CPZ16 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CPZ16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1204

Appeal from: CPZ16 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2251
File number: VID 1079 of 2018
Judge: WHEELAHAN J
Date of judgment: 2 August 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal interlocutory decision of the Federal Circuit Court – no reasonably arguable error in the decision below – application dismissed.
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) 36(aa), 424A

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) 13.03C(1)(c), 16.05, 16.05(2)(a)

Cases cited:

Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172

CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1344

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391

VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing: 1 August 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 33
Counsel for the Applicants: The applicants appeared in person.
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms X Teo
Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz
Counsel acting as amici curiae: Ms M Schilling with Mr B Petrie

ORDERS

VID 1079 of 2018
BETWEEN:

CPZ16

First Applicant

CQE16

Second Applicant

CQC16 (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

WHEELAHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 AUGUST 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed with costs.

2.The first and second applicants pay the first respondent’s costs, to be assessed in default of agreement.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

3.The Court was not persuaded that it was appropriate to make an order for costs against the infant applicants.

4.The first respondent has agreed not to recover costs from the first applicant for work referable solely to the applications of the third and fourth applicants.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

WHEELAHAN J:

Introduction

  1. The applicants seek leave to appeal an interlocutory order of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made 23 August 2018 by which their application for reinstatement of a proceeding in that Court was dismissed: CPZ16 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 2251. The applicants had sought judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made 19 August 2016 by which the Tribunal affirmed a decision of the first respondent (the Minister) to refuse the applicants’ applications for protection visas.

    Background

  2. The first and second applicants, who are wife and husband, are citizens of Sri Lanka. They first arrived in Australia in June 2009 and March 2007 respectively. The second applicant entered Australia under a student visa, and the first applicant entered Australia as his dependent. The third and fourth applicants are their twin children, who were born in Australia in July 2013. The children are not citizens of Australia…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1204
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

CPZ16 v Minister for Home Affairs involved an application for leave to appeal an interlocutory decision of the Federal Circuit Court in a migration matter. The applicants sought to challenge the Federal Circuit Court's decision not to reinstate their proceedings. Pro bono counsel, Ms Meredith Schilling and Mr Ben Petrie, were appointed to act as amici curiae to assist the Court in examining the potential grounds of appeal. The primary issue for the Court was whether there was a reasonably arguable basis for the applicants to appeal the Federal Circuit Court's decision, particularly in light of the principles set out in CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.

The Court considered the submissions made by amici curiae, who had meticulously reviewed the Tribunal’s reasons and determined that no reasonably arguable grounds of appeal existed. The amici curiae had examined whether the Tribunal’s rejection of the applicants' claims was legally sound and whether the findings were reasonable. They concluded that the Tribunal's decision was consistent with established legal principles and did not contain any jurisdictional error warranting an appeal. The Court found itself in agreement with the amici curiae, concluding that the primary judge’s decision was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant a grant of leave to appeal.

The Court ultimately dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no reasonable prospect of success for the applicants. The Court acknowledged the efforts of the amici curiae but determined that the merits of the grounds of appeal advanced by the applicants were insufficient. The Court ordered that the applicants pay the costs of the application to the Minister for Home Affairs, as the application was dismissed with costs. The Court noted that it was not appropriate to order costs against the infant applicants, and the Minister had agreed not to recover costs from the first applicant for work related to the third and fourth applicants' applications.

In summary, the Court upheld the Federal Circuit Court’s decision and dismissed the applicants' appeal on the basis that there were no reasonably arguable grounds for the application. The Court’s decision was influenced by the thorough analysis provided by the amici curiae and the lack of any significant legal error in the primary judge’s decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed with costs.

2. The first and second applicants pay the first respondent’s costs, to be assessed in default of agreement.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

3. The Court was not persuaded that it was appropriate to make an order for costs against the infant applicants.

4. The first respondent has agreed not to recover costs from the first applicant for work referable solely to the applications of the third and fourth applicants.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Counsel acting as amici curiae submitted that they had examined the Tribunal’s reasons in considerable detail over a number of days to discern whether there were any grounds of appeal reasonably open to the applicants. In particular, counsel examined the Tribunal’s factual findings which involved rejecting claims that were made by the applicants against the principles essayed in CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496, which concern the circumstances in which credibility findings might be attended by jurisdictional error. Counsel informed the Court that they had looked at whether the Tribunal had adequately explained its rejection of the applicants’ claims, whether claims had been rejected on a minor or trivial basis, and whether the findings of the Tribunal were legally unreasonable. Counsel submitted to the Court that they were unable to identify any reasonably arguable ground of appeal.Conclusion The application for leave to appeal the decision of the Federal Circuit Court will be dismissed because I am not persuaded that the decision of the primary judge is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant a grant of leave to appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Having regard to the circumstances of the applicants, including the position of their two children, the Court sought the assistance of pro bono counsel to act as amici curiae. Ms Meredith Schilling and Mr Ben Petrie of the Victorian Bar provided assistance to the Court, on a pro bono basis, to seek to identify whether there was any potential ground of appeal available to the applicants that might enjoy reasonable prospects of success. The Court had the benefit of considered written and oral submissions by counsel acting as amici curiae. The submissions of counsel were clear and direct. The Court was most assisted by Ms Schilling and Mr Petrie, and acknowledges the considerable amount of work that they undertook and the quality of the submissions that they presented.Consideration Any appeal to this Court from the interlocutory orders of the primary judge refusing to reinstate the applicants’ proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court is an appeal by way of rehearing. The powers of the Court on any such appeal are exercisable where the appellant demonstrates some legal, factual, or discretionary error: Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at [23]. In this case, the decision of the primary judge was discretionary, which attracts the well-known statement of principle in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505. In any appeal in this case, that statement of principle would invite attention principally to whether there was a reasonably arguable basis upon which the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error which, within the boundaries of the grounds of review advanced by the applicants before the Federal Circuit Court, the primary judge had overlooked. In determining whether leave to appeal the primary judge’s orders should be given, I shall consider whether the primary judge’s decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration on appeal. It was not submitted by the Minister that, assuming the decision of the primary judge to be wrong, substantial injustice would not be caused to the applicants if leave to appeal were not granted. The proposed grounds of appeal before this Court do not reflect the grounds that were advanced by the applicants before the primary judge. It is the practice of this Court that leave is necessary to advance on appeal an argument that was not advanced at first instance: VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588 at [48] (Kiefel, Weinberg and Stone JJ). Leave to rely upon a new argument will be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so. In this case, I consider that the merits of any new argument to be the leading consideration in determining whether it is expedient in the interests of justice to allow the argument to be advanced if leave to appeal were given. There is therefore overlap between the considerations necessary to determine the question whether leave to appeal should be given from the primary judge’s interlocutory orders, and the question whether leave would likely be given to the applicants to raise new arguments on any appeal. Both questions invite consideration of the merits of the grounds that are now advanced.