HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, HEYDON AND KIEFEL JJ
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION APPELLANT
AND
SHANE DAY RESPONDENT
Commissioner of Taxation v Day
[2008] HCA 53
12 November 2008
S315/2008ORDER
Appeal dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation
D H Bloom QC with K J Deards for the appellant (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
M L Brabazon with A H Rider for the respondent (instructed by Leitch Hasson Dent Solicitors)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON AND KIEFEL JJ. The respondent was a senior compliance officer with the Australian Customs Service between 1997 and 1999. The Public Service Act 1922 (Cth), in force at the relevant time[1], provided that an officer may be charged with failure to fulfil his duty as an officer[2]. In that event an inquiry was to be held[3], and the officer charged could be suspended from duty pending the hearing and determination of the charge[4]. The officer holding the inquiry, if satisfied that the charge was made out, could direct that action be taken in relation to the officer the subject of the charge. Such action included deduction of salary, demotion or dismissal from the Australian Public Service[5] ("the Service").
[1]Repealed by Sched 1 to the Public Employment (Consequential and Transitional) Amendment Act 1999 (Cth).
[2]Public Service Act 1922, s 61(2).
[3]Public Service Act 1922, s 62(1).
[4]Public Service Act 1922, s 63B(1)(d).
[5]Public Service Act 1922, s 62(6).
The respondent was charged with failure of duty in 1998 ("the first charge") and in 1999 ("the third charges"). A second set of charges notified to the respondent is not relevant to this appeal. The respondent sought and obtained legal advice and representation in connection with the first and third charges (together, "the charges"). In his objection to the Commissioner of Taxation's notice of assessment of his income to taxation, for the year ended 30 June 2002, the respondent claimed that $37,077 should have been allowed as a deduction from his assessable income. That figure represents the balance of the legal expenses incurred by the respondent with respect to the charges, after recovery of costs under an order of the Federal Court with respect to the first charge. On 19 April 2005 the Commissioner disallowed that objection. The respondent appealed to the Federal Court under s 14ZZ(a)(ii) of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth).
Section 8‑1(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ("the ITAA") provides:
"(1)You can deduct from your assessable income any loss or outgoing to the extent that:
(a)it is incurred in gaining or producing your assessable income; or
(b)it is necessarily incurred in carrying on a business for the purpose of gaining or producing your assessable income.
(2)However, you cannot deduct a loss or outgoing under this section to the extent that:
(a)it is a loss or outgoing of capital, or…
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- Case
- [2008] HCA 53
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court were whether the respondent's legal expenses were incurred "in gaining or producing" his assessable income, and alternatively, whether these expenses were of a private or domestic nature. The Court was required to determine the necessary connection between the expenditure and the income-producing activity, and to consider the character of the conduct giving rise to the legal expenses in light of the respondent's public service employment.
A majority of the High Court (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ) found that the respondent's legal expenses were not deductible. Their Honours reasoned that the conduct giving rise to the charges was "quite beyond anything contemplated as being involved in the taxpayer's duties" and lacked the requisite temporal or other connection with the gaining or producing of assessable income. The Court emphasised that the expenditure must be connected to specific activities that are productive of assessable income, rather than merely being incidental to employment. Alternatively, the majority concluded that the expenditure was of a private nature. Kirby J dissented, considering the expenditure to be deductible as it was incurred to protect the taxpayer's employment and thus his income.
The appeal was allowed with costs, meaning the Commissioner of Taxation was successful.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs. (Majority decision, Kirby J dissenting)
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
The Commissioner accepts that the respondent was also under an obligation, imposed by s 56(d) of the Public Service Act 1922, not to engage in improper conduct, but submits that the observance of that duty was not itself an activity which was productive of the respondent's income and was therefore not relevant. The Commissioner submits that a positive obligation to perform tasks of employment is different from one not to engage in certain other conduct, particularly where the conduct proscribed involves private misbehaviour. The Commissioner argues that the dichotomy between conduct undertaken in performance of the tasks for which the respondent was employed and improper conduct in breach of s 56(d) of the Public Service Act 1922, which was rejected by Edmonds J, is a distinction that s 8‑1(1)(a) makes necessary. In the Commissioner's submission, the questions arising under the provision cannot be answered by identifying the occasion of the outgoing as the respondent's employment which, in a general sense, was productive of the respondent's income. The Commissioner says that the attention of s 8‑1(1) is directed to specific activities which can be said to be productive of assessable income.Consideration of the Commissioner's argument The terms of s 8‑1(1)(a) of the ITAA and its predecessors[31] have not been regarded as materially different[32]. They refer to a relationship between expenditure incurred and what is productive of assessable income, which is to say the connection necessary for deductibility[33]. The words "incurred in gaining or producing … assessable income", appearing in the section, have long been held to mean incurred "'in the course of' gaining or producing" income, as was observed in Payne[34]. In Amalgamated Zinc (De Bavay's) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[35], Latham CJ explained that it was necessary to read "losses and outgoings … incurred in gaining or producing the assessable income" as incurred "in the course of" gaining or producing that income, in order to make the section[36] intelligible. Outgoings may have an effect in gaining income, but losses cannot, as they simply reduce income[37]. In Commissioner of Taxation v Cooper[38] Hill J observed that an outgoing might be referable to a year of income other than that in which it was incurred[39]. That was a reason why s 51(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) did not express the right to a deduction in terms of outgoings incurred to earn income[40]. The words "in the course of" therefore facilitate the application of s 8‑1(1)(a). They do not require a direct connection between the expenditure in question and an activity itself productive of income.[31]Section 51(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth); s 23(1)(a) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922 (Cth).[32]Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Citylink Melbourne Ltd (2006) 228 CLR 1 at 30 [90] per Crennan J; [2006] HCA 35.[33]Payne (2001) 202 CLR 93 at 99-101 [9]‑[13] per Gleeson CJ, Kirby and Hayne JJ, 112 [51] per Gaudron and Gummow JJ.[34](2001) 202 CLR 93 at 99 [9] per Gleeson CJ, Kirby and Hayne JJ (emphasis added), referring to Amalgamated Zinc (De Bavay's) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1935) 54 CLR 295 at 303 per Latham CJ, 309 per Dixon J; Ronpibon Tin (1949) 78 CLR 47 at 56-57; Charles Moore & Co (WA) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 95 CLR 344 at 350.[35](1935) 54 CLR 295.[36]Section 23(1)(a) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922 (Cth).[37]Amalgamated Zinc (De Bavay's) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1935) 54 CLR 295 at 303 per Latham CJ.[38](1991) 29 FCR 177.[39](1991) 29 FCR 177 at 197, referring to Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Smith (1981) 147 CLR 578; [1981] HCA 10.[40]Commissioner of Taxation v Cooper (1991) 29 FCR 177 at 197.