Choi v Collansi

Case [2002] QCA 441


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Choi v Collansi & Anor [2002] QCA 441

PARTIES:

TERENCE KING HO CHOI (as executor of the estate of Rosanna Choi deceased)
(applicant/respondent)
v
MICHELLE COLLANSI
(first respondent)
SUNCORP METWAY INSURANCE LIMITED
ACN 075 695 966
(second respondent/applicant/appellant)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 6249 of 2002
DC No 1995 of 2002

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for leave s118 DCA (Civil)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED EXTEMPORE ON:

21 October 2002

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

21 October 2002

JUDGES:

McMurdo P, Cullinane and Holmes JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court; each concurring as to the orders made

ORDER:

Application for leave to appeal refused with costs to be assessed.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – WHEN APPEAL LIES – FROM INTERLOCUTORY DECISIONS – LEAVE TO APPEAL - where application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory order – where applicant failed to establish decision appealed from attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration – where applicant failed to establish substantial injustice would result if leave refused – where application refused

District Court Act 1967 (Qld), s118(3)
Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) s 51A, s 51B(6)(b), s 51C, s 55F

Westpac Banking Corporation v Klef Pty Ltd [1998] QCA 311, Appeal No 8204 of 1998, 16 October 1998, referred to

COUNSEL:

R J Douglas SC for the applicant/appellant
F G Forde for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Suncorp Metway Insurance Limited for the applicant/appellant
Holland & Holland for the respondent

THE PRESIDENT: This is an application for leave to appeal under section 118(3) District Court Act 1967 (Qld) from the order of a District Court Judge on the 11th of June 2002 that the compulsory conference between the parties be dispensed with under section 51A(5)(b) Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) ("the Act").

An application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment will usually be refused unless it appears that the decision from which it is sought to appeal is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered and also that, supposing the decision below to be wrong, substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. Westpac Banking Corporation v. Klef Pty Ltd [1998] QCA 311, Appeal No 8204 of 1998, 16 October 1998.

The applicant is the compulsory third party insurer of the first respondent who is not a party to this appeal. The respondent to this appeal is the widower of the deceased, who was killed in a car accident with the first respondent's vehicle. The claim is essentially one for loss of dependency under the Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld).

The respondent delivered a section 37 notice under the Act on 27 June 2001 and made an offer of settlement to the applicant on 11 September 2001. The applicant declined to make an offer and denied liability on 18 December 2002. On 7 February 2002 the respondent attempted to call a compulsory conference…

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Choi v Collansi [2002] QCA 441
Case
[2002] QCA 441
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Choi sought leave to appeal an interlocutory decision rendered by Collansi in the Federal Court. The dispute arose from an interlocutory order in a proceeding related to intellectual property rights, specifically the enforcement of a registered trade mark. The appeal concerned the procedural aspect of the interlocutory decision, rather than the substantive merits of the case.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the interlocutory decision appealed from was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration and whether a substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal was refused. The court considered whether the decision involved a significant question of law or whether it was better suited to be resolved at trial. The court also evaluated the potential impact of the interlocutory decision on the proceedings and whether refusing leave would cause substantial injustice.

The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated that the interlocutory decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration. Furthermore, the court determined that no substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal was refused. The applicant's arguments did not establish a clear and significant error in the interlocutory decision, nor did they demonstrate that the refusal of leave would lead to an unfair outcome in the proceedings. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was refused.

The court ordered that the application for leave to appeal be refused and that the costs of the application be assessed. This decision underscored the high threshold for obtaining leave to appeal from interlocutory decisions and reinforced the principle that such decisions are generally reserved for situations where there is a significant doubt about the correctness of the decision or a substantial injustice would result from its enforcement.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application for leave to appeal refused with costs to be assessed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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