FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Chubb Insurance Australia Limited v WSP Structures Pty Ltd [2024] FCAFC 123
Appeal from: WSP Structures Pty Ltd v Liberty Mutual Insurance Company t/as Liberty Specialty Markets [2023] FCA 1157 File number: NSD 1419 of 2023 Judgment of: O'CALLAGHAN, DERRINGTON AND JACKMAN JJ Date of judgment: 20 September 2024 Catchwords: INSURANCE – whether first respondent an insured –where named insured a construction company – where first respondent provided engineering services to named insured – where definition of “Insured” included “sub-contractors” engaged by named insured – whether primary judge erred in construing “sub-contractors” to mean a party who has been contracted to perform contractual obligations of another party under a contract that it has made with a third party – whether “sub-contractors” should instead be limited to parties engaged to undertake construction work – appeal dismissed Cases cited: GPS Power Pty Ltd v Gardiner Willis & Associates Pty Ltd [2000] QCA 495
Hopewell Project Management Ltd v Ewbank Preece Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 448
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company Australian Branch trading as Liberty Speciality Markets v Icon Co (NSW) Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 126; (2021) 396 ALR 193
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company Australian Branch v Icon Co (NSW) Pty Ltd (2021) 154 ACSR 126
Mie Force Pty Ltd v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2024] NSWCA 23
Onley v Catlin Syndicate Ltd (2018) 360 ALR 92
Pasminco Metals-Sulphide Pty Ltd v Brambles Aust Ltd [1998] NSWCA 169
Thiess Pty Ltd v Parsons Brinckerhoff Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 173
Derrington, DK and RS Ashton, The Law of Liability Insurance (3rd ed, 2013)
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance Number of paragraphs: 96 Date of hearing: 20 May 2024 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr N Hutley SC, Mr D Weinberger and Mr A Jordan Solicitor for the Appellants: McCabes Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Neal and Mr A Barnett Solicitor for the First Respondent: Crichton & Co Legal Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr I Griscti Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Lander & Rogers Lawyers ORDERS
NSD 1419 of 2023 BETWEEN: CHUBB INSURANCE AUSTRALIA LIMITED
First Appellant
TOKIO MARINE & NICHIDO FIRE INSURANCE CO LTD ABN 80 000 438 291 (AFSL 246548)
Second Appellant
AND: WSP STRUCTURES PTY LTD
First Respondent
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY TRADING AS LIBERTY SPECIALTY MARKETS
Second Respondent
AND BETWEEN: LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY TRADING AS LIBERTY SPECIALTY MARKETS
Cross-Appellant
AND: CHUBB INSURANCE AUSTRALIA LIMITED (and others named in the Schedule)
First Cross-Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
O'CALLAGHAN, DERRINGTON AND JACKMAN JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
20 SEPTEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The cross-appeal be dismissed.
3.The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
4.The second respondent pay its own costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
O’CALLAGHAN AND JACKMAN JJ:
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- Case
- [2024] FCAFC 123
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the arguments presented by the appellants, who contended that the policy should be interpreted narrowly, excluding professional consultants unless they were directly engaged by an entity named in the Schedule to perform construction work. They argued that professional indemnity insurance was widely available and that any broader coverage would lead to double insurance and additional premiums. However, the primary judge had acknowledged these factors but found no evidence to support them as part of the market context in which the policy was arranged. The primary judge concluded that the term "sub-contractors" should not be limited to those engaged for construction work, thus including professional consultants such as engineers. The court found no material error in the primary judge's reasoning, affirming that the policy remained relevantly a property damage insurance policy that extended to subcontractors. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and WSP was confirmed as an insured under the Liberty Policy.
The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal and the cross-appeal, with Chubb and Tokio ordered to pay WSP's costs of the appeal, and Liberty ordered to pay its own costs. The reasoning was that WSP, as a firm of consulting engineers engaged by a construction company, qualified as a sub-contractor under the broad definition of "Insured" in the policy, thereby extending the coverage to include professional consultants in cases where they are engaged by an entity named in the Schedule to perform work that entity has agreed to perform.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The cross-appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
4. The second respondent pay its own costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge noted that the general commercial availability of professional indemnity insurance, and the possibility of an expectation among those participating in the construction industry that professionals such as architects, engineers and professional consultants would have their own professional insurance, may be viewed as operating against the considerations which favour WSP’s construction of the policy: [103]. The primary judge referred to the consequence that any coverage for such professional people for their activities under a third party liability policy of the kind in issue would be likely to result in double insurance and the burden of additional premiums in respect of the risks associated with undertaking particular construction works: [103]. However, the primary judge said that there was no evidence as to those matters or the extent to which they were part of the market context in which the insurance was arranged by the Icon Group: [103]. In the end, the primary judge said that there must be regard to the language used by the parties, which leads to the conclusion that WSP is an Insured within Item 4 of the definition of Insured, and Item 4 should not be read as being subject to Item 8: [104]. The primary judge said that the interaction between Item 4 “and/or” Item 8 should be construed to mean that the reference to engineers in Item 8 is to engineers who are not subcontractors engaged by an Insured to undertake work that the Insured is itself contracted to perform: [104].Consideration of submissions made by the appellants The oral submissions made by the appellants focused on the existence of two different definitions of the “Insured” in the policy. At the commencement of the policy (p 2), the Insured is defined by reference to “the Insured named in the Schedule”, and that expression is again picked up in Item 1 of the definition of Insured in the Definitions section (p 16). By contrast, the full definition of “Insured” in the Definitions section (p 16) extends beyond the Insured named in the Schedule (being Item 1), and includes seven other items together with the additional category of other companies for which the Insured assumes management and all other parties for whom the Insured is required to provide insurance protection. The reference to the Insured in the Schedule (p 3) also extends beyond entities which were referred to by name (and relevantly includes “subcontractors”). The appellants draw attention to Condition 8 dealing with the adjustment of premium, and submitted that the calculation of the Turnover must be by reference to the Turnover of entities in the Icon Group, because otherwise it would lead to an absurdly high calculation, noting that “financiers” are included in Item 5 of the definition of insured in the Definitions section. The definition of Turnover refers to the value of work completed during the preceding 12 months for the Insured’s Business, which the appellants submit should be construed as a reference to the business undertakings and activities of the Icon Group entities which are referred to by name in the Schedule.