FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AAV19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 287
Appeal from: AAV19 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 517 File number: NSD 448 of 2019 Judge: MURPHY J Date of judgment: 26 February 2020 Date of publication of reasons: 10 March 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time and leave to appeal an interlocutory order of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for reinstatement of a proceeding – where applicant had sought judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority to not grant applicant a protection visa – whether the primary judge erred in holding that there was no reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on the part of the Authority – leave granted and appeal allowed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited: Ashby v Slipper [2014] FCAFC 15; (2014) 219 FCR 322
CPZ16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1204
Guo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 34
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; (2018) 264 CLR 123
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110; (2016) 152 ALD 478
Dates of hearing: 12 August 2019, 26 February 2020 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 49 Counsel for the Appellant on 12 August 2019: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Appellant on 26 February 2020: Ms R Francois (Pro Bono) Solicitor for the First Respondent on 12 August 2019: Ms K Morris of Clayton Utz Counsel for the First Respondent on 26 February 2020: Mr M Cleary Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice ORDERS
NSD 448 of 2019 BETWEEN: AAV19
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MURPHY J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 FEBRUARY 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Applicant be granted an extension of time to seek leave to appeal and be granted leave to appeal.
2.The appeal be allowed.
3.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made 4 March 2019 be set aside and in lieu thereof order that:
(a)the orders of Registrar Morgan made on 7 February 2019 dismissing the application for judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) be set aside; and
(b)the First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the reinstatement application heard on 4 March 2019.
4.The application for judicial review of the IAA decision be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court, differently constituted.
5.The First Respondent pay…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 287
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in holding that there was no reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on the part of the IAA and whether the applicant should be granted leave to appeal. The court noted that an appeal from the interlocutory orders of the Federal Circuit Court is an appeal by way of rehearing, and the powers of the court are exercisable where the appellant demonstrates some legal, factual, or discretionary error. The court examined the proposed grounds of appeal at a reasonably impressionistic level, considering whether they were reasonably arguable.
The court found that the primary judge's decision was attended by sufficient doubt as to warrant reconsideration on appeal, particularly in relation to the IAA's acceptance of the applicant's evidence regarding the riot in Tikrit and the threats he faced due to his Shia Muslim faith. The court held that the primary judge had overlooked a reasonably arguable basis upon which the IAA had fallen into jurisdictional error. The court granted the applicant an extension of time to seek leave to appeal, granted leave to appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and remitted the application for judicial review of the IAA decision to the Federal Circuit Court, differently constituted. The Minister was ordered to pay the applicant's costs of the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal before the court.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Applicant be granted an extension of time to seek leave to appeal and be granted leave to appeal.
2. The appeal be allowed.
3. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made 4 March 2019 be set aside and in lieu thereof order that:
(a) the orders of Registrar Morgan made on 7 February 2019 dismissing the application for judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) be set aside; and
(b) the First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the reinstatement application heard on 4 March 2019.
4. The application for judicial review of the IAA decision be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court, differently constituted.
5. The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal before this Court.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ground 1(a) traverses similar terrain to grounds one and two below, while grounds 1(b), (c) and (d) are proposed new grounds of appeal which were not raised before the primary judge. Given my view that the applicant should succeed on Ground 1(a) it is unnecessary to decide whether to grant leave to advance the proposed new grounds. As the Minister accepted to be appropriate, if leave to appeal is allowed it will be permissible for the applicant to rely upon any grounds of appeal that he and his legal advisers consider to be appropriate.CONSIDERATION In CPZ16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1204 at [26], in relation to an application for leave to appeal from orders made by the Federal Circuit Court to refuse reinstatement of a proceeding under r 16.05(2)(a), Wheelahan J said and I respectfully agree: Any appeal to this Court from the interlocutory orders of the primary judge refusing to reinstate the applicants’ proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court is an appeal by way of rehearing. The powers of the Court on any such appeal are exercisable where the appellant demonstrates some legal, factual, or discretionary error: Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at [23]. In this case, the decision of the primary judge was discretionary, which attracts the well-known statement of principle in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505. In any appeal in this case, that statement of principle would invite attention principally to whether there was a reasonably arguable basis upon which the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error which, within the boundaries of the grounds of review advanced by the applicants before the Federal Circuit Court, the primary judge had overlooked. It is common ground between the parties that the central question in the application before me is whether the primary judge’s decision is attended by sufficient doubt as to warrant reconsideration on appeal, which turns on whether the proposed grounds of appeal are reasonably arguable. The Minister does not contend that, assuming the decision of the primary judge to be wrong, the applicant would not suffer substantial injustice if leave to appeal were not granted. What is required is an examination of the proposed grounds of appeal at “a reasonably impressionistic level” and the Court should not descend into a full consideration of the arguments for and against each ground. The correct approach may be expressed by the use of language such as whether a ground is “arguable”, “reasonably arguable”, “sufficiently arguable” or has “reasonable prospects of success”: MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585 at [62]-[63] (Mortimer J); MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110; (2016) 152 ALD 478; at [38] (Tracey, Perry and Charlesworth JJ); Guo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 34 at [27] (Siopis, White and Perry JJ). Having said that, the factual underpinnings of the parties’ arguments addressed the Authority’s reasons in a detailed way, and I have found it appropriate to consider the arguments as they were advanced.Ground 1(a) –no intelligible justification