DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Glendenning v Goodwin & Anor [2018] QDC 9
PARTIES:
STEWART GORDAN GLENDENNING (Applicant)
v
ALYSSA GOODWIN (First Respondent)
AND
RACQ INSURANCE LIMITED (ABN 50 009 704 152) (Second Respondent)
FILE NO/S:
244/18
DIVISION:
Civil
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
22 February 2018
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
5 February 2018
JUDGE:
Porter QC DCJ
ORDER:
1. The originating application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the second respondent’s costs of
the application on a standard basis.
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE — MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL MATTERS – PERSONAL INJURY OR FATAL ACCIDENT PROCEEDINGS – PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS – where proceedings brought pursuant to Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 — where act requires compulsory conference — whether time and date for compulsory conference should be fixed by the court.
Legislation
Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) ss 37, 39, 41, 45, 47, 51A, 51B, 51DCases
Gitsham v Suncorp Metway Insurance Limited [2002] QCA 310
Parker v Ford [2011] QDC 163
Terence Choi v Collansi & Anor [2002] QCA 441
Verstappen v Fordyce [2004] QSC 149COUNSEL:
A Harris for the applicant
SOLICITORS:
Law Qld Injury Claims Solicitors for the applicant
Jensen McConaghy Lawyers for the second respondent
Summary
The applicant, Mr Glendenning, was injured in a car accident which occurred on 19 June 2017 involving a Ford Falcon of which he was the driver and a Ford Fiesta, of which the first respondent was the driver. His wife was a passenger in the Falcon. She was also injured in the accident.
It is common ground that the Glendennings each delivered a proper Notice of Accident Claim Form under the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) (the Act) to the Second Respondent (RACQ) by about 8 August 2017. On 11 August 2017, RACQ admitted liability in respect of both claims.
Prior to bringing proceedings for damages for personal injury arising out of the accident, section 51A of the Act requires a conference between the parties to occur with the view to settling the claim. By his originating application, Mr Glendenning applies to the Court under section 51A(5)(a) of the Act to fix the time and place for the compulsory conference as 26 March 2018 in the applicant’s solicitors’ board room. Identical relief is sought by Mrs Glendenning in proceedings 245/18. Mrs Glendenning’s application is made on materially identical grounds.
On 5 February 2018, I dismissed both applications with costs. I did so for the following reasons.
Statutory Scheme
Section 51A is part of a broader statutory regime enacted by the Act which is relevant to the disposition of this application.
The starting point is section 3 of the Act which, relevantly, includes as an object “to encourage the speedy resolution of personal injury claims resulting from motor vehicle accidents”.
That object is sought to be advanced, inter alia, by the pre-Court procedures outlined in Part 4, particularly Division 3, (Claim procedures), Division 4 (Co-operation between claimant and insurer); Division 5 (Enforcement…
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- AGLC
- Glendenning v Goodwin [2018] QDC 9
- Case
- [2018] QDC 9
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether it should fix the time and date for the compulsory conference under the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994. The applicant argued that the court should intervene and set the date to ensure a timely resolution of the proceedings, whereas the respondents contended that the statutory framework did not mandate judicial intervention in setting such dates.
The court considered the statutory provisions and the inherent jurisdiction to manage proceedings efficiently. Ultimately, it was held that the Act did not confer upon the court the authority to fix the time and date for a compulsory conference. The court reasoned that the statutory scheme was clear in its allocation of responsibilities and did not envisage judicial intervention in setting these dates. Consequently, the court dismissed the originating application and ordered the applicant to pay the second respondent’s costs of the application on a standard basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The originating application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the second respondent’s costs of
the application on a standard basis.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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