Tekno Autosports Pty Ltd v Jenkins

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tekno Autosports Pty Limited v Jenkins [2014] FCA 774

Citation: Tekno Autosports Pty Ltd v Jenkins [2014] FCA 774
Parties: TEKNO AUTOSPORTS PTY LIMITED v BRUCE JENKINS
File number: NSD 215 of 2014
Judge: GLEESON J
Date of judgment: 25 July 2014
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – Statutory demand – Application to set aside statutory demand – Whether there is a genuine dispute as to existence or amount of debt – Whether there is a defect in the statutory demand causing substantial injustice – Whether there is some other reason to set aside statutory demand
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 459E, 459G, 459H, 459J
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 96(1), 97, 100, 101
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth)
Cases cited: Atlas Tiles Ltd v Briers (1978) 144 CLR 202
Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty Ltd v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435
Cassaniti v Commission of Taxation (2010) 186 FCR 480
Chadwick Industries (South Coast) Pty Ltd v Condensing Vaporisers Pty Ltd (1994) 13 ACSR 37
Condor Asset Management Ltd v Excelsior Eastern Ltd (2006) 56 ACSR 223
Createc Pty Ltd v Design Signs Pty Ltd (2009) 71 ACSR 602
Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1
First Equilibrium Pty Limited v Bluestone Property Services Pty Limited (in liq) (2013) 95 ACSR 654; [2013] FCAFC 108
Gregory v Phillip Morris [1988] IR 397
Kalamunda Meat Wholesalers Pty Ltd v Reg Russell & Sons Pty Ltd (1994) 51 FCR 446
 Kay Investment Holdings Pty Ltd v North East Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] NSWSC 1121
Panel Tech Industries (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Skyreach Equipment Pty Ltd (No 2) [2003] NSWSC 896
Re UGL Process Solutions [2012] NSWSC 1256
Reavill Farm Pty Ltd v BurrellSolicitors Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1295
Rohalo Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd v R P Scherer Spa (1994) 15 ACSR 347
Spencer Constructions Pty Ltd v G & M Aldridge Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 452
The Queen v Hamilton Knight (1949) 86 CLR 283
Victor Tunevitsch Pty Ltd v Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (1994) 14 ACSR 565
Date of hearing: 24 June 2014
Date of last submissions: 1 July 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 78
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr Farid Assaf
Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Stevens & Associates Lawyers
Counsel for the Defendant: Mr Ian Neil SC
Solicitor for the Defendant: Gillis Delaney Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 215 of 2014

BETWEEN:

TEKNO AUTOSPORTS PTY LIMITED
Plaintiff

AND:

BRUCE JENKINS
Defendant

JUDGE:

GLEESON J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 JULY 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The unsigned statutory demand dated 5 February 2014 issued by the defendant and addressed to the plaintiff be set aside.

2.The signed statutory demand dated 5 February 2014 issued by the defendant to the plaintiff be set aside.

3.The defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs on a party-party basis.

4.The plaintiff file and serve any application for…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 774
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Tekno Autosports Pty Ltd brought an application to set aside a statutory demand made by the plaintiff, Mr Jenkins. The dispute centred on the existence and amount of a debt owed by Tekno Autosports to Mr Jenkins. The court was tasked with determining whether there was a genuine dispute concerning the debt's existence or amount, as required by section 459H of the relevant Act. Additionally, the court had to consider whether there were any other grounds for setting aside the statutory demand under section 459J(1)(b).

The court considered the evidence and submissions from both parties. Tekno Autosports relied on an affidavit from its CEO and tendered payslips as evidence. Mr Jenkins did not provide any evidence to support his claim. The court noted that the statutory demand was significantly overstated by $23,717.95, a fact acknowledged by Mr Jenkins. The court inferred that Mr Jenkins was aware of the genuine dispute and issued the demand to pressure Tekno Autosports into paying the disputed debt. This conduct was deemed a further reason to set aside the statutory demand.

Based on the evidence and the legal principles, the court found that there was a genuine dispute regarding the existence and amount of the debt. The court also found that Mr Jenkins' conduct in issuing the overstated demand warranted setting it aside. Consequently, the statutory demand was set aside, and the parties were directed to file written submissions on the issue of costs.

The court emphasised the low threshold for establishing a genuine dispute and noted that the debt in question was significantly overstated. The inference was drawn that Mr Jenkins issued the demand in bad faith, further justifying the court's decision to set it aside.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 459J provides:(1) On an application under section 459G, the Court may by order set aside the demand if it is satisfied that: (a)because of a defect in the demand, substantial injustice will be caused unless the demand is set aside; or (b)there is some other reason why the demand should be set aside. (2) Except as provided in subsection (1), the Court must not set aside a statutory demand merely because of a defect. Evidence The company relied on an affidavit made by Ms Kobe Webb, the chief executive officer of the company. At the hearing, counsel for the company, Mr Assaf, tendered two payslips showing Mr Jenkins’ remuneration for the periods 1 September 2013 to 30 September 2013 and 1 October 2013 to 31 October 2013. Mr Jenkins did not tender any evidence. Legal principlesGenuine dispute: s 459H The principles governing the application of s 459H of the Act were recently summarised in First Equilibrium Pty Limited v Bluestone Property Services Pty Limited (in liq) (2013) 95 ACSR 654; [2013] FCAFC 108 at [21]. Relevantly:1.The phrase “a genuine dispute” uses ordinary English words and its meaning in any particular set of circumstances must be a question of fact: Troutfarms Australia Pty Ltd v Perpetual Nominees Ltd [2013] VSCA 176 at [5].…5. For there to be a genuine dispute, there must be a “plausible contention requiring investigation”. It raises the same sort of considerations as the “serious question to be tried” criterion applicable to interlocutory injunctions. At this stage, the Court is not called on to determine the merits of or to resolve the dispute: Eyota Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACSR 785 at 787.6. The threshold is not high or demanding: Kirrak Pty Ltd v Compass Scaffolding& Plant Hire Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1002 at [3]; Roadships Logistics Ltd v Tree (as trustee for the Tree Superannuation Fund) (2007) 64 ACSR 671 at [24]. However, the claim must have some merit and be genuine. That requirement has been described variously as the claim must be “real and not spurious”, the claim must have a “real chance of success”, there must be a serious question to be tried and, in some cases, it has been said that there is a requirement of good faith: see Abadeen at [33].7. A useful analogy to the burden on the party asserting the claim is that of an alleged debtor resisting an application for summary judgment. If the Court sees any factor that, on rational grounds, indicates an arguable case, it must find that a genuine dispute exists even where any case apparently available to be advanced to the contrary seems stronger: see Product People (International) Pty Ltd v Box Seat Company Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2013] FCA 277 at [25]. In Panel Tech Industries (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Skyreach Equipment Pty Ltd (No 2) [2003] NSWSC 896 at [16] to [18], Barrett J said:16. …The question before me is not whether the plaintiff is a financially respectable and financially responsible company. It is whether it may properly be said, on the whole of the evidence, that a genuine dispute exists as to the existence of the debts the subject of the statutory demand…17. The test to be applied in cases of this kind has been established in several well known cases, of which those most often quoted are Mibor Investments Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1994] 2 VR 290, Eyota Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACSR 785, Spencer Constructions Pty Ltd v G & M Aldridge Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 452 and Re Morris Catering (Aust) Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 601. Those cases refer to tests of “plausible contention requiring investigation”, “real and not spurious, hypothetical, illusory or misconceived” and “perception of genuineness (or lack of it)”. 18. These tests, applied in the context of a summary procedure where it is not expected that the court will embark on any extended inquiry, mean that the task faced by a company challenging a statutory demand on the “genuine dispute” ground is by no means at all a difficult or demanding one. The company will fail in that task only if it is found upon the hearing of its s.459G application that the contentions upon which it seeks to rely in mounting its challenge are so devoid of substance that no further investigation is warranted. Once the company shows that even one issue has a sufficient degree of cogency to be arguable, a finding of genuine dispute must follow. The court does not engage in any form of balancing exercise between the strengths of competing contentions. If it sees any factor that, on rational grounds, indicates an arguable case on the part of the company, it must find that a genuine dispute exists, even where any case apparently available to be advanced against the company seems stronger.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, it should have been obvious to Mr Jenkins, from the detailed correspondence between the parties, including the extensive involvement of lawyers on both sides, that there was a significant dispute as to the company’s liability to pay him wages for the relevant period unpaid. There is no evidence that the company was not acting in good faith in the position which it took. The debt was significantly overstated by the inclusion of amounts which had been paid. Mr Jenkins did not seek to explain why the debt was significantly overstated, or why that overstatement was not conceded before the morning of the hearing. In my view, it is reasonable to infer that, when Mr Jenkins issued the statutory demand, he knew that there was a genuine dispute as to the existence of the debt, and he issued the demand in order to apply pressure to the company to compel payment of the disputed debt. That conduct is a further reason to set aside the statutory demand.Conclusion The statutory demand must be set aside. The parties will be directed to file and serve written submissions on the question of costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is unnecessary to go into any detail as to the events following 28 January 2014, except to say that on 7 February 2014, the company terminated Mr Jenkins’ employment.ConsiderationIs there a genuine dispute as to the existence or amount of the debt to which the demand relates? Mr Jenkins accepts that the debt specified in the statutory demand is overstated by an amount of $23,717.95.Whether the company was entitled to treat Mr Jenkins as on unpaid personal leave during the relevant period As to the balance of the debt, Mr Jenkins’ written submissions argued that there is no genuine dispute because:a.The company “unilaterally took it upon itself to appropriate the value of leave owing to [Mr Jenkins] until those balances were exhausted, and then unilaterally treated him as being on ‘unpaid leave’”;b.Neither of those unilateral actions was contractually authorised, nor discharged the company’s primary contractual obligation to pay Mr Jenkins’ salary while, as was always relevantly the case, Mr Jenkins remained ready, willing and able to serve;c.Without express contractual authorisation (which did not exist in this case) an employer who unilaterally excludes an employee, who remains ready, willing and able to serve, from the opportunity to do so cannot also lawfully refuse to pay any part of the excluded employee’s remuneration. At the hearing, Mr Neil SC put a different argument. He did not seek to argue that Mr Jenkins was ready, willing and able to serve the company during the relevant period. No doubt, this was because there is plainly a genuine and significant factual dispute between the parties on this point, arising from the medical certificates provided by Mr Jenkins and the course of the communications between the parties. Instead, Mr Neil SC argued that it did not matter whether Mr Jenkins was ready, willing and able to serve the company during the relevant period. His argument involved the following propositions:a.In the circumstances of this case, the company was not entitled to suspend Mr Jenkins without pay: see Gregory v Phillip Morris [1988] IR 397 at 414. However, it was entitled to suspend Mr Jenkins pursuant to clause 4.1 of the employment contract;b.On 16 October 2013, the company suspended Mr Jenkins’ obligation to render service in return for his remuneration; c.Thereafter, the company had suspended its right to insist upon Mr Jenkins performing any work until 22 January 2014;d.When clauses 3.1 and 4.1 of the employment contract are read together, in order for Mr Jenkins to become entitled to his remuneration, all that he had to do was to perform the duties that were assigned to him by the company from time to time: cf Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty Ltd v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435 at 466;e.However, the company did not assign any duties to Mr Jenkins in the relevant period, except for one instance on 31 October 2013 when Mr Jenkins was directed to attend a meeting;f.Whether Mr Jenkins was fit to go to work was entirely beside the point because Mr Jenkins had previously been told that he was not required to go to work. The medical certificates had no significance because they were submitted after the suspension;g.In any event, Mr Jenkins did not apply to take personal leave. Leave is a right vested in the employee not the employer. Leave connotes permission to be absent from work: The Queen v Hamilton Knight (1949) 86 CLR 283 at 306. An employer cannot choose to treat an employee’s non-attendance as personal leave, whether paid or unpaid unless the employee requests it.