Perry v R

Case [2006] NSWCCA 351


NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

CITATION:      Perry  v R [2006]  NSWCCA 351

FILE NUMBER(S):
2006/884

HEARING DATE(S):               7 August 2006

DECISION DATE:     08/11/2006

PARTIES:
Stefon Perry
Regina

JUDGMENT OF:       Spigelman CJ Howie J Rothman J   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Supreme Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          2004/2680

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Newman AJ

COUNSEL:
A: P Strickland SC and A Horvath
R: L Lamprati SC

SOLICITORS:
A: S Calomeris (LAC)
R: S Kavanagh (ODPP)

CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – CRIMINAL APPEALS – SENTENCING APPEAL
aggravated indecent assualt
using statutory non-parole period as more than a guideline
using statutory non-parole period as starting point for calculation of sentences
misuse of standard non-parole period
objective seriousness
inappropriate reduction of discount for earliest plea of guilty based on other than utilitarian value of plea

LEGISLATION CITED:
Crimes Act 1900
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999
Criminal Appeal Act 1912

DECISION:
Leave to appeal granted
The sentence imposed on the applicant by his Honour Newman AJ on 28 April 2005 for the two offences of aggravated indecent assault contrary to s.61M(2) of the Crimes Act 1900, be quashed
Pursuant to the terms of s.7 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 the sentence imposed by his Honour Newman AJ on 28 April 2005 on the applicant for the count of murder, be varied in accordance with the following
The following sentences be imposed: i. For the offence of aggravated indecent assault (child under 10) contrary to s.61M(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 committed between 22 February 2004 and 23 February 2004 (Count 2), the applicant be sentenced to imprisonment for a non-parole period of three years and seven months commencing 23 February 2004 and expiring on 22 September 2007 with the remainder of term of one year and two months expiring on 22 November 2008
ii. For the offence of aggravated indecent assault (child under 10) contrary to s.61M(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 committed between 22 February 2004 and 23 February 2004 (Count 3), the applicant be sentenced to imprisonment for a non-parole period of three years and seven months commencing 23 February 2004 and expiring 22 September 2007 with the remainder of term of one year and two months expiring on 22 November 2008
iii. For the offence of murder contrary to s.18 of the Crimes Act 1900, committed between 22 February 2004 and 23 February 2004, the applicant be sentenced to imprisonment for a non-parole period of 18 years and five months commencing 23 June 2005 and expiring 22 November 2023 with the remainder of term of 5 years and 3 months expiring 22 February 2029.

JUDGMENT:

IN THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEAL

2006/884

SPIGELMAN CJ
HOWIE J
ROTHMAN J

Wednesday 8 November 2006

STEFON PERRY v REGINA

Judgment

  1. SPIGELMAN CJ:  I agree with Rothman J.

  2. HOWIE J:  I agree with Rothman J.

  3. ROTHMAN J: The applicant, Stefon Perry, pleaded guilty to three charges: the murder of Karen Newby on the night of 22 February - 23 February 2004; and two…

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AGLC
Perry v R [2006] NSWCCA 351
Case
[2006] NSWCCA 351
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Perry v R was a criminal appeal heard by the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales. The appellant, Perry, was convicted of aggravated indecent assault and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The central issue was whether the primary judge misapplied sentencing principles, particularly by using the statutory non-parole period as more than a guideline and by reducing the discount for the early plea of guilty. The appeal questioned if these misapplications warranted the sentence being quashed and the case being re-sentenced.

The court examined if the primary judge erred by using the statutory non-parole period as a starting point for calculating sentences and by misusing the standard non-parole period. Additionally, the court assessed if the reduction of the discount for the early plea of guilty was appropriate, considering it might reflect a confusion between the utilitarian value of the plea and remorse. The court also considered if the overall sentence had a ratio greater than 3:1, as well as the objective seriousness of the offences and the need for proportionality and totality in sentencing.

The Court of Criminal Appeal found that the primary judge's application of sentencing principles was flawed. The reduction of the discount to 12½ percent for the early plea of guilty was unwarranted and bespeaks a confusion between the utilitarian value of the plea and the remorse. The court quashed the sentence imposed by the primary judge and re-sentenced the appellant. The court allowed a 25 percent discount for the early plea of guilty, assessed the objective criminality of the offences as mid-range, and set a total sentence with a ratio of 3.76:1. The court also noted that the sentence for the most serious offence should be imposed last due to the principle of totality.

The final orders of the court were to quash the sentences imposed on the two charges under appeal and to re-sentence the appellant with a total sentence no longer than the original sentence, resulting in a ratio of 3.76:1. The court exercised its power under the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 and the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 to vary the commencement of the murder sentence.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

SPIGELMAN CJ HOWIE J
While in certain circumstance it may be appropriate for a plea of guilty not to lead to any discount, the general rule is that it will. In this case, the reduction of the discount to 12½ percent is a reduction which is unwarranted, at least to that extreme, and bespeaks a confusion between the utilitarian value for which the 10 to 25 percent discount is allowed and the remorse which is another factor in the sentencing process: Thomson and Houlton, supra. Conclusion The determination of an appropriate sentence is an exercise of discretion which involves the balancing of sometimes inconsistent goals and, like the exercise of any discretion, will be interfered with by an appellate court only on the basis of: the application of a wrong principle; the consideration of an extraneous or irrelevant matter; a refusal to take into account a relevant matter; or, a manifest error such that the decision is plainly unjust. For the reasons set out earlier, the sentence imposed by his Honour should be quashed. It falls to the Court in those circumstances to re-sentence. I allow, for the very early plea of guilty, a discount of 25 percent to account for its utilitarian value. I do not consider that there are special circumstances requiring a longer period of rehabilitation after entering the community but I also do not consider that the overall sentence should have a ratio greater than 3:1. Because I am constrained to set a total sentence no longer than the sentence imposed below, I will reduce the remainder and the end result will be a ratio of 3.76:1. I do not interfere with the assessment that the offences in question are mid-range in objective criminality. In accordance with the principles adumbrated by the High Court in Veen (No.2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, I note that the applicant has a prior criminal history but not one which requires the Court to impose condign punishment to deter the offender in regard to these particular offences. I also bear in mind that, given that these offences are being imposed at the same time as the imposition of the sentence for murder that occurred on the same night, there must be the application of a degree of proportionality and totality. In relation to totality, in circumstances such as these, it is both easier and more appropriate to deal with the most serious offence last. Notwithstanding that no appeal has been filed against the sentence for murder, the Court has the power, as it is to quash the two sentences under appeal, to quash or vary any other sentence passed at the trial: s.7 Criminal Appeal Act 1912. The Court also has power pursuant to the terms of s.59 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 to vary the date of commencement of the murder charge, as the Court is to quash the sentences imposed on the two charges under appeal. Section 7 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 is a wider power which allows variation of the sentence. Section 59 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 allows only variation of the commencement (and necessarily the expiry) of the murder sentence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPIGELMAN CJ HOWIE J

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