FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Tekno Autosports Pty Limited v Jenkins [2014] FCA 774
Citation: Tekno Autosports Pty Ltd v Jenkins [2014] FCA 774 Parties: TEKNO AUTOSPORTS PTY LIMITED v BRUCE JENKINS File number: NSD 215 of 2014 Judge: GLEESON J Date of judgment: 25 July 2014 Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – Statutory demand – Application to set aside statutory demand – Whether there is a genuine dispute as to existence or amount of debt – Whether there is a defect in the statutory demand causing substantial injustice – Whether there is some other reason to set aside statutory demand Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 459E, 459G, 459H, 459J
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 96(1), 97, 100, 101
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth)Cases cited: Atlas Tiles Ltd v Briers (1978) 144 CLR 202
Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty Ltd v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435
Cassaniti v Commission of Taxation (2010) 186 FCR 480
Chadwick Industries (South Coast) Pty Ltd v Condensing Vaporisers Pty Ltd (1994) 13 ACSR 37
Condor Asset Management Ltd v Excelsior Eastern Ltd (2006) 56 ACSR 223
Createc Pty Ltd v Design Signs Pty Ltd (2009) 71 ACSR 602
Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1
First Equilibrium Pty Limited v Bluestone Property Services Pty Limited (in liq) (2013) 95 ACSR 654; [2013] FCAFC 108
Gregory v Phillip Morris [1988] IR 397
Kalamunda Meat Wholesalers Pty Ltd v Reg Russell & Sons Pty Ltd (1994) 51 FCR 446
Kay Investment Holdings Pty Ltd v North East Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] NSWSC 1121
Panel Tech Industries (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Skyreach Equipment Pty Ltd (No 2) [2003] NSWSC 896
Re UGL Process Solutions [2012] NSWSC 1256
Reavill Farm Pty Ltd v BurrellSolicitors Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1295
Rohalo Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd v R P Scherer Spa (1994) 15 ACSR 347
Spencer Constructions Pty Ltd v G & M Aldridge Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 452
The Queen v Hamilton Knight (1949) 86 CLR 283
Victor Tunevitsch Pty Ltd v Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (1994) 14 ACSR 565Date of hearing: 24 June 2014 Date of last submissions: 1 July 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 78 Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr Farid Assaf Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Stevens & Associates Lawyers Counsel for the Defendant: Mr Ian Neil SC Solicitor for the Defendant: Gillis Delaney Lawyers
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 215 of 2014
BETWEEN: TEKNO AUTOSPORTS PTY LIMITED
PlaintiffAND: BRUCE JENKINS
Defendant
JUDGE:
GLEESON J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 JULY 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The unsigned statutory demand dated 5 February 2014 issued by the defendant and addressed to the plaintiff be set aside.
2.The signed statutory demand dated 5 February 2014 issued by the defendant to the plaintiff be set aside.
3.The defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs on a party-party basis.
4.The plaintiff file and serve any application for…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 774
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the evidence and submissions from both parties. Tekno Autosports relied on an affidavit from its CEO and tendered payslips as evidence. Mr Jenkins did not provide any evidence to support his claim. The court noted that the statutory demand was significantly overstated by $23,717.95, a fact acknowledged by Mr Jenkins. The court inferred that Mr Jenkins was aware of the genuine dispute and issued the demand to pressure Tekno Autosports into paying the disputed debt. This conduct was deemed a further reason to set aside the statutory demand.
Based on the evidence and the legal principles, the court found that there was a genuine dispute regarding the existence and amount of the debt. The court also found that Mr Jenkins' conduct in issuing the overstated demand warranted setting it aside. Consequently, the statutory demand was set aside, and the parties were directed to file written submissions on the issue of costs.
The court emphasised the low threshold for establishing a genuine dispute and noted that the debt in question was significantly overstated. The inference was drawn that Mr Jenkins issued the demand in bad faith, further justifying the court's decision to set it aside.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is unnecessary to go into any detail as to the events following 28 January 2014, except to say that on 7 February 2014, the company terminated Mr Jenkins’ employment.ConsiderationIs there a genuine dispute as to the existence or amount of the debt to which the demand relates? Mr Jenkins accepts that the debt specified in the statutory demand is overstated by an amount of $23,717.95.Whether the company was entitled to treat Mr Jenkins as on unpaid personal leave during the relevant period As to the balance of the debt, Mr Jenkins’ written submissions argued that there is no genuine dispute because:a.The company “unilaterally took it upon itself to appropriate the value of leave owing to [Mr Jenkins] until those balances were exhausted, and then unilaterally treated him as being on ‘unpaid leave’”;b.Neither of those unilateral actions was contractually authorised, nor discharged the company’s primary contractual obligation to pay Mr Jenkins’ salary while, as was always relevantly the case, Mr Jenkins remained ready, willing and able to serve;c.Without express contractual authorisation (which did not exist in this case) an employer who unilaterally excludes an employee, who remains ready, willing and able to serve, from the opportunity to do so cannot also lawfully refuse to pay any part of the excluded employee’s remuneration. At the hearing, Mr Neil SC put a different argument. He did not seek to argue that Mr Jenkins was ready, willing and able to serve the company during the relevant period. No doubt, this was because there is plainly a genuine and significant factual dispute between the parties on this point, arising from the medical certificates provided by Mr Jenkins and the course of the communications between the parties. Instead, Mr Neil SC argued that it did not matter whether Mr Jenkins was ready, willing and able to serve the company during the relevant period. His argument involved the following propositions:a.In the circumstances of this case, the company was not entitled to suspend Mr Jenkins without pay: see Gregory v Phillip Morris [1988] IR 397 at 414. However, it was entitled to suspend Mr Jenkins pursuant to clause 4.1 of the employment contract;b.On 16 October 2013, the company suspended Mr Jenkins’ obligation to render service in return for his remuneration; c.Thereafter, the company had suspended its right to insist upon Mr Jenkins performing any work until 22 January 2014;d.When clauses 3.1 and 4.1 of the employment contract are read together, in order for Mr Jenkins to become entitled to his remuneration, all that he had to do was to perform the duties that were assigned to him by the company from time to time: cf Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty Ltd v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435 at 466;e.However, the company did not assign any duties to Mr Jenkins in the relevant period, except for one instance on 31 October 2013 when Mr Jenkins was directed to attend a meeting;f.Whether Mr Jenkins was fit to go to work was entirely beside the point because Mr Jenkins had previously been told that he was not required to go to work. The medical certificates had no significance because they were submitted after the suspension;g.In any event, Mr Jenkins did not apply to take personal leave. Leave is a right vested in the employee not the employer. Leave connotes permission to be absent from work: The Queen v Hamilton Knight (1949) 86 CLR 283 at 306. An employer cannot choose to treat an employee’s non-attendance as personal leave, whether paid or unpaid unless the employee requests it.