DND18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

DND18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 553  

File number: MLG 1955 of 2018
Judgment of: JUDGE MANSINI
Date of judgment: 27 June 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for judicial review of decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa – whether the Tribunal failed to consider the Applicants’ claims, reasoned in an illogical or irrational way and/or identified a wrong issue and asked a wrong question – application dismissed.   
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss.5H, 5J, 36, 65, 474, 476
Cases cited:

AppellantS395/2022 v Minister for Immigration and Cultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

CTY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 197

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 233 FCR 136; (2001) 194 ALR 244

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sabharwal [2018] FCAFC 160

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB (2013) 2010 FCR 505

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRMA (2013) 219 FCR 287

Minister for Immigration v Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11

MZYXS v MIAC [2013] FCA 614

MZYXS v MIAC [2013] FMCA 13

NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695

NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 124

Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) ALR 417

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2

SZSZW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 150 ALD 465

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 83
Date of hearing: 8 May 2023
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr A Healer
Solicitor for the Applicants: Holding Redlich
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

MLG 1955 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

DND18

First Applicant
DNE18
Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

order made by:

JUDGE MANSINI

DATE OF ORDER:

27 June 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application as amended on 27 April 2022 be dismissed.

2.The Applicants pay the costs of the First Respondent fixed in the sum of $5,000.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE MANSINI

IN SUMMARY

  1. In this application for judicial…

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Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC2G 553
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of DND18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs involves the applicants, referred to as the First and Second Applicants, who sought protection from the Australian Government on the grounds of their sexuality. The dispute arose after the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision to deny the applicants’ application for a protection visa. The applicants subsequently sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision, challenging the Tribunal's findings and conclusions.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal's decision to affirm the delegate's refusal of a protection visa was legally sound. Specifically, the applicants argued that the Tribunal had erred in its assessment of their risk of persecution in Malaysia. The applicants contended that the Tribunal failed to adequately consider the risk of serious harm and torture they faced due to their sexuality, particularly in light of the prior threat of rape and other incidents of discrimination and harassment.

In considering the applicants' arguments, the court reviewed the Tribunal's findings and reasoning, particularly in relation to the risk of persecution and torture. The court acknowledged that the Tribunal had accepted some of the applicants' claims about their experiences in Malaysia, such as the threat of rape and discrimination from neighbours. However, the Tribunal also found that these incidents did not rise to the level of persecution or torture as defined by the relevant legislation. The Tribunal's assessment considered the delay in applying for the protection visa and concluded that the applicants did not hold a subjective fear of harm arising from their sexuality. The court held that it was open to the Tribunal to reach these conclusions, as they were based on a reasonable interpretation of the evidence and did not constitute a legally illogical or irrational decision.

Ultimately, the court found that the Tribunal had correctly applied the relevant legal principles and that its decision was not in error. Therefore, the applicants' application for judicial review was dismissed, and the Tribunal's decision to affirm the delegate's refusal of the protection visa was upheld. The applicants were not granted a protection visa.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 22 June 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal’s decisionAssessment of the First Applicant The Tribunal accepted the First Applicant’s claims about her sexuality, that she is readily perceived to be a lesbian due to her clothing and appearance and in a relationship with the Second Applicant: Reasons, at [31]. The Tribunal expressed concerns about the First Applicant’s claim to fear harm in Malaysia: Reasons at [32]. In the paragraphs that followed, the Tribunal elaborated that: (a)It did not accept the claim that the First Applicant’s car was damaged because she was a lesbian: at [33];(b)It accepted the First Applicant suffered discrimination from her neighbours for being a lesbian but that this did not rise to the level of persecution: at [34];(c)It did not accept that the reason the First Applicant was placed in a back of house role in her job was because of her looks, rather the Tribunal found it was due to her promotion to a managerial role: at [35];(d)It found the claim that the First Applicant’s parents were not happy with her being a lesbian to be exaggerated as the Applicants lived together in the First Applicant’s parent’s house: at [36]; and(e)It did not accept the claim that a neighbour had told the First Applicant she would call the police when she was having sex because it made no sense in light of her other evidence about coming home in the dark so that people would not see her and as she was living with her parents at the time: at [37]. Pertinent to the grounds of review, the Tribunal then made the following findings at [38] of its Reasons:38. The applicant claims that one time her and her partner were ‘almost raped’ by Muslim men in the park. The men said that because they were lesbians they didn't know what it was like to have a real man. When questioned further about this incident the applicant claims she was in the park with her partner and a group of Muslim men stated shouting at them that they were lesbians and that they would show them what a real man was all about. The applicants were not physically touched or harmed. The Tribunal has no doubt that the applicant and her partner were frightened by the experience but nothing in her claim rose to the level of being raped, as there was only verbal threats nothing physical happened. When asked if she went to the police to report this she said no as the police may arrest her for being a lesbian.(sic.) The Tribunal considered country information showed that, whilst the LGBTI community faced a moderate risk of official and societal discrimination it was mostly centred on Muslims and gay men: Reasons, at [39]. The Tribunal’s Reasons at this part contained an extract of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) country information in which DFAT had assessed:DFAT assesses that LGBTI individuals, particularly Muslims, face a moderate risk of official and societal discrimination on a day-to-day basis in Malaysia. The level and frequency of discrimination faced by LGBTI individuals differs according to their socio-economic status, religion, geographic location and degree of openness. Some well-educated urban Malaysians of high socio-economic status can be open about their sexuality within their family and social circles. For others, previous societal acceptance of certain roles carved out in Malaysian society for 'flamboyant individuals', such as planning weddings and events, have largely disappeared. Many LGBTI individuals, especially Muslims, hide their identity to avoid harassment.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The First Respondent argued this is a case where the decision-maker was reasonably able to come to the conclusion that the Tribunal did, being a conclusion about which reasonable minds may differ and therefore no error of jurisdiction is established. Was it illogical or irrational to conclude no real risk of torture? There was no dispute about the established principle that an illogical or irrational decision is to be distinguished from a scenario about which reasonable minds may differ: citing Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16 at [131]. In their written submissions, the First Respondent relied on Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sabharwal [2018] FCAFC 160 at [45] in which the Full Court of the Federal Court referred to Minister for Immigration v Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11 and confirmed that the relevant question is whether a decision maker could reasonably come to the conclusion that they did. Further, in support of the principle that if a conclusion is one upon which reasonable minds can differ, it will not be legally illogical, irrational or unreasonable. This ground 2 was specifically pleaded as related to the Tribunal’s finding at [46] that there was no real risk the Applicants will be subjected to torture. By their written submissions, the Applicants also interchangeably used the terminology of no real risk the Applicants would be subject to persecution or torture. For present purposes, taking the Applicants’ case at its highest, it may be accepted that the Applicants’ claimed fear or risk of threatened or actual rape could constitute an instance(s) of serious harm as defined at s.5J(5) (in the form of physical harassment, physical ill-treatment and/or a threat to their liberty) or significant harm (including torture) as defined at s.36(2A). However the finding at [46] related only to the latter which is relevant to the complementary protection assessment (s.36(2)(aa)). As will be apparent from the reasons above at ground 1, the Tribunal found that the Applicants had been subject of a prior threat of rape by Muslim men on account of their sexuality (at [38] and [52]). However, on the evidence before it and placing some emphasis on the delay in applying for the protection visa, the Tribunal reasoned that the First Applicant did not hold a fear of returning to Malaysia or a subjective fear of harm arising from her sexuality. Those findings at [44] were plainly an important basis for the conclusion about the refugee assessment (s.36(2)(a), at [45]) and were not challenged in this review. The appropriate weight of emphasis to be placed on the evidence about the delay might well have differed in the mind of another decision-maker. On balance, I am prepared to accept that it was open to the Tribunal to so find and therefore, notwithstanding the positive finding of the prior threat, that there was no real chance of persecution from her neighbours, Muslims or the authorities as to engage the statutory definition of well-founded fear of persecution at s.5J(1) of the Act.