Citation Resources Ltd v IBT Holdings Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Citation Resources Ltd v IBT Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1265

File number: WAD 222 of 2016
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 27 October 2016
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – application to set aside statutory demand – where unsafe to find that there is no genuine dispute – where applicant relies upon hearsay evidence – whether entitled to terminate contract where no stipulation time of the essence – whether genuine dispute – whether abuse of process – whether statutory demand process used to compel payment of disputed debts
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 459G, 459H, 459J
Cases cited:

Amann Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1990) 22 FCR 527

Austral Softwoods Tumbarumba Pty Ltd v Tasman KB Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 1122

Collingridge v Sontor Pty Ltd (1997) 141 FLR 440

DTR Nominees Pty Ltd v Mona Homes Pty Ltd (1978) 138 CLR 423

Electricity Generation Corporation t/as Verve Energy v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640

FBM Corporation Pty Ltd v Redsilk Enterprises Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 51

Francis v Lyon (1907) 4 CLR 1023

Green v Sevin (1879) 13 CLD 589

Holland v Wiltshire (1954) 90 CLR 409

Keylink Physical Care Pty Ltd v Ergoline (Australia) Pty Ltd [1999] SASC 483

Meehan v Glazer Holdings Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 24; (2005) 53 ACSR 229

Neeta (Epping) Pty Ltd v Phillips (1974) 131 CLR 286

Pharmanet Group Ltd v Primeland Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 208

Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Victoria) Incorporated v Marson Constructions Pty Ltd (2000) 1 VR 274

Treasury Wine Estates Vintners Ltd v Garrett (2015) 235 FCR 577

Carter JW, Peden E, and Tolhurst GJ, Contract Law in Australia (5th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007)

Seddon NC and Ellinghaus MP, Cheshire & Fifoot Law of Contract (9th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008)  

Date of hearing: 14 September 2016
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr MG Pendlebury
Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Fletcher Law
Counsel for the Defendant: Mr JM Healy
Solicitor for the Defendant: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers

ORDERS

WAD 222 of 2016
BETWEEN:

CITATION RESOURCES LTD (ACN 118 710 508)

Plaintiff

AND:

IBT HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 157 759 138)

Defendant

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 OCTOBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The statutory demand dated 6 May 2016 served by the defendant on the plaintiff on 13 May 2016 be set aside.

2.The defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of the application, to be assessed if not agreed. 

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCKERRACHER J:

  1. Citation Resources Ltd (ACN 118 710 508) applies to set aside a statutory demand notice on the grounds that there is a genuine dispute.  For the reasons which follow, in these most unusual circumstances, I consider that while the case for a genuine dispute is…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1265
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Citation Resources Ltd v IBT Holdings Pty Ltd, the dispute involved an application by the plaintiff, Citation Resources Ltd, to set aside a statutory demand served by the defendant, IBT Holdings Pty Ltd. The primary focus was on the validity of the statutory demand and whether there existed a genuine dispute over the debt claimed. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia.
The legal issues at the core of this case revolved around the interpretation of the Conversion Deed, specifically Clause 2.4, which outlines the conditions under which the deed could be terminated. Citation argued that the statutory demand was improperly issued as there was a genuine dispute over the debt. IBT, on the other hand, contended that the statutory demand was valid and that Citation had failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute. The court also had to determine whether the statutory demand process had been abused and if the evidence presented was sufficient to set aside the demand.
The Federal Court concluded that a genuine dispute existed, rendering the statutory demand invalid. The court held that the evidence presented by Citation established that there was a genuine dispute over the amount claimed by IBT. Furthermore, the court found that the statutory demand process had not been abused. The court accepted that there were genuine issues in dispute, and the demand was not issued for an improper purpose. The court's reasoning was grounded in the principles that a statutory demand could be set aside if there was a substantial overstatement in the amount claimed and that the process could be abused if used to compel payment of disputed debts.
The court ordered that the statutory demand dated 6 May 2016, served by IBT on Citation on 13 May 2016, be set aside. Additionally, IBT was ordered to pay Citation's costs of the application. The orders were made under Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The statutory demand dated 6 May 2016 served by the defendant on the plaintiff on 13 May 2016 be set aside.

2. The defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of the application, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I do not find these arguments persuasive despite the clearly inappropriate language used in (b) above. Were it not for my conclusions in relation to the existence of a genuine dispute, I would not be satisfied that the evidence points to an abuse of process. CONCLUSION A genuine dispute has been established for the foregoing reasons.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Again, the principles concerning ‘some other reason’ under s 459J(1)(b) of the Act are not contentious. In Tekno Autosports Pty Ltd v Jenkins [2014] FCA 774, Gleeson J discussed those (at [23]-[25]), from which Citation extracts the following points of principle, which I accept:(a)Paragraph (a) and para (b) of s 459J(1) are mutually exclusive. Accordingly, ‘some other reason’ means some reason other than because of a defect in the demand.(b)The Court's power under s 459J(1)(b) exists to maintain the integrity of the process provided under Pt 5.4 of the Act and is to be used to counter an attempted subversion of the statutory scheme, but is not exercised by reference to subjective notions of fairness. (c)A statutory demand may be set aside under s 459J(1) where it involves conduct which is unconscionable or an abuse of process.(d)A statutory demand could be set aside under s 459J(1)(b) by reason of a substantial overstatement in the amount claimed, and that, where a statutory demand has been so grossly inflated as to comprise matters which it should have been obvious from the outset were in genuine dispute between the parties at the time the demand was served, then an order under s 459J(l)(b) setting aside that statutory demand may well be required to prevent such an abuse of the regime under Pt 5.4 of the Act.(e)The Court retains a residual jurisdiction to restrain reliance on the statutory demand procedure on the ground of an abuse of process and/or on the ground of impropriety of purpose. (f)There will be an abuse of process if the purpose of the party issuing the statutory demand is not the purpose of pursuing the statutory demand to wind up the company on the ground of insolvency, but rather to use the process as a means of obtaining an advantage for which the process is not designed or to obtain some collateral advantage beyond what the law offers - such as the application of pressure to compel payment of the disputed debt.CONSIDERATION OF FIRST ISSUE – PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONVERSION DEEDTermination of the Conversion Deed Clause 2 of the Conversion Deed provides as follows:2. DEBT CONVERSION AND REPAYMENT2.1 Conversion and Repayment On, or as soon as is reasonably practicable after, the Completion Date, and subject to receipt of any necessary regulatory and shareholder approvals of the Borrower, each Lender’s entire proportion of the Debt will be:(a) reduced to the adjusted settlement amount set out in Schedule 1;and such reduced settlement amount will then be:(b)converted into that number of Borrower Shares as are set out beside each Lender’s name in Schedule 1 [4,580,000] and which will be issued under the Capital Raising (Conversion Shares); and(c)in respect of Gorilla Pit and IBT only, partly repaid in cash by that amount which is set out beside their respective names in Schedule 1 [$171,000] from the proceeds of the Capital Raising (Repayments).2.2 Issue of Conversion Shares and Repayments(a)On, or as soon as is reasonably practicable after, the Completion Date, the Borrower must issue the Conversion Shares and make the Repayments to the Lenders as set out in Schedule 1.(b)Immediately following the issue of the Conversion Shares under clause 2.2(a), the Borrower must:(i)procure that a holding statement for the Conversion Shares is sent to each Lender; and(ii)apply for quotation of the Conversion Shares on ASX.(c) Each Lender hereby:(i) consents to being a shareholder of the Borrower;…2.3 Effect of Conversion and RepaymentThe issue of the Conversion Shares and the payment of the Repayments by the Borrower as set out in Schedule 1 will be deemed to have satisfied the Borrower’s obligations to repay each Lender’s entire proportion of the Debt. 2.4 Termination(a)If the Completion Date does not occur by the End Date, or necessary regulatory and shareholder approvals are not obtained by the End Date, any Party may terminate this Deed by written notice to the other Parties.(b)On termination, each Party is released from its obligations under this Deed, except those expressed to survive termination, and each Party retains the rights it has against the other Parties in respect of any breach of this Deed occurring before termination.(emphasis added)