Chris and Dora Di Lorenzo Partnership v Denversian Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Chris AND DORA Di Lorenzo PARTNERSHIP v DENVERSIAN PTY LTD & ANOR [2020] FCCA 1718

Catchwords:

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – Trade Marks – registration – opposition – appeal under s.56 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) from decision of Registrar of Trade Marks under s.55 of the Act dismissing opposition and allowing registration pursuant to s.44(3) of the Act – whether any trade mark in fact used by the applicant (opponent) – no use established – whether, for the purposes of s.58, the trade marks are substantially identical – whether, for the purposes of s.58A, the Applicant first used a similar trade mark before the Respondent first used its trade mark – Applicant did not establish absolute first use, or any use – subjective intention did not constitute use for either s.58 or s.58A – whether honest concurrent use of the two trade marks for the purposes of s.44(3) – no actual confusion – Appeal dismissed.

Legislation:

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr.34.24, r.34.25
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), ss.6, 7(1), 12, 27, 33, 42, 43, 44, 44(3), 44(4), 52, 55, 56, 58, 58A, 60, 72, 197

Cases cited:

Apple Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks [2014] FCA 1304; (2014) 227 FCR 511; (2014) 109 IPR 187
Bauer Consumer Media Ltd v Evergreen Television Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 71; (2019) 367 ALR 393; (2019) 142 IPR 1

Caesarstone Ltd v Ceramiche Caesar SpA (No 2) [2018] FCA 1096; (2018) 133 IPR 417
Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v Nike International Ltd [2000] HCA 12; (2000) 202 CLR 45; (2000) 46 IPR 481
Carnival Cruise Lines Inc v Sitmar Cruises Limited [1994] FCA 58; (1994) 120 ALR 495; (1994) 31 IPR 375
Community First Credit Union Ltd v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd [2019] FCA 1553; (2019) 146 IPR 185
E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 15; (2010) 241 CLR 144; (2010) 86 IPR 224
Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP [2010] FCAFC 58; (2010) 185 FCR 9; (2010) 86 IPR 437
Jafferjee v Scarlett [1937] ALR 404; (1937) 57 CLR 115
Millennium & Copthorne International Ltd v Kingsgate Hotel Group Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1022, (2012) 97 IPR 183
Pham Global Pty Ltd v Insight Clinical Imaging Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 83; (2017) 251 FCR 379; (2017) 141 IPR 1
Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCA 1020; (1999) 367 ALR 393; (1999) 93 FCR 365; (1999) 45 IPR 411
Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592; [1955] ALR 115
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Phone Directories Company Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 156; (2015) 237 FCR 388; (2015) 116 IPR 207
The Queen v A2 [2019] HCA 35; (2019) 373 ALR 214

First Applicant:

CHRIS AND DORA DI LORENZO PARTNERSHIP
First Respondent: DENVERSIAN PTY LTD
Second Respondent:
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Details
Case
[2020] FCCA 1718
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal before Baird J in the Federal Court concerned an opposition by Chris and Dora Di Lorenzo Partnership (Di Lorenzo) to the registration of a trade mark by Denversian Pty Ltd (Denversian). Di Lorenzo sought to oppose the registration of Denversian's Mark, which had been accepted for registration under s.44(3) of the *Trade Marks Act 1995* (Cth), subject to a geographical limitation to Queensland. The core of the dispute revolved around whether Di Lorenzo had established grounds for opposition, particularly concerning prior use and the similarity of trade marks.

The legal issues before the court included whether Di Lorenzo satisfied the requirements of s.58A(1) of the Act, which pertains to the availability of a ground of opposition when an opposed trade mark application has been accepted under s.44(4). The court also considered, for completeness, whether Di Lorenzo had established absolute first use under s.58A(2) and whether the trade marks were substantially identical or deceptively similar for the purposes of s.58. The court was required to determine the proper construction and application of s.58A in the context of an appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Trade Marks.

Baird J reasoned that because Denversian's Mark had been accepted for registration under s.44(3), Di Lorenzo did not satisfy the threshold requirement of s.58A(1). Consequently, Di Lorenzo's ground of opposition under s.58A failed. The judge further clarified that a rehearing under s.56 on a ground of opposition under s.58A does not necessitate a re-agitation of the criteria decided under s.44(1) or (2), nor does it require a re-examination of acceptance under s.44(4). The court rejected an interpretation of s.58A that would impose the tests from s.44(1) and (2) as a preliminary requirement, finding such a construction contrary to the plain text and purpose of the section. The court noted that Di Lorenzo had not established any use of their trade marks, which was a prerequisite for certain grounds of opposition.

The appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Court has not been tasked by Di Lorenzo with determining a ground of opposition under s.44 of the Act. To the extent, if at all, that any issue under s.44 arises for determination by the Court, it arises under sub‑s.44(3) in answer to Di Lorenzo’s s.58A ground of opposition if they establish absolute first use, by Denversian’s answering reliance on the acceptance of the Mark by the Delegate under the provisions of sub‑s.44(3).Conclusion on the preliminary issue The subject trade mark at issue before me on appeal under s.56 of the Act – the Mark – is a trade mark application that has been accepted for registration under the provisions of s.44(3), and subject to the geographical limitation to the State of Queensland. It follows that Di Lorenzo does not satisfy the requirements of s.58A(1) of the Act, and (even apart from their lack of use) that Di Lorenzo’s ground of opposition under s.58A fails. To put it another way, as Di Lorenzo does not satisfy s.58A(1), the ground of opposition under s.58A(2) is not available to Di Lorenzo. Given my conclusion on the form of the accepted trade mark before me, it is not strictly necessary for me to consider whether Di Lorenzo would have established the requirements of s.58A(2). If I am wrong, however, in the above analysis of the accepted subject mark for the purposes of an appeal to the Court under s.56, and notwithstanding that Di Lorenzo did not raise any s.44 ground of opposition in this Court, for completeness I address Di Lorenzo’s ground of opposition under s.58A(2) on the basis that the accepted trade mark application to which sub‑s.58A(1) refers is that trade mark as initially accepted under s.33 of the Act on the examination of the trade mark application under s.31 of the Act. That is, the Mark as initially accepted by the examiner on the application of s.44(4) of the Act. This, then, gives rise to the second and third issues I have identified above. I am guided by the terms of the statutory provision, within Division 2 – Grounds for opposing registration, in Part 5 of the Act. Sub‑section 58A(1) provides that the section is available as a ground of opposition when the opposed trade mark application has been accepted under sub‑s.44(4). This is the starting point for consideration of the availability of the ground of opposition in s.58A(2). Unlike the ground of opposition under s.44(1) and (2), there is nothing in the text of s.58A, or the scope and purpose of that ground of opposition as revealed by the text, and having regard to the context, purpose, and structure of Part 5, Division 2, in the broader context of the Act, and to the provisions of ss.55, 56, and 197 of the Act, that requires that under s.58A the criteria decided under sub‑s.44(1) or (2) be decided anew, or acceptance under s.44(4) be re-agitated. A rehearing under s.56 of the Act on the ground of opposition under s.58A does not so require. A construction of s.58A that requires as a threshold matter the determination whether trade marks are substantially identical or deceptively similar should be rejected. To impose such a threshold determination is to incorporate into the s.58A ground the substance of the test in ss.44(1) and (2) but without the qualification provided by ss.44(3) and (4). Section 44 exists as an independent ground of opposition. To incorporate the threshold question from s.44 is to rob the plain words of s.58A(1) of any role to perform, and to deny the prefatory words of s.58A(2) of any meaning. Such a construction is contrary to the text of the section, the context in which the section appears, as a ground of opposition following s.57 (which allows for opposition under inter alia s.44), and s.58, and to the mischief to which the remedy provided by the section is directed, as explained by the Explanatory Memorandum.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established