FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
August v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 682
Citation: August v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 682 Parties: PETER AUGUST v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
HELEN AUGUST v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
File numbers: NSD 420 of 2010
NSD 422 of 2010Judge: NICHOLAS J Date of judgment: 28 June 2012 Corrigendum: 3 July 2012 Catchwords: TAXATION – appeals against Commissioner’s disallowance of objections to income tax assessments – sale of commercial real estate – whether profit derived from sale of properties was income according to ordinary concepts – whether properties acquired for purpose of profit-making by sale
Held: Properties acquired for purpose of profit-making by sale – appeals dismissed
Legislation: Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 95, s 97
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 6-5, s 6-10, s 102-5(1), s 115-25, 115-100, Div 115, Subdiv 115-CCases cited: Californian Copper Syndicate v Harris (1905) 5 TC 159
Commissioner of Taxation v Cooling (1990) 22 FCR 42
Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
McCormack v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 143 CLR 284Moana Sand Pty Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 88 ATC 4897
Westfield Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 28 FCR 333
Date of hearing: 20, 21, 22 and 23 June 2011 Date of last submissions: 1 July 2011 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 175 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D Russell QC with Mr M Robertson Solicitor for the Applicant: Meyer Vandenberg Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Ms J Needham SC with Mr J D Smith Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
August v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 682
CORRIGENDUM
1.In paragraph 1 of the reasons for judgment dated 28 June 2012 substitute “financial years ending 30 June 2006 and 30 June 2007” for “financial year ending 30 June 2006”.
I certify that the preceding one (1) numbered paragraph is a true copy of the Corrigendum to the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Nicholas. Associate:
Dated: 3 July 2012
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 420 of 2010
BETWEEN: PETER AUGUST
ApplicantAND: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
JUDGE:
NICHOLAS J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 JUNE 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs (not including those dealt with by orders made on 17 February 2011 and 7 April 2011).
THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:
3.Subject to any appeal, the original exhibits be returned to the party by whom they were tendered after 28 days.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 422 of 2010
BETWEEN: HELEN AUGUST
ApplicantAND: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
JUDGE:
NICHOLAS J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 JUNE 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 682
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were twofold: first, whether the properties were acquired with the principal intention of engaging in a scheme of profit-making by sale, and second, if the purpose of profit-making by sale was a substantial one, thereby characterising the profits as income. The applicants argued that their sole intention was to hold the properties as long-term investments, while the Commissioner contended that the properties were part of a profit-making scheme.
The court examined the surrounding circumstances and the evidence provided by Mr August, including his statements about the properties being a risky investment and his intention to hold them until his death. However, the court found that Mr August's actions, such as discussions with Mr Konstantinou about potential joint ventures and the eventual sale of the properties, indicated a different purpose. The court concluded that the properties were likely acquired as part of a profit-making scheme with the intention to develop, tenant, and sell them for a profit.
The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the applicants pay the respondent's costs, excluding those already addressed in previous orders. The court also directed that the original exhibits be returned to the parties after 28 days, subject to any appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs (not including those dealt with by orders made on 17 February 2011 and 7 April 2011).
THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:
3. Subject to any appeal, the original exhibits be returned to the party by whom they were tendered after 28 days.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court's reasoning was based on the established legal principles that the purpose of profit-making by sale need not be the sole or dominant purpose, but rather a substantial one. The court relied on authorities such as Commissioner of Taxation v Cooling and Moana Sand Pty Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation to support this principle. In applying these principles to the facts, the court examined the surrounding circumstances and evidence provided by Mr August and Mr Konstantinou to determine the intention behind the acquisition of the properties. The court concluded that the properties were acquired for the purpose of profit-making by sale, as evidenced by the development, leasing, and eventual sale of the properties. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the purpose of profit-making by sale need not be the sole or dominant purpose, but rather a substantial one. The court distinguished this case from prior authority by considering the specific circumstances and intentions behind the acquisition of the properties, rather than solely relying on contemporaneous documents or explicit statements of intention.