SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY COURT OF APPEAL
Case Title:
Cranfield v The Queen
Citation:
[2018] ACTCA 3
Hearing Date:
13 February 2018
DecisionDate:
21 February 2018
Before:
Murrell CJ, Elkaim and Wigney JJ
Decision:
See [52]
Catchwords:
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL-GENERAL PRINCIPLES – In General and Right of Appeal – Appeal against sentence – whether the primary judge erred in providing a sentencing discount of 5% for the pleas of guilty – relevance of the offender’s mental health issues and prospects of rehabilitation – whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive
The appellant was due to face trial on 21 November 2016. However, on 16 November 2016, the appellant entered pleas of guilty to eight counts in an amended indictment.
He was sentenced by Mossop J on 26 May 2017 (R v Cranfield [2017] ACTSC 171). The offences and the sentences he received were as follows:
(a)The appellant was convicted on each charge.
(b)Count 1, contravene a protection order: 2 years, 10 months and 6 days commencing on 13 December 2015 and ending on 18 October 2018.
(c)Count 2, sexual intercourse without consent: 7 years, 7 months and 5 days commencing on 14 September 2017 and ending on 18 April 2025.
(d)Count 3, sexual intercourse without consent: 7 years, 7 months and 6 days commencing on 13 March 2018 and ending on 18 October 2025.
(e)Count 4, sexual intercourse without consent: 7 years, 7 months and 5 days commencing on 2 July 2022 and ending on 6 February 2030.
(f)Count 5, sexual intercourse without consent: 7 years, 7 months and 6 days commencing on 1 January 2023 and ending on 6 August 2030.
(g)Count 6, recklessly inflict grievous bodily harm: 3 years, 9 months and 17 days commencing on 2 July 2022 and ending on 18 April 2026.
(h)Count 7, sexual assault in the third degree: 1 year, 10 months and 24 days commencing on 26 May 2017 and ending on 18 April 2019.
(i)Count 8, making a threat to kill: 1 year, 10 months and 24 days commencing on 14 March 2029 and ending on 6 February 2031.
(j)Possessing a drug of dependence (CC 2016/1916): convicted and fined $400. (This charge…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Cranfield v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 3
Case
[2018] ACTCA 3
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The appeal concerned the sentence imposed on the respondent, Cranfield, by a primary judge in the District Court of New South Wales. Cranfield had pleaded guilty to a number of offences, and the appeal was brought by the Crown against the sentence imposed.
The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the primary judge erred in applying a sentencing discount of 5% for the pleas of guilty, and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive, particularly in light of the respondent's mental health issues and prospects of rehabilitation.
The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge had erred in the application of the sentencing discount. While acknowledging the importance of a discount for a guilty plea, the Court held that the 5% discount was insufficient given the stage at which the pleas were entered and the circumstances of the case. Furthermore, the Court determined that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive, finding that the primary judge had adequately taken into account the respondent's mental health issues and prospects of rehabilitation when arriving at the sentence.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the sentence imposed by the primary judge and resentencing the respondent. The specific orders made are detailed at paragraph [52] of the judgment.