Hale v Apostolakos trading as Diamond Conway

[2025] NSWDC 348

District Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Hale v Apostolakos trading as Diamond Conway [2025] NSWDC 348

Hearing dates:

26 August 2025

Date of orders:

2 September 2025

Decision date:

02 September 2025

Jurisdiction:

Civil

Before:

Habib SC DCJ

Decision:

See paragraph [65]

Catchwords:

NOTICE OF MOTIONS – stay of proceedings – summary dismissal – s14 Limitation Act – Legal Professional Uniform Law – assessment of costs

Legislation Cited:

Civil Procedure Act 2005 s56, s67

Legal Profession Uniform Law s175, s178, s198

Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s14

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules r13.4, r14.14

Cases Cited:

A.C.N.627087030 Pty Ltd atf the YBL Trust v Elisabeth Theordore

Coburn v Colledge [1897] 1 QB 702

Coshott v Lenin [2007] NSWCA 153

GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore

Shaw v New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 102

Stubbings v R [2023] NSWCCA 68 at 48; R v HC (2017) 325 FLR 59 at [67].

Texts Cited:

Nil

Category:

Procedural rulings

Parties:

Timothy Hale SC (Plaintiff)
Chris Apostolakos (First Defendant)
Charles Calleja (Second Defendant)
Bruce Cameron (Third Defendant)
Peter Carkagis (Fourth Defendant)
Arnold Conyer (Fifth Defendant)
Tom Doumanis (Sixth Defendant)
Ron Gorick (Seventh Defendant)
Michael Mazzone (Eight Defendant)
Phillip Meisner (Ninth Defendant)
Stephan Smith (Tenth Defendant)
Michael Zwar (Eleventh Defendant)

Representation:

Counsel:
Ms M Castle (Plaintiff)
Mr P Doyle Gray (First – Tenth Defendant’s)

Solicitors:
Andersen Legal & Consulting (Plaintiff)
Rose Legal (First-Tenth Defendant’s)
No Appearance (Eleventh Defendant)

File Number(s):

2024/00050131

Publication restriction:

Nil

Judgment

1. Before the Court are two notices of motion, one filed by the plaintiff dated 30 May 2025 and one by the 1^st to 10^th defendants (“Diamond Conway”) dated 27 March 2025. I was informed at the hearing of the motions that the 11^th defendant submits to the orders of the Court in relation to both motions.

2. The proceedings concern a claim by the plaintiff, a senior counsel, for the recovery of fees from solicitors who instructed him in relation to a matter for one of their clients.

3. The plaintiff’s notice of motion seeks a stay of the proceedings pending the determination of an assessment of the plaintiff’s costs and, in the alternative, leave to amend the statement of claim in the form annexed to the notice of motion.

4. Diamond Conway’s motion seeks summary dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim on two bases. First, on the basis that the claim is statute barred. Secondly, on the basis that the plaintiff did not comply with his disclosure obligations under the Legal Profession Uniform Law (“LPUL”) and as a result the proceedings are not maintainable by the plaintiff.

The pleadings

5. In his statement of claim, the plaintiff relevantly pleads that in or about 2017, the defendants retained him to appear and advise on behalf of a certain client. He alleges that he sent a fee disclosure dated 12 May 2017 setting out hourly and daily rates and billing arrangements. Three invoices were issued by the plaintiff. The first and third invoices were paid by the defendants. However, the second, dated 14 February 2018, was not paid and the plaintiff, by these proceedings, seeks recovery of the unpaid amount.

6. Diamond Conway denies liability to the plaintiff. Without repeating each of the matters raised, for present purposes, two defences are raised relevant to their notice of motion. First, they plead that the plaintiff’s claim for relief is statute barred. Secondly, they plead at paragraph 9 as follows:

“In the alternative, the defendants say that the plaintiff has failed to disclose his fees in accordance with division 3 of Part 4.3 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) (LPUL) and is therefore barred from commencing proceedings for recovery of his fees under section 178(1)(c) of the LPUL until they have been assessed”.

7. In reply, the plaintiff alleges that by reason of certain representations made by the 11^th defendant, the defendants are estopped from asserting that the cause of action arose at a time before 14 February 2018 or at the time of delivery of a judgment in the underlying proceedings on 25 September 2017.

Particulars sought in relation to paragraph 9 of the defence

8. On 12 September 2024, the plaintiff’s solicitors wrote to Diamond Conway’s solicitors seeking particulars of their defence. Relevantly, they asked: “in what respect is it alleged that the Plaintiff, as the “second law practice” failed to comply with s 175(2) of the LPUL”.

9. Section 175(2) of the LPUL identifies the obligations of a second law practice to provide disclosure of legal costs to the first law practice. For the purposes of the section, the plaintiff, as a barrister, is the “second law practice” and the defendant, as instructing solicitor, is the “first law practice”. Section 175(2) of the LPUL is in the following terms:

“If a law practice (the first law practice) retains or intends to retain another law practice (the second law practice) on behalf of a client, the second law practice is not required to make a disclosure to the client under section 174, but must disclose to the first law practice the information necessary for the first law practice to comply with subsection (1)”.

10. The particulars were sought to obtain some specificity with respect to the allegation being made in paragraph 9 of the defence. Clearly non-compliance of disclosure obligations could come in several ways, most simply by the absence of a fee disclosure. Alternatively, the fee disclosure could be deficient - here, for example, the precise allegation as reflected in the submissions of Diamond Conway on their motion is that the plaintiff failed to comply with his disclosure obligations because, first, his disclosure letter was given at time that was too remote from when he was retained and secondly, he failed to give an estimate of his fees.

11. Diamond Conway’s solicitors replied to the request for particulars on 20 September 2024. They stated that paragraph 9 of the defence made no reference to s. 175(2) of the LPUL. Given the nature of that reply, it was reasonable for the plaintiff to proceed on the basis that, however paragraph 9 was being put, it was not based on a failure to comply with s. 175(2) of the LPUL.

12. The plaintiff’s solicitors, by letter dated 30 September 2024, did not leave the matter there but rather pressed Diamond Conway about paragraph 9 of the defence. In that letter they pointed out that s.175(2) of the LPUL was the only section in division 3 of part 4.3 of the LPUL that has any relevance for disclosure obligations as between law practices and made clear that the plaintiff was now proceeding on the basis that no allegation was being made that he failed to comply with s.175(2) of the LPUL. They observed that on that basis, it was difficult to see how the defendant could allege that the plaintiff is barred from recovering his fees by reason of s.178 of the LPUL.

13. Further, having been served with Diamond Conway’s notice of motion, they said, by letter dated 7 April 2025 to Diamond Conway’s solicitors, that in the light of the exchange of correspondence referred to above, there was no disclosed basis for the relief sought in order 2.

14. Diamond Conway’s solicitor replied by email on 7 April 2025 without meaningfully responding to the letter of 7 April 2025.

15. No further correspondence touching on the request for particulars is in evidence. On 4 August 2025, Diamond Conway filed submissions in support of their motion. In those submissions, Diamond Conway exposed the specific basis for the allegation in paragraph 9 of the defence, namely the matters referred to in paragraph 10 above.

The Issues

16. There is substantial commonality of issues arising in each notice of motion. For example, the plaintiff’s claim for a stay is necessarily affected by Diamond Conway’s allegation that the proceedings should be summarily dismissed because they are statute barred.

17. Accordingly, I propose to deal with the primary issues raised by the two motions, and then, having dealt with those issues, identify the appropriate orders that should be made in relation to the motions. In dealing with the issues in this way, I keep firmly in mind the onus that each party carries in relation to the orders they seek.

Summary dismissal – General principles

18. In their motion for summary dismissal, Diamond Conway relies on Uniform Civil Procedure Rules r13.4(1)(b). That rule provides that a court may dismiss proceedings if it appears to the Court that in relation to the proceedings generally or in relation to any claim for relief, no reasonable cause of action is disclosed.

19. In Shaw v New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 102, Barrett JA (with whom Beazley, McColl, Macfarlan JJA and McClellan CJ and CL agreed) expressed the test for summary dismissal as follows at [32][1]:

“The question is…whether the claims in question are so obviously untenable or groundless that there is ‘a high degree of certainty’ that they will fail if allowed to go to trial; and whether this is one of the ‘clearest of cases’ in which the court may accordingly intervene to prevent the claims being litigated”

1. See also Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said at [57]; Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW)([2006) 226 CLR 256 at [46]; Agius v New South Wales [2001] NSWCA 371, Giles JA, with whom Priestly and Powell JJA agreed, said at [24] – [25]

Summary dismissal – Limitation Act 1969

20. Diamond Conway submits that the plaintiff’s claim should be summarily dismissed because it is statute barred by reason of s.14(1) of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW). As is well known, that provision provides a 6-year limitation period for causes of action founded on contract (or quasi contract).

21. Diamond Conway submits that the plaintiff’s claim falls within s.14(1) and submits that the cause of action accrues “when the last work was done”, unless the contract between the plaintiff and Diamond Conway contains a term specifying the time at which legal fees are payable [2] . On that basis, it was submitted that the limitation period ended on 25 September 2017, but the proceedings were not commenced until 8 February 2024.

    2. Coburn v Colledge [1897] 1 QB 702

22. The plaintiff submits that the cause of action was commenced within time. He does so on two bases. First, he submits that properly construed, his fee disclosure letter did not require fees to be paid until a bill was rendered (there is some inconsistency between the date on which interest would accrue between the disclosure letter and invoices). The plaintiff submits that properly construed, the following part of the disclosure letter has that effect:

    “Billing Arrangements

I have the right to bill you periodically at my discretion. I will charge you interest on bills unpaid 60 days after delivery unless, in my absolute discretion, I choose not to do so”

23. Secondly, he submits that if Diamond Conway is correct in their submissions concerning the LPUL, then the costs agreement founded on the disclosure letter is void, and he has a claim in quantum meruit. If that is right, then the cause of action arises at the time the benefit is provided by the plaintiff to Diamond Conway, and it is claimed that the benefit he provided included forbearance in pursuing his fees. Diamond Conway says, however, that this claim is not currently pleaded.

24. Apart from joining issue in relation to the contractual or quasi contractual nature of the claim and the Limitation Act’s application thereto, the plaintiff also pleads and relies on an estoppel seeking to prevent Diamond Conway from asserting that the plaintiff’s cause of action is statute barred. He does this by relying on alleged representations set out in the Reply, culminating in a plea at paragraph 14 of the Reply that “the Defendants are estopped from asserting that [the cause of action] arose at an earlier time [than 14 February 2018] or at the time of the judgment on 25 September 2017”.

25. The plaintiff submits that the Reply raises matters of fact that necessarily will need to be dealt with at a final hearing.

Resolution of the Limitation Issue

26. Mr Doyle Gray, Counsel for Diamond Conway, submitted that “however packaged” the plaintiff’s claim is one of contract or quasi-contract. He submitted that as a result, the plaintiff’s estoppel plea does not change that fact and is merely a repackaging of the claim which remains statute barred by reason of s.14(1). He relied on the decision in Coshott v Lenin [2007] NSWCA 153 per Mason P at [12]-[14].

27. In my view, Coshott v Lenin provides no assistance to Diamond Conway in this regard. It was a case in which the Court of Appeal found that an inadequately pleaded claim for the payment of fees allegedly due to a solicitor was properly seen, in that case, as a claim either in contract or for services rendered (a claim in quantum meruit). In that context, the Court held that however one packages such a claim, that is, by way of contract, or by way of a restitutionary claim, it remains a claim within the meaning of s.14(1) (i.e. either contractual or quasi-contractual). Nothing in Coshott v Lenin suggests that there is any impediment on a plaintiff seeking to raise, by way of reply, an allegation that a defendant is estopped from raising a limitation defence. Such an estoppel is not itself a claim for relief, but rather an appeal to equity in support of the contractual or quasi contractual claim being advanced in the statement of claim.

28. No submission was made that as a matter of law the estoppel pleaded was unavailable to the plaintiff; obviously whether it is made good or not will depend on what is established as a matter of fact.

29. Given that the plaintiff’s reliance on the estoppel referred to will require factual findings which may well be the subject of conflicting evidence, the Court is not able to determine Diamond Conways’ limitation defence in a summary way. The issue will need to be dealt with at a final hearing. The only basis advanced to resist this was Diamond Conway’s reliance on Coshott v Lenin which I have found is inapposite and does not assist them on this issue.

30. It is unnecessary to deal with the submissions concerning the time at which the plaintiff’s cause of action arose because even if Diamond Conway is correct (and I do not express any view about that), the proceedings cannot be summarily dismissed given the estoppel plea in reply for the reasons set out above. Accordingly, I dismiss Diamond Conway’s claim for relief in paragraph 1 of their Notice of Motion.

Summary Dismissal – LPUL

31. In their submissions, Diamond Conway submit that the plaintiff failed to disclose his fees in accordance with the requirements of the LPUL. Specifically, they assert that the plaintiff failed to:

1. send his disclosure document “as soon as practicable” in breach of s175(2) of the LPUL (“first failure”); and

2. provide an estimate of his fees in breach of s175(2) of the LPUL (“second failure”).

32. Because of those failures (or any one of them), Diamond Conway submit that s.178(1) prevents the plaintiff from maintaining these proceedings and accordingly they should be summarily dismissed. Unlike, s.14 of the Limitation Act, in my view, if a Court is satisfied that s.178(1) applies, it is not a matter that can be waived by a party – the mandate of the section operates as a matter of law.

33. With respect to the first failure, it appears that Diamond Conway assert that in relation to the fee disclosure sent by the plaintiff on 12 May 2017, the relevant brief or retainer connected to that fee disclosure arose in October 2016, some 7 months before the provision of the fee disclosure.

34. The obligation on a barrister (being the second law practice) under s.175(2) of the LPUL is to disclose to the instructing solicitor (being the first law practice) the information necessary for the first law practice to comply with its obligations under s.175(1) in relation to the second law practice. The obligation on the instructing solicitor under s.175(1) is to disclose to the client the details specified in s.174(1) in relation to the second law practice.

35. I accept that the effect of s.175 is to impose upon a barrister an obligation to provide sufficient information necessary to enable the instructing solicitor to provide to the client, “as soon as practicable”, the basis on which the barrister’s legal costs will be calculated in the matter and an estimate of the total legal costs of the barrister (being the information in s.174(1) “in relation to the second law practice”).

36. The phrase ‘as soon as practicable’ has, in a different context, been described as importing two elements. One temporal (by the use of the words ‘as soon as’) and one which identifies that which is able to be put into practice, and which can be affected or accomplished (by the use of the word ‘practicable’). The expression has also been described, again in a different context, as “imprecise and flexible in its application” [3] .

    3. Stubbings v R [2023] NSWCCA 68 at 48; R v HC (2017) 325 FLR 59 at [67].

37. Diamond Conway submits that the phrase, as used in the LPUL, is measured in days not weeks. They rely, for that submission, on a decision of this Court in A.C.N.627087030 Pty Ltd atf the YBL Trust v Elisabeth Theordore [4] . However, that decision did not purport to identify how the phrase is to be measured in all cases but simply considered the question on the facts that were before the Court (in the context of an appeal from a costs assessment review panel). Indeed, his Honour Judge Newlinds SC made plain that the phrase requires a fact specific enquiry noting [at 110] that what “is practicable can only be determined in all the surrounding circumstances, including how busy the legal practitioner is”.

    4. [2024] NSWDC 592 at [107-115].

38. The plaintiff submits that Diamond Conway should not be permitted to raise the alleged first or second failure in their motion. He submits that those allegations are not properly pleaded in the defence and further submits that the response to his requests for particulars referred to above disclaimed any allegation of a failure to comply with s.175(2) by the plaintiff. Diamond Conway for their part submitted that the pleas in paragraph 9 of its defence was sufficient to enable them to rely on the first and second failures, and they were under no obligation to explain their case in this regard any further.

39. The plaintiff further submits that he would, if the first and second failures are to be advanced, wish to file further evidence addressing both alleged failures.

40. In my view, it is doubtful that paragraph 9 of the defence complies with Uniform Civil Procedure Rules r.14.14. That rule requires a party to ‘specifically’ plead any matter that may take the other party by surprise and any matter that the party alleges makes the other party’s claim not maintainable. The purpose of the rule is to promote the ‘just, quick and cheap’ disposal of proceedings such that the real issues in dispute are litigated in a proper, timely and efficient manner. The broad pleading in paragraph 9 leaves the reader in a state of confusion as to what it is that is specifically being alleged and what facts are relied upon for the broad allegation. For example, within that plea it might be alleged, at least, that:

1. No disclosure was provided;

2. Disclosure was provided but not of the basis on which legal costs would be calculated;

3. Disclosure was not provided ‘as soon as practicable’

4. The disclosure provided was insufficient, because of a failure to provide an estimate.

41. It is unnecessary for me to decide whether paragraph 9 complies with r14.4, because in the light of the various ways that the allegation could specifically be put, it was entirely proper for the plaintiff to seek particulars of the allegation. The responses to the plaintiff’s request failed to illuminate what was being alleged by Diamond Conway. Twenty-Four years ago, Allsop J (as the Honourable James Allsop AC was then), observed that “the only consequence of keeping issues hidden or not clearly identifying them is to disrupt the business of the court leading to the waste of valuable public resources and to lead to unnecessary costs by the parties…” [5] . Whilst it is true that legal practitioners of one party do not owe duties to the other party, all parties and practitioners have duties imposed on them by s.56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).

    5. White v Overland [2001] FCA 1333 at [4]; see also Malone v New South Wales National Parks and Wildlife Service [2001] NSWCA 345.

41. Although the plaintiff’s potential further evidence was not disclosed to the Court other than in a general way, it seems clear that a question (in relation to which evidence may address) may arise as to what in fact was the relevant brief or retainer upon which time is reckoned when considering whether disclosure was provided “as soon as practicable”. Further, counsel for the plaintiff, Ms Castle did inform the Court that evidence would go to the “practicable” issue in that phrase.

42. With respect to the alleged second failure, Diamond Conway, submits that the plaintiff failed to provide an estimate of his costs in his fee disclosure. I do not understand there to be a dispute about that given the fee disclosure had “N/K” next to the estimate (it is not disputed that those initials meant ‘not known’).

43. The plaintiff submits that s.175(2) does not require the plaintiff to give an estimate. It is true that s.175(2) does not impose any specific requirement for a barrister to give an estimate. Rather, with respect to estimates, the obligation is to provide the information necessary to enable the instructing solicitor to comply with the obligation in s.174(1) to provide an estimate of the total costs in relation to the second law practice [the barrister].

44. How s.175(2) operates with respect to the provision of estimates by a barrister will be a fact specific enquiry. That is, there may be times when a barrister must give an estimate to enable compliance by the instructing solicitor with s.174(1). However, there will also be times when the provision of the daily and hourly rates of the barrister in a disclosure will be sufficient to enable the instructing solicitor, with his or her knowledge of the matter and the likely role of the barrister, to comply with s.174(1).

45. Presently, there is no evidence before the Court that any more information from the plaintiff was necessary (the word used in s.175(2)) for Diamond Conway to comply with s.174(1) in relation to the plaintiff. Further, there does not appear to be any follow up by Diamond Conway of the plaintiff for further information to enable them to comply with s.174(1) in relation to the plaintiff.

46. The plaintiff, as noted above, wishes to put on further evidence in response to the first and second failure allegations in the context of Diamond Conway’s motion.

47. I will indicate how I will deal with Diamond Conway’s notice of motion after I address the plaintiff’s notice of motion.

Application for a stay

49. The plaintiff made an application for the assessment of his costs on 28 April 2025. He then made an application pursuant to s.198(4) of the LPUL for the assessment to be dealt with after the 12-month limitation period for such assessments on the basis that it was just and fair for the application to be dealt with after 12 months.

50. The costs assessor with carriage of the plaintiff’s application ultimately referred the matter to the Manager of Costs Assessment to determine the plaintiff’s application for an extension of time. The Manager has not yet made that determination.

51. The plaintiff submits that these proceedings should be stayed to enable the assessment process to conclude given he has made a standing offer to accept the assessed costs rather than his billed costs. The cost assessor remarked that the assessment appeared to be a relatively simple one.

52. In summary, the plaintiff’s submission on the stay was that the simple costs assessment process should be compared to the complexity, time and costs involved in these proceedings. Further, given the plaintiff’s indication that he would accept the assessed costs, he would have no need to continue these proceedings after assessment.

53. In my view, however, a stay is not appropriate in these circumstances. First, at present, there is no decision as to whether an extension of time will be granted such that there may never be an assessment. Secondly, even if there is an assessment, there are reviews and appeals available to Diamond Conway should it be dissatisfied with the assessment (notwithstanding the plaintiff’s stated position). Thirdly, regardless of the outcome of the assessment, no res judicata arises such that Diamond Conway could still seek to agitate the limitation defence and the first and second failure allegations (including in proceedings it commences, should the plaintiff discontinue these proceedings), or possibly through the review and appeals processes after the initial assessment.

54. The legal issues thrown up by the defence will not necessarily be resolved through the assessment process at least in a manner which creates a res judicata. In particular, whilst the assessment process may assist the parties to quantify the plaintiff’s reasonable costs, the crux of Diamond Conway’s primary position is that the plaintiff’s claim is statute barred so that irrespective of quantification he has no right of recovery.

55. Accordingly, I am unpersuaded that there is a sufficient basis to conclude that ordering a stay of the proceedings pending determination of the plaintiff’s application for assessment of costs, will facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.

56. Diamond Conway submitted, relying on GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore [6] , that the Court, in exercising the power to order a stay under s.67 of the Civil Procedure Act, is engaged in an evaluative judgment for which there is a binary outcome, and is not engaged in the exercise of a discretion. In oral submissions, Mr Doyle Gray accepted that the High Court was not holding that the exercise of the power in s.67 could never be a discretionary exercise. That acceptance was appropriate because the plurality expressly noted that in some circumstances the exercise of the power to order a stay in s.67 is discretionary. [7] In my view, unless I was persuaded by Diamond Conway that the plaintiff’s claim must be summarily dismissed (in which case the application for a stay would fail, as an evaluative exercise), the plaintiff’s application calls for the exercise of the Court’s discretion relying, as it does, on the proposition that as a matter of case management and promotion of the objects of the Civil Procedure Act, a stay is appropriate. As I have determined, the plaintiff has failed to establish that the Court should exercise its discretion by ordering a stay of the proceedings.

    6. [2023] HCA 32

    7. Ibid at [24]

Application for leave to amend the statement of claim

57. Mr Doyle Gray accepted that unless the Court was persuaded to summarily dismiss the statement of claim, there was no proper basis to oppose the plaintiff’s alternate prayer for relief in his notice of motion, namely his application for leave to amend the statement of claim. The proceedings are at an early stage, with no hearing date appointed. No prejudice was suggested to arise from the amendment.

58. Accordingly, I will grant leave to the plaintiff to amend his statement of claim in the form of the draft Amended Statement of Claim marked annexure “A” to his notice of motion.

Resolution of the competing motions

Plaintiff’s motion

59. For the reasons set out in this judgment, I will dismiss the plaintiff’s application for a stay, however, will grant leave to the plaintiff to file an amended statement of claim as noted in paragraph 57 above.

Diamond Conway’s motion

60. I will dismiss Diamond Conway’s prayer for relief in paragraph 1 of their notice of motion seeking summary dismissal by reason of the application of the Limitation Act 1968 (NSW).

61. With respect to the prayer for relief in paragraph 2, given that the plaintiff seeks an opportunity to put on further evidence, I propose to adjourn the plaintiff’s notice of motion.

62. At the conclusion of the hearing of the motions, I directed the parties to confer on further directions that would be appropriate should I make orders permitting the plaintiff to amend the statement of claim and refusing a stay. Such orders would provide for the filing of the amended statement of claim, an amended defence, a reply and a timetabling for evidence. As I noted, earlier, the 11^th defendant submits to the orders of the Court with respect to the motions.

63. The plaintiff and Diamond Conway have provided me with proposed short minutes to which they both consent on this basis. I have reviewed those proposed orders and will make them subject to some variations.

Costs

64. I will reserve the costs of both motions including any costs thrown away by the amendment of the statement of claim. It is apparent that both parties will wish to make further submissions on costs and Diamond Conway’s motion is adjourned generally in part. How the matter ultimately progresses may well have an impact on the appropriate costs order in due course.

Orders

65. Accordingly, the I make the following orders:

1. The plaintiff is to file and serve an Amended Statement of Claim in the form of the document annexed to the plaintiff’s notice of motion filed 30 May 2025 on or before 12 September 2025.

2. The defendants are to file and serve any defences to the Amended Statement of Claim filed in accordance with order 1 above by 19 September 2025.

3. The plaintiff is to file and serve any replies to the defences to the Amended Statement of Claim filed in accordance with order 2 above by 26 September 2025.

4. The plaintiff is to file and serve all further evidence in chief upon which he proposes to rely at trial on or before 26 September 2025.

5. In respect of the plaintiff’s notice of motion filed on 30 May 2025:

1. Prayer 1 of the motion is dismissed.

2. Costs of the notice of motion, including the hearing on 26 August 2025, are reserved.

6. In respect of the notice of motion filed by the first to tenth defendants on 27 March 2025:

1. Prayer 1 is dismissed.

2. The hearing of prayer 2 is adjourned for mention before the Judicial Registrar at 10.00am on 24 October 2025.

3. Costs of the notice of motion, including the hearing on 26 August 2025, are reserved.

7. The proceedings are adjourned for a case management directions hearing before the Judicial Registrar at 10.00am on 24 October 2025.

8. The plaintiff is to notify the eleventh defendant of these orders within 24 hours of the date of these orders.

9. Liberty to restore on 3 days’ notice.

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Endnotes

Decision last updated: 02 September 2025