FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
DND18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 553
ORDERS
MLG 1955 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: DND18
First Applicant
DNE18
Second ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE MANSINI
DATE OF ORDER:
27 June 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application as amended on 27 April 2022 be dismissed.
2.The Applicants pay the costs of the First Respondent fixed in the sum of $5,000.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE MANSINI
IN SUMMARY
In this application for judicial…
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- Case
- [2023] FedCFamC2G 553
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal's decision to affirm the delegate's refusal of a protection visa was legally sound. Specifically, the applicants argued that the Tribunal had erred in its assessment of their risk of persecution in Malaysia. The applicants contended that the Tribunal failed to adequately consider the risk of serious harm and torture they faced due to their sexuality, particularly in light of the prior threat of rape and other incidents of discrimination and harassment.
In considering the applicants' arguments, the court reviewed the Tribunal's findings and reasoning, particularly in relation to the risk of persecution and torture. The court acknowledged that the Tribunal had accepted some of the applicants' claims about their experiences in Malaysia, such as the threat of rape and discrimination from neighbours. However, the Tribunal also found that these incidents did not rise to the level of persecution or torture as defined by the relevant legislation. The Tribunal's assessment considered the delay in applying for the protection visa and concluded that the applicants did not hold a subjective fear of harm arising from their sexuality. The court held that it was open to the Tribunal to reach these conclusions, as they were based on a reasonable interpretation of the evidence and did not constitute a legally illogical or irrational decision.
Ultimately, the court found that the Tribunal had correctly applied the relevant legal principles and that its decision was not in error. Therefore, the applicants' application for judicial review was dismissed, and the Tribunal's decision to affirm the delegate's refusal of the protection visa was upheld. The applicants were not granted a protection visa.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The First Respondent argued this is a case where the decision-maker was reasonably able to come to the conclusion that the Tribunal did, being a conclusion about which reasonable minds may differ and therefore no error of jurisdiction is established. Was it illogical or irrational to conclude no real risk of torture? There was no dispute about the established principle that an illogical or irrational decision is to be distinguished from a scenario about which reasonable minds may differ: citing Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16 at [131]. In their written submissions, the First Respondent relied on Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sabharwal [2018] FCAFC 160 at [45] in which the Full Court of the Federal Court referred to Minister for Immigration v Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11 and confirmed that the relevant question is whether a decision maker could reasonably come to the conclusion that they did. Further, in support of the principle that if a conclusion is one upon which reasonable minds can differ, it will not be legally illogical, irrational or unreasonable. This ground 2 was specifically pleaded as related to the Tribunal’s finding at [46] that there was no real risk the Applicants will be subjected to torture. By their written submissions, the Applicants also interchangeably used the terminology of no real risk the Applicants would be subject to persecution or torture. For present purposes, taking the Applicants’ case at its highest, it may be accepted that the Applicants’ claimed fear or risk of threatened or actual rape could constitute an instance(s) of serious harm as defined at s.5J(5) (in the form of physical harassment, physical ill-treatment and/or a threat to their liberty) or significant harm (including torture) as defined at s.36(2A). However the finding at [46] related only to the latter which is relevant to the complementary protection assessment (s.36(2)(aa)). As will be apparent from the reasons above at ground 1, the Tribunal found that the Applicants had been subject of a prior threat of rape by Muslim men on account of their sexuality (at [38] and [52]). However, on the evidence before it and placing some emphasis on the delay in applying for the protection visa, the Tribunal reasoned that the First Applicant did not hold a fear of returning to Malaysia or a subjective fear of harm arising from her sexuality. Those findings at [44] were plainly an important basis for the conclusion about the refugee assessment (s.36(2)(a), at [45]) and were not challenged in this review. The appropriate weight of emphasis to be placed on the evidence about the delay might well have differed in the mind of another decision-maker. On balance, I am prepared to accept that it was open to the Tribunal to so find and therefore, notwithstanding the positive finding of the prior threat, that there was no real chance of persecution from her neighbours, Muslims or the authorities as to engage the statutory definition of well-founded fear of persecution at s.5J(1) of the Act.