Spigelman CJ at 1; Mason P at 2; Campbell JA at 19
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE:
20 June 2007
DECISION:
Appeal dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – Contracts, torts and personal actions – when time begins to run – particular causes of action – cause of action founded on quasi-contract – unjust enrichment – restitution – quantum meruit – time runs from when the defendant received the benefit – Limitation Act 1969, s 14 - RESTITUTION – Recompense for services rendered – quantum meruit – legal practitioner claim for unpaid fees - RESTITUTION – general principles – whether there is a right of action for unjust enrichment simpliciter – where a contractual promise subsists – relationship of restitution to contract – restitution operates around contract and does not subvert it - STATUTE – Acts of parliament – interpretation – particular words and phrases – general – “quasi contract” – rules of construction – irrelevant that phrase may no longer be used in law – Act to be interpreted according to its plain meaning and not according to prevailing legal orthodoxy – Limitation Act 1969, s 14(1)(a)
1 SPIGELMAN CJ: I agree with the reasons of Mason P.
2 MASON P: The appellant was the respondent's solicitor between 1 January 1990 and 30 June 1991, representing him in Supreme Court proceedings against an insurer claiming indemnity for losses suffered in the Newcastle earthquake of 28 December 1989. When the appellant ceased to practise as a solicitor on 30 June 1991 he transferred the file to another firm. In May 1992 the insurance claim was settled with the respondent receiving a substantial sum.
3 According to the appellant's statement of claim, the conduct of the proceedings was taken over by the new solicitor (Mr Vardas) in July 1991 "on the basis…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Coshott v Lenin [2007] NSWCA 153
Case
[2007] NSWCA 153
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal of New South Wales considered an appeal concerning the application of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW). The dispute involved a claim by a legal practitioner, Mr. Coshott, for unpaid fees against his former client, Mr. Lenin. The central issue was when the limitation period for a claim founded on unjust enrichment, specifically a *quantum meruit* claim for services rendered, began to run.
The court was required to determine whether the cause of action for unjust enrichment accrued at the time the benefit was conferred or at the time the contract was terminated. Specifically, the court had to interpret section 14(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1969, which deals with when time begins to run for actions founded on "quasi-contract". The court also considered the relationship between restitutionary claims and subsisting contractual promises, and whether a claim for unjust enrichment could be brought where a contract remained on foot.
The court reasoned that the phrase "quasi-contract" in section 14(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1969 should be interpreted according to its plain meaning, irrespective of whether the term is still in common legal usage. It held that a *quantum meruit* claim for services rendered, which falls within the ambit of quasi-contract, accrues at the time the defendant received the benefit. The court affirmed that restitution operates around, and does not subvert, existing contractual arrangements. Therefore, the limitation period for Mr. Coshott's claim began to run from when Mr. Lenin received the benefit of the legal services, not from the termination of the retainer.