Bestry v Western Australian Planning Commission
[2021] WASC 462
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION: BESTRY -v- WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION [2021] WASC 462
CORAM: REGISTRAR FATHARLY
HEARD: 2 JUNE 2021
DELIVERED : 15 DECEMBER 2021
FILE NO/S: CIV 1782 of 2020
BETWEEN: ROY ALFRED GORDON BESTRY
Plaintiff
AND
WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION
First Defendant
STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Second Defendant
Catchwords:
Practise and procedure - Pleadings - Application for order striking out part of amended statement of claim
Legislation:
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 3 r 5, O 20 r 19(1)(c)
Result:
Application to strike out allowed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Plaintiff | : | R I Viner QC & L Rowley |
| First Defendant | : | H H Jackson SC |
| Second Defendant | : | H H Jackson SC |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiff | : | Rowley Legal |
| First Defendant | : | State Solicitor's Office |
| Second Defendant | : | State Solicitor's Office |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Attorney-General of Western Australia v President of the Legislative Council of Western Australia [2020] WASC 399
Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Limited v Hills Industries Limited [2014] HCA 14
Barclay Mowlem Construction Ltd v Dampier Port Authority [2006] 33 WAR 82
Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 243 CLR 253
Coshott v Lenin [2007] NSWCA 153
Dalina Huarui Heavy Industry v Clyde & Co [2020] WASC 132
Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1; (1949) 78 CLR 62
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125
Gluszak v Yeap [2020] WASC 360
Kauter v Hilton (1953) 90 CLR 86
Lampson (Australia) Pty Ltd v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd [No 3] [2014] WASC 162
Propel Accountants & Advisors Pty Ltd as Trustee for the WP Tax Unit Trust v Kazzag Pty Ltd as Trustee for The Kazzag Trust [2021] WASC 401
Technip Oceania Pty Ltd v Cutmere Pty Ltd [2019] WASC 478
Youlden Enterprises Pty Ltd v Health Solutions (WA) Pty Ltd (2006) 33 WAR 1
REGISTRAR FATHARLY:
Summary
These are my reasons for decision for striking out certain paragraphs of, and certain words contained in, the plaintiff's amended statement of claim filed 19 November 2020 (ASOC) with leave given to replead.
The plaintiff commenced proceedings on 17 July 2020 by writ of summons indorsed with a detailed statement of claim (SOC) seeking damages or equitable compensation and other relief arising from the taking of certain land located near the intersection of what is currently known as Reid Highway and Mitchell Freeway in the northern suburbs of Perth.
A pleadings dispute has plagued the advancement of these proceedings, leading to the plaintiff filing the ASOC which the defendants submit has not adequately addressed pleading issues.
On 2 June 2021 as case manager I heard the defendants' application by chamber summons filed 12 February 2021 for orders pursuant to O 3 r 5 and O 20 r 19(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (RSC) (Summons) in the following terms:
1.Until final determination of this Summons, the defendants be relieved of the obligation to file and serve a defence or give discovery.
2.Leave to make the application out of time is granted.
3.The following paragraphs of the ASOC be struck out pursuant to O 20 r 19(1)(c) RSC on the grounds that they may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action:
i.[19(a)];
ii.[19(b)];
iii.[55(c)];
iv.[57];
v.[58]; and
vi.The words 'and in breach of their duty and trust thereunder” or “and of their duty and trust thereunder” or “and their duty and trust thereunder' (as required) in paragraphs [22], [24], [25], [27], [31], [33], [36], [38], [40], [42], [44], [46], [48], [50], [53] and [59].
4.In the alternative the plaintiff is ordered to re-plead the paragraphs identified in Order 3.
5.The plaintiff pay the defendant's costs of this application, to be taxed if not agreed.
For the reasons set out herein I have determined that the impugned paragraphs and words may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action and grant the relief sought by making orders in terms of paragraphs 1 to 3 of the Summons, granting leave to the plaintiff to replead. I will hear the parties as to costs.
Extending and Abridging Time
Pursuant to O 20 r 4(1) RSC, unless the court gives leave to the contrary, the defendants appearing in and seeking to defend the proceedings must serve a defence on the plaintiff before the expiration of 14 days after the time limited for appearing or after the statement of claim is served on him, whichever is the latter.
Pursuant to O 20 r 19(3) RSC, an application to strike out a pleading must be brought within 21 days of the service of the pleading to which the application refers.
Order 3 rule 5 RSC provides:
5. Extending and abridging time
(1)The Court may, on such terms as it thinks just, by order extend or abridge the period within which a person is required or authorised by these rules, or by any judgment, order, or direction, to do any act in any proceedings.
(2)The Court may extend any such period as is referred to in subrule (1) although the application for extension is not made until after the expiration of that period.
(3)The period within which a person is required by these rules, or by any order or direction, to serve, file or amend any pleading or other document may be extended by consent (given in writing) without an order of the Court being made for that purpose.
Appearances to the writ were filed by the State Solicitor's Office for both defendants on 23 July 2020.
An ongoing dispute in case management has been whether the SOC needed to be amended before the defendants could properly file a defence.
By consent orders made:
(a)24 July 2020, the defendants were to file and serve a defence on or before 28 August 2020;
(b)26 August 2020, the time frame for filing and service of the defence was amended to on or before 15 September 2020;
(c)23 September 2020, the time frame for filing and service of the defence was amended to on or before 29 October 2020;
(d)9 November 2020, the time frame for filing and service of the defence was amended to on or before 10 December 2020;
(e)11 December 2020, following the ASOC being filed 19 November 2020, the time frame for filing and service of the defence was amended to on or before 12 February 2021, with a reply on or before 26 February 2021;
(f)25 February 2021, following the filing of the Summons on 12 February 2021, the time for filing the application to strike out was extended to 12 February 2021, with the parties to file and serve any evidence in support or their respective submissions. Accordingly, consent has been given to the application being brought at that time and leave to make the application out of time is not required.
The O 59 r 9 memorandum of conferral filed with the chamber summons sets out a detailed history of conferral including correspondence and conferences in person and by telephone since at least mid‑September 2020. The lateness of the application and leave sought can be justified in the circumstances and with the ongoing extensions by consent.
While an extension of time to 12 February 2021 has been granted by orders made by consent, to avoid any doubt I would have given leave in the circumstances even if there had not been consent and do formally grant leave.
No prejudice has been raised by the plaintiff in making those orders in terms sought for the defendants being relieved of the obligation to file and serve a defence or give discovery until determination of the summons. In practical terms that has occurred in that they have not been required to do so.
The orders made pursuant to O 3 r 5 RSC enable the consideration of merits of the strike out application to ensure that the genuine issues between the parties are clear and capable of being determined with fairness and efficiency.
Principles for striking out all or part of a claim
Order 20 rule 19 RSC provides that the whole or part of a pleading may be struck out on grounds that they:
a.disclose no reasonable cause of action or defence (O 20 r 19(1)(a) RSC);
b.are scandalous, frivolous and vexatious (O 20 r 19(1)(b) RSC);
c.may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action (O 20 r 19(1)(c) RSC);
d.are an abuse of process (O 20 r 19(1)(d) RSC).
The Summons is only based on a claim that the impugned paragraphs may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action.
As stated by Le Miere J in Gluszak v Yeap:[1]
Under its case management powers, the court has the power to strike out the whole or part of a statement of claim. The power to strike out may be exercised by the court either on the application of the parties or on its own initiative. Where, as here a strike out application is brought by the defendant, the court is not confined to considering the grounds relied upon by the defendant. In a proper case, the court may exercise its power to strike out the whole or part of a statement of claim on grounds not raised by the defendant.
…Pleadings are of fundamental importance. Pleadings determine the issues and the evidence to be led at trial as well as the scope of discovery...
…The intention and expectation of O 1 r 4A and r 4 B of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) is that the court use its case management powers to facilitate the objects of eliminating delay; disposing efficiently of the business of the court; and ensuring the procedure applicable and the costs of the procedure to the parties are proportionate to the value, importance and complexity of the subject matter in dispute.
[1] Gluszak v Yeap [2020] WASC 360, [6] - [8].
As conveniently summarised by Master Sanderson in Propel Accountants & Advisors Pty Ltd as Trustee for the WP Tax Unit Trust v Kazzag Pty Ltd as Trustee for The Kazzag Trust,[2] when dealing with an application under O 20 r 19 RSC the following principles are applicable:
a.The rule is intended to apply only to cases which are really not arguable and not cases where under the previous practice demurrer would have been the proper course;
b.On the application, not only must all the facts alleged in the statement of claim be accepted as true, but it must be taken for granted that on all other points the pleading is unassailable;
c.Great care must be exercised to ensure that a plaintiff is not improperly deprived of his opportunity for trial of his case by the appointed tribunal;
d.The rule should not be reserved for those cases where argument is unnecessary to show the futility of the plaintiff's claim;
e.As a general rule, the plaintiff is entitled to have his case heard and to have the facts found. It is only cases in which it can be seen from the outset that, however the facts be found, there is no basis for the legal conclusion contended for by the plaintiff; and
f.A court at first instance should be careful not to risk stifling the development of the law by summarily rejecting a claim where there is a reasonable possibility that, as the law develops, it will be found that a cause of action will lie.
[2] Propel Accountants & Advisors Pty Ltd as Trustee for the WP Tax Unit Trust v Kazzag Pty Ltd as Trustee for The Kazzag Trust [2021] WASC 401, [2].
There has already been considerable delay in the progress of this matter arising from the ongoing dispute as to the pleading of the OSC and ASOC. The defendants have maintained their position that they are not in a position properly to file defences. There has been ongoing conferral and a number of adjournments, the filing of the ASOC and ultimately the filing of the Summons. The parties have expended considerable efforts and costs in relation to the pleadings dispute with little progress of the proceedings.
Factual Background to Claim
To consider the issues arising in the application it is necessary to summarise the claim.
The plaintiff claims against the first defendant Western Australian Planning Commission (WAPC) and second defendant State of Western Australia (State) being the Crown in the right of the State (Crown) essentially as follows:
(a)He is the last surviving child of Anna and John Bestry, both now deceased, and each of his siblings are also now deceased;[3]
[3] ASOC pars 1, 7.
(b)On 24 September 1926 John Bestry purchased land comprised in Certificate of Title Volume 939 Folio 17 (the Bestry land).[4] Upon his death in 1960, Anna Bestry (Mrs Bestry) was granted probate of his will and the land passed to her according to the will.[5]
[4] ASCO, par 5.
[5] ASCO, par 6.
(c)In August 1963 the Metropolitan Region Planning Authority (MRPA), succeeded by its successor the first defendant, gazetted the Metropolitan Region Scheme (MRS) classifying or zoning all land within the metropolitan region of Perth plan number 10, of which that showed the Bestry land reserved for controlled access highways.[6]
[6] ASOC, pars 2, 8.
(d)An application by Mrs Bestry to subdivide the Bestry land on 2 April 1964 was refused by the State's Town Planning Board (TPD) on 21 May 1964 on the basis that it was affected by major highway proposals. That refusal was copied to the Main Roads Department (MRD), with Mrs Bestry requested to contact the MRD.[7] As a consequence of the refusal Mrs Bestry requested the TPD to purchase the whole of the land on 3 August 1964.[8]
[7] ASOC, par 9.
[8] ASOC, par 10.
(e)An agreement was made under seal (the 1965 Deed) by which Mrs Bestry agreed to sell and the MRPA agreed to purchase part of the land (Lot 4) on terms and for consideration stated in the Deed. The schedule to the Deed constituted a diagram of the land required for public works. The identified use for which Lot 4 was required by MRPA and the Crown was referred to by the description: 'STEPHENSON & NORTH PERIMETER FREEWAYS LAND REQUIRED FROM LOT PT.95 – BALCATTA RD' (Use).[9]
[9] ASOC, pars 14 - 15.
(f)Clause 7 of the 1965 Deed,[10] pleaded in full, entitled Mrs Bestry or her surviving children as the case required to be given notice of the whole or any part of the land the subject of the 1965 Deed land no longer being required and their right to purchase that land no longer required for the Use.[11]
[10] Although pleaded 'Clause 7 and the 1965 Deed …'.
[11] ASOC, par 16.
(g)Clause 7 by its terms and effect is a continuing obligation of the MRPA and the first defendant as its successor and the Crown to give such notice and the right to purchase back 'at any time in the future beyond 26 January 1965' any part of the land the subject of the Deed not required for the Use such that any failure by the MRPA and its successor or the Crown to comply with that obligation was a persistent and continuing breach of the 1965 Deed.[12]
[12] ASOC, par 17.
(h)By reason that the requirement for Use of the land the subject of the Deed was solely within the knowledge of the MRPA and its successor and the Crown, it was implied in cl 7 of the 1965 Deed (the Implied Terms) that they would:
i.Not use that land or any part of it other than for the purposes of the Stephenson Freeway and North Perimeter Highway controlled access roads;
ii.Act in good faith promptly to determine that any part of the land was not required for the Use and not unreasonably delay giving notice to Mrs Bestry, and her surviving children as the case required, when and to what extent that land or any part of it was not required for that Use;
iii.Offer the right to purchase back any such part of the land in accordance with cl 7 of the 1965 Deed.[13]
[13] ASOC, par 18.
(i)Upon a proper construction of the 1965 Deed and by legal effect of cl 7:[14]
[14] ASOC, par 19.
i.Mrs Bestry, and her children as the case required, held and the plaintiff continues to hold, an equitable interest in Lot 4 to the extent of their rights under cl 7 until the MRPA (and its successor) and the Crown has discharged all their obligations thereunder (the plaintiff's equitable interest); and
ii.The MRPA (and its successor) and the Crown were each under a duty to hold, and they hold, Lot 4 on trust for Mrs Bestry and her surviving children (as the case required) for the benefit of the plaintiff's equitable interest.
(j)By transfer dated 9 June 1967 after payment to Mrs Bestry of consideration, she transferred part of her land, being Lot 4, to the Crown.[15]
[15] ASOC, par 20.
(k)The Stephenson Freeway controlled access road for which Lot 4 was acquired has never been constructed, nor has any part of it been used for the Use and it is no longer required for that purpose.[16] Despite that continuing knowledge, the MRPA (and its successor) and the Crown have been, and continue to be, in breach of cl 7 in that they have failed to give Mrs Bestry, or any of her surviving children as the case required the notice and option to purchase back the part of Lot 4 not required, for Use.[17] Had they given such notice to the plaintiff, he would have exercised the right to purchase and continues to be prepared to exercise that right.[18]
[16] ASOC, par 21.
[17] ASOC, par 22.
[18] ASOC, par 23.
(l)A MRD drawing in 1969,[19] 1973 MRPA resolution,[20] and 1978 MRPA resolution each determined that a portion of Lot 4 was surplus to requirements for the North Perimeter Highway, and in 1978 MRPA resolved to offer to Mrs Bestry that portion of Lot 4, but neither the Crown nor MRPA gave Mrs Bestry or her children the notice and option they were obliged by cl 7 to give.[21]
[19] ASOC, par 24.
[20] ASOC, par 25.
[21] ASOC, pars 26 - 27.
(m)Despite the 1978 resolution, in 1989 the MRD advised the plaintiff that a portion of lot 4 of 1.290 ha had become surplus to 'Mitchell Freeway/North Perimeter Highway road requirements'.[22]
[22] ASOC, par 28.
(n)Despite the 1989 advice, and in purported compliance by the Crown with cl 7, in 1991 the plaintiff and his sister Gerda in payment of consideration had transferred to them 1.2545 ha of land on 29 October 1991, referred to as Lot 6 Lancelot Street, Carine, being the part of land identified in the 1989 MRD Drawing.[23]
[23] ASOC, par 29.
(o)Had the plaintiff been offered the option to purchase back the whole of the 1.290 ha area, the plaintiff would have exercised the option and continues to be prepared to exercise his right to purchase that portion of lot 4.[24]
[24] ASOC, par 30.
(p)Despite the 1969 MRD drawing showing an 803m2 portion of Lot 4 being surplus to requirements, not until 1984 did the MRPA or the Crown offer the 803m2 area to the plaintiff and Gerda to purchase by an option agreement entered into by them on 10 February 1984 for consideration. Had they done so before 1984 the plaintiff was prepared to and would have exercised his right to purchase that parcel of land.[25]
[25] ASOC, pars 31 - 32.
(q)As evidenced by MRD 1969 and 1985 drawings and a 1973 MRPA drawing, the MRPA and Crown identified an area of 3,178m2 of lot 4 not required for Use but despite that knowledge since 1969 have breached their obligations under cl 7 and have failed to offer an option to the plaintiff to purchase back that portion of the land. Had they done so at any time the plaintiff was prepared to and would have exercised his right to purchase that parcel of land and he continues to be prepared to do so.[26]
[26] ASOC, pars 33 - 34.
(r)There is a similar plea regarding part of Lot 4 being an area of 3,153m2 (the Old Limestone Kiln area), such land never being the subject of notice or offered under the cl 7 option to purchase back which the plaintiff claims he would have exercised and would exercise if given notice;[27]
[27] ASOC, par 35.
(s)There are further areas which are a portion of Lot 4 in relation to which the plaintiff claims there has been a breach of cl 7 in that:
i.the WAPC or Crown permitted to be constructed upon portions of Lot 4 not required for use for the Stephenson Freeway or the North Perimeter Highway, and which land should have been the subject of notice to the plaintiff or his siblings offering them the option to repurchase:
1.An extension of Balcatta Road;[28]
[28] ASOC, pars 38 - 39.
2.Cycleways and dual use paths in 2007 and 2008;[29]
[29] ASOC, pars 40 - 41.
3.The Mitchell Freeway in 1984 - 1986;[30]
[30] ASOC, pars 42 - 43.
4.Construction of the Norther Suburbs Railway;[31] and
[31] ASOC, pars 44 - 45.
ii.there was surplus land in portions of Lot 4 which remain unused for the Stephenson Freeway or North Perimeter Highway which the MRPA and its successor and the Crown failed to offer by notice and option to Mrs Bestry and her surviving children;[32] and
[32] ASOC, pars 46 - 54.
(iii)if there had not been a breach of the obligations the plaintiff claims he would have exercised the options and would do so if given notice.
(t)Not until 2018 by Freedom of Information requests did the plaintiff discover the true history pleaded in paragraphs [21] ‑ [54] as to:
i.the knowledge of the defendants since 1969 of the portions of Lot 4 no longer required for the Use;
ii.the fact that portions of Lot 4 required for that Use had been used for other purposes such that Mrs Bestry, and her children as the case required, ought to have been given notices and options to purchase back those portions, but in breach of cl 7 did not do so; and
iii.the WAPC and its predecessor and the Crown and State had unconscientiously with a lack of good faith concealed from Mrs Bestry, and her surviving children as the case required, and failed to notify them as required by cl 7 of portions of Lot 4 no longer required for the Use and that portions of Lot 4 had been used for purposes other than the Use.[33]
(u)The parts of Lot 4 remaining registered in the name of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II were revested in the State in or about 2008 and shown with other land in one lot on a deposited plan;[34]
(v)Notwithstanding the vesting, and save for parts of Lot 4 used for the North Perimeter Highway, the State holds the remainder of Lot 4 subject to the plaintiff's equitable interest and the trust referred to in paragraph 19;[35]
(w)By reason of their conduct described in paragraphs 21 ‑ 55 ASOC the MRPA and each of the defendants acted unconscionably and continue to act unjustly at the expense of the rights of the plaintiff under the 1965 Deed and to the enrichment of the State by its use of parts of Lot 4 other than for the Use and retention of parts of Lot 4 now vested in the State in respect of which the plaintiff holds an equitable interest.[36]
(x)By reason of the continuing breaches by the defendants of cl 7 of the 1965 Deed pleaded, the plaintiff was deprived and continues to be deprived of his right to have been given the notices and to exercise the options and purchase back those portions of Lot 4 of which he ought to have been given notice and has therefore suffered loss and damage.[37]
(y)By reason of the above the plaintiff claims declarations and any or all of specific performance, equitable compensation, all necessary accounts and enquiries, damages, interest, such other relief as the court thinks fit, and costs.[38]
[33] ASOC, par 55.
[34] ASOC, par 56.
[35] ASOC, par 57.
[36] ASOC, par 58.
[37] ASOC, par 59.
[38] ASOC, par 60.
Defendants' application and submissions
In support of the Summons the defendants filed an affidavit of Caroline Elizabeth Foster affirmed 12 March 2021 attaching a copy of the 1965 Deed and a detailed outline of submissions referencing the Limitation Act 1935 (WA), Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), 16 case authorities and a journal article on unjust enrichment. I was provided at hearing of the special appointment, without objection, a plan and aerial photograph with coloured parts shown of Lot 4 to aid in understanding the issues.
The issues giving rise to the application fell into a number of categories but arising from the defendants' claim that it cannot properly understand the plaintiff's case and desires only to do so, and at present it is not possible to plead much more than a bare denial making it more likely than not that the fair trial of the action will be embarrassed or delayed. Leave to re-plead is not opposed.
Impugned Paragraphs 19 and 57
The first issue raised by the defendants in relation to paragraphs 19 and 57 is that the ASOC pleads an express trust not a constructive trust. In paragraph 59 of the Original Statement of Claim the plaintiff pleaded a constructive trust arising from cl 7 of the 1965 Deed. By deletion of that paragraph in the ASOC, the defendants understood that a constructive trust was no longer alleged but by reference to paragraphs 19 and 57 of the ASOC and consequential references, the plaintiff's reference in the pleading to a trust is to an express trust[39] arising upon the proper construction of the 1965 Deed and legal effect of cl 7. Whether the plaintiff is pleading an express or constructive trust needs to be clear.
[39] Defendants' submissions, pars 6 - 9.
The defendants submit that if the ASOC pleads an express trust, the ASOC fails to plead the basis for it. The defendants submit that an express trust will only be created if there is clear evidence of an intention to create a trust.[40] Paragraphs 19 and 57 were impugned on the basis of being embarrassing in that the bare claim of an express trust arising from the terms of the 1965 Deed is embarrassing in that:
(a)the ASOC fails to identify the basis on which the trust is said to arise;[41]
(b)the ASOC makes no reference to surrounding facts or circumstances, or terms of the Deed as a whole or in cl 7, which might be said to amount to an expression of the intention to create a trust.[42] The defendants submit that cl 7, the wording of which is fully pleaded in the ASOC, merely provides that notice will be given to the plaintiff if all or part of Lot 4 is no longer required by the Defendants, and clause 1 and 5 state plainly that the transfer of title of Lot 4 was 'free from all encumbrances', which do not amount to an expression of intention to create a trust; and
(c)the ASOC is unclear as to when the express trust is said to arise. It is said to be unclear as to whether it is alleged the express trust arose immediately upon execution of the 1965, or upon one of the dates upon which certain portions of Lot 4 were not required, or some other date.[43]
[40] Defendants' submissions, par 10 citing Kauter v Hilton (1953) 90 CLR 86,97.
[41] Defendants' submissions, par 15.
[42] Defendants' submissions, par 13.
[43] Defendants' submissions, pars 16 - 19.
The defendant submits that if the claim of a trust is to be pursued it should be re-pleaded with sufficient certainty to allow the defendants to understand how and when the plaintiff says it arises.
The second issue raised by the defendants in relation to paragraphs 19 and 57 ASOC[44] is that the identity of the alleged trustee and that of the trust property is unclear in that:
(a)Paragraphs 19 (a) and (b) appear to plead that both defendants hold the whole of Lot 4 on trust; but
(b)Paragraph 57 states that the second defendant holds only part of Lot 4 (the remainder) on trust and makes no reference to the first defendant.
[44] Defendants' submissions, par 20.
The third issue raised by the defendants in relation to paragraphs 19 and 57 ASOC is that the paragraphs are embarrassingly unclear as to the nature of the equitable interest which the plaintiff claims to hold and its relationship to the purported trust. The relevant paragraphs and differences of pleading in that regard are set out in detail in the defendant's submissions but give rise to the defendants' contention[45] that they are unable to identify from the pleadings:
(a)the nature of the equitable interest claimed. Is it proprietary, is it a right to receive notice, something else, or a combination?
(b)the relationship of the equitable interest to the trust. Is the equitable interest the subject of the trust and if not how do the two interact if at all?
[45] Defendants' submissions, par 21 - 22.
The fourth issue raised by the defendants in relation to paragraphs 19 and 57 ASOC[46] is an alleged embarrassing lack of clarity as to when the ASOC pleads, if it does, that the defendants were first in breach of their obligations so as to give rise to the action brought, as that is necessary, amongst other things, to allow calculations of timeframes relevant to limitation defences or a defence of laches or both.
[46] Defendants' submission, pars 24 - 26.
Impugned Paragraphs 22, 24, 25, 27, 31, 33, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 53, 55, 59
The plaintiff pleads in numerous paragraphs similar, but not identical, references to the defendants' 'duty and trust' to give to the plaintiff 'the notice and option [to purchase back]' under cl 7 of the 1965 Deed.
The relevant part of cl 7 (i) states:
7(i)If the subject land or any part thereof is not required for use by the Authority or the Crown then the Authority in consideration of the provisions hereinbefore contained shall give to the Vendor or the Vendor's children as the case may require written notice that it no longer requires the subject land or part thereof and in that notice to give to the Vendor…an option to purchase the subject land or the portion thereof no longer required… [underlining added]
With the exception of attaching in a Schedule a plan of the land the subject of the terms of the 1965 Deed which makes reference to 'Stephenson & North Perimeter Freeways Land Required from Lot Pt. 95 Balcatta Rd.' and 'Land Required from Lot Pt. 95 for C.A. Roads' there is no reference in the Deed to the Use, only 'for use by the Authority or Crown'.
By way of example of the impugned paragraphs referring to the 'duty and trust', paragraph 22 ASOC pleads:
22.Despite their continuing knowledge that no part of lot 4 was to be used for and was no longer required for use for and has not been used for the Stephenson Freeway, the MRPA (and its successor) and the Crown in continuing breach of their obligation under cl.7 of the 1965 Deed and in breach of their duty and trust thereunder failed at any time to give Mrs Bestry or to any of her surviving children (as the case required) the notice and option to purchase back the part of lot 4 not used and required for use for the Stephenson Freeway which they were obliged to give them by cl.7. [underlining added]
Paragraphs 22, 24, 25, 27, 31, 33, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 53, 55[47] and 59 all contain similar wording in relation to the defendants' alleged breach of their obligation under cl 7 and of their duty and trust thereunder. Most are pleaded to arise from failure to give notice and the option, with paragraphs 31, 40, 42 and 44 referring to other matters amounting to a 'breach of duty and trust thereunder'.
[47] Not expressly referred to in the chamber summons but referred to in the Defendants' Submissions.
The defendants submit[48] that the reference to duty and trust depend on either or both of paragraphs 19 and 57 ASOC and should rise and fall with the pleadings of those paragraphs.
[48] Defendants' submissions, pars 27 - 29.
A matter not expressly raised in the Defendants' submissions as to those paragraphs but perhaps flowing from the issues as to who has the trust obligations, if any, and the basis for the trust referred to in the ASOC, is that if the reference is to cl 7 of the Deed, and the duty and trust arising [emphasis added], any obligation to provide notice and offer the option to purchase appears to be that of the first defendant not the second defendant notwithstanding the ASOC which repeatedly refers to the breach of those obligations by each of the defendants.
Impugned paragraph 55 (c)
Sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 55 ASOC is impugned. It relevantly states:
55.Not until 2018 under Freedom of Information disclosures and in 2019 / 2020 by pre-action discovery did the Plaintiff discover the true history as pleaded in paragraphs [21] to [54]:
…
(c) that the First Defendant and its predecessor and the Crown and the State had unconscientiously with a lack of good faith concealed from Mrs Bestry and her surviving children (as the case required) and failed to notify them pursuant to their obligations under cl.7 of the 1965 Deed and their duty and trust thereunder that:
(i) no part of lot 4 was any longer required for the Stephenson Freeway; and
(ii) the portions of lot 4 described in paragraphs [21] [24], [31], [33], [35], [40, [42], [44], [46], [48], [50] and [53] hereof were no longer required for the Stephenson Freeway or the North Perimeter Highway; and
(iii) the portions of lot 4 described in paragraphs [38], [40], [42] and [44] hereof no longer required for use for the Stephenson Freeway or the North Perimeter Highway; were to be and they were used for purposes other than for the Stephenson Freeway or the North Perimeter Highway…
The following issues are raised by the defendants:
(a)The pleaded failure to notify does not demonstrate bad faith concealment of anything as it is equally consistent with the defendants in good faith understanding the land to be required for future development of relevant roads and therefore no action was required.
(b)O 20 r 13(1)(b) RSC requires that particulars of the facts on which the party relies must be pleaded where 'fraudulent intention' is alleged. That is inconsistent with paragraph 55 ASOC which states that particulars will be provided after discovery and before trial. The defendants state that at the very least that paragraph ought to be struck out or at least made subject to orders for particularisation.
Impugned paragraph 58
Paragraph 58 ASOC now states:
By reason of their conduct described in paragraphs [21] to [55] hereof the MRPA and each of the Defendants acted unconscionably and they continue to act unjustly at the expense of the rights of the Plaintiff under the 1965 Deed and to the enrichment of the State by its use of parts of lot 4 for purposes other than for use for Stephenson Freeway or the Northern Perimeter Highway and the retention by the State of ownership of those parts of lot 4 now vested in the State in respect of which the Plaintiff holds the Plaintiff's equitable interest.
The defendants contend that paragraph 58 is expressed at such a level of generality that it is legally incomprehensible and ought be struck out.[49] In brief, it is submitted by reference to authorities and the journal article[50] that:
[49] Defendants' submissions, pars 40 - 51.
[50] Professor Kit Barker, Unjust Enrichment in Australia: What is(n't)? Implications for legal reasoning and practice (2020 43(3) Melbourne University Law Review 903, 932 - 933.
(a)There is no cause of action per se for 'unjust enrichment' any more than there is a cause of action in 'tort', rather it is a taxanomic category covering a collection of established causes of action with:
i.the indispensable 'unjust factor';
ii.a vitiating or qualifying factor, calling for restitution of value of an enrichment conferred in particular circumstances;
iii.the unjustness arising from a vitiating or qualifying factor such as mistake, duress or failure of consideration;
(b)there is nothing in the ASOC identifying the qualifying or vitiating factor or allowing an inference to be drawn identifying the factor that the plaintiff contends applies so as to allow restitution to be ordered. The paragraph ought to be struck out for that reason;
(c)the qualifying or vitiating factor may affect the availability or scope of defences up which the defendants may rely, such that the inability to identify the factor precludes the defendant from understanding the case against it to plead their defences; and
(d)the claim for unjust enrichment is inconsistent with the plaintiff's contractual claim and ought to be struck out for that reason. The contractual claim proceeds on the basis that the contract remains on foot with mutually agreed allocation of risk to which the law of unjust enrichment must yield, so where as here, a plaintiff pleads the defendant obtained a benefit from the plaintiff under contract the defendant must plead facts which demonstrate that the contract is void or voidable so as to both defeat the defendant's claim to the benefit under contract and displace any concern that restitution will undermine a valid contractual allocation of risk.
Senior Counsel for the defendants read from the decision of Coshott v Lenin [2007] NSWCA 153 in which Mason P, with Spigelman CJ and Campbell JA concurring, stated at [8], [10]:
[8] If we are confined to examination of the pleadings, they disclose no more than a label ('unjust enrichment') being assigned to a narrow thread of facts. The High Court has recently affirmed that 'unjust enrichment is not a "definitive legal principle according to its own terms" ' (Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22 at [151]
…
[10] A restitutionary cause of action cannot sit on top of an effective and continual contractual arrangement where that would subvert or undermine the contractual allocation of risk. In and around contract restitution operates in a gap-filling role…The statement of claim offers no clue to suggest a basis for regarding the parties' contractual arrangements as ineffective.
The further decisions of Edelman J in Lampson (Australia) Pty Ltd v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd [No 3] [2014] WASC 162 and the High Court in Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Limited v Hills Industries Limited [2014] HCA 14 were referred to in the context of the need for pleadings and giving rise to enquiries into the defendant being enriched, enrichment at the expense of the plaintiff, and enrichment being unjust.
There is a further issue not referred to in the Defendants' Submissions as to paragraphs 55(c) and 58, namely in addition to being generally repetitious the alleged conduct differs. Whether that is intentional or is of the nature of the same allegation but due to inconsistent drafting of the ASOC amendments is not clear. By comparison:
(a)In paragraph 55(c): 'the First Defendant and its predecessor and the Crown and the State had unconscientiously with a lack of good faith concealed…'; compares to
(b)In paragraph 58: 'the MRPA and each of the Defendants acted unconscionably and they continue to act unjustly at the expense of the rights of the Plaintiff…'
Two General Complaints
The defendants make two further general complaints:
(a)The claims are not pleaded in the alternative. On their face they are pleaded as a singular claim[51] but in substance they are several separate claims which cannot concurrently exist:
i.Paragaphs 21 – 23 plead that none of Lot 4 in its entirety has been used for the Use and that the defendants have failed to notify the plaintiff of that fact;
ii.paragraphs 24 – 32 plead that certain parts of Lot 4 were determined by the defendants as not required for their purposes and were offered to the plaintiff to purchase;
iii.other numerous paragraphs pleaded concern parts of Lot 4 said not to have been used for the Use, that is for a purpose that is not the relevant purpose;
(b)There are allegations, for example in paragraphs 35, 46, 48, 50, 53 in respect of non‑identifiable portions of land which leave the defendants to estimate the locations and boundaries, whereas the locations and boundaries should be identified with precision, preferably on a map annexed to the ASOC.
[51] Defendants' submissions, par 52.
Plaintiff's reply submissions
The plaintiff filed an outline of submissions with reference to the RSC, 21 case authorities, and the same journal article referred to by the defendants. Reference was made to counsel for each party conferring which resulted in the ASOC. The plaintiff filed no affidavits in response to the Summons.
The plaintiff's submissions set out in detail the law relied upon and attempt to explain why the pleadings are not defective but also seek to clarify what is pleaded for avoidance of doubt.
The plaintiff set out[52] general principles as to strike out applications which are not in issue. In particular:
(a)The court will only strike out in a clear case; a strike out application is not a substitute for the determination at trial of questions of law which the pleaded facts require to be determined by judgment after trial.[53]
(b)Interlocutory pleading disputes are actively discouraged because they consume substantial amounts of time and expense.[54]
(c)The purpose of the pleadings includes the definition of the issues to be determined in the case and enabling assessment of whether they give rise to an arguable cause of action or defence, as the case may be, and apprising the other parties to the proceedings of the case they have to meet. The contemporary role of pleadings has to be viewed in the context of contemporary case management techniques and pre-trial directions.[55]
(d)To ensure a basic requirement of procedural fairness, the pleading must state the case sufficiently clearly to allow the other party a fair opportunity to meet it. Pleadings must define with clarity and precision the issue or questions which are in dispute between the parties and fall to be determined by the court.[56]
[52] Plaintiff's submissions, pars 5 - 11.
[53] Plaintiff's submissions, par 6: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125, 129 - 130; Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1; (1949) 78 CLR 62, 91.
[54] Plaintiff's submissions, par 7: Youlden Enterprises Pty Ltd v Health Solutions (WA) Pty Ltd (2006) 33 WAR 1.
[55] Plaintiff's submissions, par 8: Martin CJ in Barclay Mowlem Construction Ltd v Dampier Port Authority [2006] 33 WAR 82, [25]; Allanson J in Technip Oceania Pty Ltd v Cutmere Pty Ltd [2019] WASC 478, [16] - [17].
[56] Plaintiff's submissions, par 9: Attorney-General of Western Australia v President of the Legislative Council of Western Australia [2020] WASC 399, [64].
In broad terms, the plaintiff submits that the ASOC meets the requirements for pleadings and does not meet any of the criteria to warrant striking out or repleading. It is submitted that the pleaded facts are material, questions of law are identified, and both are intelligible, readily and clearly identifiable and clearly state the case of the plaintiff and relief sought from the defendants.[57] The plaintiff submits that to the extent that further particulars are to be provided, as identified in the ASOC, and the issues require further discovery, contemporary case management techniques and pre-trial actions can readily be made and applied.
[57] Plaintiff's submissions, pars 10 - 11.
Paragraphs 19 and 57 Express Trust and Equitable Interest and Constructive Trust
The plaintiff's contention is that the pleadings are expressed in terms of established principle, are clear in pleading the material facts giving rise to the claimed trust and equitable interest (the 1965 Deed as a whole and cl 7 in particular), relying on the proposition 'the rules of construction of contracts apply to trusts'.[58]
[58] Plaintiff's submissions, par 12: citing Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 243 CLR 253, [102] (Heydon & Crennan JJ), [48], [53], [59] and [60] (Cummow & HayneJJ); Dalina Huarui Heavy Industry v Clyde & Co [2020] WASC 132, [164] (Kenneth Martin J).
It is contended that paragraph 19 of the ASOC is plain and intelligible in its pleading of an express trust arising by and upon the proper construction of cl 7 of the 1965 Deed, and to the extend the defendants do not understand the surrounding facts and circumstances concerning the intention of the parties to the Deed, they are referred to the material facts pleaded in paragraphs 8 to 15 ASOC, the provisions of the 1965 Deed as a whole and cl 7 in particular, from which the court can construe cl 7 and the intention of the parties.[59] It creates an equitable interest in land.[60]
[59] Plaintiff's submissions, pars 13 - 14.
[60] Plaintiff's submissions, par 15.
The plaintiff submits that paragraph 57 ASOC is necessarily pleaded to reflect the fact that the State's legal title in lot 4 is subject to a constructive trust in favour of the plaintiff's equitable interest as the Crown, now the State, was not party to the 1965 Deed and the land is vested in the State.[61]
[61] Plaintiff's submissions, pars 16 - 22.
Paragraph 55(c) Unconscionable Conduct and Lack of Good Faith
The plaintiff explains paragraph 55(c) on the basis that:
(a)Paragraph 18(b) ASOC pleads that the MRPA and its successor and the Crown were subject to an obligation of good faith as an implied contractual term of cl 7 of the 1965 Deed that they would: 'act in good faith to promptly determine that any part of lot 4 was not required for [the Use] and not to unreasonably delay in notifying…';
(b)Paragraph 55(c) is the corollary of paragraph 18 in that the alleged concealment was in continuing breach of the obligation in paragraph 18, that it is a continuing obligation to act in good faith and make the offer required by cl 7; and in breach of the trust pleaded in paragraph 19 ASOC. It is said to be thus a consistent and coherent pleading, from which damages for breach or equitable relief or both will flow according to findings made at trial.
Paragraph 58 - Restitution for Unjust Enrichment
The plaintiff set out at length submissions on the law of restitution for unjust enrichment. There is no dispute as to the principles of law, rather as to the pleadings flowing from them.
The plaintiff submits regarding paragraph 58 that the unconscientious failure or refusal of the defendants to offer back to the plaintiff the identified portions of lot 4 not required for either the Stephenson Freeway or the North Perimeter Highway, together with the major infrastructure constructed on lot 4 other than the North Perimeter Highway, evinces an intention to retain that land in breach of the obligations contained in cl 7 of the 1965 Deed. Unjust enrichment is pleaded in support of restitution.[62]
[62] Plaintiff's submissions, pars 25 - 31.
Response to General Complaints
As to the general complaints the plaintiff submits that:
(a)The defendants, by complaining that there are several different claims of alternative claims, misapprehend the pleadings and that the causes of action in contract and equity are clearly separately pleaded arising from the contractual obligations contained in cl 7 and the trust and equitable interest established by cl 7. It is said each alleged breach of contract and breach of equitable duty and trust is separately pleaded[63] and that it is clear when each of the breaches is said to occur as the obligation was a continuing one from the date of execution of the 1965 Deed with each breach being a continuing one. The alleged dates of the breaches are set out in the plaintiff's submissions;[64]
(b)the defendants misapprehend aspects of its claim pleaded at paragraphs 21 to 23 and again seeks to clarify their pleading at paragraphs 21 to 32;[65]
(c)portions of land are sufficiently identified for the purposes of pleadings, which further and better particulars can clarify more precisely, and that there has already been detailed discovery given by the defendants and third parties;
(d)the requirement for a single plan showing all of the portions of the land is not necessary for pleadings and unnecessary for clarity of the matters pleaded in the ASOC, but would be a convenience or evidence not a material fact, and expert evidence will be provided for trial.[66]
[63] Plaintiff's submissions, pars 32 - 36.
[64] Plaintiff's submissions, pars 37 - 39.
[65] Plaintiff's submissions, par 40.
[66] Plaintiff's submissions, pars 41 - 45.
Defendants' reply submissions
While the defendants have filed a detailed reply submission, I have not repeated the submissions here in details as it is unnecessary to do so in arriving at my decision.
The defendants note that there is additional confusion created by the plaintiff's submissions:
(a)referring both to an express trust and to a constructive trust, particularly in the context of paragraph 19;
(b)the basis for the express trust and alleged breach of it immediately upon execution of the 1965 Deed when it is said the trust came into existence, notwithstanding that if the trust is express it requires determination and notice of land not being required; and
(c)the nature of the equitable interest.
The defendants maintain that the plea of unconscionable behaviour and want of good faith has been pleaded without a properly pleaded factual basis for it, requiring knowledge of an obligation to notify if part of lot 4 was not required for the Use, knowledge that there were parts of lot 4 not required for that purpose, deliberately choosing not to notify the plaintiff, and deliberately acting in a way in to benefit the defendants or disadvantage the plaintiff or both. The defendants submit that the plaintiff must plead the facts supporting the contention.
The defendants maintained their complaints about the pleas of unjust enrichment and general complaints raised.
Consideration and determination
I have considered in detail submissions made by each party in the context of the ASOC.
The plaintiff, having set out the legal principles relating to striking out pleadings, submits that the ASOC in all respects meets the requirements to plead material facts, define the issues to be determined, identify the arguable causes of action and apprise the defendants of the case they have to meet.
With all due respect to Senior Counsel for the plaintiff, I disagree with the plaintiff's submissions for the following reasons:
(a)Senior Counsel for the defendants has set out very clearly a myriad of issues with the ASOC, all of which I accept as being problems needing to be addressed by repleading with the exception that I would not require the plaintiff at this stage to be required to prepare a detailed map or plan referencing each area unless it were convenient to do so. Such a map or plan may well save considerable time however and be a key component of the documents and evidence to be given for trial;
(b)Upon my consideration of the whole of the ASOC it is apparent that there are:
i.inconsistencies within the pleadings, both as to the manner of pleading and the claimed causes of action;
ii.pleaded obligations which on the one hand are contractual in nature but on the other which are said to give rise to a 'duty and trust' thereunder and arise from an express trust and a constructive trust when the nature and basis of the trusts and trust obligations have not been pleaded or it has been pleaded who has obligations as a trustee; and
iii.serious allegations made in paragraphs 55(c) and 58, themselves inadequately and inconsistently pleaded, which refer to conduct of the defendants involving a lack of good faith, concealment, unconscionability and acting unjustly, the material facts relied upon for such allegations have not been stated.
With respect to the express trust and equitable interest the plaintiff submits is plain and intelligible:
(a)While it may be the plaintiff's case that there was an express trust arising from the 1965 Deed, and in particular 7, and that it was the intention of the parties to create an express trust obligation:
i.The Deed does not refer to a trust, the creation of a trust or the holding of property on trust in the same way that it did, for example, in Byrnes v Kendle, in which the deed was called an Acknowledgement of Trust, constituted Mr Kendle a trustee and created interests in property for Mrs Byrnes as a tenant in common with a life interest in his interest if he predeceased her;
ii.paragraph 19 makes no reference to an express trust, but rather refers to an equitable interest (under cl 7) and a duty of the MRPA and its successor and the Crown being under a duty to hold lot 4 on trust for the benefit of the plaintiff's equitable interest [emphasis added];
iii.to the extent the trust arises from cl 7, the notice obligation is only one stated to be that of the 'Authority', being the MRPA as it was. The Crown, now the State as pleaded, was not a party to the Deed;
iv.to the extent the plaintiff relies on the facts pleaded at paragraphs 8 to 15 the 1965 Deed to demonstrate the intention of the parties, there is no reference in paragraphs 19 and 57 to reliance upon those particulars for that intention or of the basis for those facts giving rise to the existence of an express trust or constructive trust on certain terms; and
v.it would not be difficult for the plaintiff to amend the ASOC to replead the claim in such a way as to make very clear what is pleaded to address the issues raised.
The plaintiff's submission that paragraph 57 is a reference to a constructive trust arising from the 'equitable interest and the trust referred to in paragraph 19 hereof' only makes more confusing the issue without a clear pleading when paragraph 19 refers to an express trust and paragraph 57 refers to a constructive trust. With the cross‑referencing of one to the other with a different basis, and of the several different allegations that each of the defendants themselves or by their predecessors breaching their obligations under cl 7 of the 1965 Deed and their duty and trust thereunder, there is an embarrassing lack of clarity in the pleading even if the plaintiff has a proper claim for an equitable interest and the right to have been given notice and option to repurchase supported by the authorities referred to.
With respect to paragraphs 55(c) and 58:
(a)it is trite that allegations of fraud or misrepresentation or allegations of dishonesty or impropriety must not be pleaded without a proper factual basis, and any such allegation must be pleaded with particularity so that the facts unequivocally demonstrate dishonesty involved. If there is a proper factual and evidential basis for the allegations, the pleading should properly be made. It is entirely improper for the plaintiff to make, and for the defendants to be required to defend, generalised allegations akin to fraud, dishonesty or impropriety by relying upon the rest of the statement of claim without then unequivocally demonstrating that the conduct of the defendants or their predecessors, whether in breach of their obligations under the 1965 Deed or otherwise, constituted the conduct of the type alleged.
(b)Given the nature of the allegations, it is inappropriate to indicate merely that further particulars will be provided after discovery and before trial because:
i.Firstly, serious allegations of this type should not be made without a proper foundation, so to make them counsel must have a proper basis and should be able to state it without needing discovery;
ii.secondly, it is inappropriate for a party, for any period, to be required to defend generalised allegations of impropriety or dishonesty;
iii.thirdly, the scope of discovery is defined by matters in issue based upon the pleadings. The defendants must be able to properly plead to the plaintiff's allegations before discovery can be given. At present they are in the embarrassing position that they cannot do so;
iv.fourthly, it is inappropriate for discovery to be used in this context as a fishing expedition to create or bolster a case for which there is a lack of foundation for a serious allegation to be made.
(c)If the pleas are intended to be a corollary to the obligation of good faith pleaded in paragraph 18 ASOC with a continuing breach of the obligation of good faith to promptly determine and notify, such that the conduct was unconscionable or that the defendants have been unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff, the pleading of those paragraphs is not clear or consistent with the elements to be made out.
With respect to the defendant's complaint about when each alleged breach is said to have occurred, the plaintiff explains in the submissions that each obligation is a continuing one and then sets out the date of alleged breach for 12 separate breaches by the defendants of obligations, some of which will only be known after discovery and inspection. It is unfortunate that the plaintiff has been able to state by submissions the details which should have been stated in the ASOC and which is one of the complaints made by the defendants. The defendants should not have to search for the answers beyond the ASOC or amended pleading. However, the defendants complain that in any event the alleged dates of breaches arising, referred to in the plaintiff's submissions, show the absurdity of the plaintiff's claim in that the obligation to hold the land on trust and breaches of the obligations cannot have arisen upon execution of the 1965 Deed and be continuing.
In all the circumstances, the relief sought by the defendants in paragraphs 1 to 3 of the Summons should be granted. The paragraphs and words referred to in the Summons should be struck out with leave to replead to address the concerns.
The striking out and repleading does not prevent the plaintiff from having his case considered on the merits and heard at trial, rather requires the plaintiff to plead his claims with greater precision to avoid the prejudice, embarrassment or delay of the fair trial of the action.
While I will hear from the parties as to costs and any further orders required, and without deciding the issue until the parties have had an opportunity to be heard, there is no apparent reason why costs should not follow the event.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
AP
Court Officer
15 DECEMBER 2021
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