Palmer, in the matter of Queensland Nickel Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Parbery, in his capacity as Liquidator of Queensland Nickel Pty Ltd (In Liq)
[2016] FCA 1094
•2 September 2016
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Palmer, in the matter of Queensland Nickel Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Parbery, in his capacity as Liquidator of Queensland Nickel Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2016] FCA 1094
File numbers: QUD 580 of 2016
QUD 684 of 2016Judge: PERRAM J Date of judgment: 2 September 2016 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application to set aside decision of registrar to refuse document for filing
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal – whether arguable ground of appeal
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for stay
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 596A
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 35A
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 2.26
Companies Act 1862 (UK) ss 115 and 138
Cases cited: Barker v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2012] FCA 1076
Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330
Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36
Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd v Nixon [1999] FCA 1281
Saraceni v Jones (2012) 287 ALR 551
Saraceni v Jones (2012) 246 CLR 251
Suttor v Gundowda Pty Limited (1950) 81 CLR 418
Date of hearing: 2 September 2016 Registry: Queensland Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 41 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr N Ferrett Solicitor for the Applicant: J W Smith & Associates Counsel for the Respondents: Mr B O’Donnell QC with Mr A Stumer Solicitor for the Respondents: King & Wood Mallesons ORDERS
QUD 580 of 2016 IN THE MATTER OF QUEENSLAND NICKEL PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 009 842 068)
BETWEEN: CLIVE FREDERICK PALMER
ApplicantAND: STEPHEN JAMES PARBERY IN HIS CAPACITY AS A LIQUIDATOR OF QUEENSLAND NICKEL PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 009 842 068) and others named in the Schedule
First Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
2 SEPTEMBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application to review the decision of Registrar Baldwin on 1 September 2016 be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
ORDERS
QUD 684 of 2016 IN THE MATTER OF QUEENSLAND NICKEL PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 009 842 068)
BETWEEN: CLIVE FREDERICK PALMER
ApplicantAND: MARCUS WILLIAM AYRES IN HIS CAPACITY AS A LIQUIDATOR OF QUEENSLAND NICKEL PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 009 842 068) and others named in the Schedule
First Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
2 SEPTEMBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The stay application be dismissed.
2.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
3.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
PERRAM J:
Clive Frederick Palmer is due to be examined before this Court on Monday, 5 September 2016. That situation comes about as a result of orders made by a registrar of this Court on 3 August 2016 pursuant to s 596A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). As originally framed, those orders would have required Mr Palmer’s attendance before this Court on 19 August, but, as I understand it, some difficulties were encountered in effecting service of the examination summons upon him.
Subsequent to that, orders were obtained for substituted service on Mr Palmer on 15 August. At the same time, the original return date of the summons was amended to 30 August. The evidence does not precisely indicate when it was that substituted service upon Mr Palmer was effectuated, but it seems clear that it had certainly happened before 26 August. That is because it was on 26 August that Mr Palmer applied to set aside the examination summons to this Court. 26 August was Friday last week. When that application was made by Mr Palmer it was heard on an urgent basis by a judge of this Court, who reserved his decision over the weekend and delivered judgment on Monday, 29 August.
Greenwood J, who heard the application to set aside the examination summons, dismissed the application. On 31 August Mr Palmer sought to file a notice of appeal from the order dismissing his application, which had been made by Greenwood J. On the day that that notice of appeal was lodged in the Court’s eLodgment system, a registrar of the Court directed, pursuant to rule 2.26 the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), that the notice of appeal not be accepted for filing. The reason that course was taken apparently was because of the view formed by the registrar that the orders which had been made by Greenwood J were interlocutory in nature, and therefore that what was required was an application for leave to appeal.
Further correspondence then took place between the parties. On 1 September, which was yesterday, an application for leave to appeal was filed by Mr Palmer from the orders which had been made by Greenwood J. At around the same time, an appeal was lodged pursuant to s 35A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), to review the decision of the registrar to reject for filing the notice of appeal. Each of those matters comes before the Court this afternoon. In addition, there is an application filed in the winding up to stay the examination proceedings. The way the matter was conducted, the parties and I have proceeded upon the basis that the application for a stay should be understood as having been made in the application for leave to appeal. Although the issues are somewhat technical in that regard, it is a significant matter to note.
When the matter was called on for hearing this afternoon, after some discussion it was accepted that the application for review of the registrar’s decision under s 35A could not really go anywhere, and substantive submissions were not made about it. On the application for the stay, however, this was not the case. The evidence before me in relation to that application was the affidavit of Mr Palmer of 31 August, and an affidavit of Ms Costello for the liquidators of 2 September.
In addition to those two affidavits, I have also had regard to paragraphs 45 to 70 of an affidavit sworn by Mr Palmer of 23 August. This affidavit was before Greenwood J last Friday, and was the subject of objections and also of suppression orders. The objections have been dealt with since that time, and, as I understand it, the suppression orders are also in the process of being finalised and reduced in ambit. The affidavit was not read before me. The reason I have adverted to it is because part of the argument which was advanced on the present application was that his Honour’s method of treatment of the affidavit had occasioned Mr Palmer some denial of procedural fairness. In order to gauge and to understand that argument it is necessary at least to have regard to what was being put to Greenwood J in the affidavit.
The course I have taken is therefore to examine the affidavit as an item which was before the trial judge, not to accept the truth of any of its contents, but merely to give the context and understanding to what was being put to the judge. In addition to that evidence I have also received written submissions from the parties. I take into account written submissions sent to my associate by the liquidators, dated 2 September. I also take into account paragraphs 21 to 24 of Mr Palmer’s written submissions, which were provided to me by Mr Ferrett today. It was accepted during the course of argument that I did not have to advert to the balance of those written submissions, because they overlapped with the oral submissions which were made by Mr Ferrett on Mr Palmer’s behalf. So they are the matters which are before me.
I will deal first with the appeal from the registrar’s decision to refuse Mr Palmer’s notice of appeal for filing. Section 35A only applies to delegated judicial powers to registrars in the circumstances set out in subsection (1), and in relation to the list of powers set out in Schedule 2 to the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The decision of the registrar was a decision under rule 2.26, and is not a decision which falls into either of those sets of provisions. It is, in fact, an administrative decision. Accordingly, there is no power in this Court to entertain an appeal pursuant to s 35A. Mr Ferrett very properly, I think, accepted that this was correct during the course of argument.
As a matter of procedural regularity I think the correct thing to do is to dismiss the appeal from the registrar’s decision, which I do with costs. Given it was only filed yesterday, I imagine the costs are not very large at this stage.
I then turn to the application for a stay, which, as I have said, is to be treated as if it had been made as a collateral incident in the application for leave to appeal. The principles governing the grant of such a stay are not really in dispute, and are familiar. Pertinently, for present purposes, there are two such principles. First, the court ought not to grant a stay unless satisfied that there is an arguable ground of appeal: see Barker v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2012] FCA 1076 at [14] per Besanko J. Secondly, even if so satisfied, the Court must consider where the balance of convenience lies, including any prejudice which may be suffered by either party by the respective granting or withholding of the stay: see Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd v Nixon [1999] FCA 1281 at [17] per Sackville, Hely and Gyles JJ.
So the first issue which needs to be resolved is whether there is an arguable ground of appeal. Mr Ferrett, in his concise and efficiently put argument, advanced three grounds of appeal. The first of these was a constitutional argument. It was submitted that the summonses had been issued under s 596A of the Corporations Act, and that by reference to classical statements as to the nature of judicial power, that was a power which could not be reposed in a Chapter III Court such as this Court.
To give a flavour of the point, one of the more general descriptions of the nature of judicial power can be found in what is said to be the classical exposition by Griffiths CJ in Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330 and, in particular, a passage at 357, where his Honour said:
… I am of opinion that the words "judicial power" as used in sec. 71 of the Constitution mean the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action.
As I apprehended the argument, when one looked at what happened in an examination summons process, one did not – or one could not – see anything which resembled that kind of judicial determination of a situation calling for a binding or authoritative determination.
The second argument advanced on Mr Palmer’s behalf was based upon a statement made by Basten JA in a case called Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36 at 39. There Basten JA was not talking of s 596A, but rather s 596B, but in the present context that is not a material difference. His Honour was discussing what the limits were to the exercise of the power involved in the issue of examination summons, and he suggested that it was limited by a number of considerations, including:
… because the purpose of the section is to allow the receivers and managers to be informed of facts about the affairs of the company, the information should be information not within their knowledge, although the extent of knowledge will not be precisely definable.
Mr Ferrett placed particular emphasis upon the words ‘should be information not within their knowledge’. He submitted that it could be deduced from that that the examination summons procedure in s 596A could not be used by a liquidator to examine a person about matters which the liquidator was already informed. That was the first step in the argument. The second step in the argument was the drawing of a corollary from the first step that if a liquidator could not examine in relation to a subject matter about which he knew, he could not examine if he has in his possession documents which he has not yet reviewed. That was the second argument.
The third argument was a procedural fairness argument. At the hearing Mr Palmer sought to rely upon the affidavit to which I have already referred – that is, the affidavit of 23 August 2016. As I have indicated already, for the time being at least, until Greenwood J resolves the matter, the contents of that affidavit remain suppressed. At the hearing, the trial judge rejected large swathes of the affidavit, on relevance and other grounds, including several substantive parts of paragraphs 45 to 70. The trial judge did not actually reject those parts of the affidavit until after the argument had concluded. In that regard, it is useful to note that his Honour delivered short reasons on 31 August dealing with the objections: see Palmer, in the matter of Queensland Nickel Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Parbery, in his capacity as Liquidator of Queensland Nickel Pty Ltd (In Liq) (No. 2) [2016] FCA 1060, where his Honour rejected paragraphs 45 to 64 and 67 to 170, whilst reading paragraphs 65 and 66.
Mr Palmer says that because of the procedure which was adopted by the judge not ruling on the contents of the affidavit until after the hearing had been determined, he was denied an opportunity. What opportunity was he denied? He was denied the opportunity to make an application to adjourn the hearing before Greenwood J last Friday so as to put on further evidence which on this hypothesis would have satisfied the rules of evidence. To put it another way, if his Honour had indicated he was going to reject the paragraphs in question during the hearing, Mr Palmer would have sought to remedy the deficiencies which the judge perceived in the affidavit by means of an adjournment and putting on further evidence.
If the evidence had been put on, I infer the next step in the argument is that it would have permitted the argument that he wished to advance based on those paragraphs to have succeeded, or to have had an increased prospect of succeeding.
So those were the three arguments which were advanced to me this afternoon. I should say in deference to Greenwood J that the argument which has been put before me today is a much more concise version of the argument which was put before him last Friday, and it is apparent that his Honour’s judgment has refined the issues as indeed have the parties, making the task in front of me a somewhat simpler one than the one which confronted his Honour.
I deal then first with the constitutional argument. The validity of provisions such as s 596A of the Corporations Act is not an entirely novel area, although until relatively recently, it has not been the subject of direct authority. It seems to be assumed by everyone who examines the question that examination procedures precisely analogous to those obtaining in 19th Century Chancery practice are probably constitutionally valid. Certainly that was the assumption upon which the West Australian Court of Appeal proceeded in Saraceni v Jones (2012) 287 ALR 551.
That case was not concerned with a direct assertion of that proposition. It was rather concerned with an allied proposition which is the question of the validity of s 596A when by statute its range is extended to a person such as a receiver. The reason the receivership is said to be relevant is because when one examines what the state of the law was under the Companies Act 1862 (UK), it is apparent that at least sections 115 and 138 of that Act did not contemplate an entity or a person such as a receiver obtaining an examination summons in a winding up.
Despite that, the West Australian Court of Appeal in Saraceni concluded that s 596A was valid in relation to an application made by a receiver. The leading judgment was given by the President, and at paragraphs 114 through to 214 her Honour examined closely the history of the legislation surrounding s 596A and revisions such as s 115 of the Companies Act 1862. The conclusion to which her Honour came was that the function was sufficiently analogous so that s 596A could be seen to lie in the zone of constitutional validity cast around examination procedures in general. That decision was the subject of an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court. The special leave application was refused.
Unusually, the Court gave reasons for its refusal of special leave, and they are reported as Saraceni v Jones (2012) 246 CLR 251. For reasons which will become shortly apparent, it is relevant to have regard to paragraph 3 of those reasons, and paragraph 4. There the Court said:
3. One of those powers, conferred by s 115 of the 1862 Act, was to order the compulsory examination of an officer or other person whom the court deemed capable of giving information about the affairs of the company. The provisions of the Corporations Act which it is sought to impugn are not to any relevantly different effect. The identification in ss 596A and 596B of the circumstances in which an order may be made differs from the more generally expressed reference in s 138 of the 1862 Act to it being "just and beneficial" to make the order, but those differences are not presently significant. The making on application of a receiver of a mandatory examination order is an action of a kind which had come by 1900 to be so consistently regarded as peculiarly appropriate for judicial performance that it then occupied an acknowledged place in the structure of the judicial system.
4. The actual orders of the Court of Appeal are not attended by doubt. McLure P set out the text of ss 115 and 138 of the 1862 Act and the passage in the reasons of Kitto J in Davison to which we have referred. Her Honour concluded that the analogy between an examination in respect of companies in receivership and those in voluntary liquidation was "very close" and that the power of a court in this latter respect was of longstanding and predated Federation. We need express no further view about the correctness of the reasons given by the Court of Appeal.
Before me this afternoon, Mr Ferrett sought to point to a difference between the 1862 procedure and the s 596A procedure to demonstrate that in the current circumstances, the analogy was not sufficient to maintain the validity of the provisions. Sections 115 and 138 of the 1862 Act are as follows:
115. The Court may, after it has made an Order for winding up the Company, summon before it any Officer of the Company or Person known or suspected to have in his Possession any of the Estate or Effects of the Company, or supposed to be indebted to the Company, or any Person whom the Court may deem capable of giving Information concerning the Trade, Dealings, Estate, or Effects of the Company; and the Court may require any such Officer or Person to produce any Books, Papers, Deeds, Writings, or other Documents in his Custody or Power relating to the Company; and if any Person so summoned, after being tendered a reasonable Sum for his Expenses, refuses to come before the Court at the Time appointed, having no lawful Impediment (made known to the Court at the Time of its sitting, and allowed by it), the Court may cause such person to be apprehended, and brought before the Court for Examination; nevertheless, in Cases where any Person claims any Lien on Papers, Deeds, or Writings or Documents produced by him, such Production shall be without Prejudice to such Lien, and the Court shall have Jurisdiction in the Winding up to determine all Questions relating to such Lien.
…
138. Where a Company is being wound up voluntarily the Liquidators or any Contributory of the Company may apply to the Court in England, Ireland, or Scotland, or to the Lord Ordinary on the Bills in Scotland, in Time of Vacation, to determine any Question arising in the Matter of such Winding up, or to exercise, as respects the enforcing of Calls, or in respect of any other Matter, all or any of the Powers which the Court might exercise if the Company were being wound up by the Court; and the Court or Lord Ordinary, in the Case aforesaid, if satisfied that the Determination of such Question, or the required Exercise of Power, will be just and beneficial, may accede, wholly or partially, to such Application, on such Terms and subject to such Conditions as the Court thinks fit, or it may make such other Order, Interlocutor, or Decree on such Application as the Court thinks just.
Mr Ferrett’s point was that the issue of an examination summons under s 115 was not compulsory but was dependent upon the Court exercising a discretion to issue it. By contrast, once an eligible applicant applies under s 569A, and the other preconditions to that section’s operation have been enlivened, the summons must be issued.
This argument seems not to have been advanced in the Court of Appeal in the Saraceni decision. It certainly does not appear to have been addressed in the reasons of the learned President. And in fairness to Greenwood J in this case, Mr Ferrett very properly accepted that this precise form of his constitutional argument had not been advanced to him either. But it was said not to be a difficulty that it had not been, because it was purely a question of law, and in line with cases such as Suttor v Gundowda Pty Limited (1950) 81 CLR 418, it was open to Mr Palmer raise it. No point was taken against that.
One difficulty with the argument is that the passage I have set out above from the reasons of the High Court on the special leave application do appear to address themselves quite precisely to ss 115 and 138 of the 1862 Act. Certainly the way I would read those paragraphs would be as indicating that the Court was quite aware that there were substantial textual differences between ss 115 and 596A, and furthermore, that those textual differences extended to the fact that one provision was discretionary and the other was not. I would accept the submission which was made on behalf of the liquidators therefore, that the argument being advanced by Mr Ferrett this afternoon is in fact the argument which the High Court rejected at paragraph 3 of its reasons.
That is not a complete answer to the argument, though. It was submitted that the High Court’s decision on the special leave application in Saraceni was not, strictly speaking, binding upon me. I am not necessarily sure that is correct. It is well understood that the outcomes of special leave applications are not binding when attempts are made to take Courts to transcripts of special leave applications and to extract material from them. And no doubt the fact that an application has been dismissed does not tell one very much because the grounds for special leave are so narrow. But that, of course, is not what happened in Saraceni v Jones. Saraceni v Jones involved a dismissal of the application for special leave unusually with reasons of a substantive kind, and ultimately, as paragraph 4 I think shows, on the basis that the High Court thought that the Court of Appeal’s decision was correct.
However, for the purposes of this afternoon, I am prepared to assume in Mr Palmer’s favour that as a matter of the strict doctrine of precedent, the High Court’s pronouncements in its special leave decision do not bind me. Nevertheless, I am bound to observe that the reasoning which appears at paragraphs 3 and 4 seems to me to be compelling.
The reason it is compelling is because whilst it is true that s 596A on the one hand contains a power which must be exercised once the preconditions are met, and on the other hand, s 115 of the 1862 Act contains a power which is discretionary, that difference does not seem to me to have anything to do with the underpinning infrastructure of the constitutional argument. That question is driven by notions of judicial power and analogy with practice. The fact that a summons is issued as a matter of right rather than as a matter of discretion does not seem to intersect in the constitutional plane.
Of course, the substantive point being made, ultimately, is that the position that Mr Palmer finds himself in is not analogous to the position which existed in Saraceni. I would be disinclined to accept that, because of the matters I have just outlined. In addition, there is a further reason why it seems to me to be inapt, and that is that in this case, the special purpose liquidators were appointed by order of this Court, by Dowsett J. It seems to me to be difficult to see that the examination process which is now to take place cannot be seen as ancillary or collateral to the supervision of this Court, when it is this Court which in fact appointed the special liquidators to their office.
In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that the proposed forms of constitutional argument have any prospects of success. Greenwood J spent some time dissecting the Court of Appeal’s decision in Saraceni v Jones. It seems to me that the Court of Appeal’s decision is effectively a complete answer to Mr Palmer’s argument, and the differences which he points to in the current situation are not material. I do not think that the proposed ground of appeal from Greenwood J’s judgment in relation to the constitutional argument has any prospects of success.
I turn then to the abuse of process argument. I have set out the passage from Basten JA’s judgment above. There are two steps in Mr Ferrett’s argument. The first is that one can only examine a person pursuant to s 596A about something one does not know. The second step is if one has not read the documents which have been obtained, one cannot do so either. This effectively ought to be seen for what it is, which is a submission that a liquidator cannot examine a person about things which the liquidator ought to know, or alternatively, that a liquidator cannot examine a person about matters that a liquidator knows he does not know.
Abuse of process involves concepts of using powers for purposes for which they are not conferred. I am happy to accept that if the liquidator was shown to know all of the subject matter of the proposed examination, there may well be an argument that it would be an abuse of process to allow the examination to continue. But I do not think that an abuse of process argument can be extracted from the proposition that the liquidator had not yet read the documents or he had not continued to conclusion his process of consideration. It seems to me that that argument is speculative.
I turn then to the procedural fairness argument. The argument is, as I understood it, that Mr Palmer wished to advance a contention that in the paragraphs of the affidavit to which I have referred, there was evidence of conversations which, if accepted, could lead to an argument which might suggest that the Commonwealth had appointed or sought the appointment of the special purpose liquidators for purposes which were improper.
It was in the pursuit of that argument that my attention was drawn to the relevant parts of the affidavit. Before Greenwood J, no such oral argument was advanced. That is, his Honour was never told in Court that Mr Palmer wished to rely upon the paragraphs to establish an improper purpose on the part of the Commonwealth in appointing the special purpose liquidators.
Further, no such argument was advanced in the written submissions which were put before his Honour. The only place one finds a trace of it in the material which was before him last Friday is in the affidavit itself. It is not surprising therefore that his Honour ultimately rejected the evidence as irrelevant, because the way the case was orally and in writing conducted before him was never explained to go to a particular issue. It has been explained to me this afternoon what the issue is that it goes to, but it was not explained to Greenwood J. That is the reason, therefore, that Greenwood J rejected the material in his decision of 31 August, and it is also the reason one finds no treatment of the issue in his Honour’s reasons on the substantive matter delivered on Tuesday.
This rather suggests that that is an important matter when it comes to consider the validity of the procedural fairness argument. The argument appears to be that had the judge told Mr Palmer that he was going to reject his evidence because it was irrelevant, he would have sought to adjourn the matter to put on evidence which would have made it relevant. But that simply makes no sense, in my opinion, in circumstances where he was not advancing the case in question. I do not accept, therefore, that there is any substance in the procedural fairness issue.
It follows from all of that that that I am not satisfied that there is any arguable ground of appeal, and accordingly I should dismiss the application for a stay. It makes it unnecessary to deal with the issue of balance of convenience. Had it been necessary to deal with that issue, I would not have accepted Mr Palmer’s contentions in relation to it. The matter has been on foot for some time. There is a public interest in the pursuit of these matters, substantial amounts of money are involved, and adequate time has been afforded.
I dismiss Mr Palmer’s application of 31 August 2016 for a stay. I dismiss Mr Palmer’s application to review a decision of the registrar dated 1 September 2016, and in both matters, I order Mr Palmer to pay the liquidator’s costs.
In that circumstance, it seems to me to follow that I should dismiss the application for leave to appeal as well with costs.
I certify that the preceding forty-one (41) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Perram. Associate:
Dated: 9 September 2016
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
QUD 580 of 2016 Second Respondent
MARCUS WILLIAM AYRES IN HIS CAPACITY AS A LIQUIDATOR OF QUEENSLAND NICKEL PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 009 842 068)
Third Respondent
MICHAEL ANDREW OWEN IN HIS CAPACITY AS A LIQUIDATOR OF QUEENSLAND NICKEL PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 009 842 068)
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
QUD 684 of 2016 Second Respondent
MICHAEL ANDREW OWEN IN HIS CAPACITY AS A LIQUIDATOR OF QUEENSLAND NICKEL PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 009 842 068)
Third Respondent
STEPHEN JAMES PARBERY IN HIS CAPACITY AS A LIQUIDATOR OF QUEENSLAND NICKEL PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 009 842 068)
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