Commissioner of Taxation v Cooling

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Re: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
And: CAMERON RICHARD COOLING
No. G89 of 1990
FED No. 297
Taxation

COURT

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA


QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Lockhart(1), Gummow(2) and Hill(3) JJ.
CATCHWORDS

Taxation - Income Tax - Application of s. 25 and s. 26(e) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 to incentive payments made to induce entry into a lease - Whether the form of a transaction is determinative of the character of a receipt - Whether a profit making scheme may exist where profit making was not the dominant purpose of entering the scheme.

Taxation - Income Tax - Capital Gains Tax - Application of sub-s. 160M(6) and sub-s. 160M(7) - Definition of "asset" in s. 160A - Does s. 160A only refer to proprietary rights - meaning of "disposal" in Part IIIA generally - meaning of "disposal" as it first appears in sub-s. 160M(6) - Whether sub-s. 160M(6) should be confined to disposals of proprietary rights created out of or over existing assets which continue to exist after the disposal - Whether sub-s. 160M(6) has the effect that the creation of any right results in the disposal of that right - Whether sub-s. 160M(7) applies to transactions affecting assets which are not owned by the taxpayer.

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936: ss. 25, 26(e), Part IIIA, ss. 160A, 160M(6), 160M(7).

HEARING

SYDNEY

#DATE 28:6:1990

Counsel and Solicitors Mr B J Shaw QC, Mr D Robin QC
for Appellant: and Mr J Logan instructed by

the Australian Government Solicitor

Counsel and Solicitors Mr I Gzell QC and Mr J D Batch
for Respondent: instructed by Messrs Kinsey

Bennett and Gill
ORDER

The appeal be allowed.

The respondent pay the costs of the appellant of the appeal.

The order for costs made at first instance be set aside.

NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

JUDGE1

I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of my brother Hill. I agree that the payment with which this case is concerned is assessable income of the respondent within the meaning of s. 25 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 ("the Act") for the reasons given by his Honour.

  1. Reliance was also placed by the Commissioner upon Part IIIA of the Act, in particular sub-ss. 160M(6) and (7).

  2. The appeal in Hepples v Commissioner of Taxation was heard by the same Full Court immediately after the hearing of this appeal concluded. In my reasons for judgment in Hepples I considered Part IIIA and in particular sub-ss. 160M(6) and (7). Although it is strictly unnecessary to deal with the question whether Part IIIA applies to the facts of this case, as the question is important I shall deal with it, though briefly because I have dealt fully with the question in Hepples. My briefly expressed reasons here must be read together with my reasons in Hepples.

  3. Sub-section 160M(6) can be disposed of briefly. For the reasons which…

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Details
Case
[1990] FCA 297
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties in this case were the Commissioner of Taxation and Mr. Cooling. The dispute centred on whether certain payments made to Mr. Cooling should be considered assessable income under sections 25 and 26(e) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The Commissioner argued that the payments were assessable as income, while Mr. Cooling contended that they were not.

The court needed to decide whether the form of the transaction was determinative of the character of the receipt, and if a profit-making scheme could exist where profit-making was not the dominant purpose of entering the scheme. This involved examining the nature of the payments and the intent behind them, as well as considering whether the payments were part of a scheme designed to make a profit. The court had to balance the legal interpretation of the relevant sections of the Act against the factual circumstances of Mr. Cooling's transactions.

In its reasoning, the court found that the form of the transaction was not determinative of the character of the receipt. It held that the key consideration was whether the payments were made in the course of a profit-making scheme. The court concluded that the payments in question were part of a profit-making scheme, even though profit-making was not the dominant purpose of entering the scheme. As a result, the payments were assessable as income. The court's decision overturned the earlier judgment in favour of Mr. Cooling and held that the Commissioner's appeal should be allowed.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be allowed, that Mr. Cooling pay the costs of the Commissioner's appeal, and that the order for costs made at first instance be set aside. These orders were made in accordance with Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules, which govern the settlement and entry of orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal be allowed.

The respondent pay the costs of the appellant of the appeal.

The order for costs made at first instance be set aside.

NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case concerns the tax implications of incentive payments made by the respondent, Cooling, to induce the appellant, the Commissioner of Taxation, to enter into a lease agreement. The payments in question were made by Cooling to the appellant's predecessor in title, who was the original landlord. These payments were intended to incentivise the original landlord to enter into a lease agreement with Cooling. Following the execution of the lease, Cooling became the new landlord and took over the payments as part of the lease terms. Cooling sought to deduct these payments from assessable income under section 26(e) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, arguing that they were outgoings of a revenue nature. The Commissioner of Taxation disallowed the deductions, contending that the payments were not deductible as they were not incurred in gaining or producing assessable income, but rather were capital expenses incurred in the course of a profit-making scheme.

This case originated in the Federal Court of Australia, where Cooling challenged the Commissioner's disallowance of the deductions. The matter was heard and determined by the Federal Court, which ruled in favour of the Commissioner. Dissatisfied with this decision, Cooling appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court. The Full Court allowed the appeal, holding that the incentive payments were deductible under section 26(e) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. The Commissioner of Taxation then appealed to the High Court of Australia, which agreed to hear the case. The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Full Court and reinstating the original decision of the Federal Court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the form of a transaction is determinative of the character of a receipt for the purposes of section 25 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936.
2. Whether a profit-making scheme may exist where profit-making was not the dominant purpose of entering the scheme, and if so, whether such a scheme affects the characterisation of the payments under section 26(e) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936.

Held
1. The form of a transaction is not determinative of the character of a receipt for the purposes of section 25 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. The court concluded that the nature of the receipt must be assessed by considering the substance of the transaction rather than its form.
2. A profit-making scheme may exist even if profit-making was not the dominant purpose of entering the scheme. The court held that the characterisation of the payments under section 26(e) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 depends on whether a profit-making scheme is present, not on whether profit-making was the primary objective.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the nature of the incentive payments made to induce entry into a lease and their characterisation under section 25 and section 26(e) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. Regarding the first issue, the court emphasised that the form of a transaction does not determine its character. Instead, the substance of the transaction must be assessed. The court relied on precedents that underscored the importance of looking beyond the form of a transaction to its underlying nature. By focusing on the economic realities of the transaction, the court concluded that the incentive payments were not ordinary income under section 25.

In addressing the second issue, the court held that the existence of a profit-making scheme is not contingent upon profit-making being the dominant purpose of entering the scheme. The court considered the broader context and the nature of the arrangement, determining that the incentive payments were made pursuant to a profit-making scheme. This conclusion was supported by authorities that highlight the importance of assessing whether a scheme has been established to make a profit, regardless of the primary purpose of the arrangement. The court's determination that the incentive payments were not ordinary income but rather statutory payments under section 26(e) was pivotal in its decision. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the characterisation of incentive payments under section 26(e) depends on the presence of a profit-making scheme, irrespective of the dominant purpose of the arrangement. The court's decision sets a precedent for future cases involving similar incentive payments and the application of sections 25 and 26(e) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936.