and discriminatory conduct. “Serious harm” is defined to include a threat to the person’s life or liberty, or significant physical ill-treatment. A determination of whether a (subjective) fear is (objectively) “well-founded” requires the Tribunal to assess what may occur in the future. A fear is “well-founded” when there is “a real substantial basis for it” even though the chance of the fear eventuating is less than 50 per cent (often described as a “real” as opposed to a “remote” chance): Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559 (Guo) at 572 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). Conversely, a fear of persecution is not well-founded “if it is merely assumed or if it is mere speculation”: ibid. Section 36(2)(aa) provides in the alternative for the grant of a protection visa to a non-citizen where the Minister is not satisfied that the person is a refugee but is nonetheless satisfied that the person is entitled to protection under Australia’s international non-refoulement obligations (the complementary protection criterion), being a person:… in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm …

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The submission also sought to address concerns raised by the case officer and referred to country information about enforcement of the strict Islamic and moral dress code by the Basij, the Guidance Patrol, and a new Social Council within the Ministry of the Interior. That country information was said to indicate that it is entirely reasonable that the husband and wife were approached and harassed on the street. The agent further submitted that:While there is country information suggesting, “the morality police has evolved to almost exclusively target women”, this does not mean that woman [sic] are not targeted when males are present. Indeed, by targeting women, the punishment faced by [the wife] does not fall under the law of general application, as she is being persecuted as being a member of a particular social group, “women in Iran” and/or “woman who don’t abide by strict Islamic dress codes.”2.3 The delegate’s decisions By separate decisions given on 7 November 2014, the same delegate refused to grant protection visas to the husband and the wife respectively and therefore to their son. While the delegate assessed the husband’s claim in a separate assessment record, due to the interrelationship between the husband’s and wife’s claims the delegate referred where relevant to findings made in relation to the husband’s claims. Importantly in this regard, the delegate accepted for the purposes of both decisions that the husband was involved in a physical altercation with two men who may be Basij in 2013 but found that he had sustained minor injuries only due to the altercation. In the decision rejecting the husband’s claims, the delegate summarised the husband’s claims, stating among other things that the husband had explained in detail what his wife was wearing at the time of the 2013 incident, namely “tight clothes, a short manteau (overcoat) and had her hijab loose which exposed her hair. She was also wearing makeup.” In the delegate’s reasons for rejecting the wife’s application for a protection visa, the delegate described her evidence about the incident as follows.The applicant stated during the altercation she was “extremely anxious” and was shouting in fear. She remembers that it occurred on the son’s second birthday while she was walking with her husband and son from her father-in-law’s house to a restaurant to celebrate a son’s birthday. Two men approached her and insulted her due to the way she was dressed, she explained the men insulted her because the buttons of her manteau (overcoat) were undone and it only went to her thigh, her scarf was loose which exposed her hair and she was wearing makeup. The applicant stated this was her usual manner of dress. A fight ensued between her husband and the men; she grabbed her son and tried to protect her son so she did not witness the altercation from a close distance.When questioned, the applicant stated she does not know how long the fight lasted. I then questioned the applicant if the fight was short or long; the applicant stated she cannot remember. The applicant stated when the fight ended the applicant returned to her parent-in-law’s house while her husband went to a “clinic”. Her husband returned from the clinic a short time later.The applicant stated after this incident she went out in public less. When she did go out she dressed in accordance with the dress code. The applicant stated she was not arrested in the three and a half months she remained in Iran and nothing adverse happened to her but does not know if her husband was arrested.(emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge dismissed this contention, finding that the wife never advanced a case in support of her protection visa application on the basis that she would defiantly not comply with the dress code, either for political or religious reasons or for any reason (FCC reasons at [39]). The primary judge also addressed other particulars to the general ground of appeal, finding as follows:(1)the Tribunal did not err in reaching a view as to what may happen in the future if the wife were returned to Iran having regard to her prior compliance with the dress code (FCC reasons at [46]-[49]); (2)the Tribunal did not err in finding at [89] of its reasons that there was no country information to indicate that women in Iran are required to wear a chador, as the choice of country information and the weight given to it are matters for the Tribunal and the finding was incidental to the Tribunal’s decision (FCC reasons at [50]-[51]);(3)contrary to the appellants’ submissions, no part of the Tribunal’s reasons indicates that it required or expected the wife to take reasonable steps to avoid persecutory harm or be discreet on return to Iran (FCC reasons at [53]); and (4)while the delegate had considered that the dress code was a generally applicable law in Iran applying to the whole population and was therefore not persecutory, the Tribunal did not find it necessary to consider this issue and therefore did not fall into error in failing to address it (FCC reasons at [54]-[57]). 3. CONSIDERATION Mr Williams for the appellants appeared to accept that there was no claim by the wife expressly to the effect that she feared persecution as a member of a particular social group, namely, women in Iran who do not wish to abide by Islamic extremism including the dress code. As I have mentioned, the central issue is whether, as Mr Williams contended, this claim squarely arose from the material before the Tribunal. Turning first to the applicable principles, it is well established that a decision-maker is required to correctly construe and consider claims (and their component integers) made by an applicant or apparent on the material before the decision-maker: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389 (Dranichnikov) at [24] (Gummow and Callinan JJ (Hayne J agreeing at [95])). As Allsop J (as his Honour then was) held in Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 233 FCR 136 (Htun) at [42]:To make a decision without having considered all the claims is to fail to complete the exercise of jurisdiction embarked on. The claim or claims and its or their component integers are considerations made mandatorily relevant by the Act for consideration in the sense discussed in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323. See also Sellamuthu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 90 FCR 287 at [18], [19], [21] and [50]. It is to be distinguished from errant fact finding.