Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barker v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2012] FCA 1076

Citation: Barker v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2012] FCA 1076
Parties: STEPHEN JOHN BARKER v COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
File number: SAD 187 of 2010
Judge: BESANKO J
Date of judgment: 3 October 2012
Corrigendum: 10 October 2012
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for a stay of execution of judgment pending determination of appeal – whether appropriate to exercise discretion to grant stay – balance of convenience – Rule 36.08 of Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Held: It is appropriate to grant a partial stay of the enforcement of the judgment.

Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 Rule 36.08,
Cases cited: Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 685, cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v BMW (Australia) Limited (No 2) [2003] FCA 864, cited
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Myer Emporium Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 220, cited
Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd (No 3) (1996) 65 FCR 66, cited
Hood Barrs v Crossman [1897] AC 172, cited
Powerflex Services Pty Ltd and Ors v Data Access Corporation (1996) 35 IPR 193, cited
Re Middle Harbour Investments ltd (in liq) (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 15 December 1976), cited
TCN Channel 9 Pty Ltd v Antoniadis (No 20) (1999) 48 NSWLR 381, cited
Date of hearing: 26 September 2012
Place: Adelaide
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 22
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S McDonald
Solicitor for the Applicant: Minter Ellison Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P Heywood-Smith QC with Mr S Mitchell
Solicitor for the Respondent: Pace Lawyers

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barker v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2012] FCA 1076

CORRIGENDUM

  1. This judgment was originally published as Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker [2012] FCA 1076 and has been amended to Barker v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2012] FCA 1076.

  2. In order 1, the words “applicant’s appeal” should read: “Commonwealth Bank of Australia’s appeal” and the words “applicant’s interlocutory application” should read “Commonwealth Bank of Australia’s interlocutory application”.

  3. Paragraph 22 should read:

    I will make an order that enforcement of any amount agreed or taxed in relation to costs pursuant to the third order made by the Court on 3 September 2012 be stayed pending the hearing and determination of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia’s appeal, but that otherwise the Commonwealth Bank of Australia’s interlocutory application dated 17 September 2012 be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding three (3) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Corrigendum to the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Besanko.

Associate:

Dated:       10 October 2012


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 187 of 2010

BETWEEN:

STEPHEN JOHN BARKER
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

BESANKO J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 OCTOBER 2012

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Enforcement of any amount agreed or taxed in relation to costs pursuant to the third…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 1076
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker involved the Commonwealth Bank seeking a stay of execution of a judgment pending the determination of its appeal. The dispute centered around the enforcement of a judgment against the Commonwealth Bank for failing to terminate the respondent's employment contract in accordance with required notice or payment in lieu. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with deciding whether to exercise its discretion to grant a stay of execution of the judgment.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether it was appropriate to grant a partial stay of the enforcement of the judgment. The court needed to balance the convenience of both parties and consider Rule 36.08 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. The Commonwealth Bank argued that it might not be able to recover the sum it was ordered to pay if the appeal was successful, due to the respondent's limited means. Conversely, the respondent had secured full-time employment and owned property that provided him with some financial security. The court had to weigh these factors to determine the appropriate course of action.

The court found that while the respondent was entitled to enforce his judgment, there was a real doubt about his ability to repay a significant sum if required to do so. Therefore, it decided that a partial stay of the enforcement of the costs order in favor of the respondent was appropriate. The court reasoned that staying enforcement of the costs order was a suitable alternative to requiring the Commonwealth Bank's solicitors to provide an undertaking to repay any costs if the appeal was successful. Consequently, the court ordered that enforcement of any amount agreed or taxed in relation to costs be stayed pending the hearing and determination of the appeal, while dismissing the Commonwealth Bank's application in all other respects.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Enforcement of any amount agreed or taxed in relation to costs pursuant to the third order made by the Court on 3 September 2012 be stayed pending the hearing and determination of the applicant’s appeal, but that otherwise the applicant’s interlocutory application dated 17 September 2012 be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The order sought in paragraph 3 involves an acceptance by the applicant that it failed to terminate the respondent’s contract of employment in accordance with the provision requiring notice or payment in lieu (see reasons at [276] and [279].THE FACTS In support of its application, the applicant relied on two affidavits of a lawyer (Mr Jarrad Nelson Parker) employed by the firm of solicitors acting for it. In his first affidavit, Mr Parker referred to evidence given by the respondent at the trial to the effect that between 9 April 2009 and 30 June 2011, that his consulting business earned $116,528.18. Mr Parker said that the applicant is concerned that if it paid the respondent the sum of money it is required to pay pursuant to the orders, and is subsequently successful in its appeal, it will not be able to recover that sum from the respondent due to the fact that his means are limited relative to the size of the anticipated payment. In opposition to the application, the respondent relied on an affidavit of a lawyer (Ms Alisha Nicole Thompson) employed by the firm of solicitors representing him. Ms Thompson’s affidavit establishes the following matters:(1)The respondent has recently secured permanent full-time employment as a “Key Account Manager: Banking” with Elders Services Company Pty Ltd. His cash salary in this position is $140,000 plus 9 per cent superannuation, plus a fully maintained motor vehicle. (2)The respondent owns a property at 2 Light Walk, Adelaide. The property is an investment property and the respondent receives rent from the property of $2,590 per month net after management fees and expenses. The rent received is approximately equal to the repayments of the loan for the property, with the effect that the property is currently held by the respondent on a cashflow neutral basis. The applicant is the first mortgagee. It lent an amount to the respondent which is secured by a first mortgage over the property. The applicant obtained a valuation of the property from Megaw and Hogg, national valuers and their valuation of the property as at 25 January 2011 was $720,000. There are two further encumbrances over the property, the first being a caveat lodged by Serina Iolanda Pace and the other being a caveat lodged by Semaphore Palais Hotel Pty Ltd. Ms Thompson states that the equity in the property after deducting the amounts secured by the encumbrances is approximately $180,000.(3)If the judgment sum is paid by the applicant to the respondent then, according to his instructions, the respondent intends to use the majority of the funds received to reduce the debt secured against the property, thereby increasing the value of the equity in the property by a corresponding amount. (4)Other than the amount secured against the property, the respondent has no further significant liabilities other than his normal day-to-day bills and expenses that he has and continues to pay from time to time when they fall due.(5)The respondent has incurred legal fees from time to time in the conduct of this proceeding. As at the date of Ms Thompson’s affidavit, he had discharged a total sum of $314,550.20 by way of solicitor’s fees, counsel fees and other disbursements. The respondent continues to make payments towards his accounts as rendered from time to time.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It seems to me that this is an appropriate case for a partial stay. If the only amount in issue was the judgment sum of $317,500 and interest of $37,090, I would not grant a stay because I do not think the evidence adduced by the applicant is sufficient to displace the prima facie position that the respondent is entitled to enforce his judgment (see the statement of Mahoney JA in Re Middle Harbour Investments ltd (in liq) (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 15 December 1976) cited in Powerflex at 194). On the other, there must be real doubt as to the respondent’s ability to repay a sum in the order of $750,000 within a reasonable time should he be required to do so. It is not possible to be precise, but I think the appropriate course is to stay enforcement of the costs order in favour of the respondent against the applicant. The costs can be agreed or taxed, but the order for costs cannot be enforced until the hearing and determination of the appeal. I am fortified in thinking that this is an appropriate order because it is similar to another course which might have been adopted which is the extraction of an undertaking from the applicant’s solicitors that any costs paid to them be repaid should the appeal be successful: Hood Barrs v Crossman [1897] AC 172 at 175-176 per Lord Herschell; TCN Channel 9 Pty Ltd v Antoniadis (No 2) (1999) 48 NSWLR 381 at 385.CONCLUSION I will make an order that enforcement of any amount agreed or taxed in relation to costs pursuant to the third order made by the Court on 3 September 2012 be stayed pending the hearing and determination of the applicant’s appeal, but that otherwise the applicant’s interlocutory application dated 17 September 2012 be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established