Commissioner of Taxation v Day

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, HEYDON AND KIEFEL JJ

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION  APPELLANT

AND

SHANE DAY  RESPONDENT

Commissioner of Taxation v Day
[2008] HCA 53
12 November 2008
S315/2008

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

D H Bloom QC with K J Deards for the appellant (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

M L Brabazon with A H Rider for the respondent (instructed by Leitch Hasson Dent Solicitors)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON AND KIEFEL JJ.   The respondent was a senior compliance officer with the Australian Customs Service between 1997 and 1999.  The Public Service Act 1922 (Cth), in force at the relevant time[1], provided that an officer may be charged with failure to fulfil his duty as an officer[2].  In that event an inquiry was to be held[3], and the officer charged could be suspended from duty pending the hearing and determination of the charge[4].  The officer holding the inquiry, if satisfied that the charge was made out, could direct that action be taken in relation to the officer the subject of the charge.  Such action included deduction of salary, demotion or dismissal from the Australian Public Service[5] ("the Service").

    [2]Public Service Act 1922, s 61(2).

    [3]Public Service Act 1922, s 62(1).

    [4]Public Service Act 1922, s 63B(1)(d).

    [5]Public Service Act 1922, s 62(6).

  2. The respondent was charged with failure of duty in 1998 ("the first charge") and in 1999 ("the third charges"). A second set of charges notified to the respondent is not relevant to this appeal. The respondent sought and obtained legal advice and representation in connection with the first and third charges (together, "the charges"). In his objection to the Commissioner of Taxation's notice of assessment of his income to taxation, for the year ended 30 June 2002, the respondent claimed that $37,077 should have been allowed as a deduction from his assessable income. That figure represents the balance of the legal expenses incurred by the respondent with respect to the charges, after recovery of costs under an order of the Federal Court with respect to the first charge. On 19 April 2005 the Commissioner disallowed that objection. The respondent appealed to the Federal Court under s 14ZZ(a)(ii) of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth).

  3. Section 8‑1(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ("the ITAA") provides:

    "(1)You can deduct from your assessable income any loss or outgoing to the extent that:

    (a)it is incurred in gaining or producing your assessable income; or

    (b)it is necessarily incurred in carrying on a business for the purpose of gaining or producing your assessable income.

    (2)However, you cannot deduct a loss or outgoing under this section to the extent that:

    (a)it is a loss or outgoing of capital, or…

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Details
Case
[2008] HCA 53
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia concerning the deductibility of legal expenses incurred by the respondent taxpayer. The dispute centred on whether these expenses, incurred in defending charges brought under the *Public Service Act 1922* (Cth), were allowable deductions under section 8-1(1) of the *Income Tax Assessment Act 1997* (Cth) as losses or outgoings incurred "in gaining or producing assessable income," or whether they were of a "private or domestic nature" and thus non-deductible under section 8-1(2).

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the respondent's legal expenses were incurred "in gaining or producing" his assessable income, and alternatively, whether these expenses were of a private or domestic nature. The Court was required to determine the necessary connection between the expenditure and the income-producing activity, and to consider the character of the conduct giving rise to the legal expenses in light of the respondent's public service employment.

A majority of the High Court (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ) found that the respondent's legal expenses were not deductible. Their Honours reasoned that the conduct giving rise to the charges was "quite beyond anything contemplated as being involved in the taxpayer's duties" and lacked the requisite temporal or other connection with the gaining or producing of assessable income. The Court emphasised that the expenditure must be connected to specific activities that are productive of assessable income, rather than merely being incidental to employment. Alternatively, the majority concluded that the expenditure was of a private nature. Kirby J dissented, considering the expenditure to be deductible as it was incurred to protect the taxpayer's employment and thus his income.

The appeal was allowed with costs, meaning the Commissioner of Taxation was successful.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs. (Majority decision, Kirby J dissenting)

Background

Background to the litigation

In the uncontested facts of this case, it cannot be said that the respondent incurred his legal expenses "in" (in the sense of "in the course of") gaining or producing his assessable income. The matters giving rise to his expenditure on legal expenses lacked the requisite temporal or other connection with gaining or producing his assessable income[106]. The conduct of the taxpayer that gave rise to the necessity of incurring legal expenses was "quite beyond anything contemplated as being involved in the taxpayer's duties"[107]. Alternatively, the expenditure was a loss or outgoing of a private nature. The Commissioner was therefore correct in deciding that the expenses were not deductible. The Full Court erred in concluding otherwise. [106]cf Amalgamated Zinc (De Bavay's) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1935) 54 CLR 295 at 310 per Dixon J; [1935] HCA 81. The passage is cited by Dowsett J in Day (2007) 164 FCR 250 at 262 [58].[107](2007) 164 FCR 250 at 269 [84] per Dowsett J.The facts and legislation The background facts of this case are explained in the reasons of Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ ("the joint reasons")[108]. In considering those facts it is necessary to appreciate that, in some cases, conduct contrary to express or implied prohibitions in a contract of service or (as here) contrary to the provisions of s 56 of the PSA[109] (as then applying) will nonetheless be "closely connected to the performance of particular duties so that the infringing conduct may accurately be so described"[110]. [108]Joint reasons at [2], [6]-[10].[109]PSA, s 56, set out in the joint reasons at [6].[110](2007) 164 FCR 250 at 267 [73]. This would most obviously be so where the alleged infringements of the officer, as charged, amounted to inefficiency or incompetence[111]; negligence or carelessness[112]; improper conduct that affects adversely the performance of duties or brings the Service into disrepute[113]; patronage, favouritism or discrimination[114]; failure to comply with provisions of the Act or terms and conditions of employment[115]; or the provision of incorrect or misleading information in connection with the appointment to the Service[116]. Even particular cases of wilful disobedience or wilfully disregarding directions given by a person in authority might conceivably, in some circumstances, amount to an inappropriate way of endeavouring to perform duties having a relevant connection with the duties of an officer in the Service.[111]PSA, s 56(b).[112]PSA, s 56(c).[113]PSA, s 56(d) and (e).[114]PSA s 56(ea).[115]PSA, s 56(f).[116]PSA, s 56(g). In the present case, however, as Emmett J recorded at first instance, the respondent did not suggest that any of the conduct that led to the charges involved the performance by him of his duties and functions as a Customs officer[117]. This conclusion, unchallenged in the appeals (including before this Court), throws light on the statutory characterisation of the legal proceedings initiated by the respondent, in which he incurred the legal expenses for which he claims deduction. [117]Noted (2007) 164 FCR 250 at 269 [82] per Dowsett J.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON AND KIEFEL JJ (dissent) KIRBY J (dissent)
The charges were notified to the respondent on 22 March 1999. The respondent commenced proceedings in the Federal Court on 24 August 1999, in which it was alleged that information contained in telephonic communications, which had been intercepted by the Australian Federal Police as part of a criminal investigation, had been made available to officers of Customs including the officer who gave notice of the third charges, and that that communication was unlawful. He sought orders that the third charges be set aside and that the inquiry under s 62 of the Public Service Act 1922 be stayed, and a declaration. That application[11], an appeal to a Full Court[12], and an application for special leave to appeal to this Court were refused with costs.[11]Day v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2000) 96 IR 240.[12]Day v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (2000) 101 FCR 66.The decisions of the Federal Court Emmett J's holding, that the Commissioner was estopped from asserting that the legal expenses incurred by the respondent with respect to the third charges were not deductible, was based upon an order made by the Federal Court in earlier proceedings, to which the Commissioner consented, which allowed a deduction for fees paid to one counsel for legal advice in connection with the third charges. His Honour took the view that the Court must be taken thereby to have determined the deductibility of the other legal expenses referable to those charges[13]. It is not necessary to consider that aspect of his Honour's reasoning further. The Full Court upheld the Commissioner's appeal in that regard, and the respondent does not seek to raise that aspect of the Court's decision. This appeal is concerned solely with the question of the deductibility of the legal expenses by reference to s 8‑1(1).[13]Day v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 62 ATR 530 at 546 [71]‑[72]. The judges in the Federal Court were divided in their opinions on the issue of deductibility. Dowsett J, in his dissenting judgment in the Full Court, agreed with the primary judge, Emmett J, that the legal expenses were not deductible because the conduct the subject of the charges comprised acts unconnected to the duties to be performed by the respondent in the course of earning assessable income[14]. The misuse of the respondent's identity card was unrelated to the performance of his duties and none of the conduct referred to in the third charges was performed by the respondent in the discharge of his duties as a customs officer[15].[14]Day v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 62 ATR 530 at 540 [43], 541‑542 [52] per Emmett J; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Day (2007) 164 FCR 250 at 259 [52], 267 [73] per Dowsett J.[15]Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Day (2007) 164 FCR 250 at 268 [77], 269 [84]. The majority in the Full Court held that the expenditure was allowable as a deduction but differed in their reasoning to that conclusion. Spender J considered it to be irrelevant whether the conduct the subject of the charges was extraneous to the discharge of his duties[16]. Because the expression "incurred in gaining or producing … assessable income" is to be given a very wide application[17], it was necessary to consider the purpose of defending the charges, his Honour reasoned. The purpose of the respondent was to protect himself from the consequences of s 62(6) of the Public Service Act 1922, and therefore to protect his recurrent employment income from diminution or loss[18]. Expenditure in defence of a taxpayer's employment satisfies the test in s 8‑1(1)(a)[19].[16]Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Day (2007) 164 FCR 250 at 257 [34].[17]Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Day (2007) 164 FCR 250 at 256 [25], citing Amalgamated Zinc (De Bavay's) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1935) 54 CLR 295 at 303 per Latham CJ; [1935] HCA 81.[18]Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Day (2007) 164 FCR 250 at 256 [27]‑[28].[19]Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Day (2007) 164 FCR 250 at 257 [31].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

The Commissioner accepts that the respondent was also under an obligation, imposed by s 56(d) of the Public Service Act 1922, not to engage in improper conduct, but submits that the observance of that duty was not itself an activity which was productive of the respondent's income and was therefore not relevant. The Commissioner submits that a positive obligation to perform tasks of employment is different from one not to engage in certain other conduct, particularly where the conduct proscribed involves private misbehaviour. The Commissioner argues that the dichotomy between conduct undertaken in performance of the tasks for which the respondent was employed and improper conduct in breach of s 56(d) of the Public Service Act 1922, which was rejected by Edmonds J, is a distinction that s 8‑1(1)(a) makes necessary. In the Commissioner's submission, the questions arising under the provision cannot be answered by identifying the occasion of the outgoing as the respondent's employment which, in a general sense, was productive of the respondent's income. The Commissioner says that the attention of s 8‑1(1) is directed to specific activities which can be said to be productive of assessable income.Consideration of the Commissioner's argument The terms of s 8‑1(1)(a) of the ITAA and its predecessors[31] have not been regarded as materially different[32]. They refer to a relationship between expenditure incurred and what is productive of assessable income, which is to say the connection necessary for deductibility[33]. The words "incurred in gaining or producing … assessable income", appearing in the section, have long been held to mean incurred "'in the course of' gaining or producing" income, as was observed in Payne[34]. In Amalgamated Zinc (De Bavay's) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[35], Latham CJ explained that it was necessary to read "losses and outgoings … incurred in gaining or producing the assessable income" as incurred "in the course of" gaining or producing that income, in order to make the section[36] intelligible. Outgoings may have an effect in gaining income, but losses cannot, as they simply reduce income[37]. In Commissioner of Taxation v Cooper[38] Hill J observed that an outgoing might be referable to a year of income other than that in which it was incurred[39]. That was a reason why s 51(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) did not express the right to a deduction in terms of outgoings incurred to earn income[40]. The words "in the course of" therefore facilitate the application of s 8‑1(1)(a). They do not require a direct connection between the expenditure in question and an activity itself productive of income.[31]Section 51(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth); s 23(1)(a) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922 (Cth).[32]Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Citylink Melbourne Ltd (2006) 228 CLR 1 at 30 [90] per Crennan J; [2006] HCA 35.[33]Payne (2001) 202 CLR 93 at 99-101 [9]‑[13] per Gleeson CJ, Kirby and Hayne JJ, 112 [51] per Gaudron and Gummow JJ.[34](2001) 202 CLR 93 at 99 [9] per Gleeson CJ, Kirby and Hayne JJ (emphasis added), referring to Amalgamated Zinc (De Bavay's) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1935) 54 CLR 295 at 303 per Latham CJ, 309 per Dixon J; Ronpibon Tin (1949) 78 CLR 47 at 56-57; Charles Moore & Co (WA) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 95 CLR 344 at 350.[35](1935) 54 CLR 295.[36]Section 23(1)(a) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922 (Cth).[37]Amalgamated Zinc (De Bavay's) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1935) 54 CLR 295 at 303 per Latham CJ.[38](1991) 29 FCR 177.[39](1991) 29 FCR 177 at 197, referring to Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Smith (1981) 147 CLR 578; [1981] HCA 10.[40]Commissioner of Taxation v Cooper (1991) 29 FCR 177 at 197.