FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| CHRISTIE v WOOLWORTHS LIMITED | [2015] FCCA 2211 |
| Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – Application by respondent to strike out applicant’s amended statement of claim and to summarily dismiss the proceedings – duty of Court where litigant self-represented. |
| Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009, ss.369, 340, 343, 351, 345, 341(1) Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, ss.45.06, 45.08, 43(2) |
| Applicant: | JUSTIN CHRISTIE |
| Respondent: | WOOLWORTHS LIMITED |
| File Number: | MLG 1627 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Jones |
| Hearing date: | 6 July 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 6 July 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 17 August 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Self-Represented |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Connolly |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Workplace Law & Consulting |
ORDERS
Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12.1 and 13.1 of the applicant’s Amended Statement of Claim filed on 13 February 2105 be struck out.
Otherwise, the respondent’s Application in a Case filed on 27 February 2015 be dismissed.
The applicant file and serve an affidavit on or before 14 September 2015.
The respondent file its defence on or before 5 October 2015.
The parties attend mediation to be conducted by a Registrar of this Court as soon as practicable.
The proceeding is adjourned for Mention on 4 February 2016 at 9.30am.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 1627 of 2014
| JUSTIN CHRISTIE |
Applicant
And
| WOOLWORTHS LIMITED |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
By an Application in a Case filed on 27 February 2015, the respondent seeks orders that:
(1)Pursuant to rule 16.21(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2001 the entire pleadings filed by the applicant on 13 February 2015 be struck out and removed from the Court file on the grounds identified in the correspondence attached and to be further submitted to the Court at the hearing of this application.
(2)Pursuant to rule 13.10 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 the proceeding be summarily dismissed in its entirety.
The…
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Details
- Case
- [2015] FCCA 2211
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
This decision concerns an application by Woolworths Limited to strike out certain paragraphs of an amended Statement of Claim filed by the applicant, Christie. The proceedings were brought under Rule 13.10 of the Rules, which allows for the summary dismissal of a proceeding or claim if the prosecuting party has no reasonable prospect of success, or if the proceeding is frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicant's amended Statement of Claim, as it stood, disclosed a reasonable cause of action. This involved considering the distinction between defects in pleadings, which are typically addressed by striking out specific paragraphs under rules like Rule 13.10, and the substantive merits of a claim, which might lead to summary dismissal under provisions such as section 31A of the relevant Act. The court was required to determine if any of the pleaded paragraphs failed to articulate a valid legal claim, thereby lacking a reasonable prospect of success.
The court reasoned that the exercise of powers to summarily terminate proceedings must be approached with caution, requiring a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome if the matter were to proceed to trial. It noted that while evidence might suggest a reasonable cause of action, the pleading itself might not disclose it, justifying the striking out of the pleading without necessarily dismissing the entire proceeding. The court applied the principle that summary dismissal is appropriate only when there is no "real" question to be tried, and that the applicant must have more than a "fanciful" prospect of success. The court concluded that paragraph 8 of the amended Statement of Claim did disclose a reasonable cause of action, but other specified paragraphs did not.
Accordingly, the court ordered that paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12.1, and 13.1 of the applicant’s amended Statement of Claim be struck out.
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicant's amended Statement of Claim, as it stood, disclosed a reasonable cause of action. This involved considering the distinction between defects in pleadings, which are typically addressed by striking out specific paragraphs under rules like Rule 13.10, and the substantive merits of a claim, which might lead to summary dismissal under provisions such as section 31A of the relevant Act. The court was required to determine if any of the pleaded paragraphs failed to articulate a valid legal claim, thereby lacking a reasonable prospect of success.
The court reasoned that the exercise of powers to summarily terminate proceedings must be approached with caution, requiring a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome if the matter were to proceed to trial. It noted that while evidence might suggest a reasonable cause of action, the pleading itself might not disclose it, justifying the striking out of the pleading without necessarily dismissing the entire proceeding. The court applied the principle that summary dismissal is appropriate only when there is no "real" question to be tried, and that the applicant must have more than a "fanciful" prospect of success. The court concluded that paragraph 8 of the amended Statement of Claim did disclose a reasonable cause of action, but other specified paragraphs did not.
Accordingly, the court ordered that paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12.1, and 13.1 of the applicant’s amended Statement of Claim be struck out.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Accordingly I am satisfied that paragraph 8 discloses a reasonable cause of action.Conclusion For the reasons set out above I would make an order striking out paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12.1 and 13.1 of the applicant’s amended Statement of Claim. Rule 13.10 of the Rules, under which these interlocutory proceedings are brought, provides as follows:13.10 Disposal by summary dismissalThe Court may order that a proceeding be stayed, or dismissed generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceeding, if the Court is satisfied that:(a) the party prosecuting the proceeding or claim for relief has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or claim; or(b) the proceeding or claim for relief is frivolous or vexatious; or(c) the proceeding or claim for relief is an abuse of the process of the Court.Note:For additional powers of the Court in relation to family law proceedings that are frivolous or vexatious, see sections 102QB and 118 of the Family Law Act. These provisions are not concerned with defects in the pleadings but with the substance of the substantive application. In Spencer, French CJ and Gummow J said at [23] to [25] of their joint judgment:“Accepting that there are a number of ways in which s.31A may be applied to empower the Federal Court to dismiss a proceeding, it is to be distinguished, in its application to deficient pleadings, from rules (such as O 11, r 16 of the Federal Court Rules) which provide for the striking out of pleadings. As Lindgren J said in White Industries Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation:“[E]vidence may disclose that a person has or may have a ‘reasonable cause of Action’ or ‘reasonable prospects of success’, yet the person’s pleading does not disclose this. In such a case O 11, r 16 empowers the Court to strike out the pleading but … s.31A(2) would not empower the Court to give judgment for the respondent against the applicant. A failure after ample opportunity to plead a reasonable cause of Action may suggest that none exists and therefore that the applicant has no reasonable prospects of success, but the existence of a reasonable cause of Action and the pleading of a reasonable cause of Action remain distinct concepts.”The exercise of powers to summarily terminate proceedings must always be attended with caution. That is so whether such disposition is sought on the basis that the pleadings fail to disclose a reasonable cause of Action or on the basis that the Action is frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process. The same applies where such a disposition is sought in a summary judgment application supported by evidence. As to the latter, this Court in FanCourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd said:“The power to order summary or final judgment is one that should be exercised with great care and should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried.” More recently, in Batistatos v Roads and Traffıc Authority (NSW) Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ repeated a statement by Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Agar v Hyde which included the following:“Ordinarily, a party is not to be denied the opportunity to place his or her case before the Court in the ordinary way, and after taking advantage of the usual interlocutory processes. The test to be applied has been expressed in various ways, but all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way.”There would seem to be little distinction between those approaches and the requirement of a “real” as distinct from “fanciful” prospect of success contemplated by s.31A. That proposition, however, is not inconsistent with the proposition that the criterion in s.31A may be satisfied upon grounds wider than those contained in pre-existing Rules of Court authorising summary dispositions.Section 31A(2) requires a practical judgment by the Federal Court as to whether the applicant has more than a “fanciful” prospect of success. That may be a judgment of law or of fact, or of mixed law and fact. Where there are factual issues capable of being disputed and in dispute, summary dismissal should not be awarded to the respondent simply because the Court has formed the view that the applicant is unlikely to succeed on the factual issue. Where the success of a proceeding depends upon propositions of law apparently precluded by existing authority, that may not always be the end of the matter. Existing authority may be overruled, qualified or further explained. Summary processes must not be used to stultify the development of the law. But where the success of proceedings is critically dependent upon a proposition of law which would contradict a binding decision of this Court, the Court hearing the application under s 31A could justifiably conclude that the proceedings had no reasonable prospect of success (footnotes omitted).
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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