Chubb Insurance Australia Limited v WSP Structures Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Chubb Insurance Australia Limited v WSP Structures Pty Ltd [2024] FCAFC 123

Appeal from: WSP Structures Pty Ltd v Liberty Mutual Insurance Company t/as Liberty Specialty Markets [2023] FCA 1157
File number: NSD 1419 of 2023
Judgment of: O'CALLAGHAN, DERRINGTON AND JACKMAN JJ
Date of judgment: 20 September 2024
Catchwords: INSURANCE – whether first respondent an insured –where named insured a construction company – where first respondent provided engineering services to named insured – where definition of “Insured” included “sub-contractors” engaged by named insured – whether primary judge erred in construing “sub-contractors” to mean a party who has been contracted to perform contractual obligations of another party under a contract that it has made with a third party – whether “sub-contractors” should instead be limited to parties engaged to undertake construction work – appeal dismissed
Cases cited:

GPS Power Pty Ltd v Gardiner Willis & Associates Pty Ltd [2000] QCA 495

Hopewell Project Management Ltd v Ewbank Preece Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 448

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company Australian Branch trading as Liberty Speciality Markets v Icon Co (NSW) Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 126; (2021) 396 ALR 193

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company Australian Branch v Icon Co (NSW) Pty Ltd (2021) 154 ACSR 126

Mie Force Pty Ltd v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2024] NSWCA 23

Onley v Catlin Syndicate Ltd (2018) 360 ALR 92

Pasminco Metals-Sulphide Pty Ltd v Brambles Aust Ltd [1998] NSWCA 169

Thiess Pty Ltd v Parsons Brinckerhoff Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 173

Derrington, DK and RS Ashton, The Law of Liability Insurance (3rd ed, 2013)

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance
Number of paragraphs: 96
Date of hearing: 20 May 2024
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr N Hutley SC, Mr D Weinberger and Mr A Jordan
Solicitor for the Appellants: McCabes Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Neal and Mr A Barnett
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Crichton & Co Legal
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr I Griscti
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Lander & Rogers Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 1419 of 2023
BETWEEN:

CHUBB INSURANCE AUSTRALIA LIMITED

First Appellant

TOKIO MARINE & NICHIDO FIRE INSURANCE CO LTD ABN 80 000 438 291 (AFSL 246548)

Second Appellant

AND:

WSP STRUCTURES PTY LTD

First Respondent

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY TRADING AS LIBERTY SPECIALTY MARKETS

Second Respondent

AND BETWEEN:

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY TRADING AS LIBERTY SPECIALTY MARKETS

Cross-Appellant

AND:

CHUBB INSURANCE AUSTRALIA LIMITED (and others named in the Schedule)

First Cross-Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

O'CALLAGHAN, DERRINGTON AND JACKMAN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

20 SEPTEMBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The cross-appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

4.The second respondent pay its own costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’CALLAGHAN AND JACKMAN JJ:

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Details
Case
[2024] FCAFC 123
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Chubb Insurance Australia Limited v WSP Structures Pty Ltd involved the interpretation of an insurance policy to determine whether WSP Structures Pty Ltd (WSP), a firm of consulting engineers, was covered under the policy. WSP engaged by Icon Co (NSW) Pty Ltd, a construction company, to undertake engineering design work for the Opal Tower development. The dispute arose following serious structural damage at Opal Tower, leading WSP to seek indemnity under the policy. The central issue was whether WSP qualified as an "Insured" under the Liberty Policy, specifically under the definition of "sub-contractors." The primary judge found WSP to be an insured, a decision contested by Chubb and Tokio, who denied liability under their respective policies. The court needed to decide the correct interpretation of the term "sub-contractors" in the context of the policy and whether it should be limited to parties engaged for construction work.

The court examined the arguments presented by the appellants, who contended that the policy should be interpreted narrowly, excluding professional consultants unless they were directly engaged by an entity named in the Schedule to perform construction work. They argued that professional indemnity insurance was widely available and that any broader coverage would lead to double insurance and additional premiums. However, the primary judge had acknowledged these factors but found no evidence to support them as part of the market context in which the policy was arranged. The primary judge concluded that the term "sub-contractors" should not be limited to those engaged for construction work, thus including professional consultants such as engineers. The court found no material error in the primary judge's reasoning, affirming that the policy remained relevantly a property damage insurance policy that extended to subcontractors. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and WSP was confirmed as an insured under the Liberty Policy.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal and the cross-appeal, with Chubb and Tokio ordered to pay WSP's costs of the appeal, and Liberty ordered to pay its own costs. The reasoning was that WSP, as a firm of consulting engineers engaged by a construction company, qualified as a sub-contractor under the broad definition of "Insured" in the policy, thereby extending the coverage to include professional consultants in cases where they are engaged by an entity named in the Schedule to perform work that entity has agreed to perform.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The cross-appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

4. The second respondent pay its own costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The proceedings at first instance concerned four main issues, but the only one which arises on appeal is an issue of construction as to whether WSP Structures Pty Ltd (WSP) falls within the definition of “Insured” in the Liberty Policy, primarily on the ground that WSP contends that it was a “sub-contractor” as that word is used in Item 4 of the definition of “Insured” in the Liberty Policy. There remains to be determined by the primary judge an issue concerning the reasonableness of the defence costs as claimed, which has been ordered to be determined separately after all other questions have been determined, if required.Salient Facts Icon Co (NSW) Pty Ltd (Icon) is a construction company, and a member of the Icon Group. In October 2015, Icon entered into a contract to design and construct the Opal Tower, a high-rise, mixed residential and commercial development at Sydney Olympic Park. In November 2015, Icon engaged WSP, a firm of consulting engineers, to undertake the engineering design work in relation to the Opal Tower development. In December 2018, serious structural damage was observed at Opal Tower. Three sets of proceedings were subsequently commenced in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in relation to that property damage. Icon and WSP were parties to all three proceedings. The proceedings were compromised in 2022, with Icon and WSP agreeing to contribute to the settlement of the proceedings. WSP sought indemnity under the Liberty Policy and excess policies. Liberty accepted liability to indemnify WSP under the Liberty Policy. Chubb and Tokio denied that they were liable to indemnify WSP under their respective excess liability policies. In the proceedings brought before the primary judge, declarations and orders were sought and obtained by WSP as to the obligation of Liberty, Chubb and Tokio to indemnify it.Salient Terms of the Liberty Policy The Liberty Policy begins by stating that it has been issued to Icon Co Nominee Pty Ltd and then states (p 2):In Consideration of the Insured named in the Schedule (hereinafter called “the Insured”) paying or agreeing to pay to the Insurer(s) who have subscribed to this Policy (hereinafter called “the Insurer(s)”) the premium for or on account of the insurance hereinafter contained.The Insurer(s) agree subject to the terms, conditions, limitations, provisions and exclusions hereinafter contained to indemnify the Insured to the extent and in the manner hereinafter provided. The Schedule contains the following under the subheading “Insured” (p 3):Icon Co Nominee Pty Ltd, Icon Co Pty Ltd, Icon Co (Vic) Pty Ltd, Icon Co (NSW) Pty Ltd, Icon Construction Australia (Qld) Pty Ltd, Icon Co Developments Nominee Pty Ltd, Icon Co Developments Pty Ltd, Kajima Australia Pty Ltd, Kajima Construction Australia Pty Ltd, Kajima Development Australia Pty Ltd, ICON Construction Australia Pty Ltd, ICON Construction Management Pty Ltd, ICON Construction Australia (NSW) Pty Ltd, ICON Construction Australia (QLD) Pty Ltd, 110AM Pty Ltd, 110NB Pty Ltd, ICON Developments Australia Pty Ltd, and/or subsidiary and/or controlled and/or joint venture companies and/or principals and/or financiers and/or contractors and subcontractors, all for their respective rights, interests, and liabilities.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, the appellants submit that the result of the primary judge’s construction is that a public and product liability insurance policy designed for the construction industry has been turned into an occurrence-based professional indemnity policy in favour of those who traditionally carry their own professional liability cover, with reference to DK Derrington and RS Ashton, The Law of Liability Insurance (3rd ed, 2013) at [8-202] and [10-138]. However, the proper construction of a particular policy is not determined by such generalised categorisations of policies. The Liberty Policy remains relevantly a policy for liability for Property Damage, which extends to subcontractors by the breadth of the definition of the Insured. That definition includes professional consultants such as architects and engineers in circumstances where they are subcontractors which are engaged by an Icon Group entity to perform work which that Icon Group entity has agreed to perform. The primary judge expressly acknowledged the general commercial availability of professional indemnity insurance and the potential for double insurance and additional premiums at [103], but also noted that there was no evidence as to those matters or the extent to which they were part of the market context in which the Liberty Policy was arranged.Conclusion No material error has been established in the primary judge’s reasoning. The appeal should therefore be dismissed with costs. Liberty filed a notice of cross-appeal which arises only in the event that the appellants succeed in their appeal. In those circumstances, Liberty sought to have the matter remitted to the primary judge for consideration of an application to withdraw its admission of liability to WSP. As the appeal should be dismissed, the cross-appeal does not arise and should also be dismissed. Liberty should pay its own costs incurred in relation to the appeal and cross-appeal. In this matter I have had the considerable advantage of reading and considering at length the careful and thoughtful reasons of the learned primary judge and of O’Callaghan and Jackman JJ. With hesitation and much deference, I regret that I do not agree with their Honours’ conclusions. Albeit that I do so in only some minor respects, the consequence is that I would reach a different conclusion as to the result of the appeal.The issue on appeal The central issue on appeal turns on the competing approaches to the construction of policies of insurance and, in particular, the interpretive choices to be made where the same word used in different parts of a policy must be accorded different meanings. In this case the misused word is the pivotal term, “Insured”, and its differential usage gives rise to competing outcomes as to the scope of cover available to non-contracting third parties. This results in a difference between a construction which affords comprehensive cover to third party professional consultants, including architects and engineers on the one hand, and a construction which affords more limited and directed cover to those persons on the other.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge noted that the general commercial availability of professional indemnity insurance, and the possibility of an expectation among those participating in the construction industry that professionals such as architects, engineers and professional consultants would have their own professional insurance, may be viewed as operating against the considerations which favour WSP’s construction of the policy: [103]. The primary judge referred to the consequence that any coverage for such professional people for their activities under a third party liability policy of the kind in issue would be likely to result in double insurance and the burden of additional premiums in respect of the risks associated with undertaking particular construction works: [103]. However, the primary judge said that there was no evidence as to those matters or the extent to which they were part of the market context in which the insurance was arranged by the Icon Group: [103]. In the end, the primary judge said that there must be regard to the language used by the parties, which leads to the conclusion that WSP is an Insured within Item 4 of the definition of Insured, and Item 4 should not be read as being subject to Item 8: [104]. The primary judge said that the interaction between Item 4 “and/or” Item 8 should be construed to mean that the reference to engineers in Item 8 is to engineers who are not subcontractors engaged by an Insured to undertake work that the Insured is itself contracted to perform: [104].Consideration of submissions made by the appellants The oral submissions made by the appellants focused on the existence of two different definitions of the “Insured” in the policy. At the commencement of the policy (p 2), the Insured is defined by reference to “the Insured named in the Schedule”, and that expression is again picked up in Item 1 of the definition of Insured in the Definitions section (p 16). By contrast, the full definition of “Insured” in the Definitions section (p 16) extends beyond the Insured named in the Schedule (being Item 1), and includes seven other items together with the additional category of other companies for which the Insured assumes management and all other parties for whom the Insured is required to provide insurance protection. The reference to the Insured in the Schedule (p 3) also extends beyond entities which were referred to by name (and relevantly includes “subcontractors”). The appellants draw attention to Condition 8 dealing with the adjustment of premium, and submitted that the calculation of the Turnover must be by reference to the Turnover of entities in the Icon Group, because otherwise it would lead to an absurdly high calculation, noting that “financiers” are included in Item 5 of the definition of insured in the Definitions section. The definition of Turnover refers to the value of work completed during the preceding 12 months for the Insured’s Business, which the appellants submit should be construed as a reference to the business undertakings and activities of the Icon Group entities which are referred to by name in the Schedule.