AAV19 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AAV19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 287

Appeal from: AAV19 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 517
File number: NSD 448 of 2019
Judge: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 26 February 2020
Date of publication of reasons: 10 March 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time and leave to appeal an interlocutory order of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for reinstatement of a proceeding – where applicant had sought judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority to not grant applicant a protection visa – whether the primary judge erred in holding that there was no reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on the part of the Authority – leave granted and appeal allowed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Ashby v Slipper [2014] FCAFC 15; (2014) 219 FCR 322

CPZ16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1204

Guo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 34

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; (2018) 264 CLR 123

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110; (2016) 152 ALD 478

Dates of hearing: 12 August 2019, 26 February 2020
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 49
Counsel for the Appellant on 12 August 2019: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Appellant on 26 February 2020: Ms R Francois (Pro Bono)
Solicitor for the First Respondent on 12 August 2019: Ms K Morris of Clayton Utz
Counsel for the First Respondent on 26 February 2020: Mr M Cleary
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 448 of 2019
BETWEEN:

AAV19

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MURPHY J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 FEBRUARY 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Applicant be granted an extension of time to seek leave to appeal and be granted leave to appeal.

2.The appeal be allowed.

3.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made 4 March 2019 be set aside and in lieu thereof order that:

(a)the orders of Registrar Morgan made on 7 February 2019 dismissing the application for judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) be set aside; and

(b)the First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the reinstatement application heard on 4 March 2019.

4.The application for judicial review of the IAA decision be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court, differently constituted.

5.The First Respondent pay…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 287
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In AAV19 v Minister for Home Affairs, the applicant, a citizen of Iraq, sought judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to not grant him a protection visa. The applicant, who has limited English proficiency, was represented pro bono by Ms Rachel Francois. The applicant arrived in Australia in 2013 and applied for a protection visa in 2017, claiming that he faced harm if returned to Iraq due to his Shia Muslim faith and his service in the Iraqi Army. The IAA found that the applicant's claims were not well-founded and refused to grant the visa. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review of the IAA's decision.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in holding that there was no reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on the part of the IAA and whether the applicant should be granted leave to appeal. The court noted that an appeal from the interlocutory orders of the Federal Circuit Court is an appeal by way of rehearing, and the powers of the court are exercisable where the appellant demonstrates some legal, factual, or discretionary error. The court examined the proposed grounds of appeal at a reasonably impressionistic level, considering whether they were reasonably arguable.

The court found that the primary judge's decision was attended by sufficient doubt as to warrant reconsideration on appeal, particularly in relation to the IAA's acceptance of the applicant's evidence regarding the riot in Tikrit and the threats he faced due to his Shia Muslim faith. The court held that the primary judge had overlooked a reasonably arguable basis upon which the IAA had fallen into jurisdictional error. The court granted the applicant an extension of time to seek leave to appeal, granted leave to appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and remitted the application for judicial review of the IAA decision to the Federal Circuit Court, differently constituted. The Minister was ordered to pay the applicant's costs of the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal before the court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Applicant be granted an extension of time to seek leave to appeal and be granted leave to appeal.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made 4 March 2019 be set aside and in lieu thereof order that:

(a) the orders of Registrar Morgan made on 7 February 2019 dismissing the application for judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) be set aside; and

(b) the First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the reinstatement application heard on 4 March 2019.

4. The application for judicial review of the IAA decision be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court, differently constituted.

5. The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal before this Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Court is grateful for the assistance provided by Ms Rachel Francois of counsel, who accepted a pro bono referral to represent the applicant in the proceeding. It is difficult for a layperson to understand what may constitute jurisdictional error, which in this case is compounded by the fact that the applicant has little ability to read or write in English and his English-speaking ability is limited. He could not have properly represented himself.THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The applicant is a citizen of Iraq of Shia Muslim faith who arrived in Australia on 16 July 2013 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. The Minister later exercised his discretion under s 46A(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) to allow the applicant to make a valid application for a specified visa, and he did so on 5 June 2017. In his visa application the applicant claimed to fear harm if returned to Iraq for various reasons, only some of which are relevant to the proposed appeal. In the claim which is central to the proposed appeal, the applicant claimed that he was a soldier in the Iraqi Army from 2007. He said that in 2012 he was stationed in Tikrit, where a large prison was situated. He claimed that on 22 September 2012 a large number of prisoners, a group which included convicted terrorists, escaped and commenced to riot and kill prison guards. The Army and police were called in and a fierce gun battle broke out with the prisoners who had become armed, including with heavy weapons. The riot (or battle) went from approximately 7:00 pm until 2:00 am the next day, and the applicant was shot in the leg. In his Arrival and Induction Interview on 12 August 2013 (arrival interview) the applicant said that after his injury recovered at home, I infer in Basra, for three months and then returned to duty in Tikrit. While in Tikrit he started to receive threats saying “either you leave the army or we will kill you”, and that many of his colleagues were killed. In the statement accompanying his visa application on 5 June 2017 (statement) he expanded on this and said that when he returned to the Army base in Tikrit he saw “lots of” damage to houses in the area caused in the riot and that the local people were blaming the Army and wanted the Army to fix the damage. He said the people were also angry because “a lot” of local people were killed in the fight. The local people were largely Sunnis and were also angry at the soldiers because of their religion. He said that the local people created unofficial checkpoints at which they would stop people and review their names and they could tell a person’s religion by their name. He said that was a “massive problem” to him as his name was identifiable as a Shia name. He again said that “a lot” of his Army colleagues were killed. The applicant claimed that because of these threats he applied for one month’s leave from the Army, doing so on the basis that his son was sick and that he needed to look after him. To obtain the leave, the applicant exaggerated his son’s health problems and said that his son was in hospital when he was not. He moved back to his home district of Basra, and while still on leave he left Iraq by air, on a valid Iraqi passport, with his father, wife and children. Eventually, with the assistance of a people smuggler, they boarded a boat in Indonesia and came to Australia.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For these and other reasons, on 10 August 2018 the delegate did not accept the applicant’s various claims and decided to refuse to grant the applicant a visa. The Authority’s decision The delegate’s decision was a “fast track reviewable decision” and on 15 August 2018 it was referred to the Authority. On 3 December 2018 the Authority handed down its decision. The Authority made detailed factual findings, and accepted some parts of the applicant’s evidence and rejected other parts. Overall, the Authority concluded that the applicant’s claims that he faced a real chance of serious or significant harm on return to Iraq were not well founded. The Authority accepted that the applicant is a Shia from Basra and that his mother and a number of adult siblings continued to reside there. It also found that the applicant’s evidence in relation to a blast which injured the applicant’s uncle during 2007, and a neighbourhood dispute resulting in the applicant being stabbed during 2009, was consistent and detailed. The Authority accepted that these incidents had occurred, and that the applicant’s family had to relocate for a period because of them, but that they had since been resolved and no longer caused the applicant any difficulty. The Authority accepted that the applicant had joined the Iraq Army during 2007 and worked predominantly in administrative roles. It also accepted that the applicant attended the prison riot with other soldiers during 2012, that Army personnel had been targeted following the battle, and that the applicant’s name made him identifiable as a Shia which in turn compounded the risk to him. The Authority accepted that the applicant was injured during the battle but did not accept that he was personally targeted afterwards. The Authority did not accept that the applicant had deserted from the Army. It said (at [19]):The applicant claims he left Iraq while on leave from the army and without permission and so deserted the army. In the arrival interview he said after being threatened in Tikrit he took his family and they went back home and he left the job. On his return as he could not get work his father sold the family home and they used the money for him, his wife, children and father to travel to Australia. He left Iraq on his genuine passport in May 2013 and travelled by plane to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), then to Malaysia and then onto Indonesia where his passport was taken from him by the people smugglers and he illegally travelled by boat for Australia, all of which I accept given its consistency and the detail provided. In his SHEV application he relevantly said, for the first time, that he returned home for a few months to recover from injury after the prison riot and then returned to the army in Tikrit and was harassed by local Sunni families. He obtained leave from the army by telling them his son was sick (he says he exaggerated this to obtain leave) and that when he left Iraq he was still on leave. In the SHEV interview he said he had to tell them his son was sick and he was taking him to hospital otherwise they would not have let him leave the airport and he said, for the first time, that in Malaysia he was placed on a “deflection list” however very little detail was provided about this and it is somewhat at odds with him having been able to pass through other airports without issue before the Malaysian airport and I do not accept it. Given its late raising, the fact he was able to legally depart from Iraq without issue and the inconsistencies I do not accept he deserted the army. Based on the evidence before me, I consider it more plausible he resigned from the army after the prison riot.(Emphasis added.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ground 1(a) traverses similar terrain to grounds one and two below, while grounds 1(b), (c) and (d) are proposed new grounds of appeal which were not raised before the primary judge. Given my view that the applicant should succeed on Ground 1(a) it is unnecessary to decide whether to grant leave to advance the proposed new grounds. As the Minister accepted to be appropriate, if leave to appeal is allowed it will be permissible for the applicant to rely upon any grounds of appeal that he and his legal advisers consider to be appropriate.CONSIDERATION In CPZ16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1204 at [26], in relation to an application for leave to appeal from orders made by the Federal Circuit Court to refuse reinstatement of a proceeding under r 16.05(2)(a), Wheelahan J said and I respectfully agree: Any appeal to this Court from the interlocutory orders of the primary judge refusing to reinstate the applicants’ proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court is an appeal by way of rehearing. The powers of the Court on any such appeal are exercisable where the appellant demonstrates some legal, factual, or discretionary error: Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at [23]. In this case, the decision of the primary judge was discretionary, which attracts the well-known statement of principle in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505. In any appeal in this case, that statement of principle would invite attention principally to whether there was a reasonably arguable basis upon which the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error which, within the boundaries of the grounds of review advanced by the applicants before the Federal Circuit Court, the primary judge had overlooked. It is common ground between the parties that the central question in the application before me is whether the primary judge’s decision is attended by sufficient doubt as to warrant reconsideration on appeal, which turns on whether the proposed grounds of appeal are reasonably arguable. The Minister does not contend that, assuming the decision of the primary judge to be wrong, the applicant would not suffer substantial injustice if leave to appeal were not granted. What is required is an examination of the proposed grounds of appeal at “a reasonably impressionistic level” and the Court should not descend into a full consideration of the arguments for and against each ground. The correct approach may be expressed by the use of language such as whether a ground is “arguable”, “reasonably arguable”, “sufficiently arguable” or has “reasonable prospects of success”: MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585 at [62]-[63] (Mortimer J); MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110; (2016) 152 ALD 478; at [38] (Tracey, Perry and Charlesworth JJ); Guo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 34 at [27] (Siopis, White and Perry JJ). Having said that, the factual underpinnings of the parties’ arguments addressed the Authority’s reasons in a detailed way, and I have found it appropriate to consider the arguments as they were advanced.Ground 1(a) –no intelligible justification